Acknowledgements

We gratefully acknowledge our indebtedness to Dr. J. R. Joshi who prepared the press copy of the Sanskrit text.

We are also extremely thankful to Dr. (Mrs.) Suniti Duble of the Department of Sanskrit for her assistance in reading the proofs of this work.

Our thanks are also due to the Junior Research Fellows of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit who prepared the Indices.

Our special thanks go to the staff of the Poona University Press for seeing this Volume through the Press with great speed and skill.

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June 1986.

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PATANJALI'S

Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya

PASPAŚĀHNIKA

INTRODUCTION, TEXT, TRANSLATION & NOTES

Table of Contents

Works quoted by Abbreviation

ANA ..*Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Anabhihitāhnika.* Introduction, Text, Translation and Notes by S. D. JOSHI and J. A. F. ROODBERGEN. *Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit,* Class C, No. 11, University of Poona, Poona, 1976.

ATA ..*Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Avyayībhāvatatpuruṣāhnika.* Edited with Translation and Explanatory Notes by S. D. JOSHI and J. A. F. ROODBERGEN. *Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit,* Class C, No. 5, University of Poona, Poona, 1969.

BDA ..*Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Bahuvrīhidvandvāhnika.* Text, Translation and Notes by J. A. F. ROODBERGEN. Edited by S. D. JOSHI. *Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit,* Class C, No. 9, University of Poona, Poona, 1974.

DSG ..*A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar* by Late MM. K. V. ABHYANKAR and J. M. SHUKLA. *Gaekwad's Oriental Series,* No. 134, Second revised edition, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1977.

KA ..*Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Karmadhārayāhnika.* Edited with Translation and Explanatory Notes by S. D. JOSHI and J. A. F. ROODBERGEN. *Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit,* University of Poona, Poona, 1971.

KARA ..*Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Kārakāhnika.* Introduction, Text, Translation and Notes by S. D. JOSHI and J. A. F. ROODBERGEN. *Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit,* Class C, No. 10, University of Poona, Poona, 1975.

KV ...*The Kāśikāvṛtti with the Nyāsa or Pañcika Commentary and Padamañjarī.* Critically edited by Swami Dwarikadas SHASTRI and Pt. Kalikaprasad SHUKLA, Vols I-VI, Varanasi, 1965–1967.

MBD . *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari.* Crtically edited by Prof. K. V. ABHYANKAR and Ācārya V. P. LIMAYE, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. *Post-Graduate and Research Department Series* No. 8, Poona, 1970.

Mbh. ..*The Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali.* Edited by F. KIELHORN. Volume I. Third Edition by K. V. ABHYANKAR, Poona, 1962. Volume II, Third Edition by K. V. ABHYANKAR, Poona, 1965. Volume III, Third Edition by K. V. ABHYANKAR, Poona, 1972.

NSP ..*Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya Navāhnikam with Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa and Nāgeśa's Uddyota.* Edited by Bhārgavaśāstri Bhikājī JOSHI, Fifth Edition, Bombay, 1951.

PASPA ..*Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Paspaśāhnika.*

PN ..*The Paribhāṣenduśekhara of Nāgojībhaṭṭa.* Edited and explained by F. KIELHORN, Part II, Translation and Notes. Second Edition by K. V. ABHYANKAR.

PSA ..*Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Prātipadikārthaśeṣāhnika.* Introduction, Text, Translation and Notes by S. D. JOSHI and J. A. F. ROODBERGEN. *Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit,* Class C, No. 13, University of Poona, Poona, 1980.

SA ..*Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Samarthāhnika.* Edited with Translation and Explanatory Notes by S. D. JOSHI. *Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit,* Class C, No. 3, University of Poona, Poona, 1968.

SK ..*The Siddhāntakaumudī with the Tattvabodhinī Commentary.* Edited by Pt. Bhārgavaśāstri Bhikājī JOSHI. Eighth Edition, Bombay *NSP* 1942.

TA ..*Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Tatpuruṣāhnika.* Edited with Translation and Explanatory Notes by S. D. JOSHI and J. A. F. ROODBERGEN. *Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit.* Class C, No. 7, University of Poona, Poona, 1973.

VIBHA ..*Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Vibhaktyāhnika.* Introduction, Translation and Notes by S. D. JOSHI and J. A. F. ROODBERGEN. *Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit,* Class C, No. 12, University of Poona, Poona, 1979.

VP ..1. *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari.* Edited by K. V. ABHYANKAR and V. P. LIMAYE, Poona, 1965.

2. *Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya.* Von W. RAU. *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes,* Band XLII, 4, Wiesbaden, 1977.

Works quoted by the Name of the Author

Filliozat .. *Le Mahābhāṣya de Patañjali* avec le *Pradīpa* de Kaiyaṭa et l'*Uddyota* de Nāgeśa. *Adhyāya* 1 *Pada* 1 *Āhnika* 1–4. Traduction par Pierre Filliozat. *Publications de l'Institut Francais d'Indologie* No. 54, 1, Pondichery, 1975.

Trapp .. Dr. V. TRAPP, *Die ersten fünf Ahnikas des Mahābhāṣyam* ins Deutsche übersetzt und erklärt, Leipzig, 1933.

Abbreviations of Terms

ap.	..	*anyapadārtha*
Bh.	..	*Bhāṣya*
bv (s)	..	*bahuvrīhi (s)*
cp (s)	..	compound (s)
fn (s)	..	footnote (s)
kdh (s)	..	*karmadhāraya (s)*
Mbh.	..	*Mahābhāṣya*
NSP	..	*Nirṇaya-Sāgar Press*
P.	..	*Pāṇinisūtra*
pb (s)	..	*paribhāṣā (s)*
Skt	..	Sanskrit
tp.	..	*tatpuruṣa (s)*
Vt (s)	..	*Vārttika (s)*

Note on the Text and Translation

The translation of the *Bhāṣya* follows the text of the Kielhorn edition of the *Mbh* , Vol. I (reprint, Poona, 1962), except where stated otherwise. The translation of portions of the *Pradīpa, Uddyota* follows the *NSP* edition of the *Mbh,* Vol. I (Bombay 1951)., The translation of portions of the *MBD* follows the B. O. R. I. edition of 1970. Words within brackets are supplied to facilitate understanding.

The separate *Bhāṣyas* have been provided with titles which usually differ from those given in the *NSP* edition. It is hoped that this will contribute to a better understanding of the course of the argument.

INTRODUCTION

1 Note on the translation and explanation.

1.1 Translations consulted.

Use – though in different respects and in different degrees – was made of the following translations in alphabetical order :

(1) K. V. Abhyankar and J. M. Shukla, *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya. Āhnikas* 1–3 with English translation and notes. Poona (B.O.R.I.) 1975.

(2) V. S. Abhyankar, *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya. Mūla āṇi marāṭhī bhāṣāntara.* Vol. I. Pune (Deccan Education Society) 1938.

(3) P. Ch. Chakravarti, "The *Mahābhāṣya, Adhyāya* 1, *Pāda* I, *Āhnika* 1 (Introduction)", *The Indian Historical Quarterly.* Vol. I. Edited by N. N. Law. Calcutta 1925, p. 703–739.

(4) K. Ch. Chatterji, *Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya. Paspaśāhnika* (Introductory Chapter). Edited with English translation, notes and commentaries. Revised fourth edition. Calcutta 1972.

(5) P. Filliozat, *Le Mahābhāṣya de Patañjali* avec le *Pradīpa* de Kaiyaṭa et l '*Uddyota* de Nāgeśa. *Adhyāya* 1, *Pāda* 1, *Āhnika* 1. Institüt Francais d'Indologie. Pondichery 1975.

(6) K. R. Ray, *Vyākaraṇa – Mahābhāṣya* (*Paspaśāhnika,* Section I). Calcutta 1963.

(7) P. S. Subrahmanya Shastri, *Lectures on Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya.* Vol. I (*Āhnika* 1–3). Second Edition. Thiruvaiyaru 1960.

(8) V. Trapp, *Die ersten fünf Āhnikas des Mahābhāṣyam.* Ins deutsche übersetzt und erklärt. Leipzig 1935.

Out of these translations, instruction was mostly derived from Chatterji and Filliozat, especially for the translation part of the work. As regards the explanation, all of the works mentioned above were found of little or no use.

1.2 As will be clear from the explanatory part, leaving aside Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa, use is made of the *MBD* and of the *pūrvapakṣa* in the *vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa* of Kumārilabhaṭṭa's *Tantravārttika* to which reference is also made by Filliozat in several footnotes. Here the use made of the *MBD* requires some further remarks.

It is wellknown that the text of the *MBD* at our disposal is in a bad condition. The printed editions so far (V. Swaminathan, Varanasi 1965, the first four *āhnikas* only; K. V. Abhyankar–V. P. Limaye, Poona 1970, the seven *āhnikas* complete) are no more than first steps in the reconstruction of the

text. Recently the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute has undertaken the job of a new critical edition and translation of the *MBD*. In fact, the first three fascicules, containing *Āhnikas* III, V and VI (Pt. i), by G. B Palsule, V. P. Limaye, V. B. Bhagwat and Saroja Bhate were released by the B. O. R. I. press in July and September 1984 and March 1986. In the translation of the *MBD*-passages in connection with the *Paspaśāhnika* the Abhyankar-Limaye edition is generally followed.

The bad ms. tradition of the *MBD* and the bad state of the only (part-) ms. available can be easily explained by the difficulty in understanding the original text. Even if, at a future date, a more reliable and complete ms. would become available, many of Bhartṛhari's pronouncements will remain obscure. In this respect, it is particularly instructive to see how and to which extent Kaiyaṭa makes use of the *MBD*. At the same time, the comparison between Kaiyaṭa's comments and the comments made by the author of the *MBD* clearly show their difference in status. Kaiyaṭa may be a good commentator, but Bhartṛhari is a great philosopher and linguist, to be ranked equally with the three *munis* of grammar. But in writing the *MBD*—a work written after the composition of the *VP*—the author has chosen to jot down his thoughts in the form of short and often abbreviated notes, a kind of mental shorthand, perhaps not surprisingly so, when one realizes the extent of the work commented upon. A good example of Bhartṛhari's abbreviated style is provided by his discussion on *vyapadeśivadbhāva*, for which see Note (64). The inevitable consequence is, that in order to make the thought clear, a great deal is to be supplied in brackets in the translation.

The text of the *MBD* on the *Paspaśāhnika* can only become clear, if the thought expressed, that is, the argument itself is clear. The argument can only become clear, if, at least, four requirements are met : knowledge of the *Paspaśāhnika*, an overall knowledge of the *Mahābhāṣya*, an overall knowledge of the *VP*, and knowledge of Mīmāṁsā. It will be seen that the author of the *MBD* knows the practice and theory of sacrificial ritual well. He takes examples from there and shows a tendency to rephrase grammatical arguments in terms of Mīmāṁsā. It is with respect to the argument that the text of the *MBD* is to be reconstructed. This is the practice adopted in the translation and interpretation of the *MBD*-passages presented here. The changes introduced in the text of the Abhyankar-Limaye edition have been duly indicated.

In the present translation of the *Paspaśāhnika* the relevant portion of the *MBD* has not necessarily been translated in full. *MBD*-passages dealing with technicalities of *śrauta* and Mīmāṁsā have generally been left out of account. On the other hand, passages dealing with points of grammar and with the philosophy of language have been included. Wherever Kaiyaṭa bases his comment on the *MBD*, or just borrows it from there, this has been indicated in the footnotes. For ease of reference a list of the passages (according to the Abhyankar-Limaye edition) translated in the Notes (as distinct from short *MBD*-passages translated or paraphrased in the footnotes) follows here :

MBD	Note
p. 3, line 23–p. 4, line 7	(9)
p. 5, lines 8–9	(10)
p. 8, line 23–p. 9, line 1	(14)
p. 10, lines 5–21	(16)
p. 17, line 16–p. 18, line 12	(22)
p. 26, lines 3–14	(28)
p. 26, line 16–p. 27, line 1	(29)
p. 28, lines 8–10; lines 15–16	(31)
p. 33, lines 3–6; lines 7–13	(35)
p. 33, lines 14–19	(36)
p. 33, line 22–p. 34 line 2	(37)
p. 34, lines 3–5	(38)
p. 34, lines 14–15	(40)
p. 35, lines 2–14 (in close paraphrase)	(43)
p. 35, line 16–p. 36, line 5	(44)
p. 36, lines 15–18; p. 36, line 26 ; p. 37, line 1	(46)
p. 37, lines 3–5	(47)
p. 37, lines 6–9	(48)
p. 37, lines 10–15	(49)
p. 37, lines 15–22	(50)
p. 38, lines 1–4	(51)
p. 38, lines 11–20	(52)
p. 39, lines 3–4	(53)
p. 39, lines 5–8	(54)
p. 39, lines 9–13	(55)
p. 39, lines 14–15	(56)
p. 39, lines 17–18	(58)
p. 39, lines 19–21	(59)
p. 39, lines 21–24	(60)
p. 40, lines 1-4	(61)
p. 40, lines 4–8; 8–12; 13–14	(62)
p. 40, line 19–p. 41, line 13	(64)
p. 42, lines 5–7	(65)
p. 42, lines 7-9	(66)
p. 43, line 24–p. 44, line 2	(70)
p. 44, lines 2–5	(70)
p. 44, lines 8–11	(72)
p. 45, line 11–p. 46, line 4	(75)
p. 46, lines 6–17	(76)

2 *Paspaśāhnika* : Survey of the topics.

2.1 Section dealing with the nature of words.

2.1.0 The section consists of *Vt.* I and *Bh.* Nos. 1-16.

2.1.1 The section opens with the statement *atha śabdānuśāsanam*, which is taken as *Vt.* I, for which see Note (2). According to tradition, the first *Vt.* in the *Paspaśāhnika* is *siddhe śabdārthasaṁbandhe* numbered as *Vt.* III in the present translation. The word *śabdānuśāsana* is translated as 'instruction in words'. But which words, and what are words anyway?

2.1.2 The first question, namely, which words?, is dealt with in *Bh.* Nos. 2-3. The words intended are those known from ordinary speech (and non-Vedic literature), and those known from the Veda. But this should not be taken to mean that both classes of words receive an equal deal in grammar, or that they are equally important from the point of view of the organization of grammar. The words known from ordinary speech (and non-Vedic literature) dominate in both respects. The answer to the first question should not be taken to mean either that grammar deals with words only (*padasaṁskārapakṣa*), that is, words independent of a possible context which determines their syntactic connection. What is meant here are words in which syntax has entered (see Note (4)).

Examples of words are stated. Curiously, as far as the non-Vedic words are concerned, the examples turn out to be of words which cannot be derived in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Probably they have been taken from a list stated in the *Nirukta*. This, at the very beginning of the *Paspaśāhnika*, is illustrative of the importance attached to Yāska's work throughout the *Paspaśāhnika*.

2.1.3 The second question, what are words anyway? is dealt with in *Bh.* Nos. 4-15, which take up the rest of the section. The example is *gauḥ*. *Bh.* Nos. 5-10 explain that the object meant is not the word, nor are its gestures, actions or qualities. *Bh.* Nos. 11-12 explain that the general notion, that is the generic notion we have of things called *gauḥ*, is not the word either. *Bh.* No. 14 states the answer : the word is that from whose utterance we understand a thing-meant, like *gauḥ*. *Bh.* No. 15 provides an alternative answer : why bother? The word *śabda* means *dhvani* 'sound', and it is a wellknown word. Its meaning is illustrated by means of examples.

In connection with *Bh.* No. 14, the author of the *MBD* mentions three different views on the nature of the word. The views can be briefly described as *buddhistha śabda*, *padasthā varṇajāti*, which is identified with *sphoṭa*, and *dviśakti śabda*. For a discussion see Note (9) where, for the benefit of those interested in the historical development of doctrines the difference between the early *sphoṭa*-doctrine and the views developed later on has been stated.

2.2 Section dealing with the uses of grammar.

2.2.0 The section consists of *Vt.* II and *Bh.* Nos. 17–45.

2.2.1 In a statement which is numbered as *Vt.* II in the present translation, but which is not accepted as a *vārttika* by tradition, five uses of grammar and its study are enumerated. They are the following :—

(1) *rakṣā*, the preservation of the Vedic texts,

(2) *ūha*, the suitable adaptation of Vedic *mantras* according to the requirements of a particular ritual,

(3) *āgama*, the following of Vedic injunctions,

(4) *laghu*, the simplicity in getting to know the correct forms of language, and

(5) *asaṁdeha*, the removal of doubts regarding the correct understanding of words in Vedic passages.

These uses are explained in *Bh.* Nos. 17–21.

Because the great majority of the uses enumerated here is concerned with the Veda, which Mīmāṁsā regards as its exclusive domain, it is not surprising to see that the enumeration met with opposition. In fact, the Mīmāṁsakas must have felt that their privileged position as the guardians of Vedic tradition was threatened by grammar. The registered opponent in our case is the *pūrvapakṣin* in the *vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa* of the *Tantravārttika*. He raises the following objections :

(1) Mainly responsible for the preservation of the Vedic texts is the *śiṣyācāryasaṁbandha* 'the teacher-pupil relation', see Note (11);

(2) *ūha* is a job for Mīmāṁsakas, being experts in the ritual of sacrifice, see Note (12);

(3) *āgama* is not a benefit arising from the study of grammar, but it is rather the other way round. There is no Vedic injunction urging the study of grammar and other so-called auxiliaries. In fact, grammar does not possess the status of *vedāṅga* 'auxiliary of the Veda' at all, because it does not purport to study the Veda, and because it does not form part of the Veda, see Note (13);

(4) The simplicity claimed for grammar is nothing but difficulty upon difficulty. Just look at the *saṁjñās*, the *paribhāṣās* and the *uṇādi-sūtras*. The study of the *prakriyā* and the memorisation of the rules is a headache, see Note (14);

(5) The determination of meaning does not come from grammar, because meaning lies professedly outside its domain. Moreover, in many cases the determination of meaning comes from seeing the usage, experts who have collected lists of difficult words, or from etymologists. For the doubts which still remain we may rely on the commentators and their tradition, see Note (15).

2.2.2 In *Bh.* Nos. 22–42, five statements and eight stanzas are quoted to illustrate other, secondary uses of grammar, and to lend support for the study of grammar. The statements and the stanzas come from various sources, Vedic as well as non-Vedic. The Vedic stanzas are subjected to a grammatical reinterpretation. The pratīkas of the statements and stanzas are summed up in *Bh.* No. 22. In this series of *Bhāṣyas* the Nos. 26–32 form an interlude.

The secondary uses of grammar and its study are the following :

(1) So that one should not speak like a *mleccha* (*Bh.* No. 23);

(2) So that one should not utter defective words, especially not at the time of sacrifice (*Bh.* No. 24). In this connection the *MBD* discusses the word *indraśatru* and its accentuation, see Note (16);

(3) So that one should not memorize texts without knowing their meaning (*Bh.* No. 25).

Bh. No. 26 quotes an unidentified non-Vedic stanza, which is interpreted to mean that a man who knows the correct words knows the incorrect ones also, and that, on the latter account, he incurs blemish. But if this is the case, then what about the man who does not know the correct words, and therefore uses incorrect words all the time ? The answer is that his ignorance is his excuse. *Bh.* No. 27 indicates that this is rather strange view which may have very undesirable consequences. *Bh.* No. 28 then reverses the position : the man who does not know the correct words takes the blame, whereas the other who was tainted by his knowledge of incorrect words on account of his knowledge of the correct words, is absolved. A non-Vedic stanza is quoted in support. *Bh.* No. 30 says that the stanza quoted is a *bhrāja* stanza. *Bh.* No. 31 then asks, what is the authority to be attributed to such stanzas ? Another stanza is quoted which ridicules the practice of drinking liquor at the *Sautrāmaṇī* sacrifice. Bh. No. 32 answers that, obviously, crazy stanzas cannot be authoritative. One has to show some discrimination.

Then the enumeration on secondary uses of grammar continues :

(4) So that one should know how to return a greeting and not be treated like a woman (*Bh.* No. 33);

(5) So that one should know how to perform the *prayājas* ' introductory offerings ' by using the proper case endings (*Bh.* No. 34);

(6) So that one becomes able to officiate as an *ṛtvik* (*Bh.* No. 35);

(7) So that one may obtain similarity with a mighty, bellowing bull-god who is identified with speech (*Bh.* No. 36);

(8) So that one may know the hidden nature of the four word-classes which is accessible to grammarians only (*Bh.* No. 37);

(9) So that speech may reveal itself (*Bh.* No. 39);

(10) So that one should be able to have friendship with and commune with grammarians whose speech bears an auspicious mark (*Bh.* No. 39);

(11) So that one should not be obliged to perform an expiatory sacrifice called *sārasvatī iṣṭi* (*Bh.* No. 40). The *MBD,* in this connection, says that the study of grammar is to be regarded as a *nityakarman* 'daily obligatory rite', see Note (17);

(12) So that one may know how to name his son on the tenth day after his birth (*Bh.* No. 41);

(13) So that one may become a truth-deity (*Bh.* No. 42).

2.2.3 In answer to the question why the uses of grammar are explained to students of grammar specifically, *Bh.* No. 44 points out that times have changed and so has the study-programme. In olden days a student, at a young age, started with phonetics and grammar, memorizing the rules. After that, the study of the Veda was taken up. But nowadays the student starts with phonetics and the Veda, and, at a later age, he takes up grammar which to many students must have been a tedious subject. Then the question comes : Vedic words are known from the Veda, ordinary words from speech, so what is the use of grammar ? To answer this question, the uses of grammar have been enumerated for the benefit of students of grammar. *Bh.* No. 45 sums up the discussion so far, in the first and second sections.

2.3 Section dealing with the method of teaching words.

2.3.0 The section consists of *Bh.* Nos. 46–55.

2.3.1 Once it has been accepted that instruction in words should be given, the question is, how ? *Bh.* No. 46 mentions three ways : we teach the correct words, or the incorrect words, or both. *Bh.* No. 47 rejects the last possibility and says that either of the remaining possibilities will do. To explain this, the *Bhāṣyakāra* quotes the statements *pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ* 'five (kinds of) five-toed (animals) may be eaten', and *abhakṣyo grāmyakukkuṭaḥ. abhakṣyo grāmyasūkaraḥ* 'a domestic cock should not be eaten, a domestic pig should not be eaten'. Here the Mīmāṁsā views on *vidhi, niyama* and *parisaṁkhyā* become significant. They are explained in detail in Note (19). *Bh.* No. 48 asks, what is the preferred alternative : teaching the correct words, or teaching the incorrect words ? *Bh.* No. 49 says, teaching the correct words, because the other option involves complication. For each correct word there are many incorrect words.

Bh. No. 50 asks, whether the correct words should be taught by means of a word-inventory ? *Bh.* No. 51 contains the famous passage about Bṛhaspati teaching Indra. For purposes of teaching an inventory of the lexicon is no good, because it is open-ended, that is, unending. Patañjali returns to this point in a different context in *Bh.* No. 163. Learning goes through four stages : acquisition, memorisation, exposition and practical use. But teaching a word-inventory would mean that we would have to devote all our time to just stage one. For the word inventory the *Bhāṣyakāra* uses the word *śabdapārāyaṇa,* which is discussed in fn. 280.

Then how to teach the correct words ? *Bh.* No. 53 says, by means of general rules (*utsarga*) and special rules (*apavāda*). *Bh.* No. 55 quotes one example for each type of rules. For a more detailed explanation of the concepts of *utsarga* and *apavāda*, see Note (21).

2.4 Section dealing with the question whether a word stands for *ākṛti* or *dravya.*

2.4.0 The section consists of two *Bhāṣyas* only, Nos. 56-57.

2.4.1 *Bh.* No. 56 raises the question : what does a word stand for, *ākṛti* 'class/genus', or *dravya* 'an individual thing' ? *Bh.* No. 57 says, both, and, in justification refers to P. 1.2.58 (*ākṛti*-view) and P. 1.2.64 (*dravya*-view).

The controversy is connected with the names of Vājavāyana and Vyāḍi respectively. In the discussion four terms play a role, namely, *ākṛti*, originally the perceptible shape common to members of a given class or genus, *dravya*, the individual possessing such a shape, *jāti*, the concept of a class or genus, and *vyakti*, the individual in which a *jati* inheres. Here *ākṛti* and *jāti* came to be regarded as synonyms from an early date. See fn. 294. In *Bh.* No. 76 Patañjali will incidentally attribute a different meaning to the terms *ākṛti* and *dravya.*

Kaiyaṭa comments on *Bh.* No. 57 at great length. Note (22) explains the historical background, the two *Pāṇininisūtras* referred to in the *Bhāṣya*, and Kaiyaṭa's comment. In connection with P. 1.2.64, the concept of *ekaśeṣa* is discussed and criticised. To show the dependence of Kaiyaṭa as a commentator, Note (22) also translates and explains the relevant *MBD*-passage.

2.5 Section dealing with the question whether words are *nitya* or *kārya.*

2.5.0 The section consists of two *Bhāṣyas* only, Nos. 58–59.

2.5.1 *Bh.* No. 58 raises the question : are words *nitya* 'permanently there', or *kārya* 'to be produced' ? It is pointed out in fn. 305 that *nitya* can be interpreted in two ways, namely, in the sense of 'eternal', that is without a verifiable beginning in time, or in the sense of 'given', that is, not produced by grammar. In the latter sense *nitya* is opposed to *kārya* in its sense of 'produced / generated' by grammar.

In its comment on the present *Bhāṣya*, the *MBD* mentions different views both on the point of *nityatva* / *kāryatva* and on that of *ākṛti* / *dravya* in relation to words. In the course of the discussion on the latter views, an opinion on *sphoṭa* is referred to. See Note (23).

Bh. No. 59 makes a historical point. It connects the *nitya* / *kārya* controversy with Vyāḍi's *Saṁgraha*, and says that the merits and demerits of both views have also been discussed in the *Saṁgraha.*

2.6 Section dealing with assumptions of grammar.

2.6.0 The *Vt.* numbered as *Vt.* I in the Kielhorn edition reads as follows *siddhe śabdārthasaṁbandhe lokato 'rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ yathā laukikavaidikeṣu.* It is divided into three parts in the Kielhorn ed., in accordance with the repetitions of the text introduced by Patañjali. The three parts are

(*a*) *siddhe śabdārthasaṁbandhe,*

(*b*) *lokato 'rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ,* and

(*c*) *yathā laukikavaidikeṣu.*

The *NSP* edition assumes four divisions, namely,

(*a*) *siddhe śabdārthasaṁbandhe,*

(*b*) *lokataḥ,*

(*c*) *(lokato) 'rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāsterṇa dharmaniyamaḥ,* and

(*d*) *yathā laukikavaidikeṣu.*

In the present translation, in the first place, for the one *Vt.* of the Kielhorn edition three separate *Vts* are assumed, numbered as *Vts* III–V. In the second place, they are read as follows: III. *Siddhe śabdārthasaṁbandhe lokataḥ,* IV. *Arthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ,* and V. *Yathā laukikavaidikeṣu.* The general reason for this is that the statements make sense as separate statements, apart from being separately repeated and commented upon by Patañjali. The special reason for adding the word *lokataḥ* to *Vt.* III is stated in fn. 331.

2.6.1 The first question dealt with (*Bh.* Nos. 62–71) is the meaning of the word *siddha.* According to *Bh.* No. 63, it means *nitya* 'permanent'. Two characteristics of permanence are mentioned : *kūṭastha* 'unchangeable' and *avicālin* 'immovable'. *Bh.* No. 64 objects that *siddha* is used also in connection with things which are not *nitya,* but *kārya* 'produced', like soup. *Bh.* No. 65 refers to the *Saṁgraha,* where the word *siddha* is used as a synonym of *nitya,* in contrast with *kārya.* In the sequel (*Bh.* Nos. 65–68) four other reasons are stated to explain why *siddha* should mean *nitya.*

Kaiyaṭa, in his comment on *Bh.* No. 66, touches upon the point of *vācakatva,* and upon *dyotakatva* in opposition to *sāmarthya,* for which see fns. 354–355. *Bh.* No. 68 mentions the *pb. vyākhyānato viśeṣapratipattir na hi saṁdehād alakṣaṇam* the understanding of something particular (among two or more possibilities should be decided) on the basis of interpretation. For (a rule should) not (be regarded as) a bad rule (simply) because of doubt (regarding its meaning)'. A point made by P. Thieme in this connection is quoted in Note (25).

Bh. No. 59, in a very matter-of-fact manner, asks then, if *siddha* means *nitya,* why hasn't the word *nitya* been used ? *Bh.* No. 70 says, *maṅgalārtham* 'for the sake of auspiciousness'. Finally, *Bh.* No. 71 points out that both

words *siddha* and *nitya* stand for both permanent and non-permanent things. Therefore there is no harm in interpreting the word *siddha* in the sense of *nitya*. Thus, seven successive reasons are offered to explain why *siddha* means *nitya* (see *ATA*, Introduction, p. ii). The reason for all this probably lies in Patañjali's concern to introduce the Mīmāṁsā doctrine of the *nityatva* of words here, see Note (32).

2.6.2 The second question dealt with is the constituent analysis of the cp. *śabdārtha-saṁbandha* (*Bh.* Nos 73–79). Here the crucial point is the way in which the constituent *artha* is to be construed with the outside word *siddha*. It is to be kept in mind that *siddha* is taken to mean *nitya* ' permanent '.

Bh. Nos 72-73 adopt the *ākṛtipakṣa* ' view that words stand for the *ākṛti* ' (*artha* = *ākṛti*), and state the constituent analysis as (*sidhdhe*) *śade arthe saṁbandhe ca* ' (when) the word (form), the meaning (i.e., the thing-meant) and (their) relation (are *siddha*) '. Here the constituent *artha* is directly connected with *siddha*. Note (28) contains the relevant comment of the *MBD* in which the meaning of the terms *dravya*, *jāti* and *ākṛti* are discussed. Words stand for the *ākṛti* or *jāti* first of all, and only come to stand for the *dravya* ' individual thing ' through a process called *tādrūpyāpādāna* ' particularisation '. *Bh.* No. 74 asks, what will be the constituent analysis, if the *dravyapakṣa* ' view that words stand for the *dravya* ' (*artha* = *dravya*) is adopted ? Note (29) contains the relevant commentary of the *MBD* in which it is explained that in this view the *jāti* (*ākṛti*) is regarded as an *upādhi* ' limiting factor ' and functions as the *pravṛttinimitta* ' ground for using (a particular word in a particular meaning) '. *Bh.* No. 75 states the analysis as (*siddhe*) *śabde arthasaṁbandhe ca* ' (when) the word (form) and the relation with (its) meaning (i.e., the thing-meant) (is *siddha*) '. Here the constituent *artha* is only indirectly connected with *siddha*, for the obvious reason that the *artha*, i.e,, the *dravya*, cannot be *siddha*, i.e., *nitya*.

Bh. No. 76 proposes to adopt the first constituent analysis even in the *dravyapakṣa*. But that is only possible by changing the meaning of the terms *dravya* and *ākṛti*. Here *dravya* is taken to stand for the original material out of which an object is fashioned, and *ākṛti* for the shape of that object. One of the examples is clay and pots made out of clay. It goes without saying that in this interpretation of the *dravyapakṣa* the *artha* (=*dravya*) is *sidbha*. But this explanation is dismissed, presumably because the change in meaning of the word *dravya* is not acceptable. *Bh.* No. 77 returns to the *ākṛtipakṣa* and asserts that the first constituent analysis, (*siddhe*) *śabde arthe saṁbandhe ca*, is correct, even if the *ākṛti*, taken as ' shape ' is not *siddha* (= *nitya*) in the absolute sense. The reason is that shapes continue to be perceived, although they may disappear in some individual instances. *Bh.* No. 78 then changes the definition of *nitya* as characterized by eight

features. *Nitya* is defined as that in which the *tattva* 'essential character', the status of that as which we cognize it, is not destroyed. In his comment on *Bh.* No. 78, Kaiyaṭa sums up three kinds of *anityatā* which he connects with the earlier mentioned eight features. In Note (31), in connection with the position taken by *Bh.* Nos 77–78, the doctrine of *kṣaṇikatva* 'momentariness' is briefly discussed.

Thus the analysis finally adopted is *(sihdhe) śabde arthe saṁbandhe ca*, in which *artha* is directly connected with *siddha.* Here *siddha* is interpreted to mean *nitya. Nitya* is interpreted to mean 'that which retains its *tattva*'. *Artha* is interpreted to mean *ākṛti*, and *ākrti* is interpreted to mean '(common) shape', 'a generic feature.' It will be clear that these acrobatics of interpretation are motivated by Patañjali's attempt—here also —to introduce the Mīmāṁsā doctrine of the *nityatva* of words into grammar.

The discussion has a surprising end. In *Bh.* No. 79 Patañjali declares that the whole argument so far is useless. Our concern is not the definition of *nitya* and *anitya.* We are concerned with the constituent analysis of the cp. *śabdārthasaṁbandha.* We will analyse it as *(siddhe) śabde arthe saṁbandhe ca.* And we will assume that whatever is understood by *nitya* (i.e., *siddha*), that applies to *artha (= ākṛti).*

2.6.3 The third question which leads over to the discussion of the second part of *Vt.* III (Bh. Nos. 80–81) is put in *Bh.* No. 80 : how to know that the word form, the thing-meant and their relation are *siddha*, i.e., *nitya ?* The answer is given by *Vt.* III, second part : we know it on account of the usage of the people. *Bh.* No. 81 explains this in a famous passage. People who are in need of a pot go to a potter, saying that they need to use a pot. But nobody goes to a grammarian saying that he needs words in order to use them. The reason is that words come to people naturally, once they have formed an idea of the thing-meant in their minds. The point is, obviously, that, as regards the origination and the use of words grammar has no authority.

2.6.4 The fourth question leads over to the discussion of *Vt.* IV (Bh. Nos. 82–86) and follows logically : then what is grammar good for ? *Vt.* IV says, grammar provides us with a *dharmaniyama. Bh.* No. 83 states three slightly different analyses of this cp., which come to the same point. *Dharmaniyama* means a restriction in order that we may accumulate *dharma*, i.e , *puṇya* 'religious merit'. In this connection Kaiyaṭa says that, technically speaking, *dharma* forms the domain of the verb endings called *liṄ*, etc. in Pāṇini's grammar. Nāgeśa explains that this is really the view of the Prābhākaras. For the difference between the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras see fn. 486. In what exactly the restriction consists, is made clear in the sequel.

Vt. V states an illustration : it is a restriction of a type which we find in the Veda in non-ritual precepts. *Bh.* No. 34, after making a remark on

Kātyāyana's predilection for the use of *taddhita*-suffixes which marks him as a Southerner, quotes examples of non-vedic precepts. In *Bh.* No. 85 Vedic examples follow. *Bh.* No. 86 finally states what is meant by the restriction in Vt. VI. The point is that meaning is equally understood from standard words and non-standard words This being so, the use of grammar lies in this that it imposes a restriction, in the sense that it teaches us to impose a restriction, namely, that grammatically correct words are to be used only. This results in a happiness which is quite of this world.

2.7 Section dealing with *aprayukta* ' non-used ' words.

2.7.0 The section consists of *Vts* VI–IX and *Bh.* Nos 87–99.

2.7.1 Two words, namely, *asty aprayuktaḥ* sc. *śabdaḥ* ' words do exist which are not in use ' are taken out from *Vt.* VI for a separate discussion before the *Vt.* is introduced. The difficulty is phrased by *Bh.* No. 87 : if, to decide the correctness of words, they must be in use, it follows that the correctness of words not in use cannot be decided. This affects the position of grammar. But the difficulty is developed in a slightly different way, namely, if words are not in use, how can they be said to exist at all ? The examples quoted by *Bh.* No. 87 are *ūṣa* ' you have dwelt ', *tera* ' you have crossed ', *cakra* ' you have made ' and *peca* ' you have cooked '. These are all of them 2 pl. pf. act. forms taught by Pāṇini. *Bh.* No. 88 denies that words can be both not in use and exist. The proof is furnished precisely by the forms just quoted. Once they are quoted they are used. So they exist. This argument is taken up for comment by the *MBD*, see Note (35).

Bh. No. 89 points out that the contradiction pointed out by *Bh.* No. 88 is incorrectly assumed. The word *asti* in the part-*Vt.* under discussion refers to derivability by grammar, whereas *aprayukta* refers to non-use, namely, by people in general. So existence and non-use may go together. The *MBD*, for which see Note (36), says that existence is twofold : directly available and inferable. The forms *ūṣa*, *tera*, etc. come under the latter category, because they are inferable from grammar, even though they are not available from usage. *Bh.* No. 90, in a light vein, asks whether then the speaker of *Bh.* No. 89 is not one among the people. The answer given in *Bh.* No. 91 is, yes, but I am not the people. Kaiyaṭa explains this by saying that the forms *ūṣa*, *tera*, etc. are not to be taken as examples of actual usage, but as quoted forms only.

2.7.2 Then *Vt.* VI is introduced. It denies that words exist which are not in use, for the reason that words are used to refer to things-meant. This is explained by *Bh.* No. 92. Once the things-meant exist, there must be words to refer to them. The relevant comment of the *MBD* is translated in Note (37). It says that words are always closely connected with meaning, that is, the thing-meant. Thus we may follow two courses : either infer the

existence of the thing-meant from the use of a word. This is what happens in the case of *svarga* 'the dwelling-place of the blessed', *apūrva* 'the mysterious force which connects a sacrifice with its result' and *devatā* 'deity'. Or we may infer the existence of a word on the basis of a thing.

2.7.3 *Vt.* VII states a reason for the non-use of words. This is because usage has changed. To demonstrate this change, Patañjali in *Bh.* No. 93 refers to the replacement of the forms *ūṣa*, *tera*, etc. by participle forms, like *uṣitāḥ*, *tīrṇāḥ*, etc. Note (38) points out that here the meaning of the word *aprayukta* has been slightly changed, namely, from 'not in use' to 'not in use now'. The same note offers a few considerations on the topic of Sanskrit as a language in 'development'. The question is raised, when Sanskrit stopped being a generally spoken language, and became a second language for a relatively small group, taught in schools, much like the standard Latin of Rome after it had ceased to be the generally spoken language. It is also suggested that the replacement noted by Patañjali need not be taken as a linguistic change in the usual sense of the word, but may be regarded as a change-over to easier forms of expression by speakers who never possessed a native speaker's ability.

2.7.4 *Vt.* VIII offers an illustration for words being *aprayukta* in the sense of 'not in use nowadays', namely, the *dīrghasattras* 'Soma-sacrifices continued for a long time'. Bh. No. 94 explains that just as these sacrifices have fallen into disuse, but are still prescribed by the *Śrautasūtras*, so also words may become obsolete, but still be prescribed by grammar.

2.7.5 *Vt.* IX goes on a different track. In connection with *aprayukta* words we need not necessarily think in terms of linguistic history, of words which have become obsolete, but we may think in terms of geography also. Words used in one area may not be used in another. Against this, *Bh.* No. 96 protests : the question is not of words which are not used somewhere, but of words which are not used at all. In answer, *Bh.* No. 97 points out that it is very difficult to maintain that particular words are not used at all. The world is vast and so is literature. To say that there are words which are not used is sheer foolhardiness. *Bh.* No. 98, following the *Nirukta*, gives some examples of regional usages, among them the verbal base *śav-*, which in the sense indicated ('to go') is of Iranian stock. To clinch the matter, *Bh.* No. 99 finally says that the word *ūṣa*, *tera*, etc. cannot be examples of *aprayukta* words in whatever sense at all. They are used in the Veda, and they are very much there for everybody who is willing to hear.

Thus the outcome of the discussion is that grammar does not derive *aprayukta* words. Grammar does not invent words either. Once the pattern is provided by usage, we may regard even non-attested forms derivable by grammar as correct usage, see Note (42). The same Note offers a further observation on the point of a possible 'evolution' of Sanskrit on the basis of our data.

2.8 Section dealing with the topic of knowledge versus use.

2.8.0 The section consists of *Vts* XIII and *Bh.* Nos. 100–119.

2.8.1 The question leading to the discussion is phrased by *Bh.* No. 100 : does *dharma* ' religious merit ' result from *jñāna* ' (grammatical) knowledge (of the correct words) ' or from *prayoga* ' the use (of correct words without previous grammatical knowledge) ' ? In his comment Kaiyaṭa quotes a well-known phrase from the *Mbh.*, namely, *ekaḥ śabdaḥ samyag jñātaḥ suprayuktaḥ svarge loke kāmadhug bhavati* ' a single word correctly known (and) well-used becomes wish-fulfilling in *svarga* and in this world'. He then points out the real intention of the question : what is more important, the knowledge as the basis of correct usage, or correct use as the basis of grammatical knowledge? Note (42) quotes two passages from the *Mbh.* The first deals with the *śiṣṭas*, who are defined as those who, by a favour of fate or by their innate competence, use correct Sanskrit words without having studied the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. The second passage contains the famous dialogue between a charioteer and a grammarian. Both passages stress the importance of use (or of knowing accepted usage) over grammatical knowledge. Note (42) also sums up the discussion in the relevant *MBD*-comment. Here the matter of the relation between *śruti* and *smṛti* is raised. Moreover, within the field of *smṛti*, the difference between *dṛṣṭārtha* and *adṛṣṭārtha* passages is pointed out.

But what difference does it make, whether merit comes from *jñāna* or from *prayoga ? Vts* X and XI and *Bh.* Nos. 102–104 first take up the *jñāna*-option. *Vt.* X says that, if merit comes from *jñāna*, then there is a chance for demerit (*adharma*). *Bh.* No. 102 explains that the knowledge of correct words implies that of incorrect words (*apaśabdas*) also. Thus the man who knows the correct words stands the chance of becoming tainted by that very knowledge. Note (44) translates the relevant *MBD*-passage. Here Bhartṛhari, taking into account the *Vt.*-statement as explained by the *Bhāṣya* (if *dharma* results from *śabdajñāna* ' the knowledge of correct words ', then *adharma* may result from *apaśabdajñāna*), tries to establish the true opposite of *śabdajñāna*. It is assumed that the true opposite is not *apaśabdajñāna* (as the *Bhāṣyakāra* takes it), but *śabda-ajñāna* ' the non-knowledge of correct words '. Thus the *Bhāṣya* should explain the *Vt.* to say that, if merit results from *śabdajñāna*, then demerit may result from *śabda-ajñāna*. In this way, it can be made clear that both *jñāna* and *ajñāna* lead to opposite invisible results (*adṛṣṭārtha*). Some dissenting views are quoted.

Bh. No. 103 points out that there is rather a greater chance for demerit, because there are more *apaśabdas* than correct words. At this point, *Vt.* XI is introduced. It reminds us of a restriction relating to ritual practice. *Bh.* No. 104 explains this by referring to the Veda-passage quoted earlier, in *Bh.* No. 23. According to this passage, as assumed by the *Bhāṣyakāra*, the *asuras* were defeated, because they used *apaśabdas*, bad, corrupt, Prakrit words, when addressing the gods.

2.8.2 *Vt.* XII and *Bh.* Nos 105–110 then take up the *prayoga*-option. The *Vt.* points out the flaw in this option : if *dharma* results from correct use, then everybody will be connected with bliss. *Bh.* No. 107 asks, so what ? *Bh.* No. 108 explains that, if this position is taken, nobody will make an effort anymore, and for bliss an effort is expected. *Bh.* No. 109 says that, still, people who make an effort to speak correctly will be the first to reap the reward. *Bh.* No. 110 is not convinced. Some people really make an effort to speak correctly, but it does not help them much. They remain miserable speakers of Sanskrit. On the other hand, other people are quick learners, and, apparently, they need not make any effort whatsoever. Thus the proportion between effort and reward is in danger of being lost, and that should not be.

2.8.3 *Vt.* XIII and *Bh.* Nos. 111–113 investigate the remaining possibility, namely, the combination of *jñāna* and *prayoga* leading to *dharma.* In this combination, the *prayoga* is preceded by *jñāna.* *Vt.* XIII says that, if bliss comes from *prayoga* preceded by *jñāna,* then this is equal to *vedaśabda.* Unfortunately, the word *vedaśabda* admits of more than one explanation. *Bh.* No. 112 takes it as *tp.* cp., in the sense of ' statements of the Veda '. Two examples are quoted, both ending in the stock phrase *yá u cainam evám véda* ' and (he) who knows how (to do) this '. According to Kaiyaṭa, *vedáśabda* is a *bv.* cp. meaning ' the sense conveyed by Vedic statements '. Note (46) mentions a third possibility, overlooked so far, namely, to explain *vedaśabda* as a *kdh.* cp. Here the constituent *veda* is taken as a quotation of the word *veda* ' (who) knows ' in the stock phrase mentioned above. In this latter interpretation, the expression ' that is equal to *vedaśabda* ' comes to mean ' as implied by the use of the word *veda* " (who) knows " (in the relevant Vedic statements) '. *Bh.* No. 113 mentions a different interpretation of the expression *tat tulyaṁ vedaśabdena* ' that is equal to *vedaśabda* in the *Vt.* In the new interpretation mention is made of a restriction with regard to the study of the words of the Veda. This restriction is itself the subject of different interpretations, for which see fn. 610.

2.8.4 *Bh.* Nos. 114–119 return to the *jñāna*-option : merit comes from *jñāna* alone. *Bh.* No. 115 reminds us of the undesired chance for demerit. *Bh.* No. 116 says, no harm. We are *śabdapramāṇaka.* That is, we go by what the words say. And the words say that merit comes from *jñāna.* They do not say that demerit comes from *apaśabdajñāna* ' the knowledge of incorrect words '. What has not been prescribed or prohibited is indifferent. It does not lead to harm or to bliss. For instance, actions like hiccoughing, laughing, scratching have no influence on a person's future fate. Note (48) translates the relevant *MBD*-comment. The comment is wholly concerned with the attempt to classify the statement *jñāne eva dharmaḥ* ' merit lies in (grammatical) knowledge alone ' in *Bh.* No. 114 under a fitting Mīmāṁsā heading of *smṛti* statements, namely, of the *adṛṣṭārtha* type.

Bh. No. 117 suggests an alternative with regard to the knowledge of incorrect words as implied by the knowledge of the correct words. We may consider that the knowledge of incorrect words has a use also, namely, that it serves as a means to knowing the correct words. The *MBD*-comment, translated in Note (49) deals with *smṛti* again. Here also things are known which are undesired, but which are accepted, because they serve as a means to acquiring *puṇya*. The example is *hiṁsādharma* ' the duty of violence ' in the *aśvamedha* sacrifice. *Bh.* No. 118 proposes another alternative to solve the difficulty. There are undesired things which cannot be avoided, but which, on reaching the desired aim, seem to vanish into thin air. The example is the well-digger, bespattered with dust and mud while digging, but filled with bliss on reaching the water which also cleans him. The relevant *MBD*-comment is translated in Note (50). It suggests that the mention of the knowledge of incorrect words should be taken as a way of expressing praise for the knowledge of the correct words. *Bh.* No. 119 finally disposes of the objection raised by *Vt.* XI. It is pointed out that the objection holds for speech used during the performance of a ritual only, not for ordinary speech outside the ritual. In this connection the *Bhāṣya* refers to *ṛṣis* called *yarvāṇas tarvāṇaḥ* after their favourite expression. They used correct words during the performance of the ritual, but didn't mind using incorrect ones before and after. They didn't come to harm. The *MBD*, translated in Note (51) states that the demerit possibly resulting from the knowledge of correct words is confined to a particular situation, namely, the use of incorrect words during the performance of a ritual. Different rules hold for ritual and non-ritual. What is allowed outside the ritual may not be allowed during the ritual, and vice versa. Some examples for the latter are quoted. Ritual knows some curious practices. But it does not follow that these practices should be adopted outside the ritual also.

2.9 Section dealing with the meaning of the term *vyākaraṇa*.

2.9.0 The section consists of *Vts* XIV-XVIII and *Bh.* Nos 120–143.

2.9.1 *Bh.* No. 120 phrases the question; what does the word *vyākaraṇa* mean ? It also proposes the first answer : *vyākaraṇa* means *sūtra* ' (the body of) rules '. The discussion on this point is taken up in *Bh.* Nos 121–124. *Vt.* XIV formulates an objection. If *vyākaraṇa* means *sūtra*, then we cannot justify the meaning of the genitive case ending. *Bh.* No. 121 explains that the *Vārttikakāra* is thinking of the genitive ending in the expression *vyākaraṇasya sūtram.* Kaiyaṭa further explains that the use of the genitive ending presupposes *vyatireka,* the separate identity of the objects referred to. Note (52) translates the relevant portion of the *MBD*. Here the question is raised, why particular words are used with reference to particular things. Several grounds are enumerated, *rūḍhi* ' convention ', *jāti* ' generic property ', *kriyā* ' (common) action (in the etymological background) ', *tadbhāvāpādana* ' the attribution of the character of x to y ' or *adhyāropaṇa*

'superimposition'. In the context of *rūḍhi* mention is made of homophonic sequences. The example is *aśvaḥ* The *MBD* also points out that the term *vyākaraṇa* has been used on previous occasions in the *Paspaśāhnika*, but that no explanation has been given so far. In the final part of its comment the *MBD* says that even in the view that *vyākaraṇa* means *sūtra* we can justify the expression *vyākaraṇasya sūtram* by assuming that here *vyākaraṇa* stands for the whole of the *sūtras* and *sūtra* for a part, that is, a single *sūtra*.

Vt. XV states another objection. If *vyākaraṇa* means *sūtra*, then the chance is that we may not know the words. *Bh.* No. 122 explains that here the *Vārttikakāra* has in mind the expression *vyākaraṇāc chabdān pratipadyāmahe* 'from *vyākaraṇa* we know the words'. The idea of the objection is that from hearing the mere *sūtras* we will not know how to apply them in the derivation of words. For that purpose we require an explanation of the rules too. *Bh.* No. 123, obviously thinking of the Vedic *padapāṭhas*, tries to remove the objection by saying that the *vyākhyāna* 'explanation' is nothing but the *sūtras* divided up into their constituent lexemes. *Bh.* No. 124 denies this. Then what to understand by *vyākhyāna?* The same *Bhāṣya* tells us that *vyākhyāna* consists of three things : *udāharaṇa* 'example', *pratyudāharaṇa* 'counterexample' and *vākyādhyāhāra* 'completion of the statement (by supplying words)'. In this connection see fns 664–666.

2.9.2 *Bh.* No. 125 proposes another answer. *Vyākaraṇa* does not mean *sūtra*. It means *śabda* 'words'. The point is discussed in *Vts* XVI–XVII and *Bh.* Nos. 126–133.

Vt. XVI formulates an objection. If *vyākarana* means *śabda*, then we have difficulties in explaining the meaning of the suffix *LyuṬ*. *Bh.* No. 126 explains that the word *vyākaraṇa* is derived with the help of this suffix in the sense of *karaṇa* 'instrument'. This results in the meaning *vyākriyate 'nena* 'it is analysed by that' for the term *vyākaraṇa*. But the difficulty is that, if *vyākaraṇa* means *śabda*, we cannot maintain that words—which are the grammatical object of the action of analysing—are analysed by means of words. Words are analysed by means of *sūtras*. In the *MBD*-comment, translated in Note (55), the author points out that we can justify the meaning of the genitive case ending in the expression *vyākaraṇasya sūtram* when it is assumed that *vyākaraṇa* means *śabda*, because this is clearly a case of *vyatireka*. But what we cannot justify is the etymological meaning of the word *vyākaraṇa* itself. The reason is that the presence of the suffix *LyuṬ* gives a subordinate status to *vyākaraṇa*. It serves as the means for something, namely, analysing. But, really speaking, the analysis of words is the main thing in *vyākaraṇa*. Some examples from the sacrificial ritual are quoted.

Vt. XVII has been split up into two parts, for which see fn. 685. The first part, *Vt.* XVII a, states another objection against the view that *vyākaraṇa*

means *śabda*. It says that, in that case, we cannot justify the meaning *bhava* 'located (in that)' either. *Bh.* No. 127 explains that the *Vārttikakāra* is thinking of the word *vaiyākaraṇa* in the expression *yogo vaiyākaraṇaḥ* 'a rule located in *vyākaraṇa*.' The *MBD*-comment, for which see Note (56) points out that, if *vyākaraṇa* means *śabda*, any rule belonging to any system might be called *vaiyākaraṇa*. The consequence is that the distinction between *vyākaraṇa* 'grammar' and other sciences would be lost. *Vt.* XVII b says that, moreover, we cannot justify the *taddhita* suffixes added in the sense of *prokta* 'promulgated (by him)'. *Bh.* No. 128 explains that the *Vārttikakāra* is thinking of words like *pāṇinīya*, *āpiśala* and *kāśakṛtsna*, all of which refer to rules promulgated by a particular person, but not to words promulgated.

Bh. No. 129 says that *Vt.* XVII has been wrongly phrased. The separate mention of *bhave* 'in the sense of located (in that)' in this *Vt.* (i.e., *Vt.* XVII a) is not necessary, because this meaning is included in the word *ādi* 'etc.' in *proktādayaś ca* (i.e., *Vt.* XVII b). *Bh.* No. 130 dismisses the objection. We may be certain that the *ācārya* who phrased the *Vt.* must have noticed the shortcoming. But now a days, once the ācāryas have phrased their rules they do not take them back (*na....nivartayanti*) for revision. The translation 'they (do not) cut.. ...short' proposed by Y. Ojihara for *nivartayanti* is discussed in fn. 692.

Bh. No. 131 removes the objection put forward by *Vt.* XVI. The suffix *LyuṬ* may convey other meanings than *karaṇa* also. Here the rule invoked is P. 3.3.113. Two examples are quoted. Note (59) translates the relevant comment in the *MBD*. Here the author points out that the two examples quoted by Patañjali are read in a *gaṇa* belonging to P. 3.4.74. Then why does the *Bhāṣyakāra* refer to P. 3.3.113?

Bh. No. 132 tries to improve on Bh. No. 131. Even if the sense of *karaṇa* is assumed for the suffix *LyuṬ*, there is no harm. We may maintain that words are "analysed" (*vyākriyante*) by words. To clarify his intention, the *Bhāṣyakāra* gives an example: once the word *gauḥ* 'cow' has been uttered, all doubts are removed, because it is neither *aśva* 'horse' nor *gardabha* 'donkey'. Note (60) discusses the meaning to be assigned to the word *vyākriyante* here and offers an explanation of the example. *Bh.* No. 133 finally reminds us that in this view (*vyākaraṇa* = *śabda*), still, the objections raised by *Vt.* XVII stand.

2.9.3 *Bh.* No. 134 admits that the objection is valid, and says that we must look for a new solution. This solution is proposed by *Vt.* XVIII. It says that *vyākaraṇa* should be taken to mean *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa*. *Bh.* No. 135 explains that *vyākaraṇa* thus stands for the whole of *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa*. It also explains that *lakṣya* means 'the words' and that *lakṣaṇa* means 'the rules'. Thus the new view appears to be a combination of the two earlier views. The relevant comment of the *MBD* is translated in Note (61).

Here the author points out that we should not interpret the *Vt.* to mean that one single wordform *vyākaraṇa* possesses two meanings, namely, *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa*. *Vyākaraṇa* is not a homonym like *bilva* which means both 'a forest' and 'a fruit'. It is not a word standing for a *jāti* 'generic property' like *ap* 'water', because there is no single generic property which covers both meanings *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa*. It is not a word in whose etymological background we can detect a common action to explain that it may refer to both *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa*. It is not an instance of *ekaśeṣa* either.

Bh. No. 136 objects that, if *vyākaraṇa* stands for the whole of *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa*, we cannot explain that it may be used with reference to one of the parts also, namely, *lakṣaṇa*. That is to say, we will have difficulties again in explaining the genitive expression *vyākaraṇasya sūtram* (see *Bh.* No. 121). *Bh.* No. 137 removes this objection by saying that words referring to wholes may be used with reference to parts also. The examples are *pūrve pañcālāḥ* 'East Pañcāla', *uttare pañcālāḥ* 'North Pañcāla', *tailaṁ bhuktam* 'oil has been eaten', *ghṛtaṁ bhuktam* 'ghee has been eaten', *śuklaḥ* 'white', *nīlaḥ* 'violet-blue', and *kṛṣṇaḥ* 'black'. Note (62) translates the *MBD*-comment. Here more examples are quoted for words standing for wholes which are not used for parts, namely, *saṁgha* 'congregation', *maṇḍala* 'group', *senā* 'army', *vana* 'forest'. Also, an example is quoted of a word which stands for a whole but which may be used with reference to a part also, namely, *go* 'ox', used with reference to an inhabitant of the country Vahīka. In addition to the examples *tailaṁ bhuktam*, *ghṛtaṁ bhuktam* and *śuklaḥ*, the *MBD* gives the example of the perception of a jar and of the verbform *pacati* 'he cooks'. It will be clear that these examples are not all of them on the same level. For an explanation see Note (62). The difference between Kaiyaṭa and Patañjali in the interpretation of the examples *tailaṁ bhuktam* and *śuklaḥ* is explained in fns 727 and 728.

2.9.4 Apparently, the solution offered by *Vt.* XVIII is felt to be unsatisfactory. The idea is that vyākaraṇa stands for *lakṣaṇa* (= *sūtra*), but not for the whole of *lakṣya* (= *śabda*) and *lakṣaṇa*. *Bh.* No. 138 returns to the earlier view proposed by *Bh.* No. 120, that *vyākaraṇa* means *sūtra*. Now the question is, how to dispose of the objections put forward against this view.

Bh. No. 139 reminds us of the objection referred to in *Vt.* XIV, namely, the difficulty in explaining the genitive ending in the expression *vyākaraṇasya sūtram*. *Bh.* No. 140 removes the objection by invoking *vyapadeśivadbhāva* 'treatment (of an item which cannot have a particular designation in the original sense of the term when it stands alone) like the item which has that designation in the original sense of the term'. For a detailed exposition see Note (64). The same Note translates and explains the relevant *MBD*-comment in which several examples of *vyapadeśivadbhāva* are quoted and discussed. The conclusion of the *MBD* is that the use of the genitive

ending in *vyākaraṇasya sūtram* can be justified by simply assuming a general-particular relation or a part-whole relation. Here Bhartṛhari disagrees with Patañjali without clearly saying so.

Bh. No. 141 reminds us that the objections stated by *Vt.* XV (with reference to the expression *vyākaraṇāc chabdān pratipadyāmahe* 'from *vyākaraṇa* we know the words' has already been removed by *Bh.* No. 122. The reason given here was that we do not just know the words from *vyākaraṇa* (= *sūtra*). We know them from *vyākhyāna* 'the explanation (of the *sūtras*)' (Bh. Nos. 123–124). But *Bh.* No. 143 says that *vyākhyāna* is not something different from *sūtra*. We cannot go beyond *sūtra* 'the rules'. And *vyākhyāna* also remains within the confines of the rules. Only an ignorant person can think that *vyākhyāna* is different from *sūtra*. In this *Bhāṣya* the author uses the form *nādaḥ*, which is taken as an instance of *sabhaṅgaśleṣa*.

So, after a long detour in which different views are put forward and objections raised and removed, the final conclusion of the *Bhāṣyakāra* is that *vyākaraṇa* means *sūtra*, although the alternative that *vyākaraṇa* means *lakṣya* + *lakṣaṇa* is not totally rejected. See further Note (65).

2.10 Section dealing with the teaching of the speech-sounds in the *Śiva-sūtras*.

2.10.0 The section consists of *Vts* XIX–XXII and a *Vārttika*-like statement and of *Bh.* Nos. 144–163.

2.10.1 First the question of the purpose of the teaching of the speech-sounds is raised by *Bh.* No. 144. The *MBD*-comment, translated in Note (66) explains that grammar deals with meaningful elements. But the speech-sounds listed in the *Śivasūtras* are not meaningful elements, nor is the inventory complete. That is why the question is raised. The meaning of the terms *upadeśa* 'teaching' and *varṇa* 'speech-sound' is discussed in fn. 783. *Vt.* XIX says that the speech-sounds are taught for *vṛttisamavāya*. *Bh* No. 145 explains the cp. *vṛttisamavāya* in three ways which are assumed by Kaiyaṭa to be three significantly different ways. The *Bhāṣya* also explains that *vṛtti* means *śāstrapravṛtti* 'the application of the rules' (see fn. 786), and that *samavāya* means an arrangement of items (in our case, the speech-sounds) in a particular order. The *MBD*-comment, summarized in Note (67), explains the point made by the *Vārttikakāra*. The *Śivasūtras* are not meant to teach us the Sanskrit alphabet, but to inform us of the way in which the speech-sounds have been ordered and grouped together with a view to the application of the rules.

Vt. XI states another purpose. It says that the speech-sounds are taught so that we can add the *anubandhas*. *Bh.* No. 140 explains that both the particular arrangement of the sounds and the addition of *anubandhas* serve to enable us to form *pratyāhāras*, the short, abbreviated designations of

groups of speech-sounds used by Paṇini. For the rendering of the term *anubandha* see fn. 796.

2.10.2 *Bh.* No. 147, by way of introduction to *Vt.* XXI, informs us that there is still another purpose. The discussion on this point takes up the rest of the section. The other purpose is to make us familiar with the desired speech-sounds. Kaiyaṭa explains that 'desired' here means 'free from defects', namely, in pronunciation.

Vt. XXI states a shortcoming and how to remedy it. We will assume that the teaching of the speech-sounds serves to acquaint us with the desired sounds. But since not all of the varieties of speech-sounds, that is, especially, of the vowels, have been mentioned in the *Śivasūtras*, provision must be made for teaching variations of pitch, nasality and quantity also. This is repeated in *Bh.* No. 148. Kaiyaṭa observes that *sūtras* are recited in *ekaśruti* 'monotone recitation', and that goes for the *Śivasūtras* also. Nāgeśa points out that even the recitation of the *Śivasūtras* with all three accents would lead to the same difficulty, because additional varieties have to be mentioned for the one variety recited.

Bh. No. 149, by way of introduction to *Vt.* XXII, says that we can avoid the trouble involved in teaching all the vowel-variations required, by stating the sounds in their generic form. But this is not without difficulties either. How to recite a generic speech-sound? We cannot but utter a particular variety at a time. This is the difficulty pointed out by Kaiyaṭa. He proposes to remove it by assuming that the variety uttered is a sample of the whole class it represents. *Vt.* XXII says that, if it is assumed that we can manage by teaching the sounds, that is, the vowels, in their generic form, then an express prohibition should be phrased of *saṁvṛta* 'closed', etc. *Bh.* No. 150 explains that by *saṁvṛta*, etc. the *Vārttikakāra* refers to a list of defects in the pronunciation of vowels. In the *Bhāṣya* two such lists are given, one admittedly coming from a different source. Both lists contain twelve defects. Kaiyaṭa tries to explain each defect to the best of his knowledge, but it is clear that his knowlede consists in guesswork mainly. In Note (70) both lists are compared with each other and with a list of defects in the *Ṛk-prātiśākhya*. The conclusion is that the list acknowledged as coming from a different source shows more affinity with the *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya* list than Patañjali's first list.

But it is doubtful, whether the *Bhāṣyakāra* has correctly interpreted the word *saṁvṛtādīnām* '(prohibition) of *saṁvṛta* etc.' in the *Vt.* This is argued in Note (70). The discussion here also takes into account P. 8.4.68 and *Vts* I and II on *Śivasūtra* 1. From the discussion three conclusions are drawn, namely, that Kātyāyana is unaware of Patañjali's lists of defects; that P. 8.4.68 must be regarded as a very late addition to the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*; and that the *Vts* on the latter rule cannot have come from Kātyāyana, that is, the original Kātyāyana. If all of this is correct, it shows again how unreliable

the grammatical tradition is. Not because Patañjali didn't know what Kātyāyana was talking about, but rather because he twists the intention of the *Vārttikakāra* in order to accommodate knowledge available to him in a suitable context.

Bh. No. 151 has a different solution. We will accept that the sounds, i.e., the vowels, are taught in their generic form. But the prohibition is not required. The reason is that we know the vowels in their desired form from the recitation of the *garga*-and *bida*-lists. This is denied by *Bh.* No. 152. According to this *Bhāṣya*, the lists just mentioned have a different purpose, namely, to ensure the correctness of the wholes. What does the *Bhāṣyakāra* mean ? The commentators, the *MBD*, Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa each propose different interpretations. For a discussion see Note (71) which comes to the conclusion that none of the interpretations proposed by the commentators is a happy one, and which proposes a new interpretation in agreement with the later *Bh.* No. 162.

Then how to remove defects in the pronunciation of vowels ? *Bh.* No. 153, in anticipation of the Vārttika-like statement A, says, we will introduce reinstatement rules regarding the vowel *a* in its eighteen varieties. This idea is clearly based on the very last rule of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* in its present redaction, namely, P. 8.4.68. The rule prescribes the reinstatement (*pratyāpatti*) of the *saṁvṛta* ' closed ' quality of the short vowel *a*. *Bh.* No. 154 asks, whether we should really do so. At this point the *Vārttika*-like statement is introduced. It says that the reinstatement is for the sake of *liṅgas* ' markers '. Note (73) explains the intention of the statement. The intention is that the defects enumerated in the first list in *Bh.* No. 150 receive the technical grammatical function fulfilled by *anubandhas*. *Bh.* No. 157 asks, whether we should really do so. The obvious reason for the question is that the new proposal involves a lot of work. *Bh.* No. 157 points to the advantage of the proposal. It saves us hundreds of *anubandhas*, we can do away with P. 1.3.2–8, which introduce *anubandhas*, and with P. 1.3.9, which prescribes the lopa ' elision ' of *anubandhas*. The point is that the new function assigned to the defects in vowel-pronunciation does not lead to greater complication (*gaurava*), but to greater simplicity (*lāghava*). Kaiyaṭa shows how *pratyāhāras* can be formed in the new system. Following the *MBD*, he also shows how new rules are to be phrased with markers in the form of defective vowel-pronunciations. *Bh.* No. 158 states the final answer. The new system appears to be o.k., but it is not Pāṇinian any more. Therefore we better keep to the old system. Nāgeśa points out that really, in spite of *Bh.* No. 157, the new system would mean complication only.

In the meantime, the question how to prevent defects in the pronunciation of vowels in the *Śivasūtras* is still to be answered. *Bh.* Nos 159–161 remind us of the earlier series of *Bh.* Nos 150–152. *Bh.* No. 162 admits that the difficulty has not been solved and suggests a way out. Things need not be restricted to serving just one purpose. They may have two purposes also.

Two examples are quoted in the form of phonic sequences, namely, *śveto-dhāvati* and *alambusānāṁyātā*. These sequences may be cut up in different ways, like what happens in *sabhaṅgaśleṣa*, and, accordingly, convey different meanings. See fn 883. In the same way, we will assume that the recitation of the *garga-* and *biḍa-*lists serves two purposes also, namely, to ensure the correctness of the wholes, and to remove the defects in the pronunciation of the vowels. Note (76) establishes that by 'the wholes' the *Bhāṣyakāra* must have meant the sound-sequences of the words listed in the *garga* and *biḍa-*lists, and not something outside these lists, as assumed by Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa. In this connection see also Note (71).

The relevant *MBD*-comment is translated in Note (76). Here Bhartṛhari says that words literally brim with denotative powers (*śaktis*, for which see fn. 886). In communication, what takes place, is a mutual delimitation (*avaccheda*) of these powers. For instance, from *śvetaḥ* we will understand different meanings depending on its connection with *gauḥ* 'bull' and depending on the division of its phonic sequence as *śvā itaḥ* 'the dog (runs) from here'. But how can one and the same thing like the phonic sequence *śvetaḥ* convey two meanings at the same time, that is, serve two purposes at the same time ? To illustrate this, Bhartṛhari refers to a lamp. One lamp, at one and the same time, may serve different purposes for different people. This is called *tantra* 'multi-purposiveness', for which see fn. 894. Similarly, one and the same phonational act, like reciting the *garga-* and *biḍa-*lists may serve two purposes. The author further refers to two different ways of presenting items in language, namely, *krama* '(repetition in) succession' and *yaugapadya* 'simultaneity'. He quotes two examples, *akṣo bhajyatām akṣo bhakṣyatām akṣo dīvyatām* 'let the *akṣa* "axle" be broken, let the *akṣa* "fruit" be eaten, let the *akṣa* "die" be played', and *akṣāḥ bhajyantāṁ bhakṣyantāṁ dīvyantām* respectively. In the first example we do not assume the application of *tantra*, but in the second we do.

Bh. No. 163 states an alternative solution for the difficulty mentioned in *Vt.* XXII, namely, the necessary prohibition of *saṁvṛta*, etc. Defects in the pronunciation of vowels have no place in Pāṇini's *upadeśa* 'the particular form in which (word-elements) are taught'. So here there is hardly a chance for not knowing the desired pronunciation, because all items have been specifically enunciated. True, there are *agrahaṇa* 'non-mentioned' nominal stems also. But they should be taught as part of the *upadeśa*, so that no doubt remains regarding the correct pronunciation of the vowels.

In connection with *agrahaṇa* see fn. 915. The difference between *upadeśa* and *uddeśa* in Patañjali's usage is explained in Note (77). The same Note also translates the relevant *MBD*-comment. Here Bhartṛhari discusses the meaning of *agrahaṇa* According to him, *agrahaṇa* may refer to stems like *ḍittha*, which are both non-mentioned and non-derived in Pāṇini's system. Or it may refer to stems like *garga* and *biḍa*, which are mentioned, but not

derived by Pāṇini. Bhartṛhari then proposes to bring the first type of stems under the control of the *uṇādi*-rule P. 3.3.1. In this connection Kaiyaṭa also makes mention of the *pṛṣodarādi*-rule, P. 6.3.109. As regards the correct vowel-pronunciation, Bhartṛhari thinks that a *pratipadapāṭha* ' word by-word list ' of the *ḍittha*-type words which Patañjali had in mind, is not required. For the correct pronunciation we may rely on the usage of the *śiṣṭas*. Thus, here again (compare under 2.9.4) Bhartṛhari disagrees with Patañjali.

श्रीमद्भगवत्पतञ्जलिविरचिते

व्याकरणमहाभाष्ये

पस्पशाह्निकम्

श्रीभगवत्पतञ्जलिविरचिते व्याकरणमहाभाष्ये प्रथमाध्याये प्रथमपादे प्रथमं पस्पशाह्निकम् ।

१

(अथ शब्दस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकरणम्)

(विषयप्रस्ताववार्त्तिकम)

अथ शब्दानुशासनम् ॥ १ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

१ **अथेत्ययं शब्दोऽधिकारार्थः प्रयुज्यते । शब्दानुशासनं[1] शास्त्रमधिकृतं वेदितव्यम् ।**

(प्रदीप:) भाष्यकारो विवरणकारत्वात् व्याकरणस्य साक्षात्प्रयोजनमाह **अथ शब्दानुशासनमिति** । प्रयोजनप्रयोजनानि तु रक्षोहादीनि पश्चाद्वक्ष्यन्ते ।

स्ववाक्यं व्याख्यातुं तदवयवमथशब्दं तावद् व्याचष्टे **अथेत्ययमिति** । इतिशब्दोऽथशब्दस्य स्वरूपेऽवस्थापनाय प्रयुक्तः । एवं हि पदान्तरैः सामानाधिकरण्येन संबन्धे सति 'अथ' शब्दो व्याख्यातुं शक्यते । स्वरूपेऽवस्थितश्च सर्वनाम्ना परामृश्यते '**अयम्**' इति । **शब्द इति** । स्वरूपकथनं विस्पष्टप्रतिपत्त्यर्थम् । **अधिकारार्थ इति** । अधिकारः प्रस्तावः द्योत्यत्वेनास्य प्रयोजनमित्यर्थः । निपातानां च द्योतकत्वं वाक्यपदीये निर्णीतम् । अथशब्दस्याधिकारार्थत्वे यो वाक्यार्थः संपद्यते तं दर्शयति **शब्दानुशासनमिति** । अनेकक्रियाविषयस्यापि शब्दानुशासनस्य आरभ्यमाणता 'अथ' शब्दसंनिधाने प्रतीयते । व्याकरणस्य चेदमन्वर्थं नाम 'शब्दानुशासनम्' इति । अत्र चाचार्यस्य कर्तुः प्रयोजनाभावादनुपादानादुभयप्राप्त्यभावात् न '**उभयप्राप्तौ कर्मणि**' इत्यनेन षष्ठी, अपि तु '**कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति**' इत्यनेनेति '**कर्मणि च**' इति समासप्रतिषेधाप्रसङ्गात् इध्मप्रव्रश्चनादिवत् समासः ।

(प्रश्नभाष्यम्)

२ **केषां शब्दानाम् ।**

(प्रदीप:) **शब्दशब्दस्य** सामान्यशब्दत्वात् विना प्रकरणादिना विशेषेऽवस्थानाभावात् तन्त्रीशब्दकाकवाशितादीनामनुशासनप्रसङ्ग इति मत्वा पृच्छति **केषामिति**। उत्तरपदार्थान्तर्गतस्यापि पूर्वपदार्थस्य बुद्ध्या प्रविभागात् प्रत्यवमर्शः । यथा राजपुरुष इत्युक्ते कस्य राज्ञः इति ।

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१. Ben. शब्दानुशासनं नाम शास्त्र०.

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

३ **लौकिकानां वैदिकानां च। तत्र लौकिकास्तावत्। गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्ती शकुनिर्मृगो ब्राह्मण इति। वैदिकाः खल्वपि। शं नो देवीरभिष्टये**[a]**। इषे त्वोर्जे त्वा**[b]**। अग्निमीळे पुरोहितम्**[c]**। अग्न आयाहि वीतये इति**[d]**।**

(प्रदीपः) सिद्धान्तवादी तु व्याकरणस्य वेदाङ्गत्वात्सामर्थ्याद्विशेषावगतिरिति मत्वाऽह—**लौकिकानामिति**। लोके विदिता इति 'लोकसर्वलोकात्' इति ठञ्। **अथवा** भवार्थे **अध्यात्मादि**त्वाट्ठञ्। वेदे भवाः वैदिकाः। वैदिकानामपि लौकिकत्वे प्राधान्यख्यापनाय पृथगुपादानम्। यथा **ब्राह्मणा आयाता वसिष्ठोऽप्यायात** इति वसिष्ठस्य। तेषां तु प्राधान्यं यत्नेनापभ्रंशपरिहारात्। **अथवा** भाषाशब्दानामेव लौकिकत्वमिति भेदेन निर्देशः। तत्र लोके पदानुपूर्वीनियमाद्वाक्यान्युदाहरति—**शं न इति**।

(प्रश्नभाष्यम्)

४ **अथ गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः।**

(प्रदीपः) अयं गौः, अयं शुक्लः इति शब्दार्थयोरभेदेन लोके व्यवहारदर्शनाच्छब्दस्वरूपनिर्द्धारणाय पृच्छति **अथेति**। 'गौः' इति विज्ञाने प्रतिभासमानेषु वस्तुषु कः शब्द इत्यर्थः।

(एकदेशिन : प्रथमसमाधानभाष्यम्)

५ **किं यत्तत्सास्नालाङ्गूलककुदखुरविषाण्यर्थरूपं स शब्दः।**

(प्रदीपः) तान्येव वस्तूनि क्रमेण निर्दिशति **किं यत्तदिति**। उद्दिश्यमानप्रतिनिर्दिश्यमानयोरेकत्वमापादयन्ति सर्वनामानि पर्यायेण तल्लिङ्गमुपाददते कामचारतः इति '**स शब्दः**' इति पुंलिङ्गेन निर्देशः।

(प्रथमसमाधाननिराकरणभाष्यम्)

६ **नेत्याह। द्रव्यं नाम तत्।**

(प्रदीपः) **नेत्याहेति**। भिन्नेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वान्न **द्रव्यं** शब्द इति प्रतीतम्, अपि तु **द्रव्यम्**—इति। यदि च द्रव्यानुशासनं विवक्षितमभविष्यत् 'अथ द्रव्यानुशासनम्' इत्येवावक्ष्यत्।

(एकदेशिन : द्वितीयसमाधानभाष्यम्)

७ **यत्तर्हि तदिङ्गितं चेष्टितं निमिषितं स शब्दः।**

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a. अथ. स. 1.6.1. (अथ.सं.I.1.1. in one MS only).

b. वाज. सं. I.1.1 तै. सं. I.1.1.

c. ऋ. सं. I.1.1.

d. साम. सं. I.1.1.

(प्रदीप:) अनेनैव न्यायेन गुणक्रियासामान्यानां निराकृतेऽपि शब्दत्वे प्रपञ्चार्थं तच्चोद्यपूर्वकं निराकरोति—**यत्तर्हीति**। गोशब्दार्थे चैषां संभवात् शब्दत्वमाशङ्क्यते। परिहारस्तु पूर्ववत्। तत्र**ङ्गितम्** अभिप्रायस्य सूचकः शरीरव्यापारः। **चेष्टितं** कायपरिस्पन्दः। **निमिषितम्** अक्षिव्यापारः।

(उद्द्योतः) तेन '**तदभिन्नाभिन्नस्य तदभिन्नत्वम्**' इति न्यायेन शब्दत्वाशङ्का तेषामिति भावः। **यद्वा** गोशब्दार्थे गुणसमूहे समूहितया एषां संभवादित्यर्थः।

(**द्वितीयसमाधाननिराकरणभाष्यम्**)

८ **नेत्याह। क्रिया नाम सा।**

(**एकदेशिन : तृतीयसमाधानभाष्यम्**)

९ **यत्तर्हि तच्छुक्लो नीलः कृष्णः कपिलः कपोत इति स शब्दः।**

(प्रदीप:) **शुक्लो नील इति**। द्रव्यस्य प्रागुपन्यासाद् गुणमात्राभिधायिनोऽत्र शुक्लादयो द्रष्टव्याः।

(**तृतीयसमाधाननिराकरणभाष्यम्**)

१० **नेत्याह। गुणो नाम सः।**

(**एकदेशिन : चतुर्थसमाधानभाष्यम्**)

११ **यत्तर्हि तद्भिन्नेष्वभिन्नं छिन्नेष्वच्छिन्नं सामान्यभूतं स शब्दः।**

(प्रदीप:) **भिन्नेष्वभिन्नमिति**। अनेन सामान्यस्य 'एकत्वं' कथ्यते। छिन्नेष्वच्छिन्नं इत्यनेन तु 'नित्यत्वम्'। **सामान्यभूतमिति**। सत्ताख्यं महासामान्यं गोत्वादेः सामान्यविशेषस्योपमानं निर्दिष्टम्। सामान्यमिव **सामान्यभूतम्**। भूतशब्द उपमार्थे, यथा पितृभूत इति।

(**चतुर्थसमाधाननिराकरणभाष्यम्**)

१२ **नेत्याह। आकृतिर्नाम सा।**

(**प्रश्नभाष्यम्**)

१३ **कस्तर्हि शब्दः।**

(प्रदीप:) द्रव्यादिषु निरस्तेषु पृच्छति—**कस्तर्हीति**।

(**समाधानभाष्यम्**)

१४ **येनोच्चारितेन सास्नालाङ्गूलककुदखुरविषाणिनां संप्रत्ययो भवति स शब्दः।**

(प्रदीप:) उत्तरमाह—**येनोच्चारितेनेति**। वैयाकरणा वर्णव्यतिरिक्तस्य पदस्य वाक्यस्य वा वाचकत्वमिच्छन्ति। वर्णानां प्रत्येकं वाचकत्वे द्वितीयादिवर्णोच्चारणानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात्। आनर्थक्ये तु प्रत्येक**मुत्पत्तिपक्षे** यौगपद्येनोत्पत्त्यभावात्, **अभिव्यक्तिपक्षे** तु क्रमेणैवाभिव्यक्त्या समुदायाभावात्। एकस्मृत्युपारूढानां वाचकत्वे

'सरः' 'रसः' इत्यादावर्थप्रतिपत्त्यविशेषप्रसङ्गात्तद्व्यतिरिक्तः **स्फोटो** नादाभिव्यङ्ग्यो वाचको विस्तरेण वाक्यपदीये व्यवस्थापितः। **उच्चारितेन**—प्रकाशितेनेत्यर्थः।

(उद्द्योतः) प्रत्येकमानर्थक्ये तु ससुदायस्य वाचकत्वसुपेयम्, तत्तु न युक्तम् इति शेषः। यतस्तत्र **नयद्वयम्**—उत्पद्यमानसमुदायस्य अभिव्यज्यमानसमुदायस्य वा वाचकत्वमिति। तत्राद्यं दूषयति—**उत्पत्तिपक्षे इति**।

(समाधानान्तरभाष्यम्)

१५ **अथवा प्रतीतपदार्थको लोके ध्वनिः शब्द इत्युच्यते। तद्यथा। शब्दं कुरु। मा शब्दं कार्षीः। शब्दकार्ययं माणवक इति। ध्वनिं कुर्वन्नेवमुच्यते। तस्माद् ध्वनिः शब्दः।**

(प्रदीपः) **अथवेति**। अन्यत्र ध्वनिस्फोटयोर्भेदस्य व्यवस्थापितत्वादिहाभेदेन व्यवहारेऽपि न दोषः, द्रव्यादयो न शब्दवाच्या इत्यत्र तात्पर्यात्। **ध्वनिं कुर्वन्निति**। विधिप्रतिषेधयोरप्रवृत्तविषयत्वात्कथमस्य त्रिभिः संबन्धः। उच्यते। शब्दं कुर्वन्नपि 'शब्दं कुरु' इत्युच्यते विरामाशङ्कायां तन्निवृत्तये। तथाऽनभिमत—शब्दश्रवणोद्वेजितेनोच्यते—मा शब्दं कार्षीरिति।

(उद्द्योतः) भाष्ये—**अथवा प्रतीतपदार्थक इति**। लोके व्यवहर्तृषु पदार्थबोधकत्वेन प्रसिद्धः श्रोत्रेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वाद्वर्णरूपध्वनिसमूह एव शब्द इत्यर्थः। तस्यार्थबोधकताऽप्यविचारितरमणीयस्यैव लोके सिद्धा, तादृशस्यैव शास्त्रेणान्वाख्यानमिति तात्पर्यम्।

२

(अथ व्याकरणशास्त्रप्रयोजनाधिकरणम्)

(वार्त्तिकावतारभाष्यम्)

१६ **कानि पुनः शब्दानुशासनस्य प्रयोजनानि।**

(प्रदीपः) **कानि पुनरिति**। किं संध्योपासनादिवद् व्याकरणाध्ययनं नित्यं कर्म—अथ काम्यमिति प्रश्नः।

(प्रयोजनवार्त्तिकम्)

रक्षोहागमलघ्वसंदेहाः प्रयोजनम् ॥ २॥

(रक्षाशब्दार्थनिरूपणभाष्यम्)

१७ **रक्षार्थं वेदानामध्येयं व्याकरणम्। लोपागमवर्णविकारज्ञो हि सम्यग्वेदान्परिपालयिष्यति।**

(प्रदीपः) पारम्पर्येण पुरुषार्थसाधनतामस्याह **रक्षेति**। लोके लोपाद्यदृष्टं वेदे दृष्ट्वा भ्राम्येदवैयाकरणः, वैयाकरणस्तु न भ्रमति, वेदार्थं चाध्यवस्यति। तत्र

लोपागमयोरुदाहरणं—**देवा अदुह्रेति**। दुहेर्लङो झस्यादादेशे कृते '**लोपस्त आत्मनेपदेषु**' इति तलोपः, '**बहुलं छन्दसि**' इति रुटि सति रूपमेतत्। वर्णविकारो यथा—**उद्ग्राभं च निग्राभं** चेति। '**हृग्रहोर्भश्छन्दसि**' '**हस्येति वक्तव्यम्**' इति भकारः। '**उदि ग्रहः**' इत्यत्र '**उद्ग्राभनिग्राभौ च छन्दसि स्रुगुद्यमननिपातनयोः**' इति वचनाद् उन्निपूर्वाद् ग्रहेर्घञ्।

(उद्द्योतः) ननु शिष्याचार्यसंबन्ध एव महान् वेदरक्षाहेतुः, किं व्याकरणेनेत्यत आह—**लोके** इति।

(ऊहपदार्थनिरूपणभाष्यम्)

ऊहः खल्वपि। न सर्वैर्लिङ्गैर्न च सर्वाभिर्विभक्तिभिर्वेदे मन्त्रा निगदिताः। ते चावश्यं यज्ञगतेन[२] यथायथं विपरिणमयितव्याः। तान्नावैयाकरणः शक्नोति यथायथं विपरिणमयितुम्। तस्मादध्येयं व्याकरणम्।

(प्रदीपः) **ऊहः खल्वपीति**। इह यस्मिन्यागे इतिकर्तव्यतोपदिष्टा यागान्तरेणोपजीव्यते सा **प्रकृतिः**। येन चोपजीव्यते सा **विकृतिः**। '**प्रकृतिवद्विकृतिः कर्तव्या**' इति मीमांसकैर्व्यवस्थापिते न्याये प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादीनामूहं वैयाकरणः सम्यग् विजानाति। तत्राग्नेर्मन्त्रोऽस्ति **अग्नये त्वा जुष्टं निर्वपामि** इति। तत्र '**सौर्यं चरुं निर्वपेद् ब्रह्मवर्चसकामः**' इति सौर्यचरौ मन्त्र ऊह्यते **सूर्याय त्वा जुष्टं निर्वपामि** इति। विस्तरेण भर्तृहरिणा प्रदर्शित ऊहः।

(उद्योतः) ऊहज्ञस्य हि आर्त्विज्यलाभेन द्रव्यप्राप्तिद्वारा ऐहिकसुखसिद्धिः फलमिति बोध्यम्।

(आगमपदार्थनिरूपणभाष्यम्)

आगमः खल्वपि। ब्राह्मणेन निष्कारणो धर्मः षडङ्गो वेदोऽध्येयो ज्ञेय इति। प्रधानं च षट्स्वङ्गेषु व्याकरणम्। प्रधाने च कृतो यत्नः फलवान्भवति।

(प्रदीपः) **आगम इति**। आगमः प्रयोजनः प्रवर्तको नित्यकर्मतां व्याकरणाध्ययनस्य दर्शयति। प्रयोजनशब्देन च फलं प्रयोजकश्चोच्यते। **निष्कारण इति**। दृष्टं कारणमनपेक्ष्येत्यर्थः। **प्रधानं चेति**। पदपदार्थावगमस्य व्याकरणनिमित्तत्वात्तन्मूलत्वाद्वाक्यवाक्यार्थावसायस्येति भावः।

(उद्द्योतः) **निष्कारण इति**। कारणशब्दः फलपरः। ननु नित्यत्वेऽपि प्रत्यवायपरिहाररूपं फलमस्त्येवेत्यत आह—**दृष्टमिति**। **धर्मत्वं** च वेदस्य पुरुषयत्नसाध्यतया धर्मत्वेनाभिमताध्ययनज्ञानकर्मत्वेनौपचारिकमित्याहुः। **षडङ्गः**—शिक्षाकल्पव्याकरणनिरुक्तछन्दोज्योतिषाङ्गसहितः। **वेदः**—स्वशाखारूपः।

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२. Ben. पुरुषेण यज्ञगतेन.

(लघुपदार्थनिरूपणभाष्यम्)

२० **लघ्वर्थं चाध्येयं व्याकरणम्। ब्राह्मणेनावश्यं शब्दा ज्ञेया इति। न चान्तरेण व्याकरणं लघुनोपायेन शब्दाः शक्या ज्ञातुम्।**

(प्रदीपः) **लघ्वर्थमिति।** लाघवेन शब्दज्ञानमस्य प्रयोजनम्। **ब्राह्मणेनेति।** अध्यापनं ब्राह्मणस्य वृत्तिः। न चाशब्दज्ञं तमुपश्लिष्यन्ति शिष्या इति।

(असंदेहपदार्थनिरूपणभाष्यम्)

२१ **असंदेहार्थं चाध्येयं व्याकरणम्। याज्ञिकाः पठन्ति। स्थूलपृषतीमाग्निवारुणीमनड्वाहीमालभेतेति। तस्यां संदेहः स्थूला चासौ पृषती च स्थूलपृषती स्थूलानि पृषन्ति यस्याः सा स्थूलपृषतीति। तां नावैयाकरणः स्वरतोऽध्यवस्यति। यदि पूर्वपदप्रकृतिस्वरत्वं ततो बहुव्रीहिः[e]। अथान्तोदात्तत्वं[3] ततस्तत्पुरुष[f] इति।**

(प्रदीपः) **असंदेहार्थमिति।** संदेहस्य प्रागभावोऽत्र द्रष्टव्यः, न तु प्रध्वंसाभावः। न हि वैयाकरणस्य संशय उत्पद्य विनश्यति, इतरस्यैव तदुत्पादात्। **स्वरत इति।** पूर्वपदप्रकृतिस्वराद्बहुव्रीह्यर्थावसाय इत्यर्थः।

(प्रयोजनान्तरभाष्यम्)

२२ **इमानि च भूयः शब्दानुशासनस्य प्रयोजनानि। तेऽसुराः। दुष्टः शब्दः। यदधीतम्। यस्तु प्रयुङ्क्ते। अविद्वांसः। विभक्तिं कुर्वन्ति। यो वा इमाम्। चत्वारि। उत त्वः। सक्तुमिव। सारस्वतीम्। दशम्यां पुत्रस्य। सुदेवो असि वरुणेति।**

(प्रदीपः) मुख्यानि प्रयोजनानि प्रदर्श्यानुषङ्गिकाणि प्रदर्शयति--**इमानि चेति। भूय इति।** पुनरित्यर्थः। आनुषङ्गिकत्वाच्चैषां वर्गद्वयोपादानम्।

(प्रथमप्रतीकभाष्यम्)

२३ **तेऽसुराः। तेऽसुरा हेलयो हेलय इति कुर्वन्तः पराबभूवुः। तस्माद्ब्राह्मणेन न म्लेच्छितवै नापभाषितवै। म्लेच्छो ह वा एष यदपशब्दः। म्लेच्छा मा भूमेत्यध्येयं व्याकरणम्। तेऽसुराः।**

(प्रदीपः) **तेऽसुरा हेऽलय इति।** निन्दाऽर्थवादेन '**न म्लेच्छितवै**' इति म्लेच्छनं निषिध्यते। तत्र **केचिदाहुः** '**हैहेप्रयोगे हैहयोः**' इति प्लुते प्रकृतिभावे च कर्तव्ये तदकरणं म्लेच्छनमिति। पदद्विर्वचने कार्ये वाक्यद्विर्वचनं लत्वं च म्लेच्छनमित्यपरे। **न म्लेच्छितवा** इत्यस्य पर्यायः **नापभाषितवा** इति। '**कृत्यार्थे**' इति तवैप्रत्ययः। **म्लेच्छ इति।** कर्मणि घञ्।

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e. ६.२.१.

f. ६.१.२२३.

३. Ben. अथ समासान्तोदात्तत्वम्.

(द्वितीयप्रतीकभाष्यम्)

२४ **दुष्टः शब्दः ।**

दुष्टः शब्दः स्वरतो वर्णतो वा मिथ्या प्रयुक्तो न तमर्थमाह ।
स वाग्वज्रो यजमानं हिनस्ति यथेन्द्रशत्रुः स्वरतोऽपराधात् ॥

दुष्टाञ्शब्दान्मा प्रयुक्ष्महीत्यध्येयं व्याकरणम् । दुष्टः शब्दः ।

(प्रदीपः) **दुष्टः शब्द इति।** स्वरेण **स्वरतः**, आद्यादित्वात्तसिः। **मिथ्याप्रयुक्त इति।** यदर्थप्रतिपादनाय प्रयुक्तस्ततोऽर्थान्तरं स्वरवर्णदोषात्प्रतिपादयन्नाभिमतमर्थमाहेत्यर्थः। वागेव **वज्रो** हिंसकत्वात्। यथेन्द्रशत्रुशब्दः स्वरदोषाद्यजमानं हिंसितवानित्यर्थः। इन्द्रस्याभिचारो वृत्रेणारब्धस्तत्र '**इन्द्रशत्रुर्वर्धस्व**' इति मन्त्र ऊहितः। तत्रेन्द्रस्य शमयिता शातयिता वा भव इति क्रियाशब्दोऽत्र **शत्रुशब्द** आश्रितो न तु रूढिशब्दः, तदाश्रयणे हि बहुव्रीहितत्पुरुषयोरर्थाभेदः। तत्रेन्द्रामित्रत्वे सिद्धे सति 'इन्द्रस्य शत्रुर्भव' इत्यत्रार्थे प्रतिपाद्येऽन्तोदात्ते प्रयोक्तव्य आद्युदात्त ऋत्विजा प्रयुक्त इति अर्थान्तराभिधानादिन्द्र एव वृत्रस्य शातयिता संपन्नः। इन्द्रशत्रुत्वस्य च विधेयत्वात् संबोधनविभक्तेरनुवाद्यविषयत्वादिहाभावः। यथा राजा भव युध्यस्वेति। ऊह्यमानस्य चामन्त्रत्वात् '**यज्ञकर्मणि**' इति जपादिपर्युदासेन मन्त्राणामेकश्रुतिर्विधीयमाना नेह भवति।

(तृतीयप्रतीकभाष्यम्)

२५ **यदधीतम् ।**

यदधीतमविज्ञातं निगदेनैव शब्द्यते ।
अनग्नाविव शुष्कैधो न तज्ज्वलति कर्हिचित् ॥

तस्मादनर्थकं माधिगीष्महीत्यध्येयं व्याकरणम् । यदधीतम् ।

(प्रदीपः) **अविज्ञातमिति।** अविदितसुबादिसंस्कारत्वात्, अर्थापरिज्ञानाद्वा। **निगदेनेति।** पाठमात्रेण। **न तज्ज्वलतीति।** निष्फलं भवति। **अनर्थकमिति।** निष्प्रयोजनम्।

(चतुर्थप्रतीकभाष्यम्)

२६ **यस्तु प्रयुङ्क्ते ।**

यस्तु प्रयुङ्क्ते कुशलो विशेषे शब्दान्यथावद् व्यवहारकाले ।
सोऽनन्तमाप्नोति जयं परत्र वाग्योगविद् दुष्यति चापशब्दैः ॥

कः । वाग्योगविदेव । कुत एतत् । यो हि शब्दाञ्जानात्यपशब्दानप्यसौ जानाति । यथैव हि शब्दज्ञाने धर्म एवमपशब्दज्ञानेऽप्यधर्मः । अथवा भूयानधर्मः प्राप्नोति । भूयांसोऽपशब्दा अल्पीयांसः शब्दाः । एकैकस्य हि शब्दस्य बहवोऽपभ्रंशाः । तद्यथा । गौरित्यस्य शब्दस्य गावी गोणी गोता गोपोतलिकेत्येवमादयोऽपभ्रंशाः । अथ योऽवाग्योगवित् । अज्ञानं तस्य शरणम् ।[4]

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४. Ben. शरणम्, विषम उपन्यास; नात्यन्ताय०.

(प्रदीप:) **यस्तु प्रयुङ्क्ते इति**। अनेनाभ्युदयहेतुत्वं व्याकरणाध्ययनस्य दर्शयति। **विशेष इति**। स एव शब्दः क्वचिदर्थे केनचिन्निमित्तेन प्रयुक्तः साधुः, अन्यथा **त्वसाधुः**। यथाऽश्वेऽस्वशब्दो धनाभावनिमित्तकः साधुः जातिनिमित्तकोऽसाधुः। गवि च गोणीशब्दः साधर्म्यात्प्रयुक्तः साधुः, जातिप्रयुक्तस्त्वसाधुः। **क इति**। वाग्योगविदः श्रुतत्वाद्दोषदर्शनाच्च **प्रश्नः**। प्रष्टैव परमतमाशङ्क्याह **वाग्योगविदेवेति**। **एवमपशब्दज्ञानेऽपीति**। यथा श्लैष्मिकद्रव्यसेवया श्लैष्मिकव्याधिसंभवः, तद्विपरीतसेवया त्वारोग्यं ; तथाऽत्रापि यथोक्तं न्याय्यमिति भावः। यदि मन्यसे बहवः शब्दाः, अल्पेऽपशब्दाः, अङ्गभूयस्त्वाच्च फलभूयस्त्वमिति। तन्न। यस्माद् भूयांसोऽपशब्दाः। **अज्ञानमिति**। तथा च तिरश्चां ब्रह्महत्यादिफलाभावः।

(समाधानबाधकभाष्यम्)

२७ **नात्यन्तायाज्ञानं शरणं भवितुमर्हति। यो ह्यजानन्वै ब्राह्मणं हन्यात्सुरां वा पिबेत्सोऽपि मन्ये पतितः स्यात्।**

(प्रदीप:) **नात्यन्तायेति**। पुरुषाणां विधिनिषेधयोरधिकारात्तत्परिज्ञाने प्रयत्नस्य न्याय्यत्वात्।

(सिध्दान्तभाष्यम्)

२८ **एवं तर्हि सोऽनन्तमाप्नोति जयं परत्र वाग्योगविद् दुष्यति चापशब्दैः। कः। अवाग्योगविदेव। अथ यो वाग्योगवित्। विज्ञानं तस्य शरणम्।**

(प्रदीप:) प्रकरणात्सामर्थ्यं बलीय इत्याह **अवाग्योगविदिति**। वाग्योगवित्तूभयज्ञोऽपि शब्दान्प्रयुङ्क्ते, नापशब्दान् इति ज्ञानपूर्वकप्रयोगादभ्युदयभाग्भवति।

(प्रश्नभाष्यम्)

२९ **क्व पुनरिदं पठितम्।**

(प्रदीप:) श्लोकस्यापरिज्ञानात्पृच्छति **क्व पुनरिति**। प्रातिपदिकार्थप्रश्ने चात्र तात्पर्यम्। किं तदस्ति यत्रेदं पठितमित्यर्थः। अत एव 'श्लोकाः' इति प्रथमान्तेनोत्तरम्। अन्यथा 'श्लोकेषु' इति वाच्यं स्यात्।

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

३० **भ्राजा नाम श्लोकाः।**

(आक्षेपभाष्यम्)

३१ **किं च भोः श्लोका अपि प्रमाणम्। किं चातः। यदि प्रमाणमयमपि श्लोकः प्रमाणं भवितुमर्हति।**

यदुदुम्बरवर्णानां घटीनां मण्डलं महत्।
पीतं न गमयेत्स्वर्गं किं तत्क्रतुगतं नयेदिति।

(प्रदीप:) आप्तोक्तत्वापरिज्ञानादाह **किं च भो इति**। **यदुदुम्बरेति**। अयं श्लोकः सौत्रामणियागे सुरापानस्य दुष्टत्वमुद्भावयति।

(उद्द्योतः) **उदुम्बरं** ताम्रम्।

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

३२ **प्रमत्तगीत एष तत्रभवतो यस्त्वप्रमत्तगीतस्तत्प्रमाणम् । यस्तु प्रयुङ्क्ते ।**

(प्रदीपः) **प्रमत्तगीत इति ।** प्रमादेन विप्रतिपन्नत्वेन गीत इत्यर्थः । कात्यायनोपनिबद्धभ्राजाख्यश्लोकमध्यपठितस्य त्वस्य श्लोकस्य श्रुतिरनुग्राहिकाऽस्ति "**एकः शब्दः सम्यग् ज्ञातः शास्त्रान्वितः सुप्रयुक्तः स्वर्गे लोके कामधुग्भवति**" इति ।

(पञ्चमप्रतीकभाष्यम्)

३३ **अविद्वांसः ।**

अविद्वांसः प्रत्यभिवादे नाम्नो ये न प्लुतिं विदुः ।
कामं तेषु तु विप्रोष्य स्त्रीष्विवायमहं वदेत् ॥

अभिवादे स्त्रीवन्मा भूमेत्यध्येयं व्याकरणम् । अविद्वांसः ।

(प्रदीपः) **स्त्रीष्विवेति ।** प्रत्यभिवादे हि गुरुणा प्लुतः कार्यः । यस्तु प्लुतं कर्तुं न जानाति स स्त्रीवद्वक्तव्यः अयमहम् इति, न तु 'अभिवादये देवदत्तोऽहम्' इत्यादिना संस्कृतेन वाक्येनेत्यर्थः ।

(षष्ठप्रतीकभाष्यम्)

३४ **विभक्तिं कुर्वन्ति । याज्ञिकाः पठन्ति । प्रयाजाः सविभक्तिकाः कार्या इति । न चान्तरेण व्याकरणं प्रयाजाः सविभक्तिकाः शक्याः कर्तुम् । विभक्तिं कुर्वन्ति ।**

(प्रदीपः) **प्रयाजा इति ।** प्रयाजमन्त्रा ऊह्यमानाऽग्निशब्दप्रकृतिकविभक्तियुक्ता इत्यर्थः । यथा "**समिधः समिधोऽग्नेऽग्न आज्यस्य व्यन्तु अग्नेऽग्न**" इति

(सप्तमप्रतीकभाष्यम्)

३५ **यो वा इमाम् । यो वा इमां पदशः स्वरशोऽक्षरशो वाचं विदधाति स आर्त्विजीनः[५] । आर्त्विजीनाः स्यामेत्यध्येयं व्याकरणम् । यो वा इमाम् ।**

(प्रदीपः) **पदश इति ।** पदं पदमिति '**संख्यैकवचनाच्च वीप्सायाम्**' इति शस् । **स्वरश इति ।** स्वरः उदात्तादिः । **अक्षरश इति ।** अक्षरं व्यञ्जनसहितोऽच् । **आर्त्विजीन इति ।** ऋत्विजमर्हतीति आर्त्विजीनः यजमानः । ऋत्विक्कर्मार्हतीति याजकोऽप्यार्त्विजीनः । '**यज्ञर्त्विग्भ्यां घखञौ**' इति सूत्रेण '**यज्ञर्त्विग्भ्यां तत्कर्मार्हतीति चोपसंख्यानम्**' इति वार्त्तिकेन च खञ् । '**विद्वान्यजेत, विद्वान्याजयेत्**' इति द्वयोरपि विदुषोरधिकारात् ।

(अष्टमप्रतीकभाष्यम्)

३६ **चत्वारि ।**

चत्वारि शृङ्गा त्रयो अस्य पादा द्वे शीर्षे सप्त हस्तासो अस्य ।
त्रिधा बद्धो वृषभो रोरवीति महो देवो मर्त्याँ आ विवेश ॥

ऋ. सं. ४।५८।३

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५. Ben. आर्त्विजीनो भवति. आर्त्विजीनाः

चत्वारि शृङ्गाणि चत्वारि पदजातानि नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपाताश्च। त्रयो अस्य पादास्त्रयः काला भूतभविष्यद्वर्तमानाः। द्वे शीर्षे द्वौ शब्दात्मानौ नित्यः कार्यश्च। सप्त हस्तासो अस्य सप्त विभक्तयः। त्रिधा बद्धस्त्रिषु स्थानेषु बद्ध उरसि कण्ठे शिरसीति। वृषभो वर्षणात्। रोरवीति शब्दं करोति। कुत एतत्। रौतिः शब्दकर्मा। महो देवो मर्त्याँ आविवेशेति। महान्देवः शब्दः। मर्त्या मरणधर्माणो मनुष्याः। तानाविवेश। महता देवेन नः साम्यं यथा स्यादित्यध्येयं व्याकरणम्।

(प्रदीपः) **चत्वारीति।** शब्दस्य वृषभत्वेन निरूपणम्। **त्रय काला इति।** लडादिविषयाः। **नित्यः कार्यश्चेति।** व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभेदेन। **सप्त विभक्तय इति।** सुप इत्यर्थः। केचित्तु तिङामपरिग्रहप्रसङ्गात्सह शेषेण सप्त कारकाणि विभक्तिशब्दाभिधेयानि इति व्याचक्षते। **वर्षणादिति।** कामानां ज्ञानपूर्वकानुष्ठानफलत्वात्। **महतेति।** परेण ब्रह्मणेत्यर्थः।

(नवमप्रतीकभाष्यम्)

३७ **अपर आह।**

चत्वारि वाक्परिमिता पदानि तानि विदुर्ब्राह्मणा ये मनीषिणः।

गुहा त्रीणि निहिता नेङ्गयन्ति तुरीयं वाचो मनुष्या वदन्ति॥

ऋ. सं. १।१६४।४५

चत्वारि वाक्परिमिता पदानि। चत्वारि पदजातानि नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपाताश्च। तानि विदुर्ब्राह्मणा ये मनीषिणः। मनस ईषिणो मनीषिणः। गुहा त्रीणि निहिता नेङ्गयन्ति। गुहायां त्रीणि निहितानि नेङ्गयन्ति। न चेष्टन्ते। न निमिषन्तीत्यर्थः। तुरीयं वाचो मनुष्या वदन्ति। तुरीयं ह वा एतद्वाचो यन्मनुष्येषु वर्तते। चतुर्थमित्यर्थः। चत्वारि।

(प्रदीपः) '**चत्वारि**' इत्यनेनैकदेशेन सदृशेन वाक्यान्तरमपि सूच्यत इत्याह **अपर आहेति।** परिमितानि इति प्राप्ते '**शेश्छन्दसि बहुलम्**' इति शेर्लोपे परिमिता इति भवति। परिमितानि परिच्छिन्नानि, एतावन्त्येवेत्यर्थः। मनीषिशब्दः **पृषोदरादित्वात्साधुः।** कथं मनीषिण एव विदन्तीत्याह **गुहेति।** अज्ञानमेव गुहा, तस्यामित्यर्थः। '**सुपां सुलुक्—**' इति सप्तम्या लुक्। व्याकरणप्रदीपेन तु तानि प्रकाशन्ते। तत्र चतुर्णां पदजातानामेकैकस्य चतुर्थं भागं मनुष्या अवैयाकरणा वदन्ति। **नेङ्गयन्तीत्यस्यैव** व्याख्यानं न चेष्टन्ते, न निमिषन्तीति।

(उद्द्योतः) **वाक्परिमितानी**ति षष्ठीतत्पुरुषः। **पदजातानि** परापश्यन्तीमध्यमावैखर्यः, नामादीनि च। नामादिमध्ये च एकैकं चतुष्पादम्। **गुहा** अज्ञानं, हृदयादिरूपा च। वैयाकरणस्तु शास्त्रबलेन तद्बललब्धयोगेन च गुहाऽन्धकारं विदीर्य सर्वं जानातीति भावः।

(दशमप्रतीकभाष्यम्)

३८ उत त्वः ।

उत त्वः पश्यन्न ददर्श वाचमुत त्वः शृण्वन्न शृणोत्येनाम् ।

उतो त्वस्मै तन्वं वि सस्रे जायेव पत्य उशती सुवासाः ॥

ऋ. सं. १०।७१।४

अपि खल्वेकः[६] पश्यन्नपि न पश्यति वाचम् । अपि खल्वेकः शृण्वन्नपि न शृणोत्येनाम् । अविद्वांसमाहार्धम् । उतो त्वस्मै तन्वं विसस्रे । तनुं विवृणुते । जायेव पत्य उशती सुवासाः । तद्यथा जाया पत्ये कामयमाना सुवासाः स्वमात्मानं विवृणुत एवं वाग्वाग्विदे स्वमात्मानं विवृणुते । वाङ् नो विवृणुयादात्मानमित्यध्येयं व्याकरणम् । उत त्वः ।

(प्रदीपः) उत त्व इति । त्वशब्दोऽन्यवाची । उतशब्द अपिशब्दसार्थे । स च भिन्नक्रमः, प्रत्यक्षेण शब्दस्वरूपमुपलभमानोऽप्यर्थापरिज्ञानान्न पश्यतीत्यर्थः । उतो इति । 'उत-उ' इति निपातसमाहारः । अविद्वांसमाहार्धमिति । अविद्वल्लक्षणमर्थमर्द्धर्च आहेत्यर्थः ।

(उद्द्योतः) एवमर्धेनाविद्वांसं निन्दित्वाऽर्धान्तरेण विद्वांसं स्तौति उतो त्वस्मै । यथा स पुरुषस्तां यथावत्पश्यति, शृणोति तद्वचनार्थं; नान्यदा घनपटप्रावृतशरीराम् । एवं स एवैनां वाचं पदशः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययविभागेन विगृह्यार्थमस्याः पश्यति शृणोति चेति । अयमर्थो निरुक्ततद्भाष्ययोः (१ अ. १९ ख.) स्पष्टः । भाष्ये वाग्विदे वैयाकरणाय ।

(एकादशप्रतीकभाष्यम्)

३९ सक्तुमिव ।

सक्तुमिव तितउना पुनन्तो यत्र धीरा मनसा वाचमक्रत ।

अत्रा सखायः सख्यानि जानते भद्रैषां लक्ष्मीर्निहिताधि वाचि ॥

ऋ. सं. १०।७१।२

सक्तुः सचतेर्दुर्धावो भवति । कसतेर्वा विपरीताद्विकसितो भवति । तितउ परिपवनं भवति ततवद्वा तुन्नवद्वा । धीरा ध्यानवन्तो मनसा प्रज्ञानेन वाचमक्रत वाचमकृषत । अत्रा सखायः सख्यानि जानते । अत्र सखायः सन्तः सख्यानि जानते । सायुज्यानि जानते[७] । क । य एष दुर्गो मार्ग एकगम्यो वाग्विषयः । के पुनस्ते । वैयाकरणाः । कुत एतत् । भद्रैषां लक्ष्मीर्निहिताधि वाचि । एषां वाचि भद्रा लक्ष्मीर्निहिता भवति । लक्ष्मीर्लक्षणाद्भासनात्परिवृढा भवति । सक्तुमिव ।

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६. उत त्वः अपि खल्वेकः.

७. Ben. om सायुज्यानि जानते०

(प्रदीपः) **सचतेरिति** । 'षच सेचने' इत्यस्य । **दुर्धाव इति** । दुःशोधः । यथा तितउना सक्तोस्तुषाद्यपनीयते तथा व्याकरणेन वाचोऽपशब्दा इत्यर्थः । **कसतेरिति** । पृषोदरादित्वाद्वर्णव्यत्ययः । **ततवदिति** । विस्तार-युक्तमित्यर्थः । **तुन्नवदिति** । बहुच्छिद्रम् । **धीरा इति** । वैयाकरणाः । **वाचमक्रतेति** । अपशब्देभ्यो विविक्तां कृतवन्तः । '**मन्त्रे घस**' इति लेर्लुकि 'अक्रत' इति रूपम् । **अत्रा सखाय इति** । '**ऋचि तुनुघ**' इति दीर्घः । **सखायः** समानख्यातयो भेदग्रहस्य निवृत्तत्वात्सर्वमेकमिति मन्यते । **सख्यानीति** । सायुज्यानीत्यर्थः । **एकगम्य इति** । ज्ञानेनैव प्राप्यः । **वाचीति** । वेदाख्ये ब्रह्मणि या लक्ष्मीर्वेदान्तेषु परमार्थसंविल्लक्षणोक्ता सैषां निहितेत्यर्थः ।

(उद्योतः) **क्वेति** । 'किं तत् यत्र सायुज्यानि प्राप्नुवन्ति' इति **प्रश्नः** । उत्तरयति **य एष इति** ।

(द्वादशप्रतीकभाष्यम्)

४० **सारस्वतीम् । याज्ञिकाः पठन्ति । आहिताग्निरपशब्दं प्रयुज्य प्राय-श्चित्तीयां सारस्वतीमिष्टिं निर्वपेदिति । प्रायश्चित्तीया मा भूमेत्यध्येयं व्याकरणम् । सारस्वतीम् ।**

(प्रदीपः) **प्रायश्चित्तीयामिति** । भवार्थे 'वृद्धाच्छः' । **प्रायश्चित्तीया इति** । प्रायश्चित्ताय पापशोधनाय श्रुतिस्मृतिविहिताय कर्मणे हिताः तन्निमित्तोत्पादका मा भूमेत्यर्थः ।

(त्रयोदशप्रतीकभाष्यम्)

४१ **दशम्यां पुत्रस्य । याज्ञिकाः पठन्ति । दशम्युत्तरकालं पुत्रस्य जातस्य नाम विदध्याद्घोषवदाद्यन्तरन्तःस्थमवृद्धं त्रिपुरुषानूकमनरिप्रतिष्ठितं तद्धि प्रतिष्ठिततमं भवति । द्व्यक्षरं चतुरक्षरं वा नाम कृतं कुर्यान्न तद्धितमिति । न चान्तरेण व्याकरणं कृतस्तद्धिता वा शक्या विज्ञातुम् । दशम्यां पुत्रस्य ।**

(प्रदीपः) **दशम्युत्तरकालमिति** । दशम्या उत्तर इति '**पञ्चमी**' इति योगविभागात्समासः । ततः कालशब्देन बहुव्रीहिः । क्रियाविशेषणं चैतत् । दश दिनान्यशौचं भवति इति दशम्युत्तरकालमित्युक्तम् । येऽपि गृह्यकाराः पठन्ति '**दशम्यां पुत्रस्य**' इति, तैर्दशम्यामिति सामीपिकमधिकरणं व्याख्येयम् । **घोष-वदादीति** । घोषवन्तो ये वर्णाः शिक्षायां प्रदर्शिताः, तदादि । **अन्तरन्तःस्थमिति** । मध्ये यरलवा यस्य तदित्यर्थः । **त्रिपुरुषानूकमिति** । नामकरणे योऽधिकारी पिता तस्य ये त्रयः पुरुषास्ताननुकायति अभिधत्त इति त्रिपुरुषानूकम्, '**अन्येषामपि दृश्यते**' इति दीर्घः ।

(चतुर्दशप्रतीकभाष्यम्)

४२ **सुदेवो असि ।**

सुदेवो असि वरुण यस्य ते सप्त सिन्धवः ।
अनुक्षरन्ति काकुदं सूर्म्यं सुषिरामिव ॥

ऋ. सं. ८ ६९।१२

सुदेवो असि वरुण सत्यदेवोऽसि यस्य ते सप्त सिन्धवः सप्त विभक्तयः । अनुक्षरन्ति काकुदम् । काकुदं तालु । काकुर्जिह्वा साऽस्मिन्नुद्यत इति काकुदम् । सूर्म्यं सुषिरामिव । तद्यथा शोभनामूर्मिं सुषिरामग्निरन्तः प्रविश्य दहत्येवं तव सप्त सिन्धवः सप्त विभक्तयः ताल्वनुक्षरन्ति । तेनासि सत्यदेवः । सत्यदेवाः स्यामेत्यध्येयं व्याकरणम् । सुदेवो असि ।

(प्रदीपः) **सुदेवो असीति ।** वरुणस्येयं स्तुतिः । यस्मै हेतोर्व्याकरणज्ञानाद्वरुणः सत्यदेवः, ततो हेतोरन्येऽपि सत्यदेवा भवन्तीत्यर्थः । **सिन्धव इति ।** नद्य इव विभक्तय इत्यर्थः । **अनुक्षरन्तीति ।** ताल्वनुप्राप्य प्रकाशन्त इत्यर्थः । **साऽस्मिन्नुद्यत इति ।** अनेकार्थत्वाद्धातूनां 'उत्क्षिप्यते' इत्यर्थः । **सूर्म्यमिति ।** 'सूर्मिं' इति प्राप्ते '**अमि पूर्वः**' इत्यत्र '**वा छन्दसि**' इत्यनुवृत्त्या यणादेशः ।

(उद्द्योतः) **सूर्मिं** शोभनामयःप्रतिमाम्, **सुषिरां**–'**ऊषसुषि**'–इति रप्रत्ययेन सच्छिद्रां प्रविश्याग्निर्यथा तत्रत्यं मलं भस्मीकृत्य प्रतिमां शुद्धां करोति, एवं तालुदेशे प्रकाशं प्राप्य विभक्तयः विभक्त्यन्ताः शब्दाः शारीरं पापमपाकुर्वन्तीत्यर्थः । अनेन स्वर्गप्राप्तिः फलमित्युक्तम् ।

(प्रश्नभाष्यम्)

४३ **किं पुनरिदं व्याकरणमेवाधिजिगांसमानेभ्यः प्रयोजनमन्वाख्यायते न पुनरन्यदपि किंचित् । ओमित्युक्त्वा वृत्तान्तशः शमित्येवमादीञ्शब्दान्पठन्ति ।**

(प्रदीपः) किं **पुनरिति ।** ननु '**कानि पुनरस्य**' इति येन पृष्टं स एव कथं पृच्छति '**किं पुनर्**' इति । एवं तर्हि भाष्यकारः प्रयोजनान्वाख्यानस्य विषयविभागं दर्शयति । पुरा वेदाध्ययनात्पूर्वं व्याकरणमधीयते ते बाल्यात्प्रष्टुमसमर्था इति न प्रयोजनमन्वाख्येयम् । अद्यत्वे तु स्वल्पायुष्ट्वात्पूर्वमेव वेदं प्रधानमधीयते, अतः प्रष्टुं समर्थत्वाद् व्याकरणाध्ययनस्य प्रयोजनं पृच्छन्तीत्यवश्यान्वाख्येयं प्रयोजनम् । न **पुनरन्यदिति ।** वेदमप्यधिजिगांसमानेभ्य इत्यर्थः । **ॐ इत्युक्त्वेति ।** अभ्युपगम्येत्यर्थः । **वृत्तान्तश इति ।** वृत्तान्तः प्रपाठक उच्यते । वृत्तान्तं वृत्तान्तं प्रति इत्यर्थः ।

(उद्द्योतः) **एवं तर्हीति ।** 'वेदातिरिक्तविषय एव प्रयोजनान्वाख्यानं, न तु वेदविषये' इत्येवंरूपं **विषयविभागम् ।**

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

४४ पुराकल्प एतदासीत् । संस्कारोत्तरकालं ब्राह्मणा व्याकरणं स्माधीयते । तेभ्यस्तत्र स्थानकरणानुप्रदानज्ञेभ्यो[८] वैदिकाः शब्दा उपदिश्यन्ते । तदद्यत्वे न तथा । वेदमधीत्य त्वरिता वक्तारो भवन्ति । वेदान्नो वैदिकाः शब्दाः सिद्धा लोकाच्च लौकिकाः । अनर्थकं व्याकरणमिति । तेभ्य एवं विप्रतिपन्नबुद्धिभ्योऽध्येतृभ्य[९] आचार्य इदं शास्त्रमन्वाचष्टे । इमानि प्रयोजनान्यध्येयं व्याकरणमिति ।

(प्रदीपः) अद्यत्वेशब्दो निपातः अस्मिन् काल इत्यत्रार्थे वर्तते । त्वरिता इति । विवाहादौ ।

(उद्योतः) भाष्ये उत्तरमाह—**पुराकल्पे इति**। युगान्तरे इत्यर्थः। **संस्कारः** उपनयनम्। **करणम्**—आभ्यन्तरप्रयत्नः। **अनुप्रदानं**—नादादिबाह्यप्रयत्नः। तेनाधीतव्याकरणशिक्षेभ्य इत्यर्थः। भाष्ये **आचार्यपदेन** शास्त्राध्यापको भाष्यकृदेव विवक्षितः।

(अनुबन्धचतुष्टयोपसंहारभाष्यम्)

४५ उक्तः शब्दः । स्वरूपमप्युक्तम् । प्रयोजनान्यप्युक्तानि ।

(उद्द्योतः) भाष्ये—**उक्तः शब्दः इति**। '**लौकिकानां वैदिकानां च**' इत्यनेन विषयभूतः शब्द उक्त इत्यर्थः। **स्वरूपमपीति**। '**अथ गौः**' इत्यादिना। अयमुपसंहारो ग्रन्थस्य विषयप्रयोजननिरूपणमेतावता कृतमिति बोधयितुम्।

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(अथ शास्त्ररीतिनिरूपणाधिकरणम्)

(प्रश्नभाष्यम्)

४६ शब्दानुशासनमिदानीं कर्तव्यम् । तत्कथं कर्तव्यम् । किं शब्दोपदेशः कर्तव्य आहोस्विदपशब्दोपदेश आहोस्विदुभयोपदेश इति ।

(प्रदीपः) **उभयोपदेश इति**। हेयोपादेयोपदेशे स्पष्टा प्रतिपत्तिर्भवति इत्युभयोपदेश उद्भावितः।

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

४७ अन्यतरोपदेशेन कृतं स्यात् । तद्यथा । भक्ष्यनियमेनाभक्ष्यप्रतिषेधो गम्यते । पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या इत्युक्ते गम्यत एतदतोऽन्येऽभक्ष्या इति । अभक्ष्यप्रतिषेधेन वा भक्ष्यनियमः । तद्यथा । अभक्ष्यो ग्राम्यकुक्कुटोऽभक्ष्यो ग्राम्यशूकर इत्युक्ते गम्यत एतदारण्यो भक्ष्य इति । एवमिहापि

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८. Ben. स्थानकरणनादानु०.

९. Ben. अध्येतृभ्यः सुहृद् भूत्वा.

यदि तावच्छब्दोपदेशः क्रियते गौरित्येतस्मिन्नुपदिष्टे गम्यत एतद्गाव्यादयोऽपशब्दा इति । अथापशब्दोपदेशः[10] क्रियते गाव्यादिषूपदिष्टेषु गम्यत एतद्गौरित्येष शब्द इति ।

(प्रदीपः) यद्यपि प्रतिपत्तिः स्पष्टा, गौरवं तु भवतीत्याह- **अन्यतरेति** । शब्दापशब्दयोरित्यर्थः । अन्यतरान्यतमशब्दावव्युत्पन्नौ स्वभावात् द्विबहुविषये निर्धारणे वर्तेते । **पञ्चेति** । अर्थित्वाद् भक्षणं प्राप्तं पञ्चसु पञ्चनखेषु नियम्यमानं सामर्थ्यादन्येभ्यो निवर्तते । न त्वयं विधिः, अप्राप्तेरभावात् ।

(प्रश्नभाष्यम्)

४८ **किं पुनरत्र ज्यायः ।**

(प्रदीपः) **किं पुनरिति** । उभयोपदेशाद् गुरोर्द्वावपि प्रशस्यौ, तयोः को ज्यायानित्यर्थः ।

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

४९ **लघुत्वाच्छब्दोपदेशः । लघीयाञ्शब्दोपदेशो गरीयानपशब्दोपदेशः । एकैकस्य शब्दस्य बहवोऽपभ्रंशाः । तद्यथा । गौरित्यस्य शब्दस्य गावीगोणीगोतागोपोतलिकादयोऽपभ्रंशाः । इष्टान्वाख्यानं खल्वपि भवति ।**

(प्रदीपः) **इष्टेति** । साधुप्रयोगाद्धर्मावाप्तेरित्यर्थः । **अथवा** उपादेयोपदेशात्साक्षात्प्रतिपत्तिर्भवतीति भावः ।

(आक्षेपभाष्यम्)

५० **अथैतस्मिञ्शब्दोपदेशे सति किं शब्दानां प्रतिपत्तौ प्रतिपदपाठः कर्तव्यः । गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्ती शकुनिर्मृगो ब्राह्मण इत्येवमादयः शब्दाः पठितव्याः ।**

(समाधानभाष्यम्

५१ **नेत्याह । अनभ्युपाय एष शब्दानां प्रतिपत्तौ प्रतिपदपाठः । एवं हि श्रूयते । बृहस्पतिरिन्द्राय दिव्यं वर्षसहस्रं प्रतिपदोक्तानां शब्दानां शब्दपारायणं प्रोवाच नान्तं जगाम । बृहस्पतिश्च प्रवक्तेन्द्रश्चाध्येता । दिव्यं वर्षसहस्रमध्ययनकालो न चान्तं जगाम । किं पुनरद्यत्वे । यः सर्वथा चिरं जीवति स वर्षशतं जीवति । चतुर्भिश्च प्रकारैर्विद्योपयुक्ता भवत्यागमकालेन स्वाध्यायकालेन प्रवचनकालेन व्यवहारकालेनेति । तत्र चागमकालेनैवायुः[11] पर्युपयुक्तं स्यात् । तस्मादनभ्युपायः शब्दानां प्रतिपत्तौ प्रतिपदपाठः ।**

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१०. Ben. अथाप्यपशब्दोपदेशः.

११. तत्र चास्यागम०.

(प्रदीपः) **बृहस्पतिरिन्द्रायेति।** प्रतिपदपाठस्याशक्यत्वं प्रतिपादयितुमयमर्थवादः। **शब्दानामिति।** 'शब्दपारायण' शब्दो योगरूढः शास्त्रविशेषस्य। तत्र 'प्रतिपदोक्तानाम्' इति विशेषणाभिधानाय गम्यमानार्थस्यापि 'शब्दानाम्' इत्यस्य प्रयोगः। एकदेशोपयोगादपि लोके 'उपयुक्तम्' इत्युच्यते। यथा औषधसंस्कृतघृतमात्रैकदेशोपयोगे 'उपयुक्तं घृतम्' इति व्यवहारः, तथेह न इति प्रतिपादयति **चतुर्भिरिति। आगमकालः :** ग्रहणकालः। **स्वाध्यायकाल :** अभ्यासकालः। **प्रवचनकाल :** अध्यापनकालः। **व्यवहारो** याज्ञे कर्मणि।

(उद्योतः) चतुर्षु कालेषु विद्योपयुज्यते इति फलितोऽर्थः। तत्राद्ययोः 'विद्यार्थ्ययं बुद्धिमान्' इत्यादरपूर्वकमन्नवस्त्रादिलाभरूप उपयोगः। तृतीये प्रतिष्ठा, सच्छिष्यलाभद्वाराऽर्थप्राप्तिः, सत्कारविशेषश्च। चतुर्थे यज्ञाद्यनुष्ठानकालेऽपशब्दप्रयोगप्रयुक्तप्रायश्चित्ताभावः, कर्मसाङ्गता, दक्षिणालाभः, प्रतिष्ठा चेत्युपयोगः। तादृशश्चोपयोगः सर्वाध्ययन एव।

(प्रश्नभाष्यम्)

५२ **कथं तर्हीमे शब्दाः प्रतिपत्तव्याः।**

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

५३ **किंचित्सामान्यविशेषवल्लक्षणं प्रवर्त्यं येनाल्पेन यत्नेन महतो महतः शब्दौघान्प्रतिपद्येरन्। किं पुनस्तत्। उत्सर्गापवादौ। कश्चिदुत्सर्गः कर्तव्यः, कश्चिदपवादः।**

(प्रदीपः) **किंचिदिति।** सामान्यविशेषौ यस्मिंस्तत् सामान्यविशेषवत्। '**कर्मण्यण्**', '**आतोऽनुपसर्गे** कः' इत्यादि।

(प्रश्नभाष्यम)

५४ **कथंजातीयकः पुनरुत्सर्गः कर्तव्यः कथंजातीयकोऽपवादः।**

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

५५ **सामान्येनोत्सर्गः कर्तव्यः। तद्यथा। कर्मण्यण्। [३.२.१]। तस्य विशेषेणापवादः। तद्यथा। आतोऽनुपसर्गे कः [३.२.३]।**

४

(अथ आकृतिद्रव्यपदार्थनिर्णयाधिकरणम्)

(प्रश्नभाष्यम्)

५६ **किं पुनराकृतिः पदार्थ आहोस्विद् द्रव्यम्।**

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

५७ **उभयमित्याह। कथं ज्ञायते। उभयथा ह्याचार्येण सूत्राणि पठितानि। आकृतिं पदार्थं मत्वा जात्याख्यायामेकस्मिन्बहुवचनमन्यतरस्याम्**

[१.२.५८] इत्युच्यते । द्रव्यं पदार्थं मत्वा सरूपाणाम् [१.२.६४] इत्येकशेष आरभ्यते ।

(प्रदीपः) सकलशास्त्रव्यवस्था एकतरपक्षाश्रयणे न सिध्यतीति पक्षद्वयाश्रयणं प्रश्नपूर्वकं करोति **किं पुनरिति** । आकृतिपक्षे केवल आश्रीयमाणे '**सकृद्गतौ विप्रतिषेधे**' इत्यादि नोपपद्यते, केवलेऽपि व्यक्तिपक्षे '**पुनःप्रसङ्गविज्ञानात्**' इत्यादि न घटते । तस्माल्लक्ष्यसिद्धये क्वचित्प्रदेशे कश्चित्पक्षः परिगृह्यते । तत्र **जातिवादिन आहुः** जातिरेव शब्देन प्रतिपाद्यते, व्यक्तीनामानन्त्यात्संबन्धग्रहणासंभवात् । सा च जातिः सर्वव्यक्तिष्वेकाकारप्रत्ययदर्शनादस्तीत्यवसीयते । तत्र गवादयः शब्दा भिन्नद्रव्यसमवेतां जातिमभिदधति । तस्यां प्रतीतायां तदावेशात्तदवच्छिन्नं द्रव्यं प्रतीयते । शुक्लादयः शब्दा गुणसमवेतां जातिमाचक्षते । गुणे तु तत्संबन्धात्प्रत्ययः, द्रव्ये संबन्धिसंबन्धात् । संज्ञाशब्दानामप्युत्पत्तिप्रभृत्या विनाशात् पिण्डस्य कौमारयौवनाद्यवस्थाभेदेऽपि स एवायमित्यभिन्नप्रत्ययनिमित्ता डित्थत्वादिका जातिर्वाच्या । क्रियास्वपि जातिर्विद्यते, सैव धातुवाच्या । पठति पठतः पठन्ति—इत्यादेरभिन्नस्य प्रत्ययस्य सद्भावात्तन्निमित्तजात्यभ्युपगमः । **व्यक्तिवादिनस्त्वाहुः** शब्दस्य व्यक्तिरेवाभिधेया, जातेस्तूपलक्षणभावेनाश्रयणादानन्त्यादिदोषानवकाशः ।

५

(शब्दनित्यत्वानित्यत्वविचाराधिकरणम्)

(प्रश्नभाष्यम्)

५८ **किं पुनर्नित्यः शब्दः, आहोस्वित्कार्यः ।**

(प्रदीपः) **किं पुनरिति** । विप्रतिपत्त्या संशयः । **केचित्** ध्वनिव्यङ्ग्यं वर्णात्मकं नित्यं शब्द**माहुः** । **अन्ये** वर्णव्यतिरिक्तं पदस्फोटमिच्छन्ति । वाक्यस्फोट**मपरे** संगिरन्ते । अन्ये तु ध्वनिरेव शब्दः स च कार्यः, तद्व्यतिरेकेणान्यस्यानुपलम्भात् इत्याचक्षते ।

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

५९ **संग्रह एतत्प्राधान्येन परीक्षितं नित्यो वा स्यात्कार्यो वेति । तत्रोक्ता दोषाः प्रयोजनान्यप्युक्तानि । तत्र त्वेष निर्णयो यद्येव नित्योऽथापि कार्य उभयथापि लक्षणं प्रवर्त्यमिति ।**

(प्रदीपः) **संग्रह इति** । ग्रन्थविशेषे ।

(उद्द्योतः) व्याडिकृतो लक्षश्लोकसंख्यो ग्रन्थ इति प्रसिद्धिः । भाष्ये **उभयथाऽपीति** । एवं च निष्फलोऽयं विचार इति भावः । साधुत्वज्ञानायोभयथाऽपि शास्त्रमावश्यकमिति तात्पर्यम् ॥

६

(अथ व्याकरणस्य मूलनिबन्धननिर्णयाधिकरणम्)

(वार्त्तिकावतरणभाष्यम्)

६० **कथं पुनरिदं भगवतः पाणिनेराचार्यस्य लक्षणं प्रवृत्तम् ।**

(प्रदीपः) **कथं पुनरिति ।** किमाचार्य एव स्रष्टा शब्दार्थसंबन्धानाम्, अथ-स्मर्तेति प्रश्नः ।

(उद्द्योतः) **शब्दार्थसंबन्धानामिति ।** शब्दाश्चार्थाश्च संबन्धाश्चेति द्वन्द्वः । एवं च किमपूर्वशब्दनिष्पादानद्वारार्थविशेषसंबन्धनिष्पादकत्वं शास्त्रस्य, किं वा सिद्ध-शब्दार्थसंबन्धनिष्पादकत्वमिति प्रश्नार्थ इति तात्पर्यम् ।

(शब्दार्थसंबन्धप्रतिष्ठितशास्त्रनिरूपकवार्त्तिकप्रथमखण्डम्)

सिद्धे शब्दार्थसंबन्धे ॥ ३ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

६१ **सिद्धे शब्देऽर्थे संबन्धे चेति ।**

(प्रदीपः) **सिद्ध इति ।** तत्र नित्यः **शब्दो** जातिस्फोटलक्षणो व्यक्तिस्फोटलक्षणो वा । कार्यशब्दिकानामपि मते प्रवाहनित्यतया **अर्थ**स्यापि जातिलक्षणस्य नित्यत्वम् । द्रव्यपक्षेऽपि सर्वशब्दानामसत्योपाध्यवच्छिन्नं ब्रह्मतत्त्वं वाच्यमिति नित्यता, प्रवाह-नित्यतया वा । **संबन्ध**स्यापि व्यवहारपरम्परयाऽनादित्वान्नित्यता ।

(प्रश्नभाष्यम्)

६२ **अथ सिद्धशब्दस्य कः पदार्थः ।**

(प्रदीपः) सिद्धशब्दस्य नित्यानित्ययोर्दर्शनात्पृच्छति—**अथेति ।**

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

६३ **नित्यपर्यायवाची सिद्धशब्दः । कथं ज्ञायते । यत्कूटस्थेष्वविचालिषु भावेषु वर्तते । तद्यथा सिद्धा द्यौः, सिद्धा पृथिवी, सिद्धमाकाशमिति ।**

(प्रदीपः) **नित्येति ।** नित्यलक्षणस्यार्थस्य पर्यायेण वाचकः, तमेवावार्थं कदाचि-न्नित्यशब्द आह कदाचित्सिद्धशब्द इत्यर्थः । **कूटस्थेष्विति ।** अविनाशिषु । **अविचालिष्विति ।** देशान्तरप्राप्तिरहितेषु ।

(उद्योतः) **कूटस्थेष्विति ।** कूटम् अयोघनस्तद्वत्तिष्ठन्ति ये तेषु, संसर्गिनाशेऽपि स्वयमनष्टेष्वित्यर्थः । नन्वयोघनस्यापि तर्हि नित्यत्वं स्यादत आह **अविचालि-ष्विति ।** भाष्ये द्यावापृथिव्याद्यपि व्यावहारिकनित्यत्वाभिप्रायेण दृष्टान्तितम् । आकाशस्यापि व्यावहारिकनित्यत्वमेवाचार्याभिमतम् । एवंच तत्र रूढत्वान्नित्यवाचक-स्यैव ग्रहणमिति भावः ।

(आक्षेपभाष्यम्)

६४ **ननु च भोः कार्येष्वपि वर्तते। तद्यथा। सिद्ध ओदनः, सिद्धः सूपः, सिद्धा यवागूरिति। यावता कार्येष्वपि वर्तते तत्र कुत एतन्नित्यपर्यायवाचिनो ग्रहणं न पुनः कार्ये यः सिद्धशब्द[१२] इति**

(प्रदीपः) **ननु चेति।** सिद्धशब्दात्क्रियानिष्पन्नोऽप्यर्थोऽवगम्यत इत्यर्थः।

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

६५ **संग्रहे तावत्कार्यप्रतिद्वन्द्विभावान्मन्यामहे नित्यपर्यायवाचिनो ग्रहणमिति। इहापि तदेव।**

(प्रदीपः) **संग्रहे तावदिति।** तत्र हि 'किं **कार्यः** शब्दोऽथ **सिद्धः**' इति पक्षद्वयविचारः कृतः। तत्र कार्यप्रतिपक्षार्थाभिधायी सामर्थ्यात्सिद्धशब्द इति स्थितम्। तत्समानतन्त्रत्वादिहापि तथैव युक्तमित्यर्थः।

(समाधानान्तरभाष्यम्)

६६ **अथवा सन्त्येकपदान्यप्यवधारणानि। तद्यथाब्भक्षो वायुभक्ष इत्यप एव भक्षयति वायुमेव भक्षयतीति गम्यते। एवमिहापि सिद्ध एव न साध्य इति।**

(प्रदीपः) **अथवेति।** एवशब्दप्रयोगे द्विपदमवधारणम्, द्योतकत्वेनैवशब्दसापेक्षणात्। यदा तु द्योतकमन्तरेण सामर्थ्यादवधारणं गम्यते तदा तत्–**एकपदमि**त्युच्यते। तत्र 'सर्व एवापो भक्षयन्ति' इत्यब्भक्षश्रुतिः सामर्थ्यान्नियममवगयति **अप एवेति।** इहापि नित्यानित्यव्यतिरेकेण राश्यन्तराभावात्सिद्धशब्दोपादानान्नियमोऽवगम्यते **सिद्ध एवेति।** कार्याणां तु पदार्थानां प्राक्प्रध्वंसावस्थयोः सिद्धता नास्तीति न ते सिद्धा एव।

(समाधानान्तरभाष्यम्)

६७ **अथवा पूर्वपदलोपोऽत्र द्रष्टव्यः। अत्यन्तसिद्धः सिद्ध इति। तद्यथा। देवदत्तो दत्तः, सत्यभामा भामेति।**

(प्रदीपः) **अथवेति।** कथं पुनर्देवदत्तशब्दे संज्ञात्वेन विनियुक्ते एकदेशः प्रयुज्यते, न ह्यसौ संज्ञात्वेन विनियुक्तः। न चैकदेशात् स्मर्यमाणस्य समुदायस्य वाचकत्वमुपपद्यते, प्रतीयमानस्य प्रत्यायकत्वासंभवादुच्चार्यमाणस्यैव वाचकत्वात्। एवं तर्ह्यनुनिष्पादिन्योऽवयवसरूपाः संज्ञा विनियोगकाले विनियुक्ता एव। लोपस्तु वर्णानां साधुत्वं मा भूदित्यन्वाख्यायते। इहापि नित्यानित्ययोर्निष्पन्नत्वाविशेषात्सिद्धश्रुतिरुपात्ता प्रकर्षं गमयति **अत्यन्तसिद्ध इति।**

(समाधानान्तरभाष्यम्)

६८ **अथवा व्याख्यानतो विशेषप्रतिपत्तिर्न हि संदेहादलक्षणमिति नित्यपर्यायवाचिनो ग्रहणमिति व्याख्यास्यामः।**

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१२. Ben. यः सिद्धशब्दस्तस्येति.

(प्रदीपः) न्यायाद्वा नित्यत्वं शब्दादीनां स्थितमित्याह **अथवेति**। न हि संदेहमात्रादलक्षणता भवति, पुनः प्रमाणान्तरेण निश्चयोत्पादात्।

(उद्द्योतः) ननु निर्युक्तिकं व्याख्यानमयुक्तं, विपरीतस्यापि संभवादत आह **न्यायाद्वेति**। वृद्धव्यवहारादेव पदार्थसंबन्धानां नित्यत्वं संग्रहादौ स्थितमिति व्याख्यानतः सिद्धशब्देन तदेवोपात्तमित्यर्थः।

(आक्षेपभाष्यम्)

६९ **किं पुनरनेन वर्ण्येन। किं न महता कण्ठेन नित्यशब्द एवोपात्तो यस्मिन्नुपादीयमानेऽसंदेहः स्यात्।**

(प्रदीपः) **वर्ण्येनेति**। प्रयत्नव्याख्यातव्येनेत्यर्थः।

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

७० **मङ्गलार्थम्। माङ्गलिक आचार्यो महतः शास्त्रौघस्य मङ्गलार्थं सिद्धशब्दमादितः प्रयुङ्क्ते। मङ्गलादीनि हि शास्त्राणि प्रथन्ते वीरपुरुषकाणि च भवन्त्यायुष्मत्पुरुषकाणि चाध्येतारश्च सिद्धार्था यथा स्युरिति।**

(प्रदीपः) **माङ्गलिक इति**। अगर्हिताभीष्टार्थसिद्धिः मङ्गलं, तत्प्रयोजन आचार्यो माङ्गलिकः। **प्रथन्त इति**। अध्ययनस्याविच्छेदात्। **वीरपुरुषाणीति**। श्रोतॄणां परैरपराजयात् **आयुष्मत्पुरुषाणीति**। शास्त्रार्थानुष्ठाने धर्मोपचयादायुर्वर्धनात्। **सिद्धार्था इति**। अध्ययननिवृत्तिरेव तेषां सिद्धिः।

(समाधानशेषभाष्यम्)

७१ **अयं खल्वपि नित्यशब्दो नावश्यं कूटस्थेष्वविचालिषु भावेषु वर्तते। तद्यथा। नित्यप्रहसितो नित्यप्रजल्पित इति। यावताभीक्ष्ण्येऽपि वर्तते तत्राप्यनेनैवार्थः स्याद् व्याख्यानतो विशेषप्रतिपत्तिर्न हि संदेहादलक्षणमिति। पश्यति त्वाचार्यो मङ्गलार्थश्चैव सिद्धशब्द आदितः प्रयुक्तो भविष्यति, शक्ष्यामि चैनं नित्यपर्यायवाचिनं वर्णयितुमिति[13]। अतः सिद्धशब्द एवोपात्तो न नित्यशब्दः।**

(प्रदीपः) **नावश्यमिति**। ततश्चाभीक्ष्ण्येन ये शब्दाः प्रयुज्यन्ते आगोपालाङ्गनं तेषामेवान्वाख्यानं स्यात्, न विरलप्रयोगाणाम्। विनाऽपि च क्रियापदप्रयोगेणाभीक्ष्ण्यवृत्तिर्नित्यशब्दः प्रयुज्यते। यथा—'आश्चर्यमनित्ये' 'नित्यवीप्सयोः' इति।

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१३. Ben. पर्यायं वर्णयितुमिति.

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(नित्यतासाधकपक्षनिर्णयाधिकरणम्)

(प्रश्नभाष्यम्)

७२ अथ कं पुनः पदार्थं मत्वैष विग्रहः क्रियते सिद्धे शब्देऽर्थे संबन्धे चेति ।

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

७३ आकृतिमित्याह । कुत एतत् । आकृतिर्हि नित्या द्रव्यमनित्यम् ।

(प्रश्नभाष्यम्)

७४ अथ द्रव्ये पदार्थे कथं विग्रहः कर्तव्यः ।

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

७५ सिद्धे शब्देऽर्थसंबन्धे चेति । नित्यो ह्यर्थवतामर्थैरभिसंबन्धः ।

(प्रदीपः) **अर्थसंबन्धे चेति ।** द्रव्ये पक्षे द्रव्यस्यानित्यत्वादर्थग्रहणं संबन्धविशेषणार्थमुपात्तम् । अनित्येऽर्थे कथं संबन्धस्य नित्यता इति चेत्, योग्यतालक्षणत्वात्संबन्धस्य । तस्याश्च शब्दाश्रयत्वात् शब्दस्य च नित्यत्वाददोषः ।

(द्रव्यपदार्थाभ्युपगमभाष्यम्)

७६ **अथवा द्रव्य एव पदार्थ एष विग्रहो न्याय्यः सिद्धे शब्देऽर्थे संबन्धे चेति । द्रव्यं हि नित्यमाकृतिरनित्या । कथं ज्ञायते । एवं हि दृश्यते लोके । मृत्कयाचिदाकृत्या युक्ता पिण्डो भवति । पिण्डाकृतिमुपमृद्य घटिकाः क्रियन्ते । घटिकाकृतिमुपमृद्य कुण्डिकाः क्रियन्ते । तथा सुवर्णं कयाचिदाकृत्या युक्तं पिण्डो भवति । पिण्डाकृतिमुपमृद्य रुचकाः क्रियन्ते । रुचकाकृतिमुपमृद्य कटकाः क्रियन्ते । पुनरावृत्तः सुवर्णपिण्डः पुनरपरयाकृत्या युक्तः खदिराङ्गारसवर्णे कुण्डले भवतः । आकृतिरन्या चान्या च भवति द्रव्यं पुनस्तदेव । आकृत्युपमर्देन द्रव्यमेवावशिष्यते ।**

(प्रदीपः) **द्रव्यं हि नित्यमिति ।** असत्योपाध्यवच्छिन्नं ब्रह्मतत्त्वं द्रव्यशब्दवाच्यमित्यर्थः । **आकृतिरिति ।** संस्थानम् । ब्रह्मदर्शने च गोत्वादिजातेरप्यसत्यत्वादनित्यत्वम्, '**आत्मैवेदं सर्वम्**' इति श्रुतिवचनात् ।

(आकृतिपदार्थाभ्युपगमभाष्यम्)

७७ **आकृतावपि पदार्थ एष विग्रहो न्याय्यः सिद्धे शब्देऽर्थे संबन्धे चेति । ननु चोक्तमाकृतिरनित्येति । नैतदस्ति । नित्याकृतिः । कथम् । न क्वचिदुपरतेति कृत्वा सर्वत्रोपरता भवति, द्रव्यान्तरस्था तूपलभ्यते ।**

(प्रदीपः) **न क्वचिदुपरतेति ।** अनभिव्यक्तेत्यर्थः । अद्वैतेन लोके व्यवहाराभावात् व्यवहारे चाकृतेरेकाकारपरामर्शहेतुत्वान्नित्यत्वम् ।

(उद्द्योतः) ननु परमार्थदृष्ट्या सर्वमनित्यमत आह **अद्वैतेनेति । नित्यत्वमिति ।** सर्वदा एकाकारपरामर्शदर्शनेन यावद् व्यवहारकालं तस्या अपि ध्रुवादित्वेन नित्यत्वमिति भावः ।

(नित्यपदार्थान्तरनिरूपणभाष्यम्)

७८ **अथवा नेदमेव नित्यलक्षणं ध्रुवं कूटस्थमविचाल्यनपायोपजनविकार्यनुत्पत्त्यवृद्ध्यव्यययोगि यत्तन्नित्यमिति। तदपि नित्यं यस्मिंस्तत्त्वं न विहन्यते। किं पुनस्तत्त्वम्। तद्भावस्तत्त्वम्। आकृतावपि तत्त्वं न विहन्यते।**

(प्रदीपः) **अथवेति**। असत्यत्वेऽपि तत्त्वतो लोकव्यवहाराश्रयेण जातेर्नित्यत्वं साध्यते। त्रिविधा चानित्यता, **संसर्गानित्यता** यथा स्फटिकस्य लाक्षाद्युपधाने स्वरूपतिरोधानेन पररूपप्रतिभासः। उपधानापगमे स्वरूपप्रतिभासात् परिणामाभावः। **परिणामानित्यता** यथा बदरफलस्य श्यामतातिरोभावे लौहित्यस्याविर्भावः। **प्रध्वंसानित्यता** सर्वात्मना विनाशः। एतत्त्रिविधानित्यताप्रतिक्षेपेण नित्यतां प्रतिपादयितुमुक्तं **ध्रुवमित्यादि,** तत्र **ध्रुवं कूटस्थ**मिति संसर्गनित्यता परिहृता, **अविचाली**ति परिणामानित्यता, **अनपाये**त्यादिना प्रध्वंसानित्यता।

(उद्द्योतः) अथावयवसंस्थानरूपाया जातिव्यञ्जिकाया आकृतेर्यावद्व्यवहारकालं मध्ये मध्ये उत्पत्तौ नाशेऽपि प्रकारान्तरेण नित्यत्वमाह भाष्ये—**अथवेति**। नित्यत्वलक्षणे ध्रुवपदस्यैव व्याख्यानं **कूटस्थमिति**। रूपान्तरापत्तिः **विचालः**। यथा पयसो दध्यादिरूपता। अनेन परिणामानित्यता परास्ता। उत्पत्तेः सत्तापर्यन्तत्वाद**नुत्पत्ती**त्यनेन जन्मसत्तारूपौ भावविकारौ निरस्तौ। **अवृद्धी**त्यनेन तृतीयो वृद्धिलक्षणः। **अनुपजने**ति चतुर्थः परिणामः। **अनपाये**ति पञ्चमोऽपचयः। एतद्रूपविकाररहितमिति तदर्थः। **अव्यये**ति षष्ठो विनाशः। इदं च ब्रह्मविषयं नित्यत्वं यावद्व्यवहारमेकरूपस्थितपदार्थविषयं च। अयमेव न नित्यशब्दार्थः, प्रवाहाविच्छेदेऽतादृश्यपि नित्यत्वव्यवहारादित्याह भाष्ये—**तदपीति**। **यस्मिंस्तत्त्वमिति**। यस्मिन्विहतेऽपि तद्वृत्तिधर्मो न विहन्यते तदित्यर्थः। प्रवाहनित्यता चानेनोक्ता। तन्नाशेऽपि तद्धर्मो न नश्यति। आश्रयप्रवाहाविच्छेदादिति भावः।

(नित्यानित्यत्वविचारस्य वैयर्थ्यबोधकभाष्यम्)

७९ **अथवा किं न एतेनेदं नित्यमिदमनित्यमिति। यन्नित्यं तं पदार्थं मत्वैष विग्रहः क्रियते सिद्धे शब्देऽर्थे संबन्धे चेति।**

(प्रदीपः) **यन्नित्यमिति**। बुद्धिप्रतिभासः शब्दार्थः। यदा यदा शब्द उच्चारितस्तदा तदाऽर्थाकारा बुद्धिरुपजायते इति प्रवाहनित्यत्वादर्थस्य नित्यत्वमित्यर्थः।

(उद्द्योतः) **यन्नित्यमिति**। व्यक्तिजात्याकृतीनां मध्ये यन्नित्यमित्यर्थः। ननु शशशृङ्गादिपदार्थानां कथं नित्यत्वं तेषां स्वरूपस्यैवाभावादत आह **बुद्धिप्रतिभास इति**। बाह्यः पदार्थो न शाब्दबोधे विषयः, किंतु बौद्धः। स च प्रवाहनित्य इति भावः। एतच्च मञ्जूषायां विस्तरेण निरूपितम्।

(वार्त्तिकद्वितीयखण्डावतरणभाष्यम्)

८० **कथं पुनर्ज्ञायते सिद्धः शब्दोऽर्थः संबन्धश्चेति।**

(शब्दार्थसंबन्धानां लोकव्यवहारसिद्धत्वबाधकवार्त्तिकद्वितीयखण्डम्)

लोकतः ॥ ४ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

८१ यल्लोकेऽर्थमर्थमुपादाय शब्दान्प्रयुञ्जते नैषां निर्वृत्तौ यत्नं कुर्वन्ति। ये पुनः कार्या भावा निर्वृत्तौ तावत्तेषां यत्नः क्रियते। तद्यथा। घटेन कार्यं करिष्यन्कुम्भकारकुलं गत्वाह कुरु घटं कार्यमनेन करिष्यामीति। न तद्वच्छब्दान्प्रयोक्ष्यमाणो वैयाकरणकुलं गत्वाह कुरु शब्दान् प्रयोक्ष्य[१४] इति। तावत्येवार्थमुपादाय शब्दान् प्रयुञ्जते।

(प्रदीपः) **लोकत इति**। अन्यथा कार्येषु वस्तुषु लोकव्यवहारः, अन्यथा नित्येषु। शाब्दश्च व्यवहारोऽनादिवृद्धव्यवहारपरम्पराव्युत्पत्तिपूर्वक इति शब्दादीनां नित्यत्वम्। घटादयस्त्वर्थक्रियार्थिभिरन्यत आनीयन्ते, उत्पादविनाशयुक्ताश्चोपलभ्यन्ते। नैवं शब्दादयः। **तावत्येवार्थमिति**। बुद्ध्या वस्तु निरूप्येत्यर्थः।

(वार्त्तिकावतरणभाष्यम्)

८२ यदि तर्हि लोक एषु प्रमाणं किं शास्त्रेण क्रियते।

(शास्त्रोपयोगप्रकथने वार्त्तिकतृतीयखण्डम्)

लोकतोऽर्थप्रयुक्ते शब्दप्रयोगे शास्त्रेण धर्मनियमः ॥ ४ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

८३ लोकतोऽर्थप्रयुक्ते शब्दप्रयोगे शास्त्रेण धर्मनियमः क्रियते। किमिदं धर्मनियम इति। धर्माय नियमो धर्मनियमः, धर्मार्थो वा नियमो धर्मनियमः, धर्मप्रयोजनो वा नियमो धर्मनियमः।

(प्रदीपः) अत्र भाष्यकारेण संभवन्तीमप्येकवाक्यतामनाश्रित्य वाक्यत्रयं स्थापितम्। **सिद्धे शब्दार्थसंबन्धे** शास्त्रं प्रवृत्तमित्येकं वाक्यम्। कथं ज्ञायत इति प्रश्ने **लोकतो** ज्ञायते इति द्वितीयम्। लोकत इत्यसावृत्त्या **लोकतोऽर्थप्रयुक्त** इत्यादि तृतीयम्। **शब्दप्रयोग इति**। प्रयोगग्रहणेन 'प्रयोगाद् धर्मो न तु ज्ञानमात्रात्' इत्युक्तं भवति। अर्थेनात्मप्रत्यायनाय प्रयुक्तः अर्थप्रयुक्तः।

धर्माय नियम इति। चतुर्थ्या तादर्थ्यं प्रतिपाद्यते। संबन्धसामान्ये तु षष्ठीं विधाय समासः कर्तव्यः, चतुर्थीसमासस्य प्रकृतिविकारभाव एव विधानात्। **धर्मार्थ इति**। धर्मार्थत्वान्नियम एव धर्मशब्देनाभिधीयते इति कर्मधारयः समासः। **धर्मप्रयोजन इति**। लिङादिविषयेण नियोगाख्येन धर्मेण प्रयुक्त इत्यर्थः।

(उद्द्योतः) '**लोकतः**' इत्यस्य च लोकव्यवहारत इत्यर्थः। **लिङादीति**। प्रभाकराङ्गीकृतमतेनेदम्। तन्मते हि लिङादीनामपूर्वरूपं कार्यं वाच्यम्। तदेव च स्वस्मिन् पुरुषं प्रयुञ्जानं **नियोग** इत्युच्यते। स एव धर्मः।

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१४. Ben. शब्दान् प्रयुयुक्षमाणो.

(दृष्टान्तदर्शकवार्त्तिकम्)

यथा लौकिकवैदिकेषु ॥ ५ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

८४ **प्रियतद्धिता दाक्षिणात्या यथा लोके वेदे चेति प्रयोक्तव्ये यथा लौकिकवैदिकेष्विति प्रयुञ्जते। अथवा युक्त एव तद्धितार्थः। यथा लौकिकेषु वैदिकेषु च कृतान्तेषु। लोके तावदभक्ष्यो ग्राम्यकुक्कुटोऽभक्ष्यो ग्राम्यसूकर इत्युच्यते। भक्ष्यं च नाम क्षुत्प्रतीघातार्थमुपादीयते।[15] शक्यं चानेन श्वमांसादिभिरपि क्षुत्प्रतिहन्तुम्। तत्र नियमः क्रियत इदं भक्ष्यमिदमभक्ष्यमिति। तथा खेदात्स्त्रीषु प्रवृत्तिर्भवति। समानश्च खेदविगमो गम्यायां चागम्यायां च। तत्र नियमः क्रियत इयं गम्येयमगम्येति।**

(प्रदीपः) **प्रियतद्धिता इति**। नायमपशब्दः, किंतु ये लोकवेदयोर्भवा अवयवास्ते लोकवेदशब्दाभ्यामभिधातुं शक्यन्ते। आधाराधेयभावकल्पनया तु तद्धितप्रयोगः प्रियतद्धितत्वनिमित्तः। यथा कश्चिद्**वनस्पतय** इति प्रयुङ्क्ते, कश्चिद्**वानस्पत्य**मिति समूहप्रत्ययान्तम्।

अथवेति। नात्रावयवावयविविभागः। किं तर्हि। वेदलोकव्यतिरिक्तः सिद्धान्तः शब्दार्थो भवरूप इत्यर्थः। **लौकिकः** स्मृत्युपनिबद्धः। **वैदिकः** श्रुत्युपनिबद्धः। **शक्यं चानेनेति**। शकेः कर्मसामान्ये लिङ्गसर्वनामनपुंसकयुक्ते कृत्यप्रत्ययः। ततः शब्दान्तरसंबन्धादुपजायमानमपि स्त्रीत्वं बहिरङ्गत्वादन्तरङ्गसंस्कारं न बाधते इति '**शक्यं....क्षुत्**' इत्युक्तम्। यदा तु पूर्वमेव विशेषविवक्षा तदा 'शक्या क्षुत्' इति भवत्येव। यदा तु प्रतिघातस्यैव क्षुत्कर्म, शकेस्तु प्रतिघातः, तदा 'क्षुधं प्रतिहन्तुं शक्यम्' इति भवति। **खेदादिति**। खेदयतीति खेदः रागः, इन्द्रियनियमासामर्थ्यं वा खेदः।

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

८५ **वेदे खल्वपि पयोव्रतो ब्राह्मणो यवागूव्रतो राजन्य आमिक्षाव्रतो वैश्य इत्युच्यते। व्रतं च नामाभ्यवहारार्थमुपादीयते। शक्यं चानेन शालिमांसादीन्यपि व्रतयितुम्। तत्र नियमः क्रियते। तथा बैल्वः खादिरो वा यूपः स्यादित्युच्यते। यूपश्च नाम पश्वनुबन्धार्थमुपादीयते। शक्यं चानेन शालिमांसादीन्यपि व्रतयितुम्। तत्र नियमः क्रियते। तथा बैल्वः खादिरो वा यूपः स्यादित्युच्यते। शक्यं चानेन किंचिदेव काष्ठमुच्छ्रित्यानुच्छ्रित्य वा पशुरनुबन्द्धुम्। तत्र नियमः क्रियते। तथाग्नौ कपालान्यधिश्रित्याभिमन्त्रयते। भृगूणामङ्गिरसां घर्मस्य तपसा तप्यध्वमिति। अन्तरेणापि मन्त्रमग्निर्दहनकर्मा कपालानि संतापयति। तत्र नियमः क्रियत एवं क्रियमाणमभ्युदयकारि भवतीति।**

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१५. Ben. क्षुत्प्रतिघातार्थ०.

(प्रदीपः) **पयोव्रत इति ।** सत्यामर्थितायां 'पय एव व्रतयति' इति नियमोऽयं न तु विधिः, अर्थित्वाभावे कारणाभावात् ।

(उपसंहारभाष्यम्)

८६ **एवमिहापि समानायामर्थगतौ[16] शब्देन चापशब्देन च धर्मनियमः क्रियते । शब्देनैवार्थोऽभिधेयो नापशब्देनेत्येवं क्रियमाणमभ्युदयकारि भवतीति ।**

(प्रदीपः) **समानायामिति ।** यद्यपि साक्षादपभ्रंशा न वाचकास्तथापि स्मर्यमाण-साधुशब्दव्यवधानेनार्थं प्रत्याययन्ति । केचिच्चापभ्रंशाः परम्परया निरूढिमागताः साधुशब्दानस्मारयन्त एवार्थं प्रत्याययन्ति । **अन्ये** तु मन्यन्ते साधुशब्दवदपभ्रंशा अपि साक्षादर्थस्य वाचका इति ।

(उद्द्योतः) **एवं क्रियमाणमिति ।** शास्त्रज्ञानपूर्वकमुच्चार्यमाणमित्यर्थः ।

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(अथ अप्रयुक्तशब्दविचारणाधिकरणम्)

(वार्त्तिकावतरणभाष्यम्)

८७ **अस्त्यप्रयुक्तः । सन्ति वै शब्दा अप्रयुक्ताः । तद्यथा । ऊष, तेर, चक्र, पेचेति । किमतो यत्सन्त्यप्रयुक्ताः । प्रयोगाद्धि भवाञ्शब्दानां साधुत्व-मध्यवस्यति । य इदानीमप्रयुक्ता नामी साधवः स्युः ।**

(प्रदीपः) **अस्त्यप्रयुक्त इति ।** प्रयोगमूलत्वादस्याः स्मृतेरप्रयुक्तानामप्यन्वा-ख्यानादप्रामाण्यमाशङ्कते ।

(आक्षेपभाष्यम्)

८८ **इदं[17] विप्रतिषिद्धं यदुच्यते सन्ति वै शब्दा अप्रयुक्ता इति । यदि सन्ति नाप्रयुक्ताः अथाप्रयुक्ता न सन्ति । सन्ति चाप्रयुक्ताश्चेति विप्रतिषिद्धम् । प्रयुञ्जान एव खलु भवानाह सन्ति शब्दा अप्रयुक्ता इति । कश्चेदानी-मन्यो भवज्जातीयकः पुरुषः शब्दानां प्रयोगे साधुः स्यात् ।**

(प्रदीपः) यथा घटादीनां विनाऽप्यर्थक्रियया सत्त्वं गम्यते नैवं शब्दानां, ते हि सर्वदा व्यवहाराय प्रयुज्यमानाः सन्तः सत्त्वेनावसीयन्ते इत्याह—**इदमिति । कश्चे-दानी**मिति उपहासपरम् ।

(उद्द्योतः) **कश्चेदानीमिति ।** स्वयमेव प्रयोगं कृत्वा '**सन्ति चाप्रयुक्ताः**' इत्यादीनां शब्दानां प्रयोगे साधुर्योग्यः स्यादित्यर्थः । त्वत्प्रयोगेणैव प्रयुक्तत्वावगमेऽ प्रयुक्तत्वोक्तिर्विरुद्धेति भावः ।

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१६. Ben. अर्थावगतौ.

१७. Ben. इदं तावद् विप्रति०.

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

८९ नैतद्विप्रतिषिद्धम्। सन्तीति तावद् ब्रूमो यदेताञ्शास्त्रविदः शास्त्रेणानुविदधते। अप्रयुक्ता इति ब्रूमो यल्लोकेऽप्रयुक्ता इति। यदप्युच्यते कश्चेदानीमन्यो भवज्जातीयकः पुरुषः शब्दानां प्रयोगे साधुः स्यादिति। न ब्रूमोऽस्माभिरप्रयुक्ता इति। किं तर्हि। लोकेऽप्रयुक्ता इति।

(प्रदीपः) उत्तरं तु शास्त्रदृष्ट्या प्रकृतिप्रत्ययसद्भावादनुमितसत्त्वा, व्यवहारे तु न दृश्यन्त इत्युक्तम्।

(आक्षेपसाधकभाष्यम्)

९० ननु च भवानप्यभ्यन्तरो लोके।

(आक्षेपबाधकभाष्यम्)

९१ अभ्यन्तरोऽहं लोके न त्वहं लोकः।

(प्रदीपः) **न त्वहं लोक इति।** यथा लोकोऽर्थावगमाय शब्दान् प्रयुङ्क्ते नैवं मयैतेऽर्थे प्रयुक्ताः, अपि तु स्वरूपपदार्थका इत्यर्थः।

(आक्षेपबाधकवार्त्तिकम्)

अस्त्यप्रयुक्त इति चेन्नार्थे शब्दप्रयोगात् ॥ ६ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

९२ अस्त्यप्रयुक्त इति चेत् तन्न। किं कारणम्। अर्थे शब्दाः प्रयुज्यन्ते सन्ति चैषां शब्दानामर्था येष्वर्थेषु प्रयुज्यन्ते।

(प्रदीपः) **अर्थे शब्दप्रयोगादिति।** अर्थसद्भावः शब्दसद्भावे लिङ्गम्। न हि विना शब्देनार्थप्रत्यायनमुपपद्यते।

(अप्रयोगसाधनवार्त्तिकम्)

अप्रयोगः प्रयोगान्यत्वात् ॥ ७ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

९३ अप्रयोगः खल्वेषां शब्दानां न्याय्यः। कुतः। प्रयोगान्यत्वात्। यदेतेषां शब्दानामर्थेऽन्याञ्शब्दान्प्रयुञ्जते। तद्यथा। ऊषेत्यस्य शब्दस्यार्थे क्व यूयमुषिताः। तेरेत्यस्यार्थे क्व यूयं तीर्णाः। चक्रेत्यस्यार्थे किं यूयं कृतवन्तः। पेचेत्यस्यार्थे क्व यूयं पक्वन्त इति।[१८]

(प्रदीपः) इतरोऽन्यथासिद्धतामाह—**अप्रयोग इति।** यतोऽन्ये तेषामर्थानां सन्ति वाचकास्ततो नैषामनुमानमुपपद्यते। यद्यपि 'ऊष' इत्यस्य 'उषिताः' इति समानार्थो न भवति, परोक्षतादेर्विशेषस्यानवगमात्, तथापि तत्प्रत्यायनाय पदान्तरसहितः प्रयुज्यते।

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१८. Ben. क्व यूयं तीर्णा :···· क्क यूयं कृत····क्व युयं पक्ववन्त इति.

(दृष्टान्तदर्शकवार्त्तिकम्)

अप्रयुक्ते दीर्घसत्रवत् ॥ ८ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

९५ यद्यप्यप्रयुक्ता अवश्यं दीर्घसत्रवल्लक्षणेनानुविधेयाः । तद्यथा । दीर्घसत्राणि वार्षशतिकानि वार्षसहस्रिकाणि च न चाद्यत्वे कश्चिदपि व्यवहरति । केवलमृषिसंप्रदायो धर्म इति कृत्वा याज्ञिकाः शास्त्रेणानुविदधते ।

(प्रदीपः) संप्रत्यप्रयुज्यमानानामपि पूर्वं प्रयुक्तत्वादनुशासनं कर्तव्यमित्याह अप्रयुक्त इति । ऋषिसंप्रदाय इति । वेदाध्ययनमित्यर्थः ।

(अप्रयुक्तत्वसाधकपक्षान्तरवार्त्तिकम्)

सर्वे देशान्तरे ॥ ९ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

९५ सर्वे खल्वप्येते शब्दा देशान्तरे[१९] प्रयुज्यन्ते ।

(प्रदीपः) सर्वे इति । इदमत्र तात्पर्यम् । यस्य कस्यचिद्वचनात्प्रयोगाप्रयोगौ न व्यवतिष्ठेते, अपि तु शिष्टानामेव वचनात् ।

(आक्षेपभाष्यम्)

९६ न चैत उपलभ्यन्ते ।

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

९७ उपलब्धौ यत्नः क्रियताम् । महान् हि शब्दस्य प्रयोगविषयः । सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती त्रयो लोकाश्चत्वारो वेदाः साङ्गाः सरहस्या बहुधा विभिन्नाः एकशतमध्वर्युशाखाः, सहस्रवर्त्मा सामवेदः, एकविंशतिधा बाह्वृच्यं, नवधाऽथर्वणो वेदः, वाकोवाक्यमितिहासः, पुराणं, वैद्यकमित्येतावाञ्शब्दस्य प्रयोगविषयः । एतावन्तं शब्दस्य प्रयोगविषयमननुनिशम्य सन्त्यप्रयुक्ता इति वचनं केवलं साहसमात्रम् ।

(प्रदीपः) वाकोवाक्यशब्देनोक्तिप्रत्युक्तिरूपो ग्रन्थ उच्यते । यथा "किंस्विदावपनं महत्" इति । पूर्वचरितसंकीर्तनम् इतिहासः । वंशाद्यनुकीर्तनं पुराणम् ।

(शब्दानां देशान्तरप्रयोगदर्शकभाष्यम्)

९८ एतस्मिन्नतिमहति शब्दस्य प्रयोगविषये ते ते शब्दास्तत्र तत्र नियतविषया दृश्यन्ते । तद्यथा । शवतिर्गतिकर्मा कम्बोजेष्वेव भाषितो भवति । विकार एनमार्या भाषन्ते शव इति । हम्मतिः सुराष्ट्रेषु । रंहतिः प्राच्यमध्येषु । गमिमेव त्वार्याः प्रयुञ्जते । दातिर्लवनार्थे प्राच्येषु दात्रमुदीच्येषु ।

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१९. Ben: देशान्तरेषु.

(प्रदीप:) विकार इति। जीवतो मृतावस्था विकार:, तत्रेत्यर्थः।

(सिद्धान्तभाष्यम्)

९९ ये चाप्येते भवतोऽप्रयुक्ता अभिमताः शब्दा एतेषामपि प्रयोगो दृश्यते। क्व। वेदे।[20] यद्वो रेवती रेवत्यं तदूष। यन्मे नरः श्रुत्यं ब्रह्म चक्र[g]। यत्रा नश्चक्रा जरसं तनूनामिति[h]।

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(अथ शब्दज्ञानप्रयोगधर्मजनकत्वविचाराधिकरणम्)

(प्रश्नभाष्यम्)

१०० किं पुनः शब्दस्य ज्ञाने धर्म आहोस्वित्प्रयोगे।

(प्रदीप:) किं पुनरिति। "एकः शब्द सम्यग् ज्ञातः सुप्रयुक्तः स्वर्गे लोके कामधुग्भवति" (भाष्ये ६।१।८४) इति श्रुतिः। तत्र किं सम्यग् ज्ञातः कामधुग्भवति, सुप्रयोगात्तु सम्यग्ज्ञातत्वानुमानमित्यर्थः। आहोस्वित्सुप्रयुक्तः कामधुक् भवति, सुप्रयुक्तत्वं सम्यग्ज्ञानादित्यर्थ इति प्रश्नः।

(प्रतिप्रश्नभाष्यम्)

१०१ कश्चात्र विशेषः।

(ज्ञानस्य अधर्मजनकत्ववार्त्तिकम्)

ज्ञाने धर्म इति चेत्तथाधर्मः ॥ १० ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

१०२ ज्ञाने धर्म इति चेत्तथाधर्मः प्राप्नोति। यो हि शब्दाञ्जानात्यपशब्दानप्यसौ जानाति। यथैव शब्दज्ञाने धर्म एवमपशब्दज्ञानेऽप्यधर्मः।

(प्रदीप:) ज्ञाने धर्म इति चेदिति। यथा श्लेष्मणः प्रकोपनं स्नेहद्रव्यं रूक्षं तु वायोः, तथेहापि प्राप्तमिति भावः।

(अधर्माधिक्यदर्शनभाष्यम्)

१०३ अथवा भूयानधर्मः प्राप्नोति। भूयांसोऽपशब्दा अल्पीयांसः शब्दाः। एकैकस्य शब्दस्य बहवोऽपभ्रंशाः। तद्यथा। गौरित्यस्य गावी गोणी गोता गोपोतलिकेत्येवमादयोऽपभ्रंशाः।

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२०. Ben. वेदे. तद्यथा. सप्तास्ये रेवती रेवदूष (ऋ.सं.4.51.4), यद्वो रेवती रेवत्यं तमूष. यन्मे नर :, etc.

g. ऋ. सं. 1.165.11.

h. ऋ. सं. 1.89.9.

(नियमबोधकवार्त्तिकम्)

आचारे नियमः ॥ ११ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

१०४ आचारे पुनर्ऋषिर्नियमं वेदयते। तेऽसुरा हेलयो हेलय इति कुर्वन्तः पराबभूवुरिति।

(प्रदीपः) आचार इति। प्रयोगे। ऋषिः वेदः।

(प्रयोगपक्षाङ्गीकारभाष्यम्)

१०५ अस्तु तर्हि प्रयोगे।

(प्रयोगपक्षे दूषणवार्त्तिकम्)

प्रयोगे सर्वलोकस्य ॥ १२ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

१०६ यदि प्रयोगे धर्मः सर्वो लोकोऽभ्युदयेन युज्येत।

(आक्षेपभाष्यम्)

१०७ कश्चेदानीं भवतो मत्सरो यदि सर्वो लोकोऽभ्युदयेन युज्येत।

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

१०८ न खलु कश्चिन्मत्सरः प्रयत्नानर्थक्यं तु भवति। फलवता च नाम प्रयत्नेन भवितव्यम्। न च प्रयत्नः फलाद् व्यतिरेच्यः।

(प्रदीपः) न च प्रयत्न इति। यदि प्रयत्नेन विना फलं स्यात् प्रयत्नवैयर्थ्यमापद्येतेत्यर्थः।

(आक्षेपभाष्यम्)

१०९ ननु च ये कृतप्रयत्नास्ते साधीयः शब्दान्प्रयोक्ष्यन्ते त एव साधीयोऽभ्युदयेन योक्ष्यन्ते।

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

११० व्यतिरेकोऽपि वै लक्ष्यन्ते। दृश्यन्ते, हि कृतप्रयत्नाश्चाप्रवीणा अकृतप्रयत्नाश्च प्रवीणाः। तत्र फलव्यतिरेकोऽपि स्यात्।

(प्रदीपः) व्यतिरेक इति। परिहासः।

(पक्षान्तरदर्शकवार्त्तिकावतरणभाष्यम्)

१११ एवं तर्हि नापि ज्ञान एव धर्मो, नापि प्रयोग एव। किं तर्हि।

(ज्ञानपूर्वकप्रयोगाभ्युपगमसिध्दान्तवार्त्तिकम्)

शास्त्रपूर्वके प्रयोगेऽभ्युदयस्तत्तुल्यं वेदशब्देन ॥ १३ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

११२ शास्त्रपूर्वकं यः शब्दान्प्रयुङ्क्ते सोऽभ्युदयेन युज्यते । तत्तुल्यं वेदशब्देन । वेदशब्दा अप्येवमभिवदन्ति । योऽग्निष्टोमेन यजते य उ चैनमेवं वेद[i] । योऽग्निं नाचिकेतं चिनुते य उ चैनमेवं वेद[j] ।

(प्रदीपः) तत्तुल्यमिति । वेदः शब्दो यस्यार्थस्य सः वेदशब्दः, तस्य यथा ज्ञात्वाऽनुष्ठानं तथा शब्दानामपि प्रकृत्यादिविभागज्ञानपूर्वकः प्रयोग इत्यर्थः ।

(व्याख्यान्तरभाष्यम्)

११३ अपर आह । तत्तुल्यं वेदशब्देनेति । यथा वेदशब्दा नियमपूर्वमधीताः फलवन्तो भवन्त्येवं यः शास्त्रपूर्वकं शब्दान्प्रयुङ्क्ते सोऽभ्युदयेन युज्यत इति ।

(प्रदीपः) अपर आहेति । वेदश्चासौ शब्दश्च वेदशब्द इति कर्मधारयः ।

(प्रथमपक्षसाधकभाष्यम्)

११४ अथवा पुनरस्तु ज्ञान एव धर्म इति ।

(आक्षेपस्मारणभाष्यम्)

११५ ननु चोक्तं ज्ञाने धर्म इति चेत्तथाऽधर्म इति ।

(आक्षेपनिराकरणभाष्यम्)

११६ नैष दोषः । शब्दप्रमाणका वयम् । यच्छब्द आह तदस्माकं प्रमाणम् । शब्दश्च शब्दज्ञाने धर्ममाह नापशब्दज्ञानेऽधर्मम्, यच्च पुनरशिष्टाप्रतिषिद्धं नैव तद्दोषाय भवति नाभ्युदयाय । तद्यथा । हिक्कितहसितकण्डूयितानि नैव दोषाय भवन्ति नाप्यभ्युदयाय ।

(समाधानान्तरभाष्यम्)

११७ अथवाभ्युपाय एवापशब्दज्ञानं शब्दज्ञाने । योऽपशब्दाञ्जानाति शब्दानप्यसौ जानाति । तदेवं ज्ञाने धर्म इति ब्रुवतोऽर्थादापन्नं भवत्यपशब्दज्ञानपूर्वके शब्दज्ञाने धर्म इति ।

(प्रदीपः) अथवेति । अपशब्दज्ञाननान्तरीयकत्वाच्छब्दज्ञानस्य पृथक्फलमपिशब्दज्ञानस्य नास्तीत्यर्थः ।

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i. cf. योऽग्निष्टोमेन यजमानोऽथ सर्वस्तोमेन यजेत. तै. सं. ७.१.३.१.

j. तै. ब्रा. ३.११.८.६.

(समाधानान्तरसाधकभाष्यम्)

११८ अथवा कूपखानकवदेतद्भविष्यति। तद्यथा कूपखानकः कूपं खनन्यद्यपि मृदा पांसुभिश्चावकीर्णो भवति सोऽप्सु संजातासु तत एव तं गुणमासादयति येन स च दोषो निर्हण्यते। भूयसा चाभ्युदयेन योगो भवत्येवमिहापि यद्यप्यपशब्दज्ञानेऽधर्मस्तथापि यस्त्वसौ शब्दज्ञाने धर्मस्तेन स च दोषो निर्घानिष्यते। भूयसा चाभ्युदयेन योगो भविष्यति।

(प्रदीपः) दोष इति। उत्कृष्टधर्मफलप्राप्तौ स्वल्पमधर्मफलमुत्पन्नमप्यनुत्पन्नकल्पं भवतीत्यर्थः।

(द्वितीयपक्षदूषणनिरासभाष्यम्)

११९ यदप्युच्यत आचारे नियम इति याज्ञे कर्मणि स नियमः।[२१] एवं हि श्रूयते। यर्वाणस्तर्वाणो नामर्षयो बभूवुः प्रत्यक्षधर्माणः परापरज्ञा विदितवेदितव्या अधिगतयाथातथ्याः। ते तत्रभवन्तो यद्वा नस्तद्वा न इति प्रयोक्तव्ये यर्वाणस्तर्वाण इति प्रयुञ्जते। याज्ञे पुनः कर्मणि नापभाषन्ते। तैः पुनरसुरैर्याज्ञे कर्मण्यपभाषितमतस्ते पराभूताः।

(प्रदीपः) प्रत्यक्षधर्माण इति। योगिप्रत्यक्षेण सर्वं विदितवन्तः। परापरज्ञाः विद्याऽविद्याप्रविभागज्ञाः।

१०

(अथ व्याकरणपदार्थनिर्णयाधिकरणम्)

(प्रश्नद्वारा वार्त्तिकावतरणभाष्यम्)

१२० अथ व्याकरणमित्यस्य शब्दस्य कः पदार्थः। सूत्रम्।

(प्रदीपः) अथेति। उक्तमिदं न चान्तरेण व्याकरणम् इत्यादि। तत्र पक्षद्वयेऽपि दोषदर्शनात् पदार्थप्रश्नः।

(सूत्रपक्षे आक्षेपवार्त्तिकम्)

सूत्रे व्याकरणे षष्ठ्यर्थोऽनुपपन्नः ॥ १४ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

१२१ सूत्रे व्याकरणे षष्ठ्यर्थो नोपपद्यते व्याकरणस्य सूत्रमिति। किं हि तदन्यत्सूत्राद् व्याकरणं यस्यादः सूत्रं स्यात्।

(प्रदीपः) षष्ठ्यर्थ इति। द्वाभ्यामपि शब्दाभ्यामष्टाध्याय्याः प्रतिपादनाद्व्यतिरेकाभावः। सामान्यविशेषशब्दतया तु द्वयोः प्रयोगो न विरुध्यते। यदा त्वष्टाध्याय्येकदेशः सूत्रशब्देनोच्यते, तदा षष्ठ्यर्थोऽप्युपपद्यते।

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२१. Ben. स नियम : अन्यत्रानियम :.

(आक्षेपान्तरवार्त्तिकम्)

शब्दाप्रतिपत्तिः ॥ १५ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

१२२ शब्दानां चाप्रतिपत्तिः प्राप्नोति व्याकरणाच्छब्दान्प्रतिपद्यामह इति । न हि सूत्रत एव शब्दान्प्रतिपद्यन्ते किं तर्हि व्याख्यानतश्च ।

(प्रदीपः) शब्दाप्रतिपत्तिरिति । न हि व्याख्यानरहितसूत्रमात्रश्रवणाच्छब्दाः प्रतीयन्ते ।

(आक्षेपबाधकभाष्यम्)

१२३ ननु च तदेव सूत्रं विगृहीतं व्याख्यान भवति ।

(आक्षेपसाधकभाष्यम्)

१२४ न केवलानि चर्चापदानि व्याख्यानं वृद्धिः आत् ऐजिति । किं तर्हि । उदाहरणं प्रत्युदाहरणं वाक्याध्याहार इत्येतत्समुदितं व्याख्यानं भवति ।

(प्रदीपः) समुदितमिति । समुदायादेवार्थावसायोत्पादादित्यर्थः ।

(वार्तिकावतरणभाष्यम्)

१२५ एवं तर्हि शब्दः ।

(शब्दपक्षे आक्षेपवार्त्तिकम्)

शब्दे ल्युडर्थः ॥ १६ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

१२६ यदि शब्दो व्याकरणं ल्युडर्थो नोपपद्यते । व्याक्रियतेऽनेनेति[२२] व्याकरणम् । न हि शब्देन किंचिद् व्याक्रियते । केन तर्हि । सूत्रेण ।

(प्रदीपः) शब्द इति । करणे ल्युड् विधीयते । शब्दश्च व्याक्रियमाणत्वात्कर्म, न तु करणमिति भावः ।

(आक्षेपान्तरवार्त्तिकम्)

भवे ॥ १७ अ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

१२७ भवे च तद्धितो नोपपद्यते[k] । व्याकरणे भवो योगो वैयाकरण इति । न हि शब्दे भवो योगः । क्व तर्हि । सूत्रे ।

(प्रदीपः) भवे चेति । शब्देऽप्यन्वाख्यायकत्वेन भवो योग इति चेत्, मीमांसादियोगस्यापि शब्दं प्रति विचारकत्वात् वैयाकरणत्वप्रसङ्गः ।

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२२. Ben. व्याक्रियन्ते शब्दा अनेनेति.

k. तत्र भव : ४.३,५३.

(आक्षेपान्तरवार्त्तिकम्)

प्रोक्तादयश्च तद्धिताः ॥ १७ ब ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

१२८ प्रोक्तादयश्च तद्धिता नोपपद्यन्ते[1]। पाणिनिना प्रोक्तं पाणिनीयम्। आपिशलम्। काशकृत्स्नमिति। न हि पाणिनिना शब्दाः प्रोक्ताः। किं तर्हि। सूत्रम्।

(वार्त्तिकप्रणयनाक्षेपभाष्यम्)

१२९ किमर्थमिदमुभयमुच्यते भवे प्रोक्तादयश्च तद्धिता इति। न प्रोक्तादयश्च तद्धिताः इत्येव भवेऽपि तद्धितश्चोदितः स्यात्।

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

१३० पुरस्तादिदमाचार्येण दृष्टं भवे तद्धित[२३] इति तत्पठितम्। तत उत्तरकालमिदं दृष्टं प्रोक्तादयश्च तद्धिता इति तदपि पठितम्। न चेदानीमाचार्याः सूत्राणि कृत्वा निवर्तयन्ति।

(प्रदीपः) न चेदानीमिति। लक्षणप्रपञ्चाभ्यां मूलसूत्रवत् वार्त्तिकानामुपपत्त्या दोषाभावः।

(प्रथमाक्षेपबाधकभाष्यम्)

१३१ अयं तावददोषो यदुच्यते शब्दे ल्युडर्थ इति। नावश्यं करणाधिकरणयोरेव ल्युड् विधीयते। किं तर्हि। अन्येष्वपि कारकेषु कृत्यल्युटो बहुलम् [३.३.११३] इति। तद्यथा। प्रस्कन्दनम्, प्रपतनमिति।

(प्रदीपः) प्रस्कन्दनमिति। यद्यप्ययं भीमादिः, तथापि 'कृत्यल्युटो बहुलम्' इत्यस्यैव 'भीमादयोऽपादाने' इत्ययं प्रपञ्च इति भावः।

(करणार्थसमर्थनभाष्यम्)

१३२ अथवा शब्दैरपि शब्दा व्याक्रियन्ते। तद्यथा। गौरित्युक्ते सर्वे संदेहा निवर्तन्ते नाश्वो न गर्दभ इति।

(प्रदीपः) गौरित्युक्त इति। सास्नादिमति यदा कश्चित्प्रति 'अयं गौः' इत्युच्यते तदाऽत्र वाचकान्तराणां निवृत्तिः कृता भवति। एवमेकस्मिन्नुदाहृणे उपन्यस्ते सर्वाणि तत्सदृशानि शब्दान्तराणि प्रतीयन्ते।

(आक्षेपस्मारणभाष्यम्)

१३३ अयं तर्हि दोषो भवे प्रोक्तादयश्च तद्धिता इति।

(वार्त्तिकावतरणभाष्यम्)

१३४ एवं तर्हि।

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1. तेन प्रोक्तम्. ४.३.१०१.

२३. Ben. भवे च तध्दितः

(पक्षान्तरवार्त्तिकम्)

लक्ष्यलक्षणे व्याकरणम् ॥ १८ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

१३५ लक्ष्यं च लक्षणं चैतत्समुदितं भवति। किं पुनर्लक्ष्यं लक्षणं च। शब्दो लक्ष्यः सूत्रं लक्षणम्।

(आक्षेपभाष्यम्)

१३६ एवमप्ययं दोषः समुदाये व्याकरणशब्दः प्रवृत्तोऽवयवे नोपपद्यते। सूत्राणि चाप्यधीयान इष्यते वैयाकरण इति।

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

१३७ नैष दोषः। समुदायेषु हि शब्दाः प्रवृत्ता अवयवेष्वपि वर्तन्ते। तद्यथा। पूर्वे पञ्चालाः। उत्तरे पञ्चालाः। तैलं भुक्तम्। घृतं भुक्तम्। शुक्लः नीलः कृष्ण इति। एवमयं समुदाये व्याकरणशब्दः प्रवृत्तोऽवयवेऽपि वर्तते।

(प्रदीपः) **पूर्वे पञ्चाला इति।** जनपदान्तरनिवृत्तिविवक्षायामेकदेशेऽपि समुदायरूपारोपात्प्रयोगः। **तैलमिति।** यदौषधसंस्कृता घृततैलमात्रा भवति तदैतदुदाहरणम्। आकृतिवाचित्वे तु घृततैलशब्दयोः संस्थानप्रमाणनिरपेक्षा सर्वत्र मुख्या वृत्तिः। **शुक्ल इति।** अशुक्लेऽप्यवयवेऽवयवान्तरस्य शौक्ल्यात्समुदायस्य शुक्लत्वे सति आरोपात्प्रयोगः।

(प्रथमपक्षाभ्युपगमभाष्यम्)

१३८ अथवा पुनरस्तु सूत्रम्।

(प्रथमाक्षेपस्मारणभाष्यम्)

१३९ ननु चोक्तं सूत्रे व्याकरणे षष्ठ्यर्थोऽनुपपन्न इति।

(आक्षेपनिरासभाष्यम्)

१४० नैष दोषः। व्यपदेशिवद्भावेन भविष्यति।

(प्रदीपः) **व्यपदेशिवद्भावेनेति।** यथा 'राहोः शिरः' इत्येकस्मिन्नपि वस्तुनि शब्दार्थभेदाद् भेदव्यवहारः, एवमिहापि व्याकरणशब्देन शास्त्रस्य व्याकृतिक्रियायां करणरूपत्वमुच्यते। सूत्रशब्देन तु समुदायरूपता इति भेदव्यवहार उपपद्यते।

(द्वितीयाक्षेपनिराकरणस्मारणभाष्यम्)

१४१ यदप्युच्यते शब्दाप्रतिपत्तिरिति। न हि सूत्रत एव शब्दान्प्रतिपद्यन्ते। किं तर्हि व्याख्यानतश्चेति। परिहृतमेतत्तदेव सूत्रं विगृहीतं व्याख्यानं भवतीति।

(निराकरणबाधकस्मारणभाष्यम्)

१४२ ननु चोक्तं न केवलानि चर्चापदानि व्याख्यानं वृद्धिः, आत्, ऐजिति। किं तर्हि उदाहरणं प्रत्युदाहरणं वाक्याध्याहार इत्येतत्समुदितं व्याख्यानं भवतीति।

(सूत्रपदार्थसमर्थनभाष्यम्)

१४३ **अविजानत एतदेवं भवति। सूत्रत एव हि शब्दान्प्रतिपद्यन्ते। आतश्च सूत्रत एव यो ह्युत्सूत्रं कथयेन्नादो गृह्येत॥**

(प्रदीपः) **सूत्रत एवेति।** पदच्छेदादिभिः सूत्रार्थस्यैवाभिव्यञ्जनात्॥

आत इति। निपातः। अतश्च हेतोरित्यर्थः। **नाद इति।** नैतदित्यर्थः। अथवा नादोऽर्थरहितत्वात् घोषमात्रमेव गृह्येतेत्यर्थः॥

११

(अथ शिवसूत्रस्य वर्णोपदेशाधिकरणम्)

(वार्त्तिकावतरणभाष्यम्)

१४४ **अथ किमर्थो वर्णानामुपदेशः।**

(प्रदीपः) **किमर्थ इति।** न हि वर्णोपदेशेन कस्यचित्साधुशब्दस्यानुशासनमिति भावः।

(वर्णोपदेशप्रयोजनवार्त्तिकम्)

वृत्तिसमवायार्थ उपदेशः॥ १९॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

१४५ **वृत्तिसमवायार्थो वर्णानामुपदेशः कर्तव्यः। किमिदं वृत्तिसमवायार्थ इति। वृत्तये समवायो वृत्तिसमवायः। वृत्त्यर्थो वा समवायो वृत्तिसमवायः। वृत्तिप्रयोजनो वा समवायो वृत्तिसमवायः। का पुनर्वृत्तिः। शास्त्रप्रवृत्तिः। अथ कः समवायः। वर्णानामानुपूर्व्येण संनिवेशः। अथ क उपदेशः। उच्चारणम्। कुत एतत्। दिशिरुच्चारणक्रियः। उच्चार्य हि वर्णानाहोपदिष्टा इमे वर्णा इति।**

(प्रदीपः) **वृत्तिसमवायार्थ इति।** लाघवेन शास्त्रप्रवृत्त्यर्थ इत्यर्थः। धर्मनियमवत्समासः। **वृत्त्यर्थ इति।** शास्त्रप्रवृत्तिप्रत्यासन्नत्वं समवायस्य दर्शयति '**इग्यणः**' इत्यादौ हि **यथासंख्य**शास्त्रं वर्णसंनिवेशमात्रादेवावतिष्ठते। **वृत्तिप्रयोजन इति।** पारम्पर्येण शास्त्रप्रवृत्तावस्याङ्गत्वम्। सति हि समवाये इत्संज्ञा, ततः '**आदिरन्त्येन**' इति प्रत्याहारस्ततः '**ढ्रलोपे**' इत्यादिशास्त्रप्रवृत्तिः।

(प्रयोजनान्तरवार्त्तिकम्)

अनुबन्धकरणार्थश्च ॥ २० ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

१४६ अनुबन्धकरणार्थश्च वर्णानामुपदेशः कर्तव्यः । अनुबन्धानासङ्क्ष्यामीति । न ह्यनुपदिश्य वर्णाननुबन्धाः शक्या आसङ्क्तुम् । स एष वर्णानामुपदेशो वृत्तिसमवायार्थश्चानुबन्धकरणार्थश्च । वृत्तिसमवायश्चानुबन्धकरणं च प्रत्याहारार्थम् । प्रत्याहारो वृत्त्यर्थः ।

(प्रदीपः) प्रत्याहारार्थमिति । प्रत्याहारशब्देनाणादिकाः संज्ञा उच्यन्ते ।

(वार्त्तिकावतरणभाष्यम्)

१४७ इष्टबुद्ध्यर्थश्च[२४] । इष्टबुद्ध्यर्थश्च वर्णानामुपदेशः । इष्टान्वर्णान्भोत्स्य[२५] इति । न ह्यनुपदिश्य वर्णानिष्टा वर्णाः शक्या विज्ञातुम् ।

(प्रदीपः) इष्टबुद्ध्यर्थश्चेति । सति ह्युपदेशे कलादिदोषरहिता ये वर्णा निर्दिष्टास्तथैव प्रयोक्तव्या इत्युक्तं भवति ।

(आक्षेपवार्त्तिकम्)

इष्टबुद्ध्यर्थश्चेति चेदुदात्तानुदात्तस्वरितानुनासिकदीर्घप्लुतानामप्युपदेशः ॥ २१ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

१४८ इष्टबुद्ध्यर्थश्चेति चेदुदात्तानुदात्तस्वरितानुनासिकदीर्घप्लुतानामप्युपदेशः कर्तव्यः । एवंगुणा अपि हि वर्णा इष्यन्ते ।

(प्रदीपः) एकश्रुत्या सूत्राणां पाठात्सर्वेषामुदात्तादीनामुपदेशः कर्तव्य इत्याह इष्टबुद्ध्यर्थश्चेति चेदिति ।

(वार्त्तिकावतरणभाष्यम्)

१४९ आकृत्युपदेशात्सिद्धम् । आकृत्युपदेशात्सिद्धमेतत्[२६] । अवर्णाकृतिरुपदिष्टा सर्वमवर्णकुलं ग्रहीष्यति । तथेवर्णाकृतिः । तथोवर्णाकृतिः ।

(प्रदीपः) आकृत्युपदेशादिति । उपात्तोऽपि विशेषो नान्तरीकत्वाज्जातिप्राधान्यविवक्षायां न विवक्ष्यत इत्यर्थः ।

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२४. Ben. read इष्टबुध्दयर्थश्च as Vārttika.

२५. Ben. भोत्स्यामह इति.

२६. Ben. read आकृत्युपदेशात्सिध्दम् as a Vārttika and omit आकृत्युपदेशात्सिध्दमेतत्.

(आक्षेपवार्त्तिकम्)

आकृत्युपदेशात्सिद्धमिति चेत्संवृतादीनां प्रतिषेधः ॥ २२ ॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

१५० **आकृत्युपदेशात्सिद्धमिति चेत्संवृतादीनां प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः। के पुनः संवृतादयः। संवृतः कलो ध्मात एणीकृतोऽम्बूकृतोऽर्धको ग्रस्तो निरस्तः प्रगीत उपगीतः क्ष्विण्णो रोमश इति। अपर आह।**

ग्रस्तं निरस्तमविलम्बितं निर्हतमम्बूकृतं ध्मातमथो विकम्पितम्।
संदष्टमेणीकृतमर्धकं द्रुतं विकीर्णमेताः स्वरदोषभावना इति ॥
अतोऽन्ये व्यञ्जनदोषाः।

(प्रदीपः) **संवृतादीनामिति**। आकारादीनां संवृतत्वं दोषः। न त्वकारस्य संवृतगुणत्वात्। तत्र संध्यक्षरेषु विवृततमेषूच्चार्येषु संवृतत्वं दोषः। **कलः** स्थानान्तरनिष्पन्नः काकलिकत्वेन प्रसिद्धः। **ध्मातः** श्वासभूयिष्ठतया ह्रस्वोऽपि दीर्घ इव लक्ष्यते। **एणीकृतः** अविशिष्टः किमयमोकारोऽथौकार इति यत्र संदेहः। **अम्बूकृतः** यो व्यक्तोऽप्यन्तर्मुख इव श्रूयते। **अर्धकः** दीर्घोऽपि ह्रस्व इव। **ग्रस्तः** जिह्वामूले निगृहीतः, अव्यक्त इत्यपरे। **निरस्तः** निष्ठुरः। **प्रगीतः** सामवदुच्चारितः। **उपगीतः** समीपवर्णान्तरगीत्यानुरक्तः। **क्ष्विण्णः** कम्पमान इव। **रोमशः** गम्भीरः। **अवलम्बितः** वर्णान्तरसंभिन्नः। **निर्हतः** रूक्षः। **संदष्टः** वर्धित इव। **विकीर्णः** वर्णान्तरे प्रसृतः, एकोऽप्यनेकनिर्भासीत्यपरे। **स्वरदोषभावना इति**। स्वरदोषगोत्राणि। अनन्ता हि दोषा अशक्तिप्रमादकृताः

(आक्षेपनिराकरणभाष्यम्)

१५१ **नैष दोषः। गर्गादिबिदादिपाठात्संवृतादीनां निवृत्तिर्भविष्यति।**

(आक्षेपसाधकभाष्यम्)

१५२ **अस्त्यन्यद् गर्गादिबिदादिपाठे प्रयोजनम्। किम्। समुदायानां साधुत्वं यथा स्यादिति।**

(प्रदीपः) **अस्त्यन्यदिति**। गर्ग इत्यादिनैव संनिवेशेन गर्गादीनां साधुत्वं यथा स्यात्, गार्ग्य इत्यादीनां मा भूत्। ततश्च तद्गतानामेवाकारादीनां दोषनिवृत्तिः कृता स्यात्, न तु समुदायान्तरस्थानाम्। यद्यपि प्रत्ययविध्यर्थो गर्गादीनां पाठस्तथापि प्रसङ्गात्समुदायसाधुत्वायापि भवति।

(उद्द्योतः) परे तु **समुदायानां**—एतत्प्रकृतिकयञन्तसमुदायानां साधुत्वं यथा स्यादित्यर्थं पाठश्चरितार्थः, न कलादिदोषान्निवर्तयेदित्येव भाष्यार्थः।

(पक्षान्तरद्वारा वार्त्तिकसदृशवचनावतारभाष्यम्)

१५३ **एवं तर्ह्यष्टादशधा भिन्नां निवृत्तकलादिकामवर्णस्य प्रत्यापत्तिं वक्ष्यामि।**

(प्रदीप:) **निवृत्तकलादिकामिति।** अकारस्य संवृतत्वात् 'निवृत्तसंवृतत्वादिकाम' इति नोक्तम्। अकारस्य निदर्शनार्थत्वात्सर्ववर्णानां शास्त्रान्ते प्रत्यापत्तिरित्यर्थः।

(प्रश्नभाष्यम्)

१५४ **सा तर्हि वक्तव्या।**

(आक्षेपनिराकरणवार्त्तिकसदृशवचनम्)

लिङ्गार्था तु प्रत्यापत्तिः॥

(व्याख्याभाष्यम्)

१५५ **लिङ्गार्था सा तर्हि भविष्यति।**

(उद्द्योतः) **लिङ्गार्था त्विति।** अनुबन्धस्थानीयतत्तद्धात्वादिगतकलादिलिङ्गनिवृत्त्यर्था इत्यर्थः। नाकृतिनिर्देशप्रयुक्तदोषपरिहारमात्रप्रयोजना प्रत्यापत्तिः किं तु सर्वानुबन्धेत्संज्ञाशास्त्राद्यकरणफलिकाऽपीति न गौरवमिति भावः।

(आक्षेपभाष्यम्)

१५६ **तत्तर्हि वक्तव्यम्।**

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

१५७ **यद्यप्येतदुच्यतेऽथवैतर्ह्यनेकमनुबन्धशतं नोच्चार्यमित्संज्ञा च न वक्तव्या लोपश्च न वक्तव्यः। यदनुबन्धैः क्रियते तत्कलादिभिः करिष्यते।**

(प्रदीपः) **यदनुबन्धैरिति।** यथा स्वरितत्वमधिकारार्थमेवमात्मनेपदार्थं कलादिकं प्रतिज्ञाय **कलादात्मनेपद**मित्यादि करिष्यते, न तु '**अनुदात्तङित:**' इत्यादि। नन्वनुबन्धाभावे कथमणादिकाः संज्ञा उपपद्यन्ते। '**आदिः कलैः सह**' इत्युक्त्वा 'अ--उ' इत्यादिकाः संज्ञाः करिष्यन्ते, स्वरसन्धिश्चासंदेहाय न करिष्यते इत्यदोषः।

(सिद्धान्तभाष्यम्)

१५८ **सिद्ध्यत्येवमपाणिनीयं तु भवति। यथान्यासमेवास्तु।**

(आक्षेपस्मारणभाष्यम्)

१५९ **ननु चोक्तमाकृत्युपदेशात्सिद्धमिति चेत्संवृतादीनां प्रतिषेध इति।**

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

१६० **परिहृतमेतद् गर्गादिबिदादिपाठात्संवृतादीनां निवृत्तिर्भविष्यति।**

(आक्षेपस्मारणभाष्यम्)

१६१ **ननु चान्यद् गर्गादिबिदादिपाठे प्रयोजनमुक्तम्। किम्। समुदायानां साधुत्वं यथा स्यादिति।**

(समाधानभाष्यम्)

१६२ एवं तर्ह्युभयमनेन क्रियते पाठश्चैव विशेष्यते कलादयश्च निवर्त्यन्ते। कथं पुनरेकेन यत्नेनोभयं लभ्यम्। लभ्यमित्याह। कथम्। द्विगता अपि हेतवो भवन्ति। तद्यथा। आम्राश्च सिक्ताः पितरश्च प्रीणिता इति। तथा वाक्यान्यपि द्विष्ठानि भवन्ति। श्वेतो धावति। अलम्बुसानां यातेति।

(प्रदीपः) **उभयमिति**। यथाभूता गर्गादिस्था अकारादयस्तथाभूता एव सर्वत्र प्रयोक्तव्या इति प्रतिपाद्यते इत्यर्थः। **द्विगता इति**। द्वौ अर्थौ गताः प्रयोजनद्वयसंपादका इत्यर्थः। **तथा वाक्यान्यपीति**। शब्दस्याप्यर्थवत् द्विगतत्वमित्यर्थः।

(समाधानान्तरभाष्यम्)

१६३ अथवेदं तावदयं प्रष्टव्यः। क्वेमे संवृतादयः श्रूयेरन्निति। आगमेषु। आगमाः शुद्धाः पठ्यन्ते। विकारेषु तर्हि। विकाराः शुद्धाः पठ्यन्ते। प्रत्ययेषु तर्हि। प्रत्ययाः शुद्धाः पठ्यन्ते। धातुषु तर्हि। धातवोऽपि शुद्धाः पठ्यन्ते। प्रातिपदिकेषु तर्हि। प्रातिपदिकान्यपि शुद्धानि पठ्यन्ते। यानि तर्ह्यग्रहणानि प्रातिपदिकानि। एतेषामपि स्वरवर्णानुपूर्वीज्ञानार्थम् उपदेशः कर्तव्यः। शशः षष इति मा भूत्। पलाशःपलाष इति मा भूत्। मञ्चकः मञ्जक इति मा भूत्।

आगमाश्च विकाराश्च प्रत्ययाः सह धातुभिः।
उच्चार्यन्ते ततस्तेषु नेमे प्राप्ताः कलादयः॥

(प्रदीपः) **अथवेति**। केवलानां वर्णानां लोके प्रयोगाभावात् धात्वादीनां च शुद्धानां पाठात् तत्स्थत्वाच्च वर्णानां न कश्चिद्दोषः। **यानि तर्हीति**। डित्थादीनि। **एतेषामपीति**। शिष्टप्रयुक्तत्वेनोणादीनां पृषोदरादित्वाच्च साधुत्वाभ्यनुज्ञानात्सर्वेषामत्र संग्रहः सिद्धः।

इति उपाध्यायजैयटपुत्रकैयटकृते महाभाष्यप्रदीपे प्रथमस्याध्यायस्य प्रथमे पादे प्रथममाह्निकम्॥

इति श्रीभगवत्पतञ्जलिविरचिते व्याकरणमहाभाष्ये प्रथमस्याध्यायस्य प्रथमे पादे प्रथममाह्निकम्॥

PATANJALI'S

Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya

PASPAŚĀHNIKA

INTRODUCTION, TEXT, TRANSLATION & NOTES

(NOW STARTS THE FIRST *ĀHNIKA* CALLED *PASPAŚĀ* IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE FIRST BOOK IN THE *VYĀKARAṆA-MAHĀBHĀṢYA* COMPOSED BY THE REVERED MASTER PATAÑJALI)

Note (1)

The word *paspaśā* is derived from the frequentative *(yaṅluk)* of *spaś-* 'to see' with the help of the suffixes *aC* (P. 3.1.134) and *ṬāP* (P.4.1.4). Thus the literal meaning is 'seeing frequently or repeatedly'. As appears from *Vt.* I on P. 7.3.87, Kātyāyana thinks that the verbal base is not *spaś-*, but *spāś-*. The *Vt.* says that the penultimate vowel of reduplicated bases is shortened before an ending which begins with a vowel, as we see in usages like *paspaśāte*, etc. That is to say, in the absence of this *Vt.* we would have expected forms like *paspāśāte*, etc. Patañjali (*Mbh.* III, p. 338, line 17) quotes the usage *kapotaḥ śaradaṁ paspaśāte* 'may the pigeon see the autumn frequently'. Later on (ibid., lines 25–26), he rejects the *Vt.* by assuming *spaś-* as the original verbal base.

It is not known when or by whom the name *paspaśā* was given to the first *āhnika* of the *Mbh.* All we can say is that it must have been known to Māgha, who is usually dated in the 7th century. The *Śiśupālavadha*, 2.112 d, says *śabdavidyeva no bhāti rājanītir apaspaśā* 'statecraft without espionage appears to us like grammar without the *paspaśā*'. The pun on the meaning of *paspaśā* can only be explained by assuming that its use as a name in grammar was known to Māgha. Mallinātha, commenting on the passage, says *paspaśā śāstrārambhasamarthaka upodghātasaṁdarbhagranthaḥ* '*paspaśa* is a literary composition in the form of an introduction which explains why a (particular) *śāstra* is taken up'. For similar and different explanations of the term *paspaśā* see *Patañjali's Mahābhāṣhya* (Introductory Chapter). Edited with English Translation....by K. C. Chatterji. Revised fourth edition, Calcutta 1972, p. 136–37; *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Āhnikas* 1–3 with English Translation and Notes, Edited by Prof. K. V. Abhyankar and Dr. J. M. Shukla, B.O.R.I., Poona 1975, p. 1; and P. S. Subrahmanya Sastri, *Lectures on Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya*, Volume I *(Āhnikas* 1–3*)*, Second Edition, Thiruvaiyaru 1960, p. 5.

(Kaiyaṭa's Introductory Stanzas to his Commentary)

(1) Having bowed down for the highest *ātman* who[1] takes on the form of everything, (yet is himself) without form,[2] who is the

1. In the translation, to avoid complication, the *paramātman* is considered to be personal throughout, although in connection with some epithets like *sarvākāra, nirākāra, sadasadrūpatātīta* and *jñānalocanasaṁlakṣya* it may be viewed as impersonal also. The latter view requires the pronoun 'which'.

2. Nāgeśa, in his comment, explains *ākāra* in the sense of *upādānakāraṇa* 'material cause'. If this sense is adopted, the translation reads 'who / which is the

supervisor of the universe, who is beyond our senses, who has passed beyond a nature (which can be described in terms) of being and non-being,[3] who is invisible for those enveloped in cosmic illusion;

(2) (but) who can be experienced by the eye of intuitive realization, who is Nārāyaṇa, unborn, all-pervading, the one who has instituted all sciences;[4]

(3) and having bowed down for that Sarasvatī, patroness of all learning, by whose grace men reach the status of god;[5]

(4) having saluted the feet of my guru Maheśvara also who possesses the power of reasoning, who has expert knowledge of (the sciences dealing with) words, the sentence and the means of valid cognition;[6]

(5) In such a way that tradition is adhered to, I, Kaiyaṭa, son of Jaiyaṭa, am going to build a boat in the form of an explanation, which goes from the near shore to the far shore of the ocean-like *Mahābhāṣya*.[7]

(6) How can my shallow mind fathom the very deep ocean of the *Mahābhāṣya*? (This seems impossible), therefore I shall be ridiculed by students who are in the habit of faultfinding.

(7) Still, with the help of the solid book which functions like a bridge, composed by (Bhartṛ) hari,[8] I shall reach its other side, proceeding slowly, like a cripple.

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material cause of everything, (yet is himself) without a material cause'. But the current meaning of *ākāra* is 'form', 'shape'.

3. That is to say, he can be described as *sat* 'being' only. This is how Nāgeśa explains.

4. Nāgeśa explains that *sarvavidyā* here refers to the Vedas.

5. According to Nāgeśa, *devatvam* here means *pāṇḍityam* 'the status of pandit'. The idea seems to be that in a pandit all knowledge is concentrated, like in a god.

6. A standard expression referring to mastery over grammar, Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya.

7. According to Nāgeśa, the suffix *Kha* added to *avārapāra* conveys the sense of *tatra bhavaḥ* 'located there', by P. 4.5.53. This is allowed by P. 4.2.93. Accordingly, *avārapārīṇa* is taken to mean 'located on the near and on the far shore'. Since this meaning must qualify *plava*, and since it does not fit in with *plava* in the sense of 'boat', Nāgeśa interprets *plava* as *plūyate anena* 'it is crossed by means of that', that is to say, a bridge.

However, it is not clear why *avārapārīṇa* must be derived in the sense indicated. P. 5.2.11 prescribes the same suffix *KHa* after *avārapāra* in the sense of *gāmin* 'going'. Thus *avārapārīṇa* comes to mean 'going to the near and the far shore', which goes well with the meaning 'boat' for *plava*. Compare also MONIER WILLIAMS, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, s. v. *pārāvāra*. Here the usage *pārāvārasya nauḥ* 'a boat which plies from one side to the other' is mentioned.

8. Reference is, of course, to the *Vākyapadīya* on which Kaiyaṭa wrote a commentary also.

I

(SECTION DEALING WITH THE NATURE OF WORDS)

1. (Vārttika : Introduction of the topic)

Now starts the instruction in words.

1. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

The word *atha* 'now starts' here is used for introducing a topic.[9] We are to understand that the discipline called *śabdānuśāsana* 'instruction in words' has been introduced as a topic.

Kaiyaṭa

Being a commentator, the author of the *Bhāṣya* states the direct use of grammar with (the words) *atha śabdānuśāsanam* 'now starts the instruction in words'.[10] But the indirect uses like the preservation (of the Veda), etc., will be stated later on.

In order to explain his own statement,[11] he first explains the word *atha* which forms part of that (statement).

(On) 'the word *atha*....here'. The word *iti* has been used in order to ensure that the word *atha* stands for its own form.[12] For, when in this way a connection with the other words has been formed through *sāmānādhikaraṇya* 'syntactic agreement', the word *atha* can be explained.[13] And (the word *atha*) which has been ensured to stand for its own form is referred to by the pronoun *ayam*.

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9. Thus Patañjali makes it clear that *atha* here does not mean 'but', 'afterwards', etc.

10. Kaiyaṭa, true to tradition, assumes that the words *atha śabdānuśāsanam* are part of the *Bhāṣya* itself, and not a *Vt*.

11. Since it is assumed that *atha śabdānuśāsanam* forms part of the *Bhāṣya* itself, it follows that in *Bh*. No. 1, Patañjali offers an explanation of his own words. In this connection compare the stanza quoted by *DSG*, s. v. *bhāṣya*, which states a definition of the literary genre called *bhāṣya*, as follows : *sūtrārtho varṇyate yatra padaiḥ sūtrānukāribhiḥ / svapadāni ca varṇyante bhāṣyaṁ bhāṣyavido viduḥ* 'the experts on *bhāṣya* consider (that) to be a *bhāṣya* in which the meaning of *sūtras* is explained by means of words which closely follow the *sūtras* and (in which) the own words (of the *bhāṣya*) are explained'.

12. As different from its use in grammar, *iti* is used in common speech to dissociate a wordform from its meaning. Thus *gaur iti* refers to the wordform *g-au-ḥ*. Similarly, *atha iti*. For details see *BDA*, Note (98).

13. The statement *atha ity ayaṁ śabdaḥ adhikārārthaḥ prayujyate* says something about *atha*. What it says cannot be about the meaning *atha* but only about the wordform *a-th-a*. Only when this is assumed, we can connect the words of the statement meaningfully through positing *sāmānādhikaraṇya* between them. Words in the nominative always stand in syntactic agreement, see *PRA*, p. 21, para 2.

(On) 'The word'. (The use of the word *śabda*) to indicate a word's own form is for the sake of clear understanding.[14]

(On) 'for introducing a topic'. *Adhikāra* (means) *prastava* 'introduction'. That is to say, (the word *atha*) is used as a merely indicative word.[15] And in the *Vākyapadīya* it has been ascertained that particles function as merely indicative words.[16]

When (it is assumed that) the word *atha* (is used) for (indicating) a topic, he shows the resulting sentence-purport by (saying) *śabdānuśāsanam* (etc.). Since it stands near the word *atha*, we understand the fact that

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14. Kaiyaṭa thinks that every word in the *Bhāṣya* must have a special significance. Thus the question arises, what is the use of the word *śabda*, when *iti* already indicates that *atha* stands for its own form?

Vaidyanāth Pāyguṇḍe's *Chāyā* (*Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya Navāhnikam, NSP* ed., Bombay, 1951, text, p. 7, on *evaṁ hīti* in the *Uddyota*) explains that the simple statement *athaśabdo 'dhikārārthaḥ prayujyate*, where *iti* is not used, would give us the wrong idea that *atha* always serves the purpose of *adhikāra*.

Actually, the use of *iti* + *śabda* is a matter of style of expression.

15. According to Kaiyaṭa, the particle *atha* here has no independent meaning of its own. It is not *vācaka* 'directly denotative' here, but *dyotaka* 'merely indicative (of a meaning)'. That is to say, since a previous context is lacking without which *atha* cannot have a definite meaning, it merely serves to bring out the meaning *adhikāra*.

16. The *VP*, 2.192, in Rau's reading says *nipātā dyotakā kecit pṛthagarthakalpane / āgamā iva kecit tu saṁbhyūyārthasya sādhakāḥ* 'some particles are (merely) indicative (of meaning) on the assumption (that they convey) a separate meaning. But others, like augments, establish a meaning after having joined (with another word)'. Here the translation of *pṛthagarthaprakalpane* is doubtful, as is the reading *pṛthagarthaprakalpane* itself. How can particles be *dyotaka* and still convey a separate meaning?

The traditional reading of the stanza, which is not mentioned by Rau, is given in the Abhyankar-Limaye edition as *nipātā dyotakāḥ kecit pṛthagarthābhidhāyinaḥ / āgamā iva ke 'pi syuḥ saṁbhūyārthasya vācakāḥ* '(some) particles are (merely) indicative (of meaning), others convey a separate meaning, but still others, like augments, may be expressive of meaning after having joined (with another word)'. The same reading is found in the commentary *Kāśikā* of Harirāma on the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* (see *The Vaiyākaraṇabhūshaṇa af Koṇḍabhaṭṭa*....by K. P. Trivedi. *Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series*, No. LXX, Bombay, 1915, p. 528). For the interpretation, which assumes three varieties of *nipātas*, as against Rau's two varieties, see S. D. Joshi, "Word-Integrity and Syntactic Analysis", *Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit*, Class A, No. 20, University of Poona, Poona, 1968, p. 169; and K. A. Subramania Iyer, *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, Kāṇḍa* II. English Translation with Exegetical Notes, Delhi, 1977, p. 82. Harirāma, l. c., explicitly says that the first *kecit* in the text is to be connected with both (*dyotakā* and *pṛthagarthābhidhāyinaḥ*). For what is meant by *saṁbhūya*, in contrast with *pṛthagarthābhidhāyinaḥ*, see S. D. Joshi, art. quoted, p. 169, on *bhavati* and *anubhavati*. For some examples, see K. A. Subramania Iyer, work quoted, p. 82–83.

As is known, the first mention of the *dyotaka-vācaka* controversy occurs in the *Nirukta* 1.3.

śabdānuśāsana is being started, although (*śabdānuśāsana*) could have been the subject-matter of several actions.[17]

And this name *śabdānuśāsana* 'instruction in words' for grammar is (a name) which fits the subject-matter.

And since there is no *ubhayaprāpti* 'possibility (to use the sixth case ending in the sense) of both (the *kartṛ* 'agent' and the *karman* 'object'), because the *kartṛ* (that is), the *ācārya* 'teacher', has not been mentioned —the reason being that there was no point (in mentioning him)—, in this (cp.- analysis *śabdānām anuśāsanam*) the sixth (case ending has not been added) by (the rule) *ubhayaprāptau karmaṇi*,[18] but by (the rule) *kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti*.[19] Therefore, since there is no opportunity for a prohibition of cp.-formation by (the rule) *karmaṇi ca*,[20] the cp. (*śabdānuśāsana* is formed) like *idhmapravraścana*.[21]

Note (2)

The words *atha śabdānuśāsanam* must be a *Vt.*, because they are commented upon by Patañjali. But tradition holds that they cannot be a *Vt.*, because Patañjali himself, while commenting upon *siddhe śabdārthasaṁbandhe* (*Mbh.* I, p. 6, line 16), says that here the word *siddhe* is used for the sake of auspiciousness (*Mbh.* I, p. 6, line 28). Since *siddhe* is taken to be an auspicious word, this implies that it must stand at the beginning of a work. Therefore, according to Patañjali, *siddhe śabdārthasaṁbandhe* is the first *Vt.*

As is known, Patañjali interprets the word *siddha* here in the sense of *nitya*. Then the question arises, why didn't Kātyāyana say *nitya*? The

17. *Śabdānuśāsana* by itself may be the subject-matter of the action of the ending, etc. also. But that is excluded by the fact that the word *śabdānuśāsana* occurs near *atha*.

18. P. 2.3.66, for which see *PRA*, Notes (90) and (92). The rule says that when we have the possibility to add the genitive ending in the sense of both *kartṛ* and *karman*, it must be added in the sense of *karman* only. But since in the expression *śabdānām anuśāsanam* that possibility is lacking due to the abscnse of a *kartṛ*, P. 2.3.66 cannot become applicable for adding the genitive ending after *śabda*.

19. P. 2.3.65, for which see *PRA*, Note (74). The rule says that the genitive ending is used to express the *kartṛ* or the *karman*, when the word conveying this grammatical meaning is construed with a *kṛdanta* word. In *śabdānām anuśāsanam* the condition is met, and we are free to add the genitive ending after *sabda* in the sense of *karman*.

20. P. 2.2.14, for which see *TA*, Notes (117) and (119). According to tradition, the word *karmaṇi* in this rule does not refer to the objective genitive allowed by P. 2.3.65, but to the same genitive prescribed by P. 2.3.66. Therefore P. 2.2.14 cannot become applicable to prohibit cp.-formation in expressions like *śabdānām anuśāsanam*.

21. *Idhmapravraścana* means 'a wood-cutting (instrument)'. It is one of the examples quoted by Patañjali in *Bh.* No. 2 on P. 2.2.14 for *Vt.* I on the same rule. The *Vt.* explicitly prescribes cp.-formation of a genitive word with a *kṛdanta* word, on the condition that a word representing the agent does not form part of the non-compound expression. That is to say, it excludes the domain of the *ubhayaprāpti* rule.

answer is, that the word *nitya* wouldn't achieve *maṅgala* 'auspiciousness'. That is why Kātyāyana used *siddha*. Obviously, *siddha* cannot mean *nitya*. The *Vt.* simply means to say that once the relationship between a word and its meaning has been established by the speech community, grammar steps in. It is not the business of grammar to establish that relationship. Patañjali, however, interprets the *Vt.* quite differently, as will be shown later on.

Since Patañjali declares *siddhe śābdārthasaṁbandhe* to be the first *Vt.* the commentators are forced to consider that *atha śabdānuśāsanam* is part of the *Bhāṣya* itself. Then, to answer the question, why Patañjali explain these words, the commentators dreamed up the idea that the *Bhāṣya* may also explain its own words.

2. (*Bhāṣya : Question*)

Of which *śabdas* ?[22]

Kaiyaṭa

(The word *śabda*) cannot be established in a specific meaning without (the help of) context, etc., because the word *śabda* is a general term. Therefore (he asks) *keṣām* 'of which', thinking that there is an undesired possibility for instruction in the sound of string-instruments or in the croaking of crows, etc.[23] Reference (by *keṣām* to the first member of the cp. *śabdānuśāsanam* is made possible) due to a separation (accomplished) by the mind, of the meaning of the first member, although it has been included in the meaning of the final member. Like (the question) *kasya rājñaḥ* 'of which king ?', when (the word) *rājapuruṣaḥ* 'a king's officer' has been uttered.

Note (3)

Kaiyaṭa's problem is, how can the pronoun *keṣām* refer to the *pūrvapada* 'first member' of the cp. *śabdānuśāsanam* only ? A cp. conveys one single integrated meaning (see *SA*, Kaiyaṭa on *Bh.* No. 8, and Note (7)). Therefore the meaning of the *pūrvapada* cannot exist independently from that of the *uttarapada* 'final member', nor be independently referred to. Kaiyaṭa solves the problem by saying that, although the meaning of the *pūrvapada* is included in that of the *uttarapada*—the latter meaning being the predominant one—, still, with the help of an operation of the mind, the meaning of the *pūrvapada* may be pried loose. Reference to the *apradhāna* 'subordinate' member of a *tp.* cp. by means of a pronoun is not uncommon in daily usage, witness the example.

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22. Of course, *śabda* can only mean 'word' here. But when this translation is adopted, Kaiyaṭa's commentary is not intelligible any more, because he assumes a far more general meaning of *śabda*, namely, 'sound'.

23. The mention of the sound of crows is perhaps not as silly as it looks because the croakings may have been used for prognostication.

Nāgeśa, however, thinks that the meaning of the *pūrvapada* is not included in that of the *uttarapada*, or the other way round, but that both meanings have fused together (*saṁsṛṣṭa*). Therefore he explains *uttarapadārthāntargata* ' included in the meaning of the *uttarapada* ' in Kaiyaṭa's commentary as *pṛthagupasthityaviṣaya* ' which cannot be the content of a separate presentation (by means of words) '.

3. (*Bhāṣya : Answer*)

Of (words) belonging to ordinary speech and of Vedic (words). Among these, to start with, (the words) belonging to ordinary language, (like) *gauḥ* ' cow ', *aśvaḥ* ' horse ', *puruṣaḥ* ' man ', *hastī* ' elephant ', *śakuniḥ* ' bird ', *mṛgaḥ* ' deer ', *brāhmaṇaḥ* ' brahmin '. (Then,) certainly, Vedic (words) also (like) *śáṁ no devīr abhíṣṭave* ' happily the goddess for our protection ',[24] *iṣé tvorjé tvā* ' you (sg. acc.) for strength, you for vigour ',[25] *agním īḷé puróhitam* ' I praise Agni, the family-priest ',[26] (and) *ágna ā yāhi vītáye* ' come, o Agni, for feasting '.[27]

Kaiyaṭa

The person who states the final opinion,[28] thinking that on the strength (of the argument that) grammar is an auxiliary of the Veda we may understand particular (words only),[29] says *laukikānām* ' of (words) belonging to ordinary language '.

(The word *laukikāḥ* is derived) with the help of (the suffix) *ṬHaÑ* in the sense of *loke viditāḥ* ' known (pl. nom. masc.) among people ', by P. 5.1.44.[30] Or, alternatively, *ṬHaÑ* (is added) in the sense of (*tatra*)

24. Atharvaveda (*Paippalādasaṁhitā*) 1.1.1.

25. Yajurveda (*Taittirīyasaṁhitā*) 1.1.1.

26. Ṛgveda 1.1.1.

27. Sāmaveda 1.1.1. On the order in which the Vedas are quoted here, see P. S. SUBRAMANYA SASTRI (1960), pp. 10–12.

28. Thus Kaiyaṭa, for no apparent reason, indicates that *Bh.* No. 3 belongs to the *siddhāntin*.

29. Considering the argument stated we may wrongly understand from the word *śabda* that the words dealt with in grammar are Vedic words only.

30. The rule prescribes *ṭhaÑ* in the sense of *tatra viditaḥ* ' known there ' (P. 5.1.43). The derivation is as follows :

loka + ṭhaÑ	P. 5.1.44
lauka + ṭhaÑ	P. 7.2.117
lauka + ika	P. 7.3.50
lauk° + ika	P. 6.4.148
laukika.	

bhavaḥ 'originating (there)', because (*loka*) belongs to the *adhyātma*-list.[31] (The word) *vaidikāḥ* (is derived) in the sense of *veda bhavāḥ* 'originating (pl. nom. masc.) in the Veda'.[32]

Although the Vedic words are considered to be *laukika*, they are mentioned separately in order to declare their pre-eminence.[33] Like that of Vasiṣṭha in (the phrase) *brāhmaṇā āyātā vasiṣṭho 'py āyātaḥ* 'the brahmins have come, Vasiṣṭha also has come'.[34] But (unlike that of Vasiṣṭha) their pre-eminence lies in this that they are kept from corruption by a special effort.[35] Or, alternatively, (the *laukika* words) are separately indicated, because only words belonging to the spoken language are considered to be *laukika*.[36]

Among these two, since there is no restriction on wordorder in ordinary language, he just shows words (by way of illustration) in *gauḥ, aśvaḥ* (etc.). But since in the Veda a restriction regarding wordorder holds, he quotes phrases by way of example, as in *śaṁ no* (etc.).[37]

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31. Kaiyaṭa may have given the alternative derivation in order to establish a uniform derivation for both the words *laukika* and *vaidika*. Reference is to *Vt.* I on P. 4.3.60, the last part of which reads *adhyātmadiṣu ceṣyate* 'and (*ṬHaÑ*) is desired with regard to *adhyātma*, etc.' The *adhyātmādi-gaṇa* is an *ākṛtigaṇa*.

32. Apply *Vt.* I on P. 4.3.60. See further fn. 36.

33. Vedic words may be said to be *laukika*, because they, or at least a big number of them, are not different from the words used in ordinary language. In this connection, reference may be made to *Nirukta* 1.16, where the opening statement says *arthavantaḥ śabdasāmānyāt* '(Vedic mantras) do possess meaning, because the words they use are shared with (the spoken language)'.

The meaning 'forming part of the word' assumed for *laukika* here by P. S. Subramanya SASTRI (1960), p. 10, on the authority of Nāgeśa, seems unnecessary. In the context given *loka* means either 'the people (forming the speech-community)', or 'ordinary, daily speech' in distinction from the speech used during the performance of the ritual.

34. The intention of the phrase is explained by P. S. Subramanya SASTRI (1960), p. 10. The words *vasiṣṭho 'pi* are not meant to exclude Vasiṣṭha from the company of brahmins, but merely stress his important position among the brahmins. Similarly, the words *vaidikānāṁ ca*. The Vedic words are separately mentioned, because among the *laukika* words, they enjoy a special position.

35. The Vedic words are very special words in so far that a great deal of effort is required to ensure their correct form and pronunciation during recitation.

36. Kaiyaṭa's alternative view may be taken to imply that since *laukika* words are the words spoken at the time when grammar was being composed, and since they are different from Vedic words which are not part of common usage any more, they should be separately mentioned.

37. Thus, according to Kaiyaṭa, Vedic words are to be studied as they occur in a given Vedic expression. They are not to be quoted in isolation from the context, because that would mean disturbing the wordorder of the text.

But one may ask, if *laukika* words can be quoted as isolated examples, or as a list of isolated examples, why not Vedic words also? It is, of course, admitted that when memorizing or reciting a Vedic text the wordorder must not be changed. But what harm is there regarding wordorder, when single Vedic words are quoted by way of example? Kaiyaṭa's reason seems to be spurious.

Note (4)

The question *keṣāṁ śabdānām* in *Bh.* No 2 is a deliberate question. Although Pāṇini deals with the Veda *(chandas)* and with the spoken language *(bhāṣā)* in one and the same grammar, this should not lead us to think that they are equally important in respect of treatment and of the organization of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. To quote a modern view (P. Kiparsky, 1979, p. 56), " virtually every decision on how to organize the system was dictated by the structure of the Classical language. Almost always, the Vedic peculiarities are derived in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* by patch-up rules added to rules already established and motivated on the basis of Classical Sanskrit. If all the specifically Vedic rules were erased from the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, one could scarcely tell from the structure of what remains that it had ever contained them. " But, in spite of this fact, tradition wants to maintain that in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* equal importance is given to the derivation of Vedic words. This is also the point made by Patañjali when saying *laukikānāṁ vaidikānāṁ ca* ' of (words) belonging to ordinary language and of Vedic (words) '.

Bh. No. 3 (and the *Vt. atha śabdānuśāsanam*) may be interpreted to support another traditional misconception of Pāṇini's grammar. From this one may conclude that the subject-matter of grammar consists in the derivation of words independently from their syntactic connection with other words in an utterance, and that they are to be connected with these other words only after their derivation. This is, in fact, the *padasaṁskārapakṣa*. It represents a learner's view of Pāṇini's grammar. But it should not be taken to provide any insight into the purpose of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, which is designed to explain and derive connected words and which starts from the actual form of the utterance in which the words are connected. See on this point *VIBHA* Introduction, p. ii and p. v–vi.

To the informed reader it comes like something of a shock that Patañjali, or whoever composed the *Paspaśāhnika*, at the very beginning of the great commentary on grammar, while quoting examples for *laukika* words, gives examples which consist of words which cannot be derived in Pāṇini's grammar. As noted by Lakshman Sarup (1926). Translation, p. 6, n. 2, and by V. Trapp (1935), p. 55, n. 1, these examples, with the exception of the last three, coincide with an enumeration stated by Yāska in *Nirukta* 1.1. The same enumeration occurs again in *Nirukta* 1.12. Here *go, aśva, puruṣa* and *hastin* are mentioned as words which are not *ākhyātaja* ' derivable from a verbal base ' according to Gārgya and some unspecified grammarians. Yāska's view on the point of derivability of words, as is known, was rather different (see Lakshman Sarup, 1926, Introduction to the Nirukta, p. 57).

What could have moved the *Bhāṣyakāra* to quote *avyutpanna* ' underivable' words here ? In answer, it may be pointed out that throughout the *Paspaśāhnika* the *Nirukta* plays a considerable role, as will be shown later

on. This being the case, maybe, at the beginning already, the *Bhāṣyakāra* wanted to give an indication of the importance he attached to the *Nirukta*.

It may be recalled also that Yāska looked upon his own work as *vyākaraṇasya kārtsnyam*, literaly 'the totality of grammar' (*Nirukta* 1.15). He says so in a context dealing with the meaning of Vedic mantras. Without the etymological investigations undertaken by him the mantras cannot be understood. Without an understanding of their meaning the explanation of *svara* 'accent' and *saṁskāra* 'gramatical word-analysis' (which, together, make up grammar) in depth is not possible. Therefore this branch of knowledge (called *nirukta*) is *vyākaraṇasya kārtsnyam*. How to interpret this ?

It may be assumed that Yāska, who deals with the etymology of Vedic words exclusively, is interested in grammar mainly in so far it gives an account of Vedic words. That is to say, for Yāska grammar would to a great extent coincide with Vedic grammar. It is clear that to such a grammar Yāska's etymological investigations would mean a big contribution, because they clarify the meaning of a considerable number of Vedic words which would otherwise be declared *avyutpanna* 'underivable'. Taking this into consideration, we may interpret the phrase *vyākaraṇasya kārtsnyam* to mean, not that the *Nirukta* is the whole of grammar, but, rather, that it serves to make Vedic grammar complete.

4. (*Bhāṣya : Question*)

Now, in *gauḥ* what (is to be considered) the word ?

Kaiyaṭa

One sees that daily communication (proceeds) by means of *abheda* 'non-difference' between the word and the meaning, as in *ayaṁ gauḥ* 'this is a cow' (and) *ayaṁ śuklaḥ* 'this is a white one'.[38] Therefore, to determine the nature of the word, he asks 'now' (etc.). That is to say, in the cognition *gauḥ*, among the things which come to our mind, what (exactly) is the word ?[39]

Note (5)

The intention behind the question will gradually become clear in the sequel of the *Bhāṣyas*.

According to Kaiyaṭa, in daily, naive experience we do not or not clearly distinguish between a word and the thing it stands for. The aim of

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38. In daily communication we seem to identify the two. In *ayaṁ gauḥ*, *ayaṁ* refers to the meaning, i. e., the thing-meant, whereas *gauḥ* is the name we give to it. But in the utterance the two are made to look identical.

39. By the 'things' (*vastūni*) which come to our mind, Kaiyaṭa refers to the things which are mentioned in the following *Bhāṣyas* as possible identifications of *śabda*.

the question is to make that distinction, which is essential in grammar, clear from the very outset.

5. *(Bhāṣya : First tentative answer)*

Is it so that what we know as an object possessing a dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs and horns, that this is the word ?[40]

Kaiyaṭa

(The author) mentions precisely those things[41] successively with (the words) ' Is it so that ' (etc.). Pronouns which establish the identity of the subject and the predicate take the gender of these in turn.[42] That is why (*sa* in) *sa śabdaḥ* in mentioned freely in the masculine.

6. *(Bhāṣya : The first tentative answer rejected)*

No, he[43] says, (because) this is what we call *dravya* ' individual thing '.[44]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' No, he says ' (etc.). We understand that, since it is perceived by a different organ of sense, the *dravya* is not the *śabda* ' word ', but it is (nothing but) a *dravya.* And if instruction in *dravyas* would have been intended, then (the author) would have definitely said *atha dravyānuśāsanam* ' now starts the instruction in individual things '.

Note (6)

The *Bhāṣya* first explains that the thing for which a word like *gauḥ* stands, and which comes to our mind along with all its characteristics, is not the word.

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40. *Yat tat* is taken in the sense of *prasiddhi* mentioned by Nāgeśa as the second alternative. In this first alternative *yat tat* simply means *yad.*

In the word *artharūpa* the constituent *rūpa* is considered to be practically redundant.

41. That is, the things which come to our mind, referred to in Kaiyaṭa's comment on the previous *Bhāṣya.*

42. Usually, in the construction *yad..tad* both pronouns show the same gender, like *yaḥ..saḥ, yā..sā, yat..tad,* because their reference is identical. But in the *Bhāṣya* the word *yat* is used in the neuter, whereas *sa* (in *sa śabdaḥ*) is used in the masculine. This is an instance of attraction of gender, not uncommon in spoken language. This is what Kaiyaṭa wants to justify by means of his statement. In this connection Nāgeśa quotes a line from Kālidāsa (*Raghuvaṁśa* 5.54), *śaityaṁ hi yat sā prakṛtir jalasya* ' for coldness is the nature of water '. The grammatical point is lost in the translation. Mallinātha here comments : *vidheyaprādhānyāt seti strīliṅganirdeśaḥ* '*sā* is mentioned in the feminine because prominence is given to the *vidheya* " predicate " '.

43. The author of the *Mahābhāṣya.*

44. See the note on *dravya* in Abhyankar-Shukla (1975), p. 5, and in *DSG,* s. v. *dravya.*

According to Kaiyata, the *Bhāsya* introduces a criterion by which we may draw the demarcation line between *śabda* and non-*śabda*, namely, the organ of sense by which they are perceived. A word is perceived by the ear, the non-*śabda*, i e., the *dravya*, by some other organ.

7. *(Bhāṣya : Second tentative answer)*

Then this which we know as a gesture (or) a movement (or) the winking of the eye, is that the word ?

Kaiyaṭa

Although, by the very same logic,[45] it has been rejected[46] that a *guṇa* ' quality ', *kriyā* ' action ' or *sāmānya* ' general notion ' are a word, (the author) after having first raised the question[47] for the sake of elaborate treatment, rejects it (starting from the words) ' Then this '. And because these[48] are possible as meanings of the word *go-*, he envisages the objection that they are words. But this is rejected, like before.

Among these, *iṅgita* (means) an action of the body indicating a feeling ; *ceṣṭita* (means) a (voluntary) movement of the body; *nimiṣita* (means) an action of the eye.

Nāgeśa

(On) ' because these are possible as meanings of the word *go* '. The reason is that there is a possibility of *abheda* ' non-difference '. On account of the maxim *tadabhinnābhinnasya tadabhinnatvam* ' that (P) which is identical with (Q) which is identical with (R) is (itself) identical with (R) ' we may envisage the objection that these are words. This is the intention (of the author). Or, alternatively, because they can be regarded as parts (of a whole)[49] in connection with the meaning of the word *go* which consists in a bundle of qualities.[50]

Note (7)

As stated by Kaiyaṭa in his comment on *Bh.* No. 4, daily communication proceeds by assuming non-difference between a word and its meaning. This explains how *go* may be taken to stand for *sāsna* ' dewlap ' and the rest. But this is still something different from assuming that *go-* may stand for *iṅgita*, etc., which are not physical parts of a cow. How to explain this ?

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45. *Anenaiva nyāyena.* Namely, by not being perceived by the ear.

46. That is to say, rejected in principle.

47. *Codyapūrvaka. Codya* is a difficulty put forward for the sake of refutation.

48. Gesture, etc.

49. *Samūhitayā.* A *samūhin* is a part of a whole *(samūha).*

50. Reference is to *Bh.* No. 31 on P. 2.2.6, for which see *TA*, p. 105.

In answer to this question, Nāgeśa refers to a maxim in logic. If *go-* is identical with the thing it stands for, and if the thing it stands for is identical with *iṅgita*, etc., then we may assume that *go* is not different from *iṅgita*, etc. Or, we may say that the meaning of a word consists in a rather fluid collection of qualities and associative features. This also may explain that *iṅgita*, etc. figure as meanings of the word *go-*, and are, therefore, regarded as the word *go*.

8 (*Bhāṣya : The second tentative answer rejected*)

No, he says, (because) that is what we call *kriyā* 'action'.

9. (*Bhāṣya : Third tentative answer*)

Then this which we know as *śukla* 'white', *nīla* 'violet', *kapila* 'brown' (or) *kapota* 'pigeon-coloured', is that the word ?[51]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) '*śukla....nīla....*' (etc.). Because of the earlier mention of *dravya* 'individual thing', here *śukla*, etc. must be regarded as expressing a mere quality.[52]

10. (*Bhāṣya : The third tentative answer rejected*)

No, he says, (because) that is what we call *guṇa* 'quality'.

11. (*Bhāṣya : Fourth tentative answer*)

Then this which we know as remaining undifferentiated among the things which are differentiated, as what remains undestroyed among the things which are destroyed, as what is the *sāmānya* 'general notion'[53] (in different individuals), is that the word?

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'which we know as remaining undifferentiated among the things which are differentiated'. By this the identity of the generic notion is stated. But by 'what remains undestroyed among the things which are destroyed' *nityatva* 'permanence' (is stated).

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51. *Bh.* No. 31 on P. 2.2.6 contains a nearly identical list of adjectives. Only, instead of *kapota*, it reads *kṛṣṇa* 'black'.

52. Kaiyaṭa means to say that here the word *guṇa* does not mean *guṇopasarjana-dravya*, but it stands for *guṇa* pure and simple. That is to say, *śukla*, etc. do not stand for a substance in which the quality mentioned inheres, like a white, etc. cow. For a discussion see *TA*, fn. 132 and Note (94).

53. The word *sāmānya*, which literally stands for that which individuals have in common, may be used in meanings not far removed from those conveyed by two other terms, namely, *ākṛti* and *jāti*, for which see fn. 294.

(On) *sāmānyabhūtam* 'what is the *sāmānya*'. The great general notion called *sattā* 'being' has been mentioned as the *upamāna* 'standard of comparison' for a specific general notion in the form of *gotva* 'cow-ness', etc.[54] *Sāmānyabhūtam* (means) *sāmānyam iva* 'like the (great) general notion'.[55] The word *bhūta* (is used) in the sense of *upamā* 'simile', as in *pitṛbhūta* 'like a father'.[56]

Note (8)

Going by the answer stated in *Bh.* No. 12 we understand that the present *Bhāṣya* uses three different expressions for what amounts to the same, namely, the entity indicated as *ākṛti*. Why the *Bhāṣya* does so is not clear. The words *abhinneṣv abhinnam acchinneṣv acchinnaṁ sāmānyabhūtam* may represent a quotation from a grammatical source in verse.

But to Kaiyaṭa, who follows Bhartṛhari (cf. *MBD*, p. 3, lines 12–13) the three expressions must needs correspond with three different concepts, namely, *sāmānyasya ekatvam* 'the identity of the general notion', *nityatva* and *sattāsāmānya* 'the general notion in the form of being'. Thus the meaning of the *Bhṣāya* is altogether misconstrued.

12. *(Bhāṣya : The fourth tentative answer rejected)*

No, he says, (because) that is what we call *ākṛti* 'generic notion'.[57]

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54. Kaiyaṭa is thinking of Bhartṛhari's doctrine of *sattā*. Just to quote two stanzas, *VP* 3.1.33 says *sambandhibhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu / jātir ucyate tasyāṁ sarve śabdā vyavasthitāḥ* 'it is being which, differentiated according to the differentiation among the things with which it is associated, is called *jāti* 'generic notion' in connection with cows, etc. On that (being) all words are based'. Thus what is *gotva* is nothing but *gosattā* 'being as present in cows'; *VP* 3.3.51 ab, says *etāṁ sattāṁ padārtho hi na kaścid ativartate* 'for there is not anything at all which goes beyond that *sattā*'. This line directly echoes the statement in the *Mbh.* II, p. 391, line 7, *na sattāṁ padārtho vyabhicarati* 'a thing never strays away from *sattā*'. See K. A. Subramania IYER (1971), p. 26 (note on stanza 33), and p. 105 (note on stanzas 49-51, where the reference to the *Mbh.* is given). For a discussion on *mahāsattā* see the same author (1969), p. 211, 246–47.

Kaiyaṭa's association of *sāmānya* with *sattā* is not based on Bhartṛhari's *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, compare *MDB*, p. 3, lines 13–17.

55. Here *sāmānya* must be interpreted as *mahāsāmānya* 'great general notion' in comparison with which notions like *gotva* can only be described as *sāmānyaviśeṣa* 'a particular general notion'.

56. Literally, 'who has become a father', namely, in comparison with the original father. Kaiyaṭa's interpretation is based on Bhartṛhari. See *MBD*, p. 3, line 13, *bhūtaśabda upamāvācī* 'the word *bhūta* expresses comparison'.

According to Nāgeśa, the interpretation of *bhūta* in the sense of *iva* is not compulsory. Compare *pramāṇabhūta* (said of the *ācārya*, *Mbh.* I, p. 39, line 10). The word can only mean 'who is the authority'.

57. According to the *MBD*, p. 3, lines 17–18, *ākṛti* does not mean 'shape' (*saṁsthāna*) here, but *jāti* 'class' only. Kaiyaṭa has no opinion on the matter. Nāgeśa says that *ākṛti* here may mean both, *jāti* and *saṁsthāna*.

13. *(Bhāṣya : Question)*

Then what is the word ?

Kaiyaṭa

The *dravya* ' individual thing ', etc. having been rejected (as being the word), he asks ' Then what ' (etc.).

14. *(Bhāṣya : Answer)*

That from which when uttered we understand objects possessing a dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs and horns.

Kaiyaṭa

(The *siddhāntin*) answers with (the words) ' That from which when uttered ' (etc.). Grammarians hold that the word or sentence, which is different from phonemes, are (the units) expressive (of meaning).[58] Because when we assume that every single phoneme is expressive (of meaning), it would undesirably follow that there is no point in uttering the second and following phonemes.[59] But since there would be no point (in doing so, on the assumption that , every single ((phoneme is expressive of meaning, we must not jump to the conclusion that it is the group of phonemes which is expressive of meaning)).[60] Because in the *utpattipakṣa,* on the one hand, there is no (room for) a simultaneous production (of phonemes).[61] (And) because in the *abhivyaktipakṣa,* on the other hand, there cannot be a group, since the manifestation occurs in succession only.[62]

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58. E. g. *VP*, 1. 74, *pade na varṇā vidyante varṇesv avayavā na ca / vākyāt padānām atyantaṁ pravibhāgo na kaścana* ' there are no phonemes in the word, nor parts in the phonemes. There is absolutely not any separation of words from the sentence '. From this it is clear that eventually, according to Bhartṛhari, the sentence is the meaning-conveying unit. But, in any case, the phonemes are out. Compare *SN*, p. 170.

59. If the *g* of *gauḥ* already conveys the meaning ' cow ', what is the use in pronouncing the second and following sounds ?

60. Apparently, after *ānarthakye tu pratyekam* some words are missing in Kaiyaṭa's commentary. They are supplied by Nāgeśa. The translation of the portion supplied by Nāgeśa has been added between (( )).

61. And so there cannot be a group. The *utpattipakṣa* is the alternative in which it is assumed that each single phoneme is separately produced by the phonational act of the vocal organs. This is the Naiyāyikas' point of view, as opposed to that of the grammarians. It may be regarded as a particular outcome of the application of a theory of causality to linguistics. The theory of causality referred to is the *asatkāryavāda,* the view held by the Naiyāyikas that an effect is non-existent before it is actually produced. This view entails that the effect is destroyed after its origination. *Utpatti* implies *prāgabhāva* ' previous non-existence ' and *pradhvaṁsābhāva* ' (subsequent) non-existence in the form of annihi ation '. See *SN*, p. 199.

62. The *abhivyaktipakṣa* is the alternative in which it is assumed that the phonemes, which already exist, are merely made manifest, that is perceptible to the liste-

(But) if (we assume that) it is the phonemes collecting together to form one single recollection which are expressive (of meaning), it would undesirably follow that there is no difference, as far as the understanding of meaning is concerned, between *saraḥ* ' pond ' and *rasaḥ* ' taste '. That is why it has been established in the *VP*, in great detail, that it is the *sphoṭa*, which is different from these (phonemes and) which is manifested through *nāda* ' sound ', which is expressive (of meaning) [63]

(On) ' from which when uttered '. That is to say, from which when manifested.

Nāgeśa

(On) ' But since there is no point '. Supply (after) *pratyekam ānarthakye tu* (the words) *samudāyasya vācakatvam upeyam, tat tu na yuktam* ' it is not correct that we must understand that it is the group which is expressive (of meaning) '. Because in this respect there are two ways : either the group which is being produced is expressive (of meaning), or the group which is being manifested is. Out of these two, he criticizes the first with (the words) *utpattipakṣe tu* ' (because) in the *utpattipakṣa*, on the one hand ' (etc.).

Note (9)

The *MBD* (p. 3, line 23–p. 4, line 7) informs us that in Bhartṛhari's days there were at least three different views regarding what is called *śabda*. The first view says *yo vāyam uccāryate kramavān avaraḥ. Kaścid anyaḥ akramaḥ śabdātmā buddhistho vigāhate. Tasmād arthapratipattiḥ. Kutaḥ. Yathaivārthāntaranibandhano nārthāntaraṁ pratyāyayati evaṁ svarūpanibandhano notsahate pratyāyitum* ' or, (the *śabda*) which is uttered, which shows a sequence (and) which is the lower one, (from that *śabda*) another *(śabda)* which shows no sequence, which is the essence of *śabda*, penetrates (so that it becomes) located in the *buddhi*. From this (latter *śabda*) we understand meaning. Why (is that so) ? (Because,) just as (a word) employed on the basis of one meaning cannot convey another meaning, in the same way, (the lower *śabda*, i.e., the sound-sequence uttered by the speaker) employed on the basis of its own form, cannot convey (anything but that own form) '.

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ner's ear, by the phonational act. This is the grammarians' point of view. The theory of causality involved here is the *satkāryavāda*, held by the Sāṁkhyas and others. It says that the effect pre-exists in its cause in a latent state. *Abhivyakti* implies the permanence and imperishability of phonemes. See *SN*, p. 199.

63. Bhartṛhari has used the term *sphoṭa* only in the first *Kāṇḍa* of the *VP*. Here the relation between the *sphoṭa* and the *nāda* (or *dhvani*) viewed as that between *vyaṅgya* ' (the item) manifested ' and *vyañjaka* ' (the item) which manifests ' is discussed in nine stanzas, for which see *SN*, p. 29–34. We have to carefully distinguish between Bhartṛhari's views on *sphoṭa* (see *SN*, p. 35–36) and those of later grammarians like Kaiyaṭa (see *SN*, p. 45, 47, 56-61). Compare also K. A. Subramania IYER (1969), p. 157, 158–160.

Here we note the following points :

(1) The first and the second sentence of the printed text are read as one sentence in which the word *tasmāt* 'from that (*śabda*) ' is supplied to have a correct relative clause construction (*yo. . ayam. . tasmāt. . vigāhate*).

(2) The expression *buddhistho vigāhate* is taken as a proleptic usage.

(3) According to the text, which reads *avaraḥ*, a hierachy is introduced within *śabda*. There is a lower *śabda*. Consequently, there must be a higher *śabda*

(4) The lower *śabda* is characterized in three ways :

(*a*) It is uttered.

(*b*) It shows a sequence. This can only be a sequence of phonemes, like in *g-au-ḥ* or *v-ṛ-kṣ-a-ḥ*.

(*c*) It gives rise (*tasmāt*, supplied in the text) to a different *śabda*.

(5) The higher *śabda* is characterized in four ways :

(*a*) It shows no sequence. So it must be simultaneously present, like in *gauḥ* or *vṛkṣaḥ*.

(*b*) It is the *śabdātman*, the word-form in its pure essence.

(*c*) It is *buddhistha*. That is to say, it is not merely an auditory perception, but a concept in the sense of a unit of knowledge.

(*d*) From it, meaning is understood.

(6) A question is asked : Why ? This is interpreted to mean : Why is meaning understood from the *buddhistha śabda*, and not from the lower *śabda*, that is directly from the sound-sequence ? The answer is that, just as a word employed to convey one meaning cannot convey another meaning, so also a sound-sequence can only convey its own form, like *g-au-ḥ* or *v-ṛ-kṣ-a-ḥ*, and nothing else. That is why meaning is not understood directly from the sound-sequence.

On the basis of these points the following scheme can be set up : lower *śabda* (sound-sequence) → higher *śabda* (the unitary perception, which is mental) → meaning. This clearly refers to a speaker-listener relation. It is meant to explain how meaning is understood by a listener from the speaker's utterance. We also note that in this connection the word *sphoṭa* is not used.

The second view does mention the term *sphoṭa*. After an initial portion which is not clear the text says : *evaṁ varṇā vākyāntareṣu ye kramajanmānaḥ ayugapatkālās te taṁ padasthaṁ* (read thus, for *padasthā*) *varṇajātim abhivyañjayanti. Vṛkṣaśabdo vṛkṣatvam. Jāter arthasya pratipattiḥ. Etac*

cārthasvarūpaṁ sphoṭo 'yam eva śabdātmā nityaḥ. Ye tu kramajanmānaḥ ayugapatkālā vyaktayo dhvanyātmānas te iti 'in the same way, the sounds which in different sentences originate in succession (and) which lack simultaneity, manifest that *varṇajāti* "type-phoneme" which is located in the word. (Like) the wordform *v-ṛ-kṣ-a-ḥ* (manifests) *v-ṛ-kṣ-a-tva* 'the type (sound in all phoneme-sequences) *v-ṛ-kṣ-a-ḥ*". From (this) *jāti* "type (sequence)" we understand meaning. And this thing's (i.e., *jāti's*) own nature is the *sphoṭa*, (and) it is eternal. But the *vyaktis* "instance (sequences, like *v-ṛ-kṣ-a-ḥ*)", which originate in succession (and) which lack simultaneity, are essentially *dhvani* "sound".

Here we note the following :

(1) The fourth sentence of the printed text is read as two sentences : *Etac cārthasvarūpaṁ sphoṭaḥ. Ayam eva śabdātmā nityaḥ*, as required by sense.

(2) The constituent *artha* in *arthasvarūpam* is taken to refer to the *jāti*. It cannot be taken in the sense of 'meaning', because the *jāti*, i.e., the *sphoṭa*, is the entity from which we understand meaning. It does not have itself the nature of meaning.

(3) The entity called *varṇas* 'phonemes' is mainly characterised as follows :

(*a*) They show a sequence.

(*b*) They lack simultaneity.

(*c*) The manifest a *varṇajāti* 'type-phoneme'.

(*d*) They are *vyaktis* 'instances, representative of a type'.

(*e*) They are essentially *dhvani* 'sound'.

(4) The entity called *varṇajāti* 'type-phoneme' is mainly characterised as follow :

(*a*) It is manifested by *varṇas*.

(*b*) From it, we understand meaning.

(*c*) It is the *sphoṭa*.

(*d*) It is eternal.

(*e*) It is the essence of the word-form.

(*f*) It is *padastha*. That is to say, since *varṇas* by themselves are not used in communication, that is, in the speaker-listener situation, but are used in *padas* 'words' they manifest their *jāti* in words. That is why the *varṇajāti* is said to be located in the word.

On the basis of these points the following scheme can be set up : *varṇas* (which come in sequences arranged in the form of words) → *varṇajāti* (which is nothing but the *sphoṭa*) → meaning.

Differences with the earlier view are :

(1) The introduction of an entity called *sphoṭa* which is identified with *varṇajāti* ' type phoneme ', in relation to which the *dhvanis* ' (speech-) sounds ' uttered by the speaker are *vyaktis* ' individual realizations '.

(2) The determination of the relation between the *sphoṭa* and the *dhvanis* as a *vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāva*; no such relation is assumed between the lower *śabda* and the higher *śabda.*

(3) The fact that meaning is understood on the basis of the *varṇa-jāti (= sphoṭa)*, and not on the basis of a sequence-less *buddhistha śabda.*

The position taken by the second view tallies with the one mentioned by *VP* 1.96 (= 1.93, ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer), for which see Note (23), and SN, p. 28, fn. 39, and p. 44–48, and K. A. Subramania Iyer (1969), p. 157–58.

The third view mentioned in the *MBD* says *dviśaktiḥ śabda ātma-prakāśane 'rthaprakāśane ca samarthaḥ Yathā pradīpaḥ ātmānaṁ prakā-śayan nidhyarthān prakāśayati. Yas tv ādhyātmikaḥ indriyākhyaḥ prakāśaḥ sa ātmānam aprakāśayan bāhyārthaṁ prakāśayatīti* ' the *śabda* ' word ' has two powers : it is capable of revealing itself and of revealing the thing-meant. (Just) like a lamp while revealing itself reveals objects in the form of trea-sures. But the light called *indriya* ' sense-organ ', which is *ādhyātmika* ' located in itself ' (only), does not reveal itself, (but) it reveals the outer object '. That is to say, in order to be understood a word must commu-nicate its own phonetic form in the first place, and then also its meaning. In this respect, a word is different from the sense organs. These organs need not be perceived themselves, but they put us into contact with the outside objects. This tallies with *VP* 1.56, *grāhyatvaṁ grāhakatvaṁ ca dve śaktī tejaso yathā / tathaiva sarvaśabdānāṁ ete pṛthag avasthite* ' just as light has two powers, (namely) that of being perceived and that of causing to perceive, so also these two (powers) have been separately established for all words '. See *SN*, p. 41–42; K. A. Subramania Iyer (1969), p. 154–55.

Here we note the following points :

(1) No mention is made of an entity called *sphoṭa.*

(2) The *śabda* has two powers : it reveals its own form (that is, it is self-revealing), and it reveals its meaning.

On the basis of these points the following scheme can be set up : *śabda* (wordform, which is self-revealed) → meaning.

A difference with the two earlier views is that the last view does not assume an intermediary stage between the (perceived) wordform and meaning.

To sum up : The problem common to all three views is, how to account for the communication of meaning through speech-sounds in the speaker-listener situation.

Bh. No. 14, from which the whole discussion starts, says no more than that, when a word is uttered, meaning is understood.

The first view quoted by the *MBD* says that the speech-sounds uttered come in a sequence which is called *avara śabda*. They produce a *buddhistha śabda* in the listener, which is itself without sequence, and on the basis of which meaning is understood. Thus here between the utterance of the sounds by the speaker and the understanding of meaning by the listener an intermediate stage is introduced.

The second view says that the speech-sounds produced by the speaker reveal or manifest type-phonemes to the listener, in which abstraction is made of individual variations of pronunciation. On the basis of these type-phonemes, which are called *sphoṭa*, and which are revealed in succession, meaning is understood. Here also, between the utterance of the sounds and the understanding of meaning an intermediate stage, namely, the *varṇajāti-sphoṭa*, is introduced.

The third view is, comparatively, a shallow view. It attributes two powers to *śabda*, namely, the power to reveal itself and meaning also. No intermediate stage between the sound-utterance and the understanding of meaning is postulated.

Finally, there is Kaiyaṭa, who in the present *Bhāṣya* finds a reference to *sphoṭa*-theory. His concept of *sphoṭa* is characterized by the following features :

(1) It is over and above the phonemes.

(2) It is manifested through *nāda* '(speech-) sound'.

(3) It is *vācaka* 'expressive of meaning'.

In conclusion, it may be observed that the *sphoṭa*-concept as developed by Patañjali and Bhartṛhari serves to explain how a wordform, on the basis of distinctive sound-features, is perceived by the listener. In the later *sphoṭa*-doctrine a shift takes place from sound to meaning. Here the *sphoṭa* is conceived as an entity over and above the phonemes, which has the nature of a meaning-conveying unit. Compare further *SN*, p. 11, 36–42, 55–61, 73–84, and K. A. Subramania Iyer (1969), p. 158 (who sums up four features of *sphoṭa*).

In Kaiyaṭa's commentary on the present *Bhāṣya*-passage, the question is about how meaning is conveyed. Separate phonemes cannot convey meaning. Groups of phonemes cannot either. Groups require either a simultaneous presence of phonemes or a succession of phonemes. But there can be no simultaneous presence, because phonemes perish as soon as they are articulated. There can be no succession, because succession requires

continuity, and there can be no question of continuity between what perishes and what is produced anew. To assume that the phonemes are preserved in a single recollection is no help, because in that case we cannot explain why words like *saraḥ* and *rasaḥ*, which are made up of indentical phonemes, convey different meanings. The idea is that in recollection the order in which the phonemes are perceived plays no rule. Then how to explain the way in which meaning is conveyed? That is why an entity over and above the phonemes is set up. That entity is called *sphoṭa*. Compare *SN*, p. 178–79.

But the *Bhāṣyakāra* does not say anything about *sphoṭa* here. He merely tells us that a *śabda* is a meaningful entity. When the *śabda gauḥ* is uttered, several things will come to the listener's mind : a generic notion based on generic features, and probably also an action and a colour or colours typical of cows. This yet apart from the phonetic form *g-au-ḥ* itself. Taken as a whole, the view presented by the *Bhāṣya* comes near to the third view on the nature of *śabda* mentioned in the *MBD* : *yena uccāritena* refers to the phonetic aspect, and *yena saṁpratyayo bhavati* to the meaning-aspect. Compare *SN*, p. 8.

15. (*Bhāṣya : Alternative answer*)

Or rather, *dhvani* 'sound', which has a (well-)known meaning in current speech, is said (to be) *śabda*. For instance, *śabdaṁ kuru* 'make a sound', *mā śabdaṁ kārṣīḥ* 'don't make a sound', *śabdakāry ayaṁ māṇavakaḥ* 'this boy is noisy', so it is said, when one produces sound. Therefore (we may say that it is) *dhvani* 'sound' (which is) *śabda*.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'Or rather' (etc.). The difference between *dhvani* 'sound' and *sphoṭa* has been established elsewhere.[64] Therefore there is no harm even in their treatment as identical, because the general purport (of the passage) here is that *dravya* 'individual thing', etc. are not the meaning of *śabda*.

(On) 'when one produces sound'. Since the *vidhi* 'injunction'[65] and the *pratiṣedha* 'prohihition'[66] are concerned with something which is not going on, how can this (expression 'when one produces sound') be connected with the three (examples)?[67] The answer is that even when somebody produces a sound one may say *śabdaṁ kuru* 'make a sound', when one has

64. According to Nāgeśa, 'elsewhere' means in the *Saṁgraha*, but also in the *Mbh.* itself, under (*Vt.* V on) P. 1.1.70. In connection with the latter passage see *SN*, p. 13–15.

65. The statement *śabdaṁ kuru.*

66. The statement *mā śabdaṁ kārṣīḥ.*

67. The first statement refers to the past, the second to the future. So how can the *Bhāṣyakāra* say *dhvaniṁ kurvan* which refers to the present ?

the fear that he will stop, so that he is prevented from doing so.[68] In the same way, a person who feels disturbed on hearing sound which he does not like may say *mā śabdaṁ kārṣīḥ* 'don't make a sound'.

Nāgeśa

(On) 'Or rather....whose meaning is popularly known' in the *Bhāṣya*. That is to say, (the word) *śabda* is nothing but a group of sounds in the form of speech-sounds because they are perceived by the auditory organ (and) which is wellknown among the speech-community as conveying meaning. The general purport (of the *Bhāṣya*) is that its status of being conveyer of meaning in common speech is wellknown to him only, to whom something is o.k. without giving thought to it,[69] (and) that the explanation (given) by grammar is for such a person only.[70]

Note (10)

Although what the *Bhāṣya* means to say is clear, namely, that *śabda* is used in the sense of *dhvani*—or, as the *Bhāṣyakāra* says it, that *dhvani* is *śabda*—, the construction of the first sentence poses a problem.

The *MBD* (p. 5, lines 8–9) very succinctly explains the *Bhāṣya* as : '*dhvani* is the known meaning of the word *śabda*. (That is to say), *dhvani* is its meaning'. Here *pratītapadārthaka* is taken as a *kdh*. cp. (*pratītaḥ padārthaḥ* 'a known meaning'). This is not correct. *Pratītapadārthaka* is a *bv*. cp. and this is what we have to keep in mind while construing the first sentence.

If we connect *pratītapadārthaka* with *dhvaniḥ*, as the text of the *Bhāṣya*-statement requires, the following meaning results : '*dhvani* which has a (well-)known meaning'. Here *dhvani* can only refer to the word *dhvani*. But in that case the connection with the rest of the statement, (*dhvaniḥ*) *śabda ity ucyate* becomes problematic, because this connection requires *dhvani* in the sense of 'the meaning *dhvani*', and not 'the word *dhvani*'. A way out of this difficulty is to supply either the word *śabdaḥ* (or *śabdaśabdaḥ* 'the word *śabda*') immediately after *loke*, or to supply a second word *dhvani* immediately after the first word *dhvaniḥ*. In the first alternative the text reads *athavā pratītapadārthako loke śabdaḥ. Dhvaniḥ śabda ity ucyate* 'or rather, the word *śabda* has a known meaning in common speech. *Dhvani* "sound" is said (to be) *śabda*'. In the second alternative the text reads *athavā pratītapadārthako loke dhvaniḥ. Dhvaniḥ śabda ity ucyate* 'or rather, (the word) *dhvani* has a known meaning in common speech. *Dhvani* "sound" is said (to be) *śabda*'. Thus in both alternatives two sentences result. Moreover, from the point of view of

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68. That is, so that he is prevented from stopping producing sounds.

69. *Avicaritaramaṇīya*, to be interpreted as a *bv*. cp.

70. That is to say, the second definition of *śabda* carries no scientific weight.

textual criticism the single reading *dhvaniḥ* may be easily explained as a case of haplography. According to Filliozat (1975), p. 22, *n*. 3, the idea of supplying the word *śabdaśabda* goes back to the commentators Īśvarānanda and Annambhaṭṭa.

A simple way of removing the difficulty is, of course, to change the wordorder and read : *athavā pratītapadārthako loke śabdo dhvanir ity ucyate* 'or rather, (the word) *śabda*, which has a known meaning in common speech, is said (to be) *dhvani*'. This solution, which connects *pratītapadārthaka* with *śabda*, has the support of the other two known occurrences in the *Mbh* of the word *pratītapadārthaka* (*Mbh.* I, p. 39, line 25, and p. 323, line 3) where it qualifies *śabda*. However, if this reading, which gives a very clear sense, is adopted, we are at a loss to explain how the present text, which represents the *lectio difficilior*, could have come into being. Therefore this solution is to be rejected.

Still, the question is whether a discussion like the foregoing does justice to the *Bhāṣya*, in particular to its generally accepted colloquial style. In compositions written in this style we shouldn't expect each and every word to stand up to close scrutiny like in the case of *sūtras* or definitions. Allowance should be made for a rather more informal approach. The use of a word both to stand for its form and its meaning in the present *Bhāṣya* may be an instance of precisely that. It is on the basis of these considerations that the translation of the *Bhāṣya* has phrased.

The question was : what is *śabda*? The first answer stated in *Bh.* No. 14 says that *śabda* is a meaningful form. The second answer stated in the present *Bhāṣya* says that *śabda* means *dhvani* 'sound'. Thus the two answers are clearly different. The difference lies in this that in his second answer the *Bhāṣyakāra* has left the question whether *śabda* represents meaningful sound or meaningless sound undecided. Precisely that may have been the *Bhāṣyakāra's* intention of offering his second, preferred definition. The point is that the rules of grammar deal with both, meaningful and non-significative linguistic units (see S. D. Joshi, "Patañjali's definition of a word—An interpretation", *Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute.* Silver Jubilee Volume, Poona 1966, p. 67, and the examples quoted in the sequel).

To the commentators, Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa, who consider that in his first definition of *śabda* the *Bhāṣyakāra* refers to the *sphoṭa* in the sense of an entity over and above the phonemes, which is responsible for conveying meaning, the second definition is rather a foolish affair. As explained by Nāgeśa, it represents the unreflecting attitude of those who use language without bothering to ask how it works, and the only point the *Bhāṣyakāra* wanted to make here is that—apart from conveying meaning—*śabda* also has a phonetic aspect : it consists of a group of sounds. But this is not a point which counts with the learned advocates of the *sphoṭa*-doctrine.

II

(SECTION DEALING WITH THE USES OF GRAMMAR)

16. *(Bhāṣya : Introducing a Vt.)*

But what are the uses of instruction in words ?

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' But what ' (etc.). The question is whether the study of grammar is like an obligatory act like the worship (of the sun) at the *saṁdhyā*, or an optional one.[71]

Note (11)

The question mentioned by Kaiyaṭa is raised and answered by the *MBD* (p. 5, lines 1-3) as follows : ' and inclination to study in a (particular) *śāstra* (is there) when one desires that. And one desires (that) when benefits (are available). But this (study of grammar) is not a *nityakarman* which must necessarily be undertaken. The non-undertaking of a *nityakarman* (results in) demerit. (Whether or not) *anitya (karmāṇi)* are undertaken, depends on one's own sweet will. And if there will be no benefits connected with that *(anityakarman)*, why should it be undertaken (at all) ? With this in mind (the author) asks " But what " (etc.) '.

II. (Vārttika : The use of grammar)[72]

Rakṣā **' preservation (of the Vedic texts),** *ūha* **' (suitable) adaptation (of a** *mantra* **according to the requirements of a particular ritual) ',** *āgama* **' (complying with a) vedic injunction ',** *laghu* **' simplicity / economy (in acquiring knowledge of the correct forms of language) ', and** *asaṁdeha* **' removal of doubt ' are the use.**

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71. Compare *Arthasaṁgraha of Laugākshi Bhāskara*....Critically edited and translated by D. V. GOKHALE, Poona (Oriental Book Agency), 1932, text p. 98–99, *yathā kāmye karmaṇi phalakāmanā, naimittike karmaṇi nimittaniścayaḥ, nitye saṁdhyopāsanādau śucivihitakalajīvitvam* ' for instance, in a *kāmyakarman* the desire of a result (is the *adhikāra* ' qualification ' for owning the result), in a *naimittikakarman* " ritual act undertaken on particular occasions only " (it is) the determination of the occasion, in a *nityakarman* in the form of *saṁdhyopāsana*, etc. (it is) the fact that one leads a clean life observing the prescribed times '.

72. The Kielhorn ed. does not print this statement as a *Vt.* But it must be a *Vt.*, because it is commented upon (and introduced) by the *Bhāṣyakāra.* Compare K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1972), p. 7. The use of the sg. *prayojanam* is typical of *Kātyāyanavārttikas* (some instances listed in K. Ch. CHATTERJI, 1972, p. 7), whereas Patañjali commonly uses the pl. The sg. itself is used in the sense of *jātyekavacana* by P. 1.2.58. According to K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1272). p. 7, Sāyaṇa in the introduction to his *Ṛgbhāṣya* treats the statement as a *Vt.* attributing it to Vararuci. In connection with the Notes on the section dealing with the uses of grammar compare K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1934) in J. F. STAAL (1972), p. 294-96.

17. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation of rakṣā)*

One should study grammar for the preservation of the Vedas. Because one who is acquainted with (the techniques of) *lopa* ' deletion ', *āgama* ' augment ' and *varṇavikāra* ' sound-substitution ' will (be able to) preserve the Vedas correctly.

Kaiyaṭa.

By (the words) *rakṣā (rtham*, etc.) he indirectly says that (the study of grammar) serves as a means of (reaching) the *puruṣārthas* ' aims of human life '.[73]

Having noticed in the Veda what he didn't notice in common speech (namely), *lopa* ' deletion ', etc. a non-grammarian may become perplexed.[74] But a grammarian does not become perplexed, and he determines the meaning of the Veda.

An example for *lopa* ' deletion ' and *āgama* ' (insertion of an) augment ' in connection with these[75] is *devā́ aduhra* ' the gods milked '.[76] After (the suffix) *laṄ* (added) after (the verbal base) *duh-* has been replaced by *jha*, (the letter) *t* is deleted by P. 7.1.41. (Then,) when (the augment) *rUṬ* is there by P. 7.1.8, the present form (results).[77]

Varṇavikāra ' sound-substitution ' (occurs), for instance, in *udgrābhaṁ ca nigrābhaṁ ca* ' the raising and lowering (of the sacrificial ladle) '.[78] The letter *bh* comes (in the place of *h*) by *Vt.* I on P. 8.2.32.[79] By the statement

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73. According to Nāgeśa, the *puruṣārthas* meant here are *dharma* and *mokṣa*.

74. Nāgeśa explains that a non-grammarian by mistake may produce different readings.

75. *Lopa, āgama* and *varṇavikāra* mentioned in the *Bhāṣya*.

76. *Yajurvedīya Maitrāyaṇī-Saṁhitā*, ed. by S. D. SATAVALEKAR, Aundh, 1956, p. 341. The complete sentence reads *táṁ devā́ aduhra hariténa pātréṇāmṛtám* ' the gods milked *amṛta* from her in a green vessel '.

77. The *prakriyā* is as follows:

duh	+ *laṄ*	P. 3.2.111
a + *duh*	+ *laṄ*	P. 6.4.71
a + *duh*	+ *jha*	P. 3.4.78
a + *duh*	+ *ata*	P. 7.1.5
a + *duh*	+ *a* °*a*	P. 7.1.41
a + *duh*	+ *a*	P. 6.1.97
a + *duh* + *rUṬ*	+ *a*	P. 7.1.8
a + *duh* + *ra*		P. 1.1.46
aduhra.		

78. The example (taken from the *Vājasaneyī-Saṁhitā* 17.64, or from the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 1.1.13) is quoted by Patañjali in his *Bhāṣya* on *Vt.* I on P. 8.2.32.

79. The *Vt.* reads *hṛgrahor bhaś chandasi hasya* ' in the case of *hṛ-* and *grah-* (the letter) *bh* comes in the place of *h*, in the Veda '. The words *iti vaktavyam* in Kaiyaṭa's commentary do not form part of the *Vt.* as stated in the Kielhorn ed.

of *Vt.* III on P. 3.3.36[80] (the suffix) *GHaÑ* (is added) after (the verbal base) *grah-* preceded by *ud.*[81]

Nāgeśa

(*Nanu,* etc.) But (one may object that) it is the relation between teacher and pupil which is the great cause of preserving the Vedas. (Then,) what is the use of grammar ? That is why (Kaiyaṭa) says ' ..in common speech ' (etc.).[82]

Note (11)

In connection with *rakṣā* as an aim of grammar, the *Tantravārttika (pūrvapakṣa)* has the following to say (ed. referred to in fn. 82, p. 261, lines 27–30) by way of refutation : *yathaiva lokasiddhatvāt kṛṣyāder lakṣaṇaṁ vṛthā / tathaiva vedasiddhānāṁ śabdānāṁ lakṣaṇaṁ vṛthā // rakṣādy api yad atroktam anvākhyānaprayojanam/ na tad apy anyataḥ siddher alpasiddhes tato 'pi vā //* 'just as (stating) prescriptions for agriculture, etc is worthless, because it is well-established among people, so also prescriptions for words which have been established in the Veda are worthless. Preservation (of the Vedic texts), etc. also, which has been stated here (in the *Paspaśāhnika*) as a (particular) use of (grammatical) explanation, is no (good) either, because it has been established in a different way, or (if it has been established by grammar) because it has been established by that (grammar) to a small degree only '. The different way to ensure the preservation of the Vedas has been stated on p. 262, lines 1-2, *śiṣyācāryasaṁbandho hi mahān vedarakṣāhetur vyākaraṇānadhīnasyāpi vedakramasyādhyayanenaiva rakṣyamāṇatvāt. Tadvināśe 'pi ca viśiṣṭataradoṣaprasaṅgāt* ' for the relation between teacher and pupil is the great cause of the preservation of the Vedas, because even for somebody who has

80. The *Vt.* says that *udgrābha* and *nigrābha* are known in the Veda in the sense of raising and lowering the sacrificial ladle.

81. P. 3.2.35 prescribes the suffix *GHaÑ* in the sense of *bhāva* (action noun, P. 3.3.18) after *udgrah-*. The *prakriyā* is as follows :

ud / ni + grah- + GHaÑ	*Vt.* III on P. 3.3.36
ud / ni + grāh + a	P. 7.2.116
ud / ni + grābh + a	*Vt.* I on P. 8.2.32
ud / ni + grābha.	

82. The opening words of Nāgeśa's comment, *śiṣyācāryasaṁbandha eva mahān vedarakṣāhetuḥ*, are almost literally quoted from Kumārilabhaṭṭa's *Tantravārttika*. See *Śrīmajjaiminipraṇīte Mīmāṁsādarśane...Śrīkumārilabhaṭṭaviracitatantravārttikākhyavyākhyāsahitaśābarabhāṣyasametaḥ..* .Edited by Subbaśāstri. *Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series* No. 97, Poona, 129, p. 262, line 1, *śiṣyācāryasaṁbandho hi mahān vedarakṣāhetur...*As is known, the *pūrvapakṣa* in the *vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa* in the *Tantravārttika* (ed. quoted, p. 252–280) contains a vehement and sometimes funny attack on grammar. One typical stanza (*Tantravārttika*, p. 260, lines 7-8) may be quoted here : *sūtravārttikabhāṣyeṣu dṛśyate cāpaśabdanām / aśvārūḍhāḥ kathaṁ cāśvān vismareyuḥ sacetanāḥ* 'in the *sūtras*, *vārttikās* and the *(Mahā-) bhāṣya* (instances of) incorrect speech are found. How can horseriders forget about their horses, if they are (really) mindful ? '.

not studied grammar the Vedic wordorder is preserved by means of recitation only. And because the undesired consequence would be incalculable damage if that (tradition of recitation) is lost'. In fact, the credit taken by the grammarians for preserving the Vedas is unjustified. The *Tantravārttika*, p. 262, lines 14–17, says *yadi vyākaraṇād rakṣāṁ manvīran vedavādinaḥ/ vaiyākaraṇagehesu chindyus te vedasaṁśayān // kakṣāvalambinaṁ nityam ko nāma karakaṁ vahan / tam anādṛtya śaucārtham anyataḥ kartum arhati //* 'if those who professionally recite the Vedas think that (the Vedas) will be preserved on account of grammar, they will (go and) put an end to their doubts regarding the Vedas in the houses of grammarians. (But) who, indeed, carrying a watervessel hanging by his side, can disregard it and clean himself in a different way ?'. In conclusion it is stated (p.262, lines 28), *tasmād vedarakṣārthaṁ tāvan nādhyeyaṁ vyākaraṇam* 'therefore, in order to preserve the V:das, one need not study grammar'.

18. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation of ūha)*

Certainly, the (suitable) adaptation (of a *mantra* according to the requirements of a particular ritual is) also (a use of grammar). The *mantras* are not recited in the Veda in all genders ard all case endings. And they have to be suitably adapted of necessity by the person in charge of the sacrifice. A non-grammarian cannot suitably adapt them. Therefore grammar must be studied.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'Certainly, the...adaptation...also'. Here the sacrifice for which the *itikartavyatā* 'detailed procedure' has been stated (and) on which another sacrifice is based (is called) *prakṛti* 'model'. And (the sacrifice) based (on that is called) *vikṛti* 'modification'. Once the Mīmāṁsakas have established the principle *prakṛtivad vikṛtiḥ kartavyā* 'the modification is to be performed like the model', it is the grammarian who correctly knows the (required) adaptation of stem and suffixes.

Regarding this there is a *mantra* connected with Agni, namely, *agnáye tvā júṣṭaṁ nírvapāmi* 'to you, Agni, I present a welcome thing'.[83] After this (model) the *mantra* connected with the boiled rice oblation for Sūrya, namely, *sauryaṁ caruṁ nirvaped brahmavarcasakāmaḥ* 'one desirous of the lustre of *brahman* should present the boiled rice oblation for Sūrya'[84] is adapted as *sūryā́ya tvā júṣṭaṁ nírvapāmi* 'to you, Sūrya, I present a welcome thing'. (What) *ūha* (means) has been shown in detail by Bhartṛhari.[85]

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83. *Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 1.1.5. *Vaidika Saṁśodhana Maṇḍal* Edition, Vol. I. Edited by N. S. SONTAKKE and T. N. DHARMADHIKARI, Poona, 1970, p. 84. The text here reads *agnáye vo júṣṭaṁ prókṣāmi.*

84. *Baudhāyana Śrauta Sūtra*, 13.24. See *The Baudhāyana Śrauta Sūtra*. Edited by W. CALAND, Vol. II, Calcutta, 1907, p, 134. Here the text reads *yo brahmavarcasakāmaḥ syāt tasmā etaṁ caruṁ sauryaṁ nirvaped.*

85. *MBD*, p. 5, line 18 p. 8, line 17. Compare the note in Abhyankar-Shukla (1975), p. 8.

Nāgeśa

(Ūhajñasya hi). We should understand that the reward (of the study of grammar) consists in obtaining *aihikasukha* ' wordly happiness ', because the person who is acquainted with *ūha* obtains the status of *ṛtvij* ' officiating priest ' (and) receives things.

Note (12).

By *ūha*, which forms the subject-matter of *adhyāya* IX of the *Mīmāṁsāsūtras*, the adaptation of *mantras*, *sāmans* or *saṁskāras* is meant as required in a ritual different from the original one. This is illustrated for *mantras* by Kaiyaṭa's example. Here the *āgneya* rite functions as the *prakṛti* ' model ' for the *vikṛti* ' modification ' which is connected with Sūrya. For the *sauryayāga* ' sacrifice to Sūrya ', in which *caru* is offered, no precise instructions regarding the manner in which it is to be performed have been stated in the Veda. In other words, here the *itikartavyatā*, which consists in the required subsidiary acts and all that belongs to them, like the accompanying *mantras*, is lacking. According to the Mīmāṁsā-principle *prakṛtivad vikṛtiḥ kartavyā*, the *itikartavyatā* is transferred from the model (Agni-)sacrifice to its *vikṛti*, the *sauryayāga* This transfer implies a change in the original (Agni-) *mantra*, because the name of Sūrya is to be substituted for that of Agni. The point made by the *Bhāṣyakara* is that this substitution in its grammatically correct form requires the knowledge of grammar.

In connection with the concepts of *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* Laugākṣi Bhāskara (*Arthasaṁgraha*, ed. D. V. Gokhale, Poona, 1932, text, p. 59-60) says: *yatra samagrā ṅgopadeśaḥ sā prakṛtiḥ, yathā darśapūrṇamāsādiḥ. Tatprakaraṇe sarvāṅgapāṭhatvāt. Yatra na sarvāṅgopadeśaḥ sā vikṛtiḥ, yathā sauryādiḥ. Tatra katipayāṅgānām atideśena prāptatvāt* ' a *prakṛti* " model " is one with regard to which all subsidiary acts have been prescribed, like the new and full moon sacrifices. etc. Because all subsidiary acts have been prescribed in this context A *vikṛti* " modification " is one with regard to which not all subsidiary acts have been prescribed, like (the oblation) offered to Sūrya. Because here some subsidiary acts apply by way of transference '. As is known, the *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice is considered to be the *prakṛti* of all sacrifices On the subject of *atideśa*, *prakṛti-vikṛti* and *ūha* see further P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. V, Part II, Poona, 1962, p. 1321-22, and p. 1323-26.

In connection with *ūha* also Kumārila's *pūrvapakṣin* rejects the utility of grammar. He says (*Tantravārttika*, ed. referred to, p. 263, lines 10-11), *ūhārtham api śabdānāṁ na vyākaraṇam arthavat / ūhasyāpy anyataḥ siddher ūhyānūhyavibhāgavat* ' for the sake of adaptation of words (in a *mantra*) grammar is not useful either. Because *ūha* can also be established by another means, like the division between what is to be adapted and what is not (is decided not by grammar, but by Mīmāṁsā) '. The conclusion (ibid. p. 264, lines 4-5) is clear : *tenohe karmakarmāṅgavākyārthajñānakauśalaiḥ /*

lokavedaprayogāc ca siddhe vyākaraṇena kim 'therefore, since *ūha* can be established by those who are expert in sacrifice, its subsidiary acts and the knowledge of the meaning of the formulas, on the basis of usage in daily life and in the Veda, what is the use of grammar ?'.

19. (*Bhāṣya : Explanation of āgama*)

Certainly, (complying with) a vedic injunction also (is a use of grammar). (For instance,) *brāhmaṇena niṣkāraṇo dharmaḥ ṣaḍaṅgo vedo 'dhyeyo jñeyaḥ* 'a brahmin should (learn to) recite (and) should understand the Veda with its six ancillaries as his duty without motive (of gain)'.[86] And among the six ancillaries grammar is the most important one. An effort made regarding what is most important becomes fruitful.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' ...a vedic injunction' (etc.). A vedic injunction which is *prayojana* (that is,) *pravartaka* 'prompting' shows that the study of grammar is a *nityakarman* 'obligatory rite'.[87] The word *prayojana* expresses (two things, namely,) *phalam* 'reward' and *prayojaka* 'prompter'.[88]

(On) 'without motive'. That is to say, without taking into consideration a visible purpose.[89]

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86. Unidentified statement. The distinction between *adhyeya* 'to be recited' and *jñeya* 'to be understood' goes back to early days. Compare P. 4.2.59, *tad adhīte tad veda* 'he recites that (or) he understands that'. Patañjali in his *Bhāṣya* on this rule clearly distinguishes the two meanings : somebody may be able to recite the text arranged according to daily portions, but he does not understand it, whereas somebody else may not be able to recite the text by heart, but yet he understands it. See further P. G. JHA, *Pūrvamīmāṁsā in its sources*, Varanasi, 1942. Second edition 1964, p. 148, sub (2) : "The *Viṣaya*, or Subject-matter..is provided by the Vedic text—'*Svādhyayaḥ adhyetavyaḥ*' ('The Veda should be studied', according to Kumar la).. ", and p. 149, sub (5) : "The Finally Established View...is that Investigation is included in the injunction of 'Vedic Study'; and hence the Investigation of the meaning of the Vedic texts is as much enjoined as the Reading of the Vedic Texts themselves".

87. Compare fn. 71. The idea is that the performance of a *nityakarman* brings no reward, but its non-performance is a cause of demerit.

88. The *Bhāṣyakāra* says that *āgama* is a *prayojana* of grammar. Kaiyaṭa points out that, actually, the *āgama* is not a *prayojana*, but it is *prayojaka*, because it urges brahmins to take up grammar. The obligation to do so follows directly from the character of the Veda itself, which is supposed to be a body of injunctions.

89. For the idea behind Kaiyaṭa's statement see G. JHA (1964), p. 151, who sums up the Bhāṭṭa position as explained in the *Śāstradīpikā*, as follows : "The basic text is *Svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ* ('The Veda should be studied'). The question is—Does this text lay down the *Study* of the Veda as a Duty, the performance of which brings about a transcendental result.. ? Or does it lay down the *Study* for the purpose of *reading* and *understanding* the Veda ? In the former case, the Injunction would have been fulfilled by the getting up of the mere Verbal Text of the Veda, and there would be no need for....investigating the meaning of the texts; while under the latter case, as the

(On) ' And....the most important one '. Because the understanding of words and word-meanings is based on grammar (and) because the determination of a sentence and the sentence-meaning is based on that (understanding of words and word-meanings). This is what (the author) means to say.

Nāgeśa

(On) ' without motive '. The word *kāraṇa* (in *niṣkāraṇa*) means *phala* ' reward '. But (one may object that) although (the study of grammar) is an obligatory rite, it does have a reward which consists in the removal of transgression.[90] That is why (Kaiyaṭa) says ' visible ' (etc.).

(Dharmatvaṁ ca). And (to say that) the Veda (itself) is *dharma* ' duty ' is *aupacārika* ' (use of language) in a secondary sense ', in so far that (the Veda) is regarded as the *karman* ' (grammatical) object ' of (the acts of) recitation and understanding which are accepted as *dharma* ' duty ' because of the fact that they are accomplished by means of human effort.[91] So they say.

(On) ' the six ancillaries '. (That is, the Veda) accompanied by *śikṣā* ' phonetics ', *kalpa* ' ritual ', *vyākaraṇa* ' grammar ', *nirukta* ' etymology ', *chandas* ' prosody ' and *jyotiṣa* ' astrology '.[92]

(On) ' the Veda '. (That is,) in the form of one's own *śākhā* ' (textual) branch '.

Note (13)

As is expected, Kumārila's *pūrvapakṣin* scouts the idea that *āgama*, that is, the Veda, is a *prayojana* in the sense of ' use ' or ' reward ' of grammar. To him, this appears to be the world upside down. The *Tantra-*

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said Investigation would be necessary for the understanding of the meaning of the Vedic texts,—such Investigation also would be included under the Injunction.. .". Kaiyaṭa points out that the Veda is not simply to be studied for an invisible purpose like the attainment of *svarga*, but for a visible purpose. And that visible purpose is to understand the meaning of the Veda.

90. Nāgeśa means to say that although the performance of a *nityakarman* brings no reward, but is, so to speak, its own reward, still, its non-performance results in demerit. The avoidance of the latter by the performance of the *nityakarman* may be said to be a kind of reward also.

91. The question is, in which sense can the Veda be said to be *dharma* ' duty ' ? One may argue that whatever is enjoined by the Veda and is accomplished by human effort is *dharma*, but that the Veda itself is not *dharma*. Nāgeśa answers this question by saying that a brahmin's direct duty is to learn the Veda by heart and understand it. Thus *dharma* consists in *adhyayana* and *jñāna*, which are achieved by human effort. But since the Veda is involved in the acts of *adhyayana* and *jñāna* as its grammatical object, it may be said to be an indirect kind of *dharma*, or an instance of the use of the word *dharma* in a secondary sense.

92. Compare *Manusmṛti* 3.145.

vārttika (ed. referred to, p. 264, lines 9–21) says : *āgamo yas tu nirdiṣṭaḥ prayojanavivakṣayā / karmaṇāṁ nocyate tatra kiṁ vedādhyayanaṁ phalam //. Sarvasya hy* (read thus instead of *hi hy*) *anuṣṭhātavyasyāgamo mūlatvenākhyāyate na prayojanatvena //. Athaitenaiva yuktaṁ syād āgamoktaṁ prayojanam / tad apy asad anāmnānān niṣkaraṇatayāpi ca //. Niṣkāraṇaṣaḍaṅgavedādhyayanopanyāsena hi sutarāṁ vyākaraṇasya niṣprayojanatvam uktam //. Āgamo vedavākyāc ca nānyaḥ kaścana vidyate / kathaṁ cādimatāṁ siddhyed vedenānādinā vidhiḥ //. Tasmāt 'svādhyayo 'dhyetavyaḥ' ity etat kevalavedādhyayanavidhānaṁ śatapathādiṣu dṛṣṭam upapannaṁ ca nityārthālambanatvat / Vyākaraṇādyaṅgādhyayanavidhānaṁ punar na kasyāṁcic chākhāyāṁ śrūyate. (..) //. Na ca vedāṅgabhāvo 'pi kaścid vyākaraṇaṁ prati / tādarthyāvayavābhāvād* (read thus for *-bhāvā-*) *buddhādivacaneṣv iva :* 'but, as regards the *āgama* which has been mentioned with the intention of *prayojana* "reward", why don't we say in that connection that the study of the Veda is the reward of sacrifices? ((Note : This latter statement is silly. It is the study of the Veda which prompts the sacrifices, not the other way round. The same should hold for the *āgama* in relation to grammar.)) For, of whatever is to be performed the *āgama* is declared to be the basis, not the reward. ((Note : The *Bhāṣyakāra* does not mean to say that the *āgama* is itself a *prayojana*, but that what the *āgama* says is a *prayojana* of grammar. Therefore Kumārila says:)). But if (it is argued that) by this very same (statement), what is stated in the *āgama* "Veda" (and not the *āgama* itself) would be an appropriate reward, that also is wrong, because (of this) there is no mention (in the Veda), and also because (the *Bhāṣya* itself says that grammar is) *niṣkāraṇa* "without reward". Because, by the statement that the study of the Veda with its ancillaries is without reward, it has been stated *a fortiori* that grammar has no reward. ((Note : The *Bhāṣyakāra* quotes an *āgama* for the study of grammar as a *vedāṅga*. This *āgama* cannot be different from a *vedavākya* 'Vedic text', because otherwise it cannot be authoritative. The difficulty, however, is, how can the Veda which is eternal and has no beginning enjoin something which has a beginning and is not eternal ?)) And (further,) an *āgama* different from the Vedic text is not found. And (in that case,) how could a prescription of things which have a beginning be established by means of the Veda which has no beginning ? Therefore the injunction *svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ* "one should learn to recite (the Veda)", which is for the study of the Veda only, is seen in the *Śatapatha (brāhmaṇa,)* etc., and it is justified, because it concerns an eternal subject-matter. ((Note : An injunction for the study of grammar cannot belong to the Veda, but an injunction for Veda-study can, because the Veda is eternal, and, consequently, the subject-matter of Veda study is eternal.)). But an injunction for the study of ancillaries like grammar, etc. is not heard of (as being prescribed) in any *śākhā* '(textual) branch (of the Veda). (..) Nor does grammar possess any status of *vedāṅga* "ancillary of the Veda", because (grammar) is not meant for that (Veda) and

because it does not form part (of the Veda), no more than is the case with the statements of the Buddha, etc.' Kumārila then goes on to assert that the word *ṣaḍaṅga* in the *āgama* quoted in the *Bhāṣya* does not refer to what is commonly known as the *vedāṅgas*, but to the six *pramāṇas* accepted by the Mīmāṁsakas for the interpretation of the Veda (compare Filliozat, 1975, p. 32, n. 1). This assertion is, obviously, without foundation. One wonders why Kumārila's *pūrvapakṣin* has become critical of *vyākaraṇa* to the extent of denying the status of *vedāṅga* to grammar. The answer probably is that Kumārila felt the privileged position of Mīmāṁsā with regard to the Veda and its interpretation to be threatened by the *Bhāṣya*-statement about *āgama* being a *prayojana* of grammar.

20. (*Bhāṣya : Explanation of laghu*)

And grammar is also to be studied for the sake of simplicity. (An authoritative text says) *brāhmaṇenāvaśyaṁ śabdā jñeyāḥ* 'a brahmin must necessarily understand the words '.[93] And without (the help of) grammar words cannot be understood by an easy means.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' for the sake of simplicity '. The purpose of this (grammar) is to understand words in simple way.

(On) ' a brahmin ' (etc.). The profession of a brahmin is to teach.[94] Because pupils do not attach themselves to one who does not understand the words.[95]

Note (14)

The *MBD*, p. 8, line 23-p. 9, line 1, explains : ' being one who does not grasp the sentence, a person who does not know the words is not approached (by pupils), because his speech is incoherent. Therefore the words must be understood. And in understanding the words there is no simple / economic means other than grammar. That is called means which is a particular arrangement of causes in connection with the production of effects '.

According to Kumārila's *pūrvapakṣin*, the statement by the *Bhāṣyakāra* is a sad reversal of the true state of affairs. The *Tantravārttika* (ed. referred to, p. 265, line 24, p. 266, line 2) says : *yad api ca śabdāpaśabdajñānalāghavaṁ prayojanatvenopadiṣṭaṁ tan nirākṛtaprayojanāntarasya lāghavamātram evāvaśiṣyate iti satyam evoktam. // Yadi vā gauravasyaiva laghutvam upacāryate / viparyayāpadeśena śūre kātaraśabdavat. // Lokaprasiddhānāṁ eva śabdānāṁ*

93. Unidentified statement. *Śabdā jñeyāḥ* here means that the grammatical derivation of words and their meaning must be known.

94. Literally quoted from the *MBD*. See p. 8, line 23.

95. Inspired by the *MBD*. See the translation in Note (14).

atyantaviṣamadhātugaṇoṇādisūtrādibhir alaukikasaṁjñāparibhāṣānibaddha-prakriyair anavasthitasthāpanākṣepasiddhāntavicāraiḥ kleśenāntaṁ gatvā yathāvasthitānuvādamātram eva kriyate. Tatrāpi codāharaṇavyatirikteṣu kasyacid eva lakṣaṇayojanasāmarthyaṁ dṛṣyate. Tenātyantaguruḥ sann ayam upāyastutyartham eva laghur ity upacāritaḥ : 'and also, as regards the simplicity / economy in knowing the correct words and the incorrect words, mentioned as a use of grammar, that mere (word) *lāghava* 'simplicity' only remains for him (i.e., the *Bhāṣyakāra*) whose other uses (of grammar) have been discarded. In that sense (the *Bhāṣya*-statement) speaks nothing but the truth. Or, if (the word) *lāghava* "simplicity / economy" is used in a secondary sense for *gaurava* "complication", it is like (using) the word *kātara* "timid" with reference to a brave person, under the pretext of (referring to something by its) opposite. Having gone, with pain, to the last stage (of derivation) of words which are well-known to people, by means of deliberations in the form of *ākṣepa* (i.e., *pūrvapakṣa*) and *siddhānta* "final view" meant to establish something which had not been established yet; containing *prakriyās* "technical word-derivations" based on *saṁjñās* "technical terms" and *paribhāṣās;* involving extremely difficult lists of verbal bases and *uṇādisūtras,* etc.; simply (what grammar amounts to is) a restatement of what has been established already. And even there the skill of somebody in handling the rules with regard (to words) different from (the known) examples is rarely seen. Therefore, since it is extremely difficult, this (grammar) is said to be simple / economic in a secondary sense, merely for eulogising (it as a) means'. Then the *Tantravārttika* quotes Bhartṛhari (*VP,* 1.13 cd), *tattvāvabodhaḥ śabdānāṁ nāsti vyākaraṇād ṛte* 'without grammar there is no understanding of the nature of words'. This statement is rejected out of hand. The *pūrvapakṣin* says (*Tantravārttika,* p. 266, line 5) that the same holds good for the perception of colour, taste, etc. Therefore Bhartṛhari's statement should be rephrased as *tattvāvabodhaḥ śabdānāṁ nāsti śrotrendriyād ṛte* 'without the sense of hearing there is no understanding of the nature of words' (*Tantravārttika,* p. 266, line 9).

21. (*Bhāṣya : Explanation of asaṁdeha*)

Grammar should be studied also for the sake of removal of doubt. The ritualists read *sthūlapṛṣatīm āgnivāruṇīm anaḍvāhīm ālabheta* 'one should kill a heifer that is *sthūlapṛṣatī* (and) consecrated to Agni and Varuna'.[96] With regard to this (heifer which is *sthūla-pṛṣatī*) there is a doubt (namely, whether) *sthūlapṛṣatī* (is to be analysed as) *sthūlā cāsau pṛṣatī ca* 'big and (at the same time) spotted', or as *sthūlāni pṛṣanti yasyāḥ sā* 'she whose spots are big'. A non-grammarian cannot determine that (heifer) from the accent (but a grammarian can). If (the word *sthūlapṛṣatī*) has retained the

96. The text is from the *Kāṭhaka-Saṁhitā* 13.6, according to V. P. LIMAYE (1974), p. 5.

original accent of the first member, then it is a *bahuvrīhi*.[97] But if (it) has the accent on the last (syllable), then it is a *tatpuruṣa*.[98]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'for the sake of removal of ambiguity'. Here we must take into account *prāgabhāva* 'previous non-existence' of the doubt, and not *pradhvaṁsābhāva* '(subsequent) non-existence in the form of annihilation'. Because in a grammarian doubt does not arise and disappear, but in a non-grammarian only it can arise.[99]

(On) 'from the accent'. That is to say, determination of a *bahuvrīhi*-meaning on the basis of retention of the original accent of the first member.

Note (15)

The same problem which is raised with regard to the word *sthūlapṛṣatī* arises again in connection with the word *indraśatru* in *Bh*. No. 24.

The *Tantravārttika*, ed. referred to, p. 266, line 11–154, has the following to say: *asaṁdehaś ca vedārtho yad apy uktaṁ prayojanam / tad apy asad yato nāsmād padavākyārthanirṇayau //. Yataḥ padārthasaṁdehas tāvad bahavo vṛddhavyavahārād eva nivartante /. Śeṣaś ca nigamaniruktakalpasūtratarkābhiyuktebhyaḥ sarveṣām arthapratipādanaparatvāt /. Vyākaraṇena punar atantrīkṛtyārthaṁ padasvarūpamātre 'nvakhyāyamāne durād apetam evārthajñānam :* 'as regards what has also been said (to be) a use (of grammar, namely,) the removal of doubt concerning the Veda, that also is wrong, because the determination of the meaning of words and that of sentences (does) not (originate) from that (grammar). Because, to begin with, many doubts regarding the meaning of words are removed on the basis of the usage of the elderly people. And the remaining (doubts can be cleared) by those trained in Vedic wordlists, etymology. ritual *sūtras* and reasoning, since all of these deal with the explanation of meaning. But grammar has nothing to do with the understanding of meaning, because, after having turned meaning into something which falls outside the rules (of grammar), only the form of words is explained'.

In connection with the word *sthūlapṛṣatī* the *pūrvapakṣin* (*Tantravārttika*, p. 267, lines 5–9, and lines 19–24) observes: *yathā caivamādiṣu vyākaraṇānapekṣāṇām eva niḥsaṁśayārthapratipattis tathā sthūlapṛṣatyādiśabdārtheṣv api vyākhyātṛparaṁparaiva nirṇayakṣameti na vyākaraṇam apekṣitavyam /. Kiṁ ca // vākyārtheṣu ca saṁdehā jayante ye sahasraśaḥ / naiṣāṁ vyākaraṇāt kaścit pūrvapakṣo'pi gamyate :* 'and like in the case of

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97. By P. 6.2.1.

98. By P. 6.1.223.

99. In the case of a grammarian it can only be maintained that he has no doubt at all. He knows.

(words) such as these there is a certain understanding of meaning for those only who are independent of grammar, in the same way, in the case of word-meanings like *sthūlapṛṣatī*, etc. the unbroken tradition of commentators itself is capable of settling (meaning). Therefore we should not be dependent on grammar. Moreover, with regard to the meaning of sentences doubts arise by the thousands. For those (doubts) not even a single *pūrvapakṣa* "prima facie view" is available from grammar'. The other passage reads: *na cāgṛhītaśabdārthaiḥ kaiścid vyākaraṇāśrayāt / vyākhyātuṁ śakyate vedo yataḥ syāt tena niścayaḥ // yathaivāvasthito vedas tathā vyākhyāpi sarvadā / ataḥ sthūlapṛṣatyādivyākhyā vyākaraṇād ṛte // na ca loke prayuktānāṁ padānāṁ dṛṣyate svaraḥ / vyavahārād bahirbhūtāt svarān nāto 'rthaniścayaḥ //*: 'by some who have not grasped the meaning of a word the Veda cannot be explained on the basis of grammar, because it is by that (grasping of the word-meaning) that (the meaning of a passage) is ascertained. Just as the Veda is (permanently) fixed, in the same way the commentary is also always there. Therefore the explanation of (words) like *sthūlapṛṣatī*, etc. (can be given) without (the help of) grammar. And accentuation of words used in common speech is not seen. Therefore, from accent which lies outside spoken usage no meaning can be ascertained'.

22. *(Bhāṣya : Still other uses of grammar)*

The following are still more uses of instruction in words. (For example,) *te 'surāḥ, duṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ, yad adhītam, yas tu prayuṅkte, avidvāṁsaḥ, vibhaktiṁ kurvanti, yo vā imām, catvāri, uta tvaḥ, saktum iva, sārasvatīm, daśamyāṁ putrasya, sudevo asi varuṇa.*[100]

Kaiyaṭa

Having shown the main uses (of grammar, the author now) shows the secondary uses by (the words) 'The following' (etc.).

(On) *bhūyaḥ* 'still more'. That is to say, (*bhūyaḥ* means) *punar* 'further'.[101] Since these are the secondary (uses), (the uses of grammar) are mentioned (as falling into) two classes.

23. *(Bhāṣya : First quotation)*

(In connection with) *te 'surāḥ.* (The text says) *te 'surā he 'layo he 'laya iti kurvantaḥ parābabhūvuḥ / tasmād brāhmaṇena na mlecchitavai* 'those demons uttering (the words) *he 'layo he 'layaḥ* "o enemies, o enemies" have been defeated. Therefore a brahmin must not

100. The *Bhāṣyakāra* simply gives a list of *pratīkas*, beginning of stanzas. The stanzas themselves will be quoted and commented upon in the sequel. There is no point in assuming (as Filliozat, 1975, p. 38, n. 1, does) that this list is on a par with statements like *atha śabdānuśāsanam*. It is not a *Vt*.

101. Literally from the *MBD*. See p. 9' line 9.

speak barbaric language '.[102] ("Must not speak barbaric language" means :) must not use corrupt words. *Mleccha* ' barbaric language ', indeed, is (the same as) *apaśabda* ' corrupt speech '. So that we should not become *mleccha* ' (users of) barbaric language ', grammar is to be studied. (So much for the example) *te 'surāḥ* (etc.).

Kaiyaṭa

(On) *te 'surā he 'layo he 'layaḥ*. By (the word) *na mlecchitavai* the use of barbaric speech is prohibited by way of *arthavāda* ' explanatory passage ' in the form of *nindā* ' censure '.[103]

In connection with this (example) some say that the use of barbaric speech consists in the non-effectuation of *pluta* ' prolation ' and of *prakṛti-bhāva* ' retention of the original form '.[104] Others say that the use of barbaric speech consists in the repetition of an utterance, instead of the repetition of words, and in *latva* ' the substitution of *l* (for *r*) '.[105]

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102. The text referred to is the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* (*Mādhyandina* recension), 3.2.1.23-24. Instead of *he 'layo he 'laya* this text reads *he 'lavo he 'lava*. The translation ' o enemies, o enemies " is the one traditionally assumed. P. THIEME, *Der Fremdling in Ṛgveda. Abh. für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, Ed. XXIII, Nr. 2. Leipzig 1938. Nachdruck Nendeln 1966, p. 4, thinks that *alayo* is a Māgadhī pl. voc., ' he you there ', and connects this pl. voc. with the sg. voc. *are / ale* known from Prakrit as a rude form of address (ibid., p. 3). Thus, presumably, in the passage quoted the *asuras* address the gods in a characteristic rude style. Thieme (ibid., p. 4) explains the form *he 'lavo* in the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* as a genuine MIA development. It follows that in the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*-passage and in the *Bhāṣya* the terms *mleccha* and *apaśabda* are used with reference to Prakrit words.

103. For *arthavāda* see Laugākṣi Bhāskara *Arthasaṁgraha*, ed. D. V. GOKHALE, Poona, 1932, text, p. 136, *arthavādavākyaṁ hi svārthapratipādane prayojanābhāvād vidheyapratiṣedhayoḥ prāśastyaninditatve lakṣaṇayā pratipādayati:* ' because an *arthavāda*-statement, since it has no (useful) purpose in conveying its own (literal) meaning, by way of *lakṣaṇā* " (the power of conveying) a secondary meaning " conveys the status of praise or censure with regard to an injunction or prohibition (in the Veda) '. Compare also V. S. APTE, *The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Poona, 1957, s. v. *artha-vāda*.

104. P. 8.2.85 says that if *he* is used in calling from a distance, its vowel should be prolated. P. 6.1.125 says that a *pluta* vowel is not subject to sandhi-changes before a following vowel.

105. It is assumed that P. 8.1.1 prescribes the repetition of *padas*, although Pāṇini has not mentioned the word *padasya* in this rule. But in *he 'layo he 'layaḥ* the whole utterance (*vākya*) has been repeated. It is rather difficult to say, what the grammatically correct expression is. It appears that there are three possibilities :

(*a*) *he3 he3 arayo 'rayaḥ*. Here the repetition can perhaps be justified by P. 8.1.4. Bui it is doubtful whether such an expression is ever used in speech.

(*b*) *he3 he3 arayaḥ*. Here the repetition of *he3* can be justified by P. 8.1.4. Since *he3* is not itself *āmantrita*, there is no possibility of applying P. 8.1.8 there.

(The expression) *nāpabhāsitavai* is synonymous with *na mlecchitavai.* The suffix *tavai* (is added) by P. 3.4.14.[106]

(On) *mleccha.* (This word is derived with) the suffix *GHaÑ* in the passive sense.[107]

24. (*Bhāṣya : Second quotation*)

(In connection with) *duṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ.* (The text says) *duṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ svarato varṇato vā mithyāprayukto na tam artham āha / sa vāgvajro yajamānaṁ hinasti yathendraśatruḥ svarato 'paradhāt* ' a word which is defective on account of accent or (a particular) phoneme, being used incorrectly, does not convey that (intended) meaning. Being a thunderbolt in the form of a word, it kills the *yajamāna,*[108] like (the word) *indraśatru,* on account of an error in accent '.[109] Grammar must be studied so that we may not use defective worde. (So much for the example) *duṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ* (etc.).

Kaiyaṭa

(On) *duṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ* (etc.). (In the sense of) *svareṇa* ' because of accent ' (the form) *svarataḥ* (is used).[110] (The suffix) *tasI* (has been added), because (*svara* and *varṇa*) are considered to belong to the *ādyādi* (*gaṇa*).[111]

(e) *he3 arayo 'rayaḥ.* Here the repetition may be justified by P. 8.1.4 again. Since *arayaḥ* does not stand in the initial position of the utterance, P. 8.1.8 does not apply.

For a recent discussion regarding the *r-l* alternation see M. M. DESHPANDE, " Genesis of Ṛgvedic retroflection. A historical and socio-linguistic investigation ", in : M. M. DESHPANDE and P. E. HOOK, eds., *Aryan and non-Aryan in India, Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia,* No. 14. The University of Michigan. Ann Arbor 1979, p. 263–65.

106. P. 3.4.14 prescribes *tavai* in the sense of a *kṛtya* suffix. Thus *mlecchitavai* means *mlecchitavyam.*

107. The *Dhātupāṭha* 1.220 (O. BÖHTLINGK, *Pāṇini's Grammatik,* Leipzig, 1887, reprint Hildesheim 1964, p. 63, mentions the verbal base *mlecchA* in the sense of *avyakte śabde* ' unclear speech '.

108. The *yajamāna* is the person on whose behalf a rite is performed. He may himself act as the performer.

109. As noted by V. TRAPP (1933), p. 36, n. 11, the stanza also occurs in a slightly different form (*mantro hīnaḥ* ' a defective *mantra* ' for *duṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ*) in the Pāṇinīyaśikṣā. See M. GHOSH, *Pāṇinīya Śikṣā* or the Śikṣā Vedāṅga ascribed to Pāṇini. University of Calcutta, 1938, translation p. 78. stanza 52.

110. The *KV* on P. 5.4.45, obviously in connection with the stanza quoted in the *Bhāṣya,* says that the words *svarataḥ* and *varṇataḥ* here do not convey the sense of the ablative ending, but that of the instrumental.

111. This *gaṇa* is mentioned in *Vt.* I on P. 5.4.44. The *KV* on this rule says that it is an *ākṛtigaṇa.*

(On) *mithyāprayuktaḥ*. That is to say, conveying a meaning different from the one to convey which it was (originally) used, because of a defect in accent or (a particular) phoneme.

(On) *vāgvajraḥ*. (The word is to be analysed as) *vāg eva vajraḥ* 'the thunderbolt is nothing but the word (itself)',[112] because (the word) caused harm. That is to say, just as the word *indraśatru* was harmful to (Vṛtra who acted as) the *yajamāna*. Black magic with regard to Indra (in order to kill him) was undertaken by Vṛtra. In this (black magic) the mantra *indraśatrur vardhasva* 'may the killer of Indra prosper' (represents) the *ūha* 'modified form' (of another mantra).[113] Here the word *śatru* is accepted as an action word in the sense of *indrasya śamayitā śātayitā vā bhava* 'be the strangler or the slayer of Indra', and not as a word in its conventional meaning.[114] Because, if it is accepted as a word in its conventional meaning (of 'enemy'), there would be no difference between the *bahuvrīhi-* and the *tatpuruṣa-* meaning.[115] This being so, once enmity with Indra has been established (and) when (it is accepted that) the accent should fall on the final syllable in order to convey the sense *indrasya śatrur bhava* 'be the killer of Indra', (but instead of that) the first (member of the cp.) is accented by the officiating priest, (then,) since a different meaning is

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112. Almost literally taken from the *MBD* (see p. 10, line 3). Thus the cp. is explained as conveying a *rūpaka*. Cp.-formation is by P. 2.1.72.

113. As noted by V. TRAPP, p. 36, n. 11, the mantra quoted occures in the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*, 1.6.3.8 and 10. The story is that Viśvarūpa, the son of Tvaṣṭṛ, is killed by Indra. Then Tvaṣṭṛ arranges a Soma-sacrifice from which Indra is excluded. Though uninvited, Indra drinks part of the Soma. Subsequently, Tvaṣṭṛ attempts to pour what is left over of the Soma into the fire. This act itself is described as a descration of the fire. While pouring the Soma, Tvaṣṭṛ says *indraśatrur vardhasva* 'may you having Indra for your killer prosper'. Before reaching the fire, however, the Soma develops into a footless being (snake) called Vṛtra (derived from *vṛ-* 'to turn'). Then the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* (*The Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* in the Mādhyāndina—Śākhā. .Edited by A. WEBER. *The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series*, Work No. 96. Varanasi, 1964, p. 58, continues : *átha yad ábravīd índraśatrur vardhasvéti tásmād hainam índra evá jaghānātha yád dhi śáśvad ávakṣyad índrasya śátrur vardhasvéti śáśvad u ha sá evéndram ahaniṣyat* 'then, because he said *índraśatrur vardhasvá* "may you having Indra for your killer prosper", Indra himself killed him. But if he had said *índrasya śátrur vardhasvá* may you, the killer of Indra, prosper", (then) directly he himself would have killed Indra'. This latter explanation of the killing of Vṛtra by Indra coincides with the one given in the *Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 2.5.2.1-2. Thus Tvaṣṭṛ's fault does not consist so much in the desecration of Agni as in the faulty pronunciation of the cp. *indraśatruḥ*.

Compare also V. P. LIMAYE (1974), p. 9.

114. Kaiyaṭa derives *śatru* either from the verbal base *śamU* (*Dhātupāṭha* 4.92) or from *śadL* (*Dhātupāṭha* 6.134). The formations are explained by Nāgeśa, for which see Filliozat (1975), p. 43–44, and p. 44, n. 1. Taken in its etymological sense, *śatru* means 'killer' or 'slayer'; taken in its conventional (*rūḍha*) sense, it means 'enemy'.

115. The *tp.*-meaning 'enemy of Indra' does not differ from the *bv.*-meaning whose enemy is Indra' in so far that the relation of being an enemy is (usually) reciprocal.

conveyed, Indra himself becomes the slayer of Vṛtra.[116] And since 'being the killer of Indra' belongs to the predicate (and) the vocative ending belongs to the (logical) subject, (this ending is) not (used) here.[117] Like in *rājā bhava yuddhasva* 'be a king (and) fight'.[118] And because what is being modified is not the (original) mantra, *ekaśruti* 'monotone (recitation)' which is being prescribed for mantras with the exception of *japa* 'low voice recitation for oneself', etc. is not (applied) here.[119]

Note (16)

The two points made by Kaiyaṭa in connection with the word *indraśatru*, namely, the meaning of *śatru* here and the rejection of the vocative *indraśatru*, are taken straight from the *MBD*. The relevant passage in the *MBD* (p. 10, lines 5–21) says the following : 'as this (word) *indraśatru* has harmed the *yajamāna*, so another (word) also, being incorrectly used, should not become harmful. Therefore grammar should be studied. (So much for) the use of defective words.

From tradition we know that the mantra *svāhendraśatrur vardhasva* "hail, may the *indraśatru* prosper" is to be recited. (In *indraśatru*) we have to use the accent on the first syllable. From that (we understand the meaning) "Indra himself has become his *śatru*". With regard to this, an objection is put forward, namely: even if the last syllable of the compound is accented, still, that meaning does not disappear. Namely, "Indra is his enemy". Like in *somasakhā* "Soma is his friend" (or) *rajasakhā* "the king is his friend" (which is not different from "he is the friend of Soma" or "he is the friend of the king", because the relation in question is reciprocal). Moreover, with regard to this (word *indraśatru*) the following must be stated (by way of question, namely) why is the vocative ending in the sense of *āmantrita* "addressing (a person)" not used (so that the mantra would read) *indraśatro vardhasva* "may you, o *indraśatru*, prosper"?

What has been stated first, namely, that even if the last syllable is accented, the meaning is not destroyed, (with regard to this we say that)

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116. The *bv*. cp. *indraśatru* has the accent on the first syllable of the *pūrvapada* by P. 6.2.1, whereas the *tp*. cp. *indraśatru* has the accent on the final syllable of the *uttarapada* by P. 6.1.223. See further fn. 113.

117. The discussion on the use of the vocative as in *indraśatro vardhasva* and its implications is found in the *MBD*, p. 10, lines 10–20.

118. The example stems from the *MBD* (see p. 10, line 19). The point is that the logical subject, i.e., the person addressed here, has not yet become a king. That is why the vocative *rājan* is not used here. Similarly, the mantra in question cannot read *indraśatro vardhasva*, because this would imply that the performer of the rite had already killed Indra. Or, to put it in different words, the vocative always belongs to the subject, it never enters into the predicate.

119. Reference is to P. 1.2.34. The rule says that mantras are to be recited in monotone during the performance of a sacrifice. Exception is made for *japa*, etc.

there is nothing wrong here. Although the word *śatru* used in the mantra is a word conveying a conventional meaning (namely, " enemy "), it has been used (in a different meaning) disregarding the conventional meaning stated as its cause (of employment), on account of the meaning-context. Therefore this (meaning) " he is the enemy of Indra " or " Indra is his enemy " is not adopted. What then ? It has been used by taking action only as its cause (of employment), (The word) *śatru* (means) " slayer " or " strangler ". This being so, although (*indraśatru*) had been intended to be used in the sense of *indrasya śātayitā bhava* " be the slayer of Indra ", what has been (actually) used was (*indraśatru*) in the sense of *indraḥ śātayitā asya* " Indra is his slayer ".

(As regards) what also has been stated, namely, that the vocative ending should have been used (we consider the following). The vocative ending (is used) in case a meaning which is wellknown on account of its distinctive feature is brought into contact with another feature. Like (someone) brings Devadatta (whose distinctive feature is already known) into contact with something else in the form of an action, as in *devadatta adhīṣva* " o Devadatta, study " (or *devadatta*) *bhuṅkṣva* " (o Devadatta) eat ". But how can the vocative ending (be used) for someone whose distinctive feature is just (on its way of) being understood? To explain, in *rāja bhava yuddhasva* " be a king (and) fight " (or) *puruṣo bhava* " be a man ", the quality of king and the quality of man is just (on its way of) being understood (and was not previously known). Therefore the vocative ending is not (used here). In the same way, here also the quality of *indraśatru* is (just on its way of) being understood. Therefore there is nothing wrong (in the use of the nominative ending). Thus in the previous (example) a defect in a (particular) phoneme has been shown, namely, in *helayo helayaḥ*. Now a defect in accent (has been shown)'.

25. (*Bhāṣya : Third quotation*)

(In connection with) *yad adhītam.* (The text says) *yad adhītám avijñātáṁ nigádenaiva śábdyate / ánagnāv íva śuṣkaidho na táj jvalati kárhicit* ' what has been recited (but) not understood (and) is merely mechanically uttered, that never blazes forth, like dry fuel on a non-fire '.[120] Therefore grammar should be studied, so that we do not memorize something without meaning.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) *avijñātam.* (' Not understood ',) because he has no training in inflection, etc.[121] or because he does not understand the meaning.[122]

120. The stanza has been quoted in the *Nirukta*, 1.18. Its origin is not known. *Anagni* ' non-fire ' refers to the ashes of an extinguished fire.

121. Instead of *subādi*, some editions read *svarādi* ' (training in) accent, etc. '. The latter reading has the support of the *MBD* (see p. 10, line 24), *iha tu svaravarṇa-*

(On) *nigadena.* By merely following the order of the text.[123]

(On) *na taj jvalati.* (That is,) it brings no reward.

(On) *anarthakam.* (That is,) it has no purpose.

26. *(Bhāṣya : Fourth quotation)*

(In connection with) *yas tu prayuṅkte.* (The text says) *yas tu prayuṅkte kuśalo viśeṣe śabdān yathāvad vyavahārakāle / so 'nantam āpnoti jayaṁ paratra vāgyogavid duṣyati cāpaśabdaiḥ* ' but he who being knowledgeable as regards the difference (between correct and incorrect words) uses words correctly when he communicates (with others), he, knowing the propriety of words, obtains unending victory in the other world, but by (using) wrong words he incurs blemish '.[124]

Who (incurs blemish) ?[125] The man who knows the propriety of words himself. Why is that so ? Because he who knows the correct words also knows the incorrect words. For just as *dharma* ' merit (as shown in future existence) ' lies in the knowledge of correct words, in the same way *adharma* ' demerit ' (as shown in future existence) [126] lies in the knowledge of incorrect words also.

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saṁskāravijñātam avijñātam iti parigṛhyate ' (the word) *avijñātam* " not understood " refers to what is not understood in respect of accent or phonological operations '. The point is that one may not understand, not only because meaning is not known, but also because one lacks the necessary grammatical training.

122. Judging from the context of the stanza as quoted in the *Nirukta* (*na vijānāti artham* ' he does not understand the meaning ' in the immediately preceding stanza), what Yāska has in mind is non-understanding of meaning.

123. *Pāṭhamātreṇa.*

124. Unidentified stanza. The *MBD* (p. 11, line 12) mentions the possibility to read *kuśalo 'viśeṣe* ' skilful (even) when (grammar) does not differentiate '. A variant reading, namely, *kuśalo viśeṣaiḥ* ' skilful on account of differences communicated by grammar ' is also mentioned. For a discussion see K. A. Subramania IYER (1969), p. 136.

125. Apart from *vāgyogavid,* the subject of *duṣyati* may also be *avāgyogavid* ' the man who does not know the propriety of words '. On this point a discussion follows in which *Bhāṣya* No. 26 deals with the first answer, *vāgyogavid.* Two views are presented here. According to the first view, the numbers of correct and incorrect words are more or less equally divided. According to the second view, which starts from ' Or rather ', the number of incorrect words is definitely greater.

126. Here *dharma* and *adharma* are taken practically in the sense of *puṇya* and *pāpa* resp. The reason for doing so is provided by the stanza itself, which speaks of unending victory in the other world as a result of using correct words, and of incurring blemish as a result of using wrong words. See further *Mīmāṁsākośaḥ* (Prājña Pāṭhaśālā Maṇḍala Grantha Mālā), Part IV. Edited by The Late Kevalānandasaraswatī, Wai, 1956, s. v. *dharmādharmau,* p. 2249), *dharmādharmau adṛṣṭaviśeṣātmakau 'dharma* and *adharma* have the nature of a specific *adṛṣṭa* " unseen result ". ' Here also mention is made of the use of the word *dharmādharma* in the Vaiśeṣika-system in the sense of *adṛṣṭa* originating from action.

Or rather, *adharma* has the bigger chance. Because the incorrect words are more numerous, the correct words less numerous. For every single correct word there are many deviating forms like *gāvī*, *goṇī*, *gotā* (or) *gopotalikā*, etc.[127]

Then what about the man who does not know the propriety of words? Ignorance is his excuse.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) *yas tu prayuṅkte* (etc.). By this (stanza the *Bhāṣyakāra*) shows that the study of grammar is the cause of *abhyudaya* 'good fortune'.

(On) *viśeṣe*. The very same word is correct when used in a particular meaning on account of a particular reason for employing it (and) incorrect otherwise. For instance, the word *asva* 'not possessing property' (used) with reference to a horse on the ground of absence of property is correct, (but) it is incorrect when used on the ground of the *jāti* 'generic quality' (*aśvatva* 'horse-hood').[128] And the word *goṇī* (used) with reference to a cow is correct when used on account of similarity,[129] but incorrect, when used on the ground of the generic quality (*gotva* 'cow-hood').

(On) 'Who....?'. The question (is raised) because (the word) *vāgyogavid* 'the man who knows the propriety of words' is supplied by the context, and because a defect is seen.[130] The person who himself asks the question, anticipating the other's opinion,[131] says *vāgyogavid eva* 'the man who knows the propriety of words himelf'.

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127. For an explanation of the forms *gāvī*, etc. see K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1972), p. 15, n. 1.

128. Kaiyaṭa refers to *VP* 1.126 (= 1.148, ed. Subramania IYER = 1.149, ed. Abhyankar-Limaye), *asvagoṇyādayaḥ śabdāḥ sādhavo viṣayāntare / nimittabhedāt sarvatra sādhutvaṁ ca vyavasthitam* 'words like *asva* and *goṇī* (may be) correct (when used) with regard to an object different (from what they literally denote). Everywhere correctness is (to be) determined on account of the different *(pravṛtti) nimitta* "ground (for using a particular word with reference to a particular thing)".'

One may want to refer to a horse *(aśva)* by using the near-homonym *asva* in order to point out that it has no property, or that that one doesn't have the property (money) to buy it (K. A. Subramania IYER, *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Vṛtti*, Chapter I. English Translation, Poona, 1965, p. 133, "priceless one"), or that it has no owner (*Bhartṛhari. Vākyapadīya Brahmakāṇḍa* avec la *Vṛtti* de Harivṛṣabha.. par M. BIARDEAU, Paris, 1964. p. 189, "qui n'a pas de propriétaire"). In that case, the word *a-sva* is the correct word to use.

129. The word *goṇī* (*goṇa* + *ṄīS*, P. 4.1.42) is known to Kaiyaṭa in the meaning *āvapana* 'vessel' from the *vṛtti* on *VP*. 1.176. The same *vṛtti* also states the ground for the use of the word *goṇī*—apparently not understood as a prakrit form for *gauḥ*—with reference to a cow: both of them contain a lot of milk. Thus the ground must be sought in the speaker's desire to point out a similarity between the cow and the vessel.

130. As stated by the word *duṣyati* 'he incurs blemish'.

131. His partner in the discussion.

(On) 'in the way...in the knowledge of incorrect words also'. Like by eating a substance which produces mucus there is a possibility of the disease of catarrh, but by eating its opposite we remain healthy, in the same way here also (the matter) as it has been stated is correct.[132] This is what (the author) means to say.

(On) 'more numerous...less numerous'. (The use of) the suffix indicating a higher degree is with regard to the other's opinion.[133] If you think that there are many (correct) words (and) few wrong words, and that there is a greater quantity of (good) result because of the greater number of *aṅgas* 'subsidiaries',[134] (then we say,) this (is) not (so). Because (actually,) the wrong words are more numerous (and) the (correct) words are less numerous.

(On) 'ignorance'. And thus the killing of a brahmin, etc. has no (bad) result in the case of animals.

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132. The question is, how do we know that the knowledge of wrong words leads to *adharma*? To make this clear, Kaiyaṭa has recourse to a *dṛṣṭānta* 'illustration'. From eating *ślaiṣmika* food one may incur a cold. This implies that by not eating this type of food one will be healthy. The point is that *ārogya* 'health' is implied, not something directly stated. Similarly, if it is accepted that the use of correct words produces *dharma*, one may conclude that the use of incorrect words leads to *adharma*.

133. That is to say, the number is less or more in relation to the number assumed by the other person who takes part in the discussion.

134. By *aṅga* Mīmāṁsā theorists understand two things, namely, subsidiaries that exist independently of our activity, like substances or numbers inhering in them, and subsidiaries that do not exist independently of our activity. The latter subsidiaries take the form of actions which have to be performed as a help for the main action. Again the action-subsidiaries are divided into two, namely, *saṁnipatyopakārakas* and *ārādupakārakas*. Here the *saṁnipatyopakārakas* are indirectly helpful for the main action, because they are prescribed with reference to a substance etc. that is itself subservient to the main action. The *ārādupakārakas* are directly helpful for the main action. They are not prescribed with reference to a substance, etc. An instance of *ārādupakāraka aṅgas* are the *prayājas* 'introductory sacrifices', of which five varieties are known. In this respect see *Mīmāṁsā-Nyāya-Prakāśa* by Āpadeva. Second Edition seen through the Press by A. D. PUSALKAR, Poona, 1972, p. 163-164, and p. 168. Compare *The Mīmāṁsā-Nyāya-Prakāśa* or Āpadevī....Translated....by F. EDGERTON, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929, p. 110-111, and p. 114. See also the Glossarial Index of Sanskrit words, s. vv. *ārādupakāraka* and *saṁnipatyopakāraka*. See further Laugākṣi Bhāskara (*Arthasaṁgraha*, ed. by D. V. GOKHALE, Poona, 1932, text, p. 77-78) who says: *ārādupakārakaṁ ca paramāpūrvotpattāv evopayujyate. Saṁnipatyopakārakaṁ tu dravyadevatāsaṁskāradvārā yāgasvarūpe 'py upayujyate* 'and what is *ārādupakāraka* serves for the origination of the highest *apūrva* only. But what is *saṁnipatyopakāraka* is useful with reference to the typical form of the sacrifice by means of preparatory acts in connection with the material and the deity'.

Kaiyaṭa applies this idea of *aṅga* to grammar. Here probably the whole body of correct words or its knowledge (*śabdajñāna*) is regarded as the *aṅgin*. In relation to this, the knowledge or use of single correct words is seen as an *aṅga*. It is assumed that the *aṅga* meant here is the *ārādupakāraka aṅga*, in the sense that the knowledge or use of single correct words is directly helpful in order to bring about *abhyudaya* as the ultimate reward of *śabdajñāna*.

27. *(Bhāṣya : Answer stated by the previous Bhāṣya rejected)*

Ignorance cannot permanently be one's excuse.[135] Because he who unknowingly would kill a brahmin or drink liquor, would still be a fallen person, I think.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' not permanently '. Since men come under the jurisdiction of prescriptions and prohibitions it would be the proper thing (for them) to make an effort to know (the law).[136]

28. *(Bhāṣya : Final answer)*

(If this is) so, then (we will consider the following). (The text says) *so ' nantam āpnoti jayaṁ paratra vāgyogavid duṣyati cāpaśabdaiḥ* ' he, knowing the propriety of words, obtains unending victory in the other world, but by (using) wrong words he incurs blemish '. Who (incurs blemish) ? Precisely the man who does not know the propriety of words. Then what about the man who does know the propriety of words ? Knowledge is his excuse.

Kaiyaṭa

The sense which words make is stronger than context.[137] That is why (the *Bhāṣyakāra*) says ' the man who does not know the propriety of words '. But even though the man who knows the propriety of words knows both (the correct and the incorrect words), he uses the (correct) words, not the wrong words. That is why he partakes of *abhyudaya* ' good fortune ', since his use (of words) is based on knowledge.[138]

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135. In the *NSP* ed. the *Bhāṣya* begins with the words *viṣama upanyāsaḥ* ' this way of putting things is wrong '.

136. A wellknown legal principle. People are assumed to know the law and cannot plead ignorance. The *MBD* (p. 12, lines 3–4) says *na hy ajñānād viṣaṁ bhakṣitam maraṇāya na prakalpate* ' it is not so that poison swallowed through ignorance does not lead to death '. The *MBD* adds that ignorance can be an excuse only in the case of animals, but not in that of *mlecchas* preparing to kill a brahmin.

137. Laugākṣi Bhāskara (*Arthasaṁgraha*, ed. D. V. GOKHALE, Poona, 1932, text, p. 42) says that there are six means which help us to decide the precise application of a Vedic injunction. The second in the order of the enumeration is *liṅga*. This is defined (ibid., text, p. 55) as *śabdasāmarthyam*, literally, ' the power (i. e., the meaning-denoting power) of words '. What is meant is that the words of the Vedic injunction should make sense. In the enumeration referred to *prakaraṇa* ' context ' occupies the fourth place. This indicates that, as compared to *liṅga* = *sāmarthya*, *prakaraṇa* is the weaker *pramāṇa*.

Kaiyaṭa's comment is based on the *MBD* (see p. 13, lines 5–6). Here the text says *pratyāsatteḥ sāmarthyaṁ balavad iti avāgyogavid abhisaṁbadhyate* '*sāmarthya* is stronger than *pratyāsatti* " nearness " (i. e., *prakaraṇa*). That is why reference is to the man who does not know the propriety of words '.

138. Kaiyaṭa means to say that the use of wrong words, not their mere knowledge, leads to *adharma*.

29. *(Bhāṣya : Question)*

But where has this been mentioned ?

Kaiyaṭa

Because he does not recognize the stanza (the speaker) asks ' But where ' (etc.) And here the intention is to have a question by means of the nominal stem meaning.[139] That is to say, (the question intended is) *kiṁ tad asti yatredaṁ paṭhitam* ' what is that in which this has been mentioned ? ' Therefore the answer (is given) by means of (a word) having a nominative ending, namely, *ślokāḥ*. Otherwise (the *Bhāṣyakāra*) should have said *slokeṣu* ' in the stanzas '.[140]

30. *(Bhāṣya : Answer)*

They are called *bhrāja* stanzas.[141]

Nāgeśa

They say that the stanzas called *bhrāja* have been composed by Kātyāyana.

31. *(Bhāṣya : Objection)*

But, sir, can stanzas also be authoritative ? (If they are,) then what ? If they are authoritative, then the following stanza should also be authoritative, namely, *yad udumbaravarṇānāṁ ghaṭīnāṁ maṇḍalaṁ mahat / pītaṁ na gamayet svargaṁ kiṁ tat kratugataṁ nayet* ' when a big group of pots of the colour of Udumbara trees, being drunk, does not lead to heaven, how (is it that) this (liquor), when belonging to a sacrifice, does lead (there) ? '[142]

Kaiyaṭa

Because (the speaker) does not recognize (the stanza) as coming from a reliable source, he says ' But, sir ' (etc.)

(On) ' when.....of Udumbara trees ' (etc.). This stanza shows the offensiveness of drinking an alcoholic drink in the Sautrāmaṇī sacrifice.[143]

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139. That is, by means of a word in the nominative, which conveys the *prātipadikārtha*, and not with the help of a locative word like *kva*. The reason is that the answer in the next *Bhāṣya* is stated in the nominative (*ślokāḥ*). To establish the grammatical correspondence between question and answer, Kaiyaṭa rephrases the question.

140. In the next *Bhāṣya*.

141. It is not known what *bhrāja* means.

142. Unidentified stanza. Compare V. P. LIMAYE (1974), p. 10 K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1972), p. 18–19, quotes a passage from the Laghumañjūṣā in which Nāgeśa attributes the stanza to the Buddha.

143. The *MBD* (p. 12, lines 12–14) says that the stanza points out the incapability of the Sautramaṇī sacrifice to lead a person to *svarga*. It also says that, apart from

Nāgeśa

Udumbaram (means) *tāmram* ' copper '.

32. (*Bhāṣya : Answer*)

This (stanza) of Your honour[144] has been composed by a crazy person.[145] But (a stanza) composed by somebody who is not crazy is authoritative. (So much for) *yas tu prayuṅkte.*

Kaiyaṭa

(On) *pramattagīta.* That is to say, *pramādena* (i.e.,) *vipratipannatvena gītaḥ* ' composed in a state of confusion '.[146] There is a *śruti*-passage

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the Sautramaṇī sacrifice, liquor should be consumed only in (licensed) bars (*panāgāraśālā*).

For the sacrifice itself see *Śrautakośa*, Encyclopædia of Vedic Sacrificial Ritual.. Vol. I, Sanskrit Section, Vaidika Saṁśodhan Maṇḍala, Poona, 1958, p. 698–759, and Vol. I, Part II, Poona, 1962, Conspectus, p. 899. The Conspectus says that the Sautramaṇī sacrifice is to be performed after a Soma-sacrifice (characterized by *agnicayana*, *rājasūya* or *vājapeya*) has been performed. Its principal offerings are liquor and animals. It appears that two versions of the sacrifice are known. Compare also P. V. KANE, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. II, Part II, Poona, 1941, p. 1224–28. It seems that the alcoholic drink (*surā*) is prepared from malt. In the course of the sacrifice a bull is offered to Indra *sutrāman* ' the good protector ' after whom the sacrifice is named.

144. That is, quoted by you.

145. The *MBD* (p. 12, line 15) explains that this must be so, because the stanza defies *śruti* and *smṛti.*

146. There are three ways of interpreting the cp. *pramattagītaḥ* in connection with *tatrabhavataḥ* :

(*a*) *pramattasya tatrabhavataḥ gītaḥ* ' (the *śloka*) composed by a crazy person who is Your Honour;

(*b*) *pramādena gītaḥ tatrabhavataḥ* ' (this *śloka*) of Your Honour composed in a thoughtless manner '.

(*c*) *pramattena gītaḥ tatrabhavataḥ* ' (this *śloka*) of (= quoted by) Your Honour, composed by a crazy person '.

Here (*a*) is adopted by the *MBD* (p. 12, line 14) where *pramatta-* is explained as *asamāhitacetasaḥ* ' of one whose mind is not collected '. Possibility (*b*) is adopted by Kaiyaṭa and explained by Nāgeśa. Possibility (*c*) is adopted in the translation.

The difficulty in (*a*) is that it leads to *asamarthasamāsa*. Here *pramattasya* is qualified by the outside word *tatrabhavataḥ*. Therefore cp.-formation is prohibited by P. 2.1.1 (see *SA*, *Bhāṣya* No. 26 (*c*). To avoid the difficulty, Kaiyaṭa does not take *pramatta-* as a *ktānta* word in the sense of *kartṛ* (by P. 3.4.72) but as a *ktānta* word in the sense of *bhāva* (by P. 1.3.114). However, in both interpretations (*a*) and (*b*) the basic difficulty is that the person ironically addressed as *tatrabhavat* and the composer of the *śloka* are regarded as one and the same person. Since this is not probable — all stanzas mentioned so far are clearly quoted from some source —, and since, moreover, it leads to a direct insult (especially in (*a*)), interpretation (*c*) is adopted in the translation. In this interpretation *tatrabhavat* is not connected with *pramatta*. Moreover, here *pramatta* can still be taken as a *ktānta* word in the sense of *kartṛ*.

which lends support[147] to this stanza which is mentioned among the stanzas called *bhrāja*, composed by Kātyāyana, namely, *ekaḥ śabdaḥ sujñātaḥ suprayuktaḥ svarge loke kāmadhug bhavati* 'a single word being well-understood (and) well-used becomes wish-fulfilling in paradise (and) on earth'.[148]

33. (*Bhāṣya : Fifth quotation*)

(In connection with) *avidvāṁsaḥ*. (The text says) *avidvāṁsaḥ pratyabhivāde nāmno ye na plutiṁ viduḥ / kāmaṁ teṣu tu viproṣya strīṣv ivāyam aham vadet* 'in the case of ignorants who do not know (how to use) prolation in returning a greeting, one should freely say *ayam aham* 'it's me', like (one says) in the case of women after returning from a journey'.[149] So that we should not be (treated) like women (in the return of a greeting), grammar should be studied. (So much for) *avidvāṁasaḥ*.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'like.... in the case of women'. Because in returning a greeting the *guru* 'person deserving reverence' has to use a prolated vowel.[150] But he who does not know how to utter a prolated vowel is to be spoken to like a woman, namely, (by saying to him) *ayam aham* 'it's me', but not by

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147. Literally, 'which favours'. According to the *MBD* (p. 12, line 15), it is a *smṛti*-passage.

148. The question is still, whether to accept the *bhrāja*-śloka as authoritative or not. Kaiyaṭa explains that it is authoritative also because it is confirmed by a *śruti*-passage. The passage quoted is found in the *Mahābhāṣya* elsewhere (Vol. III, p. 58, lines 14–15), in a slightly different reading (*samyag jñātaḥ śāstrānvitaḥ* 'correctly understood (and) in conformity with grammar' for *sujñātaḥ suprayuktaḥ*). It is not found in extant Vedic literature.

149. Unidentified stanza. A similar prescription is found in *Manusmṛti* 2.123, *nāmadheyasya ye kecid abhivādaṁ na jānate / tān prājño 'ham iti brūyāt striyaḥ sarvās tathaiva ca* 'to those who do not understand a greeting of (= including) a name a discriminating person should (simply) say *aham* "(it's) me". And exactly so (he should speak) to all women', and ibid. 2.126, *yo na vetty abhivādasya vipraḥ pratyabhivādanam / nābhivādyaḥ sa viduṣā yathā śūdras tathaiva ca* 'a brahmin who does not know (the correct form of) the return greeting should not be respectfully greeted by a discriminating person. Just like a *śūdra* he is'. See further P. V. KANE, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. II, Part I, Poona, 1941, p. 335–38. Compare also V. P. LIMAYE (1975), p. 9–10.

150. *Manusmṛti* 2.125, says *āyuṣmān bhava saumyeti vācyo vipro 'bhivādane / akāraś cāsya nāmno 'nte vācyaḥ pūrvākṣaraḥ plutaḥ* '"may you have a long life, o good man!", thus a brahmin should be spoken to in returning his greeting. And the vowel *a* preceded by phonemes, at the end of a name, must be spoken as a prolated vowel'. As far as the *pluta* part is concerned, the prescription is based on P. 8.2.83. This rule makes a specific exception for the greeting of *śūdras*. In that case no *pluti* 'prolation' takes place.

using a Sanskrit phrase[151] like *abhivādaye devadatto 'ham* 'I, Devadatta, salute (you)'.[152] This is the meaning (of the passage).

34. (*Bhāṣya : Sixth quotation*)

(In connection with) ***vibhaktiṁ kurvanti.***[153] The ritualists say : *prayājāḥ savibhaktikāḥ kāryāḥ* 'the *prayājas* "introductory sacrifices" must be performed with (the proper) case endings'.[154] Without (the knowledge of) grammar it is not possible to perform the *prayājas* with (the proper) case endings. (So much for) ***vibhaktiṁ kurvanti.***

Kaiyaṭa

(On) *prayājāḥ.* That is to say, the ***prayājamantras*** are provided with case endings whose stem is the word ***agni,*** (and) which undergo ***ūha*** 'modification'.[155] Like *agnir agniḥ* in *samidhaḥ samidho 'gne agna ājyasya vyantu* 'may the firesticks, the firesticks, o Agni, o Agni, approach the melted butter'.[156]

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151. The words used by Kaiyaṭa are *saṁskṛtena vākyena.* Here *saṁskṛtena* may refer either to the language which is not or merely partly understood by the person spoken to, or to the quality of the phrase used. In the latter case, *saṁskṛtena vākyena* may be taken to mean 'by means of a cultured or polished phrase' (compare FILLIOZAT, 1975, p. 50). In the translation the first interpretation is adopted, because it is precisely the lack of mastery over Sanskrit in the other person which leads one to greet him by saying *ayam aham.*

152. The *Chāyā* on the *Uddyota* (*Navāhnika, NSP* ed. 1951, p. 37) mentions an example of the full form of the greeting in which the personal name plus the caste-indication and the *gotra* figure, namely, *abhivādaye bhāradvājagotrakṛṣṇaśarmāhaṁ bhoḥ* 'I, Kṛṣṇaśarman of the Bhāradvājagotra, greet (you), o sir'. For *-śarman* see *Manusmṛti* 2.32.

153. As is clear from the example, the words *vibhaktiṁ kurvanti* are not a *pratīka,* but rather a free way of reference to the actual quotation. The *Chāyā* on the *Uddyota* (*Navāhnika, NSP* ed. 1951, p. 38) explains that here *kurvanti* is a subjunctive, and that the expression should be interpreted to mean *vibhaktyantaṁ kuryuḥ* 'they should provide (a particular stem) with (the required) case ending'.

154. The quotation is not known from extant Vedic literature. It may come from an early Mīmāṁsā source.

In connection with the *prayāja*-sacrifices see P. V. KANE, *History of Dharmaśāstra,* Vol. II. Part II, Poona, 1941, p. 1057, n. 2368. These sacrifices, of which five are known, consist in offerings of *ājya* 'melted butter'. The first of them is addressed to the *samidhs,* the sticks used in kindling fire. Compare K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1972), p. 20. and see also fn. 134 above.

The *Navāhnika, NSP* ed. 1951, p. 39, n. 1, explains that in the model sacrifice (*prakṛti*) the *prayājamantras* are recited with their proper case endings. The statement *prayājāḥ savibhaktikāḥ kāryāḥ* only refers to the *punarādheyeṣṭi* which is performed after the *yajamāna* has deposited the fire on the altar, but then has to interrupt the sacrifice because of stomach trouble or because a calamity has befallen him. The *punarādheyeṣṭi* is regarded as a *naimittika* rite.

155. For *ūha* see Note (12).

156. The quotation, as noted by K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1972), p. 20, n. 1, is from the *Āśvalāyana Śrauta-Sūtra,* 2.8. See *The Śrauta-Sūtra of Āśvalāyana* with the Com-

35. (*Bhāṣya ; Seventh quotation*)

(In connection with) *yo vā imām.* (The text says) *yo vā imāṁ padaśaḥ svaraśo 'kṣaraśo vācaṁ vidadhāti sa ārtvijīno bhavati* ' he who, indeed, speaks this utterance word by word, accent by accent, syllable by syllable, becomes *ārtvijīna* '.[157] So that we may be *ārtvijīna*, grammar must be studied. (So much for) *yo vā imāṁ.*

Kaiyaṭa

(On) *padaśaḥ.* (The suffix) *śas* (has been added after the word *pada*) by P. 5.4.43,[158] in the sense of ' word by word '.

(On) *svaraśaḥ. Svara* ' accent ' (means) *udātta*, etc.[159]

(On) *akṣaraśaḥ. Akṣara* ' syllable ' (means) a vowel accompanied by a consonant.

(On) *ārtvijīnaḥ. Ārtvijīna* (is derived) in the sense of *ṛtvijam arhati* ' he deserves (the services of) an *ṛtvij* ', (and thus means) *yajamāna* ' a person on whose behalf a rite is performed '. *Ārtvijīna* (may) also (be derived) in the sense of *ṛtvikkarma arhati* ' he is fit to perform the office of an *ṛtvij* ' (and thus means) *yājaka* ' one who causes (others) to sacrifice.'[160] (The suffix) *KHaÑ* (has been added) by *Vt.* I on P. 5.1.71.[161] (The word *ārtvijīna* is derived in two meanings,) because both (the *yajamāna* and the *yājaka*) who are learned persons,[162] are qualified (to perform a sacrifice).

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mentary of Gārgya Nārāyaṇa. Edited by Rāmanārāyaṇa Vidyāratna, Calcutta, 1874 (*Bibliotheca Indica*). p. 131. *The Śrauta-Sūtra of Āpastamba* with the Bhāṣya of Dhūrtasvāmin.... Edited by Narasimhacharya, Mysore, 1944, p. 617, mentions the *ūhas* as follows: *agnāgne agnāv agne 'gnināgne agnim agna iti caturṣu prayājeṣu catasro vibhaktīr dadhāti* ' in four *prayājas* he puts four case endings, as *agna agne, agnāv agne, agninā agne* (and) *agnim agne* '.

According to P. E. DUMONT, " The Agnihotra (or Fire-God Oblations) in the Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa ", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 104, 1960, p. 4, the translation reads : " May the kindling-sticks, O Agni, graciously accept the butter offering ". P. V. KANE, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. II, Part II, Poona, 1941, p. 1057, translates : " may the samidhs, O fire, partake of the ājya ". The text presented by the Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa (*The Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* with the commentary of Bhattabhāskaramiśra, Aṣṭaka III, Part I. Edited by A. Mahadeva Sastri and L. Srinivasaacharya, Mysore (Government Oriental Library Series. Bibliotheca Sanskrita No. 38), (= Taitt. Br. 3.5.8) says *samidho agna ājyasya viyantu.* On *viyantu* for *vyantu* see p. 187 KANE, op. cit., p. 1058.

157. Unidentified statement. The word *ārtvijīna* here, as explained by Kaiyaṭa, has two meanings. Therefore it has been left untranslated.

158. The rule says that after a numeral and after a word in the singular the suffix *śas* is optionally (indifferently) added in the sense of *vīpsā* ' (logical) distribution '.

159. P. 1.2.29–31.

160. Kaiyaṭa's explanation is based on the *MBD* (see p. 13, lines 16–17).

161. The *Vt.* states that the suffix *khaÑ* is added after *ṛtvij* also in the sense of *tatkarma arhati* ' he is qualified to perform the office of that (*ṛtvij*) '.

162. Presumably in the Veda and the *Śrautasūtras.*

36. (*Bhāṣya : Eighth quotation*)

(In connection with) *catvāri.* (The text says) *catvā́ri śṛ́ṅgā tráyo asya pā́dā dvé śīrṣé saptá hástāso asya / trídhā baddhó vṛṣabhó roravīti mahó devó mártyān ā́ viveśa* 'four horns, three feet he has, two heads, seven hands he has. Bound in three ways the bull loudly bellows. A mighty god has entered mortals'.[163]

(On) *catvāri sṛṅgāṇi.* (That is), the classes of words, noun, verb, preverb and particle.[164]

(On) *trayo asya pādāḥ.* (That is), the three tenses, past, future and present.

(On) *dve śirṣe.* (That is) the two natures of words (namely) *nitya* 'permanent' and *kārya* 'to be produced'.[165]

(On) *sapta hastāso asya.* (That is), the seven case endings.

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163. Ṛgveda 4.58.3. The hymn itself glorifies the ghee used in sacrifice, The ghee is first identified with Soma which is described as a bull. The sound made by *soma* trickling into a jar is taken as the bellowing of the bull. Then the *ghṛta* 'ghee' is identified with (poetical) speech. Thus it has nothing to do with grammar.

The stanza has also been quoted in the *Nirukta*, as noted by K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1972), p. 24, and by V. TRAPP (1933), p. 38, n. 22. It occurs in the *Pariśiṣṭa* (*Nirukta*, 13.7). The commentary here interprets the stanza in terms of ritual, as referring to the Soma-sacrifice: the four horns are the four Vedas, the three feet are the three pressings of Soma, etc. The *Bhāṣyakāra's* interpretation, on the other hand, is in terms of grammar. There may have been other interpretations also, according to particular schools of thought, as in the case of Ṛgveda 1.164.45, see fn. 175.

The image of the bull is also used by Bhartṛhari (*VP.* 1.134 = ed. Subramania IYER, 1.130; ed. Abhyankar-Limaye 1.131). Bhartṛhari here describes the *ātman* of the speaker, which is his inner word, as a big bull with whom *sāyujya* 'union' is desired. Nāgeśa, in his commentary connected with the present *Bhāṣya*, quotes this *Vākyapadīya*-stanza (*Navāhnika, NSP*, ed. 1951, p. 42).

The *MBD* has some comments on the stanza. Geldner (Der Rig-Veda aus dem Sanskrit ins Deutsche [übersetzt.... von K. F. GELDNER. Erster Teil, H.O.S. Vol. 33, Cambridge, Mass. 1951, p. 488, on stanza 3 d) says that *ā-viś* is the traditional expression for Soma being drunk.

For a summary of traditional interpretations of the stanza, see FILLIOZAT (1976), p. 53, n. 1. For a discussion see K. V. Subramania IYER (1869), p. 136-37.

The sandhi of *martyān* in the stanza is by P. 8.3.3.

164. *Nirukta* 1.1, says *tad yāni catvāri padajātāni. Nāmākhyāte copasarganipātāś ca tānīmāni bhavanti* 'now, which are the four classes of words? They are the following : noun and verb, and prepositions / preverbs and particles'. According to the phrasing of the *Nirukta*, among the four classes a distinction is made between inflected words (*nāmākhyāte*) on the one hand, and non-inflected words on the other. To Pāṇini, this distinction is not relevant, because to him all words are technically inflected words.

165. This point is discussed in the sequel of the *Paspaśāhnika* itself. Compare *Mbh.* I, p. 6, lines 12-13, where Patañjali says that it formed the main subject of discussion in the *Saṃgraha*. See further the *vṛtti* on *VP.* 1.143 (= 1.130, ed. Subramania Iyer), and L. Sarup, *The Nighaṇṭu and the Nirukta.* Second reprint, Delhi, 1967. Exegetical and Critical Notes, p. 204-207.

(On) *tridhā baddhah*. (That is), formed in three places, namely, the chest, the throat (and) the head.[166]

(It is called) *vṛṣabha*, because it showers (gifts).

Roravīti (means) *śabdaṁ karoti* 'it makes sound'. Why is that (so)? (Because the verbal base indicated as) *rauti* 'to roar' is *śabdakarman* '(a verb) whose object is (a word standing for) sound'.[167]

(On) *maho devo martyān āviveśa. Mahān devaḥ* (refers to) *śabdaḥ* 'speech'. *Martyāḥ* (means) *maraṇadharmāṇo manuṣyāḥ* 'men whose charcteristic feature is death', pl. acc. (dependent on) *āviveśa* 'entered'.

So that we should have similarity with the mighty god, grammar must be studied.

Kaiyata

(On) *catvāri*. *Śabda* 'speech' is described as a bull.[168]

(On) 'the three tenses'. (That is,) which form the domain of *lAṬ*, etc.[169]

(On) '*nitya*.... and *kārya*'. On account of the difference between *vyaṅgya* 'to be manifested' and *vyañjaka* 'manifestor'.[170]

(On) 'the seven case endings'. That is to say, (the endings called) *sUP*.[171] But some explain that the word *vibhakti* 'case ending'[172] (here)

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166. Compare the *Pāṇinīyaśikṣā*, stanza 12 (M. Ghosh, *Pāṇinīya Śikṣā*.., University of Calcutta, 1938, text p. 16, translation (stanza 13), p. 59. By 'head' the roof of the mouth is meant.

167. The word *śabdakarman* is used in P. 1.4.52. For its translation here see *KARA*, p. 234. The discussion on the meaning of this term is found in *Bh*. Nos. 1-7 on this rule.

168. This is correct as far as Patañjali's interpretation of the Vedic stanza is concerned, but see fn. 163.

169. *LAṬ*, etc. are Pāṇini's general designations of verbal endings (P. 3.4.78) added to convey the sense of the present tense (P. 3.2.123), etc.

170. According to Bhartṛhari, the *vyaṅgyavyñjakabhāva* 'manifestor-manifested relation' holds between *sphoṭa* and *nāda* (or *dhvani*), see fn. 63. For Kaiyaṭa's view on *sphoṭa* see Note (9).

The *MBD*, p. 13, lines 22-24, offers three interpretations :

(1) some view *śabda* as *nitya*, others as *anitya* (i.e., *kārya*),

(2) the distinction between *nitya* and *kārya* coincides with that between *jāti* 'generic notion' and *vyakti* 'individual representative of a genus', and

(3) it coincides with the distinction between *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*.

171. *SUP* is Pāṇini's general designation for case ending (P. 4.1.2).

172. Actually, Pāṇini's term *vibhakti* includes both case endings and personal endings (P. 1.4.104).

means the seven *kārakas* including *śeṣa*, because (otherwise) there is an undesired possibility that the personal endings are left out.[173]

(On) ' because it showers '. Because (the fulfillment of) wishes comes as the fruit of the performance (of sacrifices) which is based on knowledge (of the meaning of the *mantras*).

(On) ' with a mighty (god) '. That is to say, with the highest *brahman*.[174]

37. (*Bhāṣya ; Ninth quotation*)

Somebody else says (*catvāri* in) *catvā́ri vā́k párimitā padā́ni tā́ni vidur brāhmaṇā́ yé manīṣíṇaḥ / gúhā trī́ṇi níhitā néṅgayanti turī́yaṁ vācó manuṣyà vadanti* ' speech has been measured in four feet. Those (quarter-part) brahmins who have control over their mind know. The three (of them) which have been deposited secretly do not stir. The *turīya* (quarter-part) men speak '.[175]

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173. Patañjali speaks of seven *vibhaktis*. This does not include the *tiṄ-vibhaktis*. That is why, according to Kaiyaṭa, some grammarians feel that the term *vibhakti* here stands for *kāraka*. In this way, the *tiṄ-vibhaktis* can be included, because they convey the sense of *kartṛ* or *karman*, which are *kārakas*. But how to account for seven *kārakas?* Pāṇini knows six only. That is why *śesa*-relations are also included among *kārakas*.

The view ascribed to some grammarians by Kaiyaṭa is found in the *MBD* (p. 13, lines 24–25) and is expressed also by Bhartṛhari in his *VP* (3.7.44). Here the text says *sāmānyaṁ kārakaṁ tasya saptādyā bhedayonayaḥ / ṣaṭ karmākhyādibhedena śeṣabhedas tu saptamī* ' *kāraka* is (something) general. Its main sources of differentiation are seven (in number). Six on account of the difference beginning with what is called *karman*, but the seventh is the differentiation formed by *śeṣa* '.

174. Obviously, this interpretation has nothing to do any more with the original meaning of the Vedic stanza, in which Soma figures as the mighty god, but probably a great deal with Bhartṛhari's argument in the first *Kāṇḍa* of the *VP*.

175. Ṛgveda 1.164.45. The hymn itself is a collection of *brahmodyas*. For interpretations with regard to the four feet of speech see Geldner, op. cit. (see fn. 163 above), p. 236, note on stanza 45. Compare also K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1972), p. 25–26.

The stanza first speaks of speech as measured in four feet, that is, metric speech as used by poets. But then a different esoteric division of speech into four parts is introduced, the precise meaning of which is anybody's guess.

As noted by K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1972) p. 25–26, and by V. TRAPP (1933), p. 39, n. 23, the stanza is also quoted in the *Nirukta*. It forms part of the *Pariśiṣṭa* (*Nirukta* 13.9). The points to be noted in the comment on the stanza here are :

(1) *vākparimitā* is taken as a *tp*. cp. in the sense of *vācaḥ parimitāni (padāni)*,
(2) *manīṣin* is explained as *medhāvin* ' possessing insight ',
(3) *guhā* is interpreted as a locative,
(4) the word *turīya* is derived from the verbal base *tvar-*, and
(5) for *catvāri padāni* six interpretations are offered, to which a *brāhmaṇa*-passage stating still another interpretation is added.

Among the six interpretations the second, that of noun, verb, etc., is ascribed to the grammarians. The third interpretation stems from the *nairuktas*. It says that the four *padas* refer

(On) *catvāri vāk parimitā padāni.* (That is), the four classes of words (namely,) noun, verb, preposition / preverb and particle.[176]

(On) *tāni vidur brāhmaṇā ye manīṣiṇaḥ* (In the sense of) *manasa īṣiṇaḥ* ' who are master over their mind ' (we derive) *manīṣiṇaḥ.*[177]

(On) *guhā trīṇi nihitā neṅgayanti.* That is to say, *guhāyāṁ trīṇi nihitāni neṅgayanti* ' the three of them which have been put in a secret place do not stir '[178]. (*Neṅgayanti* means) *na ceṣṭante* ' they do not move ' (that is), *na nimiṣanti* ' they do not (even) blink '.

(On) *turīyaṁ vāco manuṣyā vadanti.* It is that *turīya* (quarter-part) indeed, which is found among men. That is to say, the fourth (quarterpart).

(So much for) *catvāri.*[178a]

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to the three Vedas and to speech used in daily communication. Mention is also made of *ātmavādins* who hold that the fourth part refers to the *ātman.*

As will be seen from the *Bhāṣya,* it agrees to a considerable extent with the commentary in the *Niruktapariśiṣṭa.* The question here is of chronology again.

176. Reference is to *Nirukta,* 1.1, for which see fn. 164.

177. Nāgeśa proposes two interpretations for *manasa īṣiṇaḥ* :

(1) *cittaśuddhikrameṇa vaśīkartāraḥ* ' bringing (the senses) under control through mind-purity ', and

(2) *viṣayāntarebhyo vyāvṛttyā hiṁsakāḥ* ' killing (their senses) by turning them away from the other sense-objects', and adds that in both interpretations the grammarians are meant.

As pointed out by the *Chāyā,* interpretation 1, derives *īṣiṇaḥ* from *īṣA aiśvarye* which is mentioned in the *Dhātupāṭha* 2.10, as *īśA aiśvarye.* Therefore, strictly speaking, the first interpretation is based on a reading *manasa īśinaḥ.* This is the interpretation followed in the translation. P. THIEME, *Kleine Schrifteu.* Teil I. Wiebaden, 1971, p. 240, even conjectures that the original reading of the Mbh. was *manasa īśinaḥ,* and that later on the text has been changed on account of the authority of the *Nirukta,* which in two passsages (*Nirukta* 2.25; 9.10) reads *manasa īṣiṇaḥ.* The fact remains, however, that the text of the Ṛgveda reads *manīṣiṇaḥ.* To justify this reading and to make sense out of *manasa īṣiṇaḥ,* Thieme (ibid., p. 243) proposes to derive *manīṣā* from a rootnoun *man* or *mani* + *īṣā* in the sense of ' emotional outburst ', ' ecstasy ' or ' frenzy '. Thus *brāhmaṇā ye manīṣiṇaḥ* in the Ṛgveda stanza should be taken to mean ' (those) brahmins who are given to frenzy / emotional outbursts / poetic enthusiasm ' or some such phrase. We may, therefore, assume that the difficulty has not been solved.

178. *Guhā* is a Vedic instrumental used as an adverb. But in the *Bhāṣya* it is interpreted as a locative. This is in accordance with the stanza quoted by Patañjali at the end of his *bhāṣya* on P. 3.1.85 (*Mbh.* II, p. 65, lines 5–6). The stanza says *suptiṅupagrahaliṅganarāṇāṁ kālahalacsvarakartṛyaṅāṁ ca / vyatyayam icchati śāstrakṛd eṣāṁ so'p i ca siddhyati bāhulakena* ' the author of the grammar assumes the exchange of case endings, personal endings, voice, gender, person (first, second, third), and of tenses, consonants, vowels, the *kartṛ* (etc. *kārakas*), and (the *vikaraṇas*) *yaṄ* (etc.). And that (exchange) is established by means of (this) *bahulam*-rule (P. 3.1.85) '.

178a. The *Bhāṣya* lacks the usual *pratīka* at the beginning and the conclusion at the end. It may therefore be regarded as a loose addition to the text, occasioned by the vicinity of the previous stanza and the present stanza in the *Niruktapariśiṣṭa,* on the

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Another utterance also is indicated by a similar part, namely *catvāri*.[179] That is why (the *Bhāṣyakāra*) says *apara āha* ' somebody else says '.

When there is a chance (to derive) the form *parimitāni*, (then) the form *parimitā* results, once (the ending) *Śi* is deleted by P. 6.1.70.[180] *Parimitāni* (means) *paricchinnāni* ' limited to ' (pl. nom. ntr.). That is to say, just that much.

The word *manīṣin* is correct, because it has been listed in the *pṛṣodarādi (-gaṇa)*.[181]

How (is it that) only ones who have control over their mind know (them) ? (In answer, the text says) *guhā* (etc.) *Guhā* (means) *ajñāna* ' ignorance ' only. Sg. loc. *(guhāyām)*. This is the meaning (of the passage). (In *guhā*) *luk*-deletion of the locative ending (has taken place) by P.7.1.39.[182]

But these (four parts of speech) are illuminated by the lamp of grammar. This being so, (what) men, (that is,) non-grammarians, speak (is) the fourth part of each single one of the four classes of words.[183]

The explanation of *neṅgayanti* only is *na ceṣṭante* ' they do not move' (that is,) *na nimiṣanti* ' they do not (even) blink '.

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The form *vākparimitāni* is a genitive *tatpuruṣa*..[184]

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assumption that this text is earlier than the *Paspaśāhnika*. The *MBD* contains a few short comments on the stanza. Nāgeśa has noted the absence of the conclusion. He says (*Navāhnika, NSP* ed. 1951, p. 43) *tasmāt sakalapadajñānāya manīṣitvāya vādhyeyaṁ vyākaraṇam* ' supply (the words) *tasmāt.. vyākaraṇam* " therefore, in order to have the understanding of all quarterparts (of speech) or to have the status of *manīṣin*, grammar must be studied ".

179. The previous stanza quoted also begins with the word *catvāri* as part of its text.

180. The rule says that in *chandas* the neuter ending *Śi* is variously deleted. Thus the rule applies in the derivational stage *parimitān* + *Śi*. Then the final *-n* of *pari mitān* is deleted by P. 8.2.1.

181. *Gaṇa* on P. 6.3.109, regarded as an *ākṛtigaṇa*. According to another grammatical tradition, *manīṣin* is listed in the *śakandhvādigaṇa* on P. 6.1.94. See, for instance, The *Prakriyākaumudī of Rāmachandra*..by. K. P. TRIVEDI (*Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series*, No. LXXVIII) Part I. Bombay, 1925, p. 64.

182. This rule deletes *(luk)* any case ending in the Veda.

183. Once the *Bhāṣyakāra* has interpreted *catvāri padāni* in the sense of the four classes of words, and taking into account that men only speak the fourth quarterpart *(turīya)*, Kaiyaṭa's observation is the logical consequence, because it is evident that men use all four classes of words. Then what is not known to them must be the deeper implications of each of these four classes which are known to grammarians only.

184. The accentuation of the Vedic text clearly shows that *vāk* and *parimitā* are separate words. But Nāgeśa apparently goes by the explanation in the *Niruktapariśiṣṭa*.

(On) 'classes of words'. (That is,) *parā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*,[185] and (also) noun, etc. And among noun, etc. each single (class) is divided into four.

Guhā (means) *ajñānam* 'ignorance'. ..But the grammarian, through the power of grammar and through the *yoga* obtained by that power,[186] disperses the darkness of the *guhā* 'secret place', and knows all. This is what (the author) means to say.

38. *(Bhāṣya : Tenth quotation)*

(In connection with) *uta tvaḥ.* (The text says) *utá tvaḥ páśyan ná dadarśa vā́cam utá tvaḥ śṛṇván ná śṛṇoty enām / utó tvasmai tanvàṁ ví sasre jāyéva pátya uśatī́ suvā́sāḥ* 'one, indeed, although he sees, does not see speech. Another, although he hears, does not hear her. To still another, indeed, like a wife, wearing clean (and auspicious) clothes, having desire for her husband, she spreads out her body'.[187]

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185. This is a direct reference to *VP* 1.159 (= 1.142, ed. Subramania Iyer, and 1.143, ed. Abhyankar-Limaye), which Nāgeśa quotes in the sequel of his commentary. The stanza says *vaikharyā madhyamāyāś ca paśyantyāś caitad adbhutam/anekatīrthabhedāyās trayyā vācaḥ paraṁ padam* 'this miraculous (grammar) is the highest abode of threefold speech, *vaikharī* and *madhyamā* and *paśyantī* which (thus) shows divisions according to various approaches'. For a discussion see K. A. Subramania Iyer (1969), p. 66-68.

In connection with the three varieties mentioned, Nāgeśa (*Navāhnika*, *NSP* ed. 1951, p. 44) offers the following clarifications : *vaikharī* is *śrotraviṣayā* 'forming the domain of the ear'; *madhyamā* is located in the heart and must be assumed to be the cause of *vyavahāra* 'daily communication', because otherwise we would be at a loss to explain the direct perception of words, etc.; *paśyantī* is beyond *lokavyavahāra* 'the daily communication among people', but even in this stage yogins may have an understanding of the division of words into stem and suffix.

It is clear that the *VP*-stanza speaks of a division of speech into three, not into four. In connection with the variety called *parā* Nāgeśa quotes another stanza (*VP*, 1.167 cd + 1.169 ab, where the first line reads *sūkṣmā vāg* for *parā vāg* in Nāgeśa's text; not found in Subramania Iyer's ed., nor in that of Abhyankar-Limaye). The stanza as quoted by Nāgeśa says *svarūpajyotir evāntaḥ parā vāg anapāyinī / tasyāṁ dṛṣṭasvarūpāyām adhikāro nivartate* 'the *parā* (variety of) speech has light as its nature, it is (located) inside and undifferentiated. With regard to that *(parā vāk)*, once its nature has been experienced, the authority of grammar ceases'. Thus speech is ultimately self-revealing, and not revealed by grammar. For the connection of the *parā vāk-* doctrine with Kashmiri Śaivism see K. A. Subramania Iyer (1969), p. 106-108.

It is worth noting that neither the *MBD* on the *Bhāṣya*-passage, nor Kaiyaṭa mentions the varieties. *vaikharī*, etc.

186. Here probably the power of grammar refers to (the deep knowledge of) the four word-classes, whereas the yogic power has to do with the division of *vāk* into *parā*, etc.

187. Ṛgveda 10.71.4. According to Indian tradition the hymn itself deals with *jñāna*, specifically the knowledge of speech as used in ritual, its origin and formation by *ṛṣis* in collaboration, on the occasion of sacrifice. Compare, Geldner, op. cit., Dritter

Certainly, one, although seeing, does not see (her). Another certainly, although he hears, does not hear her. By this the (first) half (of the stanza) refers to an ignorant person.

(On) *uto tv asmai tanvaṁ visasre.* (Here *tanvaṁ visasre* means) *tanvam vivṛṇute* 'she uncovers her body'.

(On) *jāyeva patya uśatī suvāsāḥ.* To explain, like a wife wearing clean clothes,[188] having desire for her husband, uncovers her body,[189] in the same way Speech reveals her body to one who is learned in speech. So that Speech may reveal itself, therefore grammar must be studied.[190] (So much for) *uta tvaḥ.*

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(On) *uta tvaḥ.* The word *tva* means 'another person'.

The word *uta* (is used) in the sense of the word *api.* And that (word *api* would occur here) in the reversed order.[191]

Although one perceives the form of the word directly, (still) one may not see it, because one does not grasp its meaning. This is the meaning (of the passage).

(On) *uto.* This is a combination of particles, namely, *uta* + *u.*

(On) 'the (first) half (of the stanza) refers to an ignorant person'. That is to say, the (first) half of the stanza[192] states the characteristic of an ignorant person.

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(*Evaṁ ardhenāvidvāṁsam*). Having thus expressed censure of the ignorant person by one half (of the stanza), by the other half (starting from) *uto tvasmai* he praises the learned person.

Teil. H.O.S. Vol. 35. Cambridge, Mass. 1951, p. 248–49. Thus, again, the hymn has nothing to do with grammar.

The stanza has also been quoted in *Nirukta* 1.19. The explanations offered by the commentary in the *Nirukta* and in the *Bhāṣya* are, to a great extent, identical. The main difference between these two, however, lies in the function assigned to the stanza as a whole. According to the *Nirukta*, the revealed body of the wife serves as the *upamāna* of *artha* 'meaning', and the stanza as a whole is meant to praise one who is *arthajña* 'knowing meaning'.

188. As stated in the commentary of the *Nirukta* itself and as explained by Nāgeśa in his commentary connected with the present *Bhāṣya*, the adjective *suvāsas* refers to the clean and auspicious clothes put on by the woman after menstruation.

189. Note the use of the word *ātman* in the sense of 'body'.

190. Thus the point of the stanza, according to the *Bhāṣyakāra*, is that it enjoins grammatical analysis.

191. When *uta* which means *api* is replaced by *api*, it results in the order *api tvaḥ* = *api anyaḥ*. The usual order, however, is just the reverse, namely, *anyo 'pi.*

192. *Ardharcaḥ*, the exact half of a stanza. Cp.-formation by P.2.2.2.

(*Yathā sa puruṣas*). Just as the man sees her as she is (and) hears the meaning of what she says, (and) not (sees and hears her) when she has her body covered up with heavy clothes,

(On) *evam* ' in the same way '. That same (man), having separated that speech by means of the division into stem and suffix, word by word, sees and hears its meaning. This sense is clear from the *Nirukta* and the *Bhāṣya*.[193]

(On) *vāgvide* ' to one who is learned in speech ' in the *Bhāṣya*. (It means) *vaiyākaraṇāya* ' to a grammarian '.

39. (*Bhāṣya : Eleventh quotation*)

(In connection with) *saktum iva*. (The text says) *sáktum iva títaunā punánto yátra dhī́rā mánasā vā́cam ákrata / átrā sákhāyaḥ sakhyā́ni jānate bhadraíṣāṁ lakṣmī́r níhitā́dhi vācí* ' where the wise have shaped speech with their mind, purifying it like groats with a sieve, there friends know friendships. On their speech an auspicious mark has been put '.[194]

(The word) *saktu* (is derived from the verbal base indicated as) *sacati*,[195] (because *saktu*) is difficult to clean, or (from the verbal base indicated as) *kasati* ' to expand ',[196] by transposition (of letters) (because *saktu*) becomes expanded.[197]

A *titau* is a *paripavana* ' sieve '. (It is named *titau*, because it is) *tatavat* ' containing what has been spread out ',[198] or (because it is) *tunnavat* ' containing what has been crushed '.[199]

Dhīrāḥ (means) *dhyānavantaḥ* ' ones intent on meditation '.

Manasā (means) *prajñānena* ' with the knowledge of discrimination '.

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193. A clear instance of the harmonizing approach to tradition of a commentator.

194. Ṛgveda 10.71.2. Thus the stanza belongs to the same hymn as the stanza quoted immediately before. Compare fn. 187. The present stanza says that the *ṛṣis* exchanging ideas with their fellow-*ṛṣis* sifted and shaped ritual speech, which therefore bears the mark of excellence.

The stanza has also been quoted in *Nirukta* 4.10. The commentary here does not contain the explanation of *titau*, nor the explanation of *sakhyāni jānate* with the following portion in the *Bhāṣya*, except for the derivation of *lakṣmī* from *lakṣaṇa*, as an alternative explanation. The portion from *kva* onwards in the *Bhāṣya* obviously serves to establish the desired relation between the stanza and grammer.

195. It is not clear which verbal base is meant here and in which meaning.

196. *Dhātupāṭha* 1.913. *kasA gatau* ' *kasA* in the sense of moving '.

197. Meaning unclear.

198. Presumably because the groats are spread over the sieve.

199. Presumably because the grains have been crushed before they are put in the sieve.

Vācam akrata. (Here *ākrata* means) *akṛṣata* 'they made'.

(On) *atrā sakhāyaḥ sakhyāni jānate* (That is), *atra sakhāyaḥ* (sc.) *santaḥ*[200] *sakhyāni jānate* (that is), *sāyujyāni jānate* 'there, being friends, they know friendships (that is), they know communion (of thought with each other).[201]

Where ? That road here, difficult to go, which can be gone by one only,[202] relating to speech.[203] But who are they ?[204] The grammarians. Why is that (so) ? (The reason is stated by the phrase) *bhadraiṣāṁ lakṣmīr nihitādhi vāci*. (That is), *eṣāṁ vaci bhadrā lakṣmīr nihitā bhavati* 'on their speech an auspicious mark has been put'. *Lakṣmī* 'mark' (is so called) because of *lakṣaṇa* 'marking', (that is) because of *bhāsana* 'spreading lustre', (that is, *lakṣmī* 'lustre') dominates (their speech).[205]

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(On) *sacati*. (That is,) of (the verbal base) *ṣacA* in the sense of *secana* 'sprinkling'.[206]

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200. An early instance of the use of *san* in commentatorial literature. Here it is used to transform the subject into a qualification of the (implied) subject.

201. In what does friendship consist ? As the *Bhāṣyakāra* sees it, in *sāyujya* 'communion' involving free exchange of thought.

202. The question stated by *kva* refers to the words *yatra....atrā* in the stanza. *Kva* is a locative word. The answer is given by means of a word in the nominative *(mārgaḥ)*. Compare fn. 139.

In the translation all adjectives are taken as qualifiers of *mārga*, in agreement with V. TRAPP (1933). p. 7, and against K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1972), p. 29, and FILLIOZAT (1975). p. 60, who interpret *vāgviṣaya* as 'the domain of speech' and take *ekagamya* as its qualifier.

Ekagamyaḥ is analysed as *ekena gamyaḥ* 'go-able by one only'. The 'one' meant here is the grammarian

203. Obviously, the road relating to speech which is *durga*, etc. is the road of grammar.

204. Who are the persons referred to in the stanza as *sakhāyaḥ*, etc. ?

205. According to G. B. PALSULE, "Patañjali's interpretation of ṚV 10.71.2' *Indian Antiquary* Third Series, Vol. III (Professor R N Dandekar Felicitation Volume) Bombay, 1969, p.27-29, the part *parivṛḍhā bhavati* in the *Bhāṣya* is an independent statement which contains the paraphrase of the word *adhi* in the stanza. This interpretation requires, in any case, the suppletion of the word *adhi* as a *pratīka* in the text of the *Bhāṣya* (as stated by Palsule, ibid., p. 29). However, the text of the *Bhāṣya (lakṣmīr lakṣaṇād bhāsanāt parivṛḍhā bhavati)* forms one continuous statement, in which first the meaning of the word *lakṣmī* is explained in the sense of 'lustre', and which then says that the speech of the brahmins is characterised by that lustre.

206. *Dhātupāṭha* 1.176 (O. BÖHTLINGK, *Pāṇini's Grammatik*, Leipzig 1887. Nachdruck Hildesheim 1964 p. 62*). The semantic connection between *saktu* and 'sprinkling' is not clear.

(On) *durdhāvaḥ.* (That is,) *duḥśodhaḥ* ' difficult to clean '. Just as by means of a sieve the husks, etc. are removed from the groats, so also by means of grammar the *apaśabdas* ' wrong words ' (are removed) from speech.

(On) *kasati.* Transportation of letters, because *(saktu)* is listed in the *pṛṣodarādi (-gaṇa).*[207]

(On) *tatavat.* That is to say, provided with a large size.

(On) *tunnavat.* (That is,) possessing many holes.

(On) *dhīrāḥ.* (That is,) *vaiyākaraṇāḥ* ' grammarians '.

(On) *vācam akrata.* (That is,) they have made speech free from *apaśabdas* ' wrong words '. The form *akrata* (is derived) when *luk*-deletion of (the aorist-marker) *li* is (applied) by P. 2.4.80.[208]

(On) *atrā sakhāyaḥ* (in the stanza). Lengthening (of *a* in *atra*) by P. 6.3.133.[209]

(On) *sakhāyaḥ.* (That is,) *samānakhyātayaḥ* ' ones possessing identical knowledge '.[210] They think that all is one, because their perception of differences has ceased.[211]

(On) *sakhyāni.* (That is, *sāyujyāni* ' (mystical) unions (with the divine) '.

(On) *ekagamyaḥ.* (That is,) *jñānenaiva prāpyaḥ* ' obtainable by intuitive realisation only '.[212]

(On) *vāci.* That is to say, in the *brahman* called Veda that *lakṣmī*, which in the Upaniṣads is said to have the character of awareness of ultimate reality, has been deposed by them.

Nāgeśa

(On) *kva.* The question (should actually be phrased) as *kiṁ tat yatra sāyujyāni prāpnuvanti* ' which is that where they obtain communion ? ' (The *Bhāṣyakāra*) answers : *ya eṣa* (etc.).[213]

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207. *Gaṇa* on P.6.3.109, considered to be an *ākṛtigaṇa.*

208. The rule says that in a *mantra* the aorist-marker *li* (= *cli*) added to *kṛ-* undergoes *luk*-deletion (*luk* continued from P.2.4.58).

209. The rule says that in the Ṛgveda the endng *-tra* is lengthened (*dīrgha* continued from P.6.3.111).

210. Taken from the *MBD* (see p. 14 line 8). which says *atra sakhāyāḥ samānakhyātayaḥ samānaprajñānāḥ* ' (the word) *sakhāyaḥ* here (means) *samānakhyātayaḥ* ' ones possessing identical knowledge ' (that is) *samānaprajñānāḥ* ' ones possessing the same insight '.

211. Here, as well as in the following comments, Kaiyaṭa's Vedānta bias clearly shows.

212. According to Nāgeśa (*Navāhnika, NSP* ed. 1951, p. 47, first column, *jñāna* here stands for *nirvikalpakajñāna* ' (that type of) knowing (which is) free from determinants '.

213. See fn. 202.

40. *(Bhāṣya : Twelfth quotation)*

(In connection with) *sārasvatīm*. The ritualists have a text which reads *āhitāgnir apaśabdaṁ prayujya prāyścittīyām sārasvatīm iṣṭiṁ nirvapet* ' after using a wrong word, (the person) who has put the fire (on the altar) should perform the *sārasvatī iṣṭi* " sacrifice dedicated to Sarasvatī ",[214] which has its origin in expiation. So that we should not be bound to perform expiation, grammar must be studied. (So much for) *sārasvatīm* (etc.).

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(On) ' which has its origin in expiation '. (The suffix) *cha* (has been added) after a *vṛddha* word in the sense of *bhava* ' originating (from that)'.[215]

(On) ' bound to perform expiation '. (Here the word *prāyaścittiyāḥ* is derived) in the sense of *prāyaścittāya hitāḥ* ' good (pl. nom. masc.) for *prāyaścitta* ' (that is,) for a rite prescribed by *śruti* and *smṛti* for the sake of purification of sin.[216] That is to say, so that we should not give rise to an occasion for that.[217]

Note (17)

The *MBD* (p. 14, lines 10–12) interprets the *Bhāṣya* with the help of a comparison. Just as a man has to bring his wife when setting up a ritual fire, because without her the *agnyādhāna* cannot proceed, in the same way the man who sets up the fire must study grammar. The conclusion is that the study of grammar has the character of a *nityakarman* ' daily, obligatory rite '. But this clearly goes beyond the point the *Bhāṣyakāra* wants to make. For the reference to the wife of the *yajamāna* in the ceremony of *agnyādheya* see P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. II, Part II, Poona 1241, p. 986, 989.

41. *(Bhāṣya : Thirteenth quotation)*

(In connection with) *daśamyāṁ putrasya*. The ritualists have a text which reads[218] *daśamyuttarakālaṁ putrasya jātasya nāma vidadhyāt. Ghoṣavadādy antarantaḥstham avṛddhaṁ tripuruṣānūkam anaripratiṣṭhitam. Tad dhi pratiṣṭhitatamaṁ bhavati. Dvyakṣaraṁ caturakṣaraṁ vā nāma. Kṛtaṁ*

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214 Not known in extant ritual literature. K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1972), p, 31, gives a reference for the description of the *iṣṭi*.

215. Reference is to P.4.2.114, which reads *vṛddhāc chaḥ*. A *vṛddha* word is a word whose first vowel is *vṛddhi* (P.1.1.73). *Ch* is replaced by *īy*, by P.7.1.2. Reference for the sense of *bhava* is to P.4.3.53. Compare Filliozat (1975), p. 65, n. 1.

216. Reference is to P.5.1.5 *(tasmai hitam)* and to P.5.1.1.

217. Namely, *prāyaścitta* on account of the use of wrong words.

218. Or, texts which read, because the passages quoted may be from different *gṛhyasūtras*. For different references see K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1972), P. 32.

kuryān na taddhitam 'one should give a name to his son at a time after the tenth (day) from his birth.[219] (The name should) begin with a voiced sound, it (should) have a semivowel inside,[220] it (should) not be *vṛddha*[221] (should) sound after (the name of one of) the three ancestors,[222] it (should) not be established among one's enemies.[223] Because such (a name) becomes most prestigious. The name (should) contain two or four syllables.[224] One should use a *kṛt* (-suffix), not a *taddhita* (-suffix)'.[225] But without (the help of) grammar *kṛt* (-suffixes) or *taddhita* (-suffixes) cannot be known. (So much for) *daśamyāṁ putrasya* (etc.).

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(On) *daśamyuttarakālam* 'at a time after the tenth (day)'. (In the sense of) *daśamyā uttaraḥ* 'following (sg. nom. masc.) after the tenth' cp.-formation (takes place) on account of *yogavibhāga* 'splitting of the rule' in P. 2.1.37.[226] Then a *bv.* (is formed) with the word *kāla*. And this (form) is an adverb.[227] There is impurity for ten days. Therefore it is said *daśa-*

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219. Compare *Pāraskaragṛhyasūtra* 1.17.1.

220. Compare *Pāraskaragṛhyasūtra* 1.17.2, and *Āśvalāyanagṛhyasūtra* 1.15.5.

221. Compare *Carakasaṁhitā* 4.8.50 (in Chatterji 1972, p. 32).

222. Compare *Carakasaṁhitā* 4.8.50 (in Chatterji, 1972, p. 32). Usually, *tripuruṣa* means the three ancestors beginning with the father. However, in the present context, as explained by Kaiyaṭa, the three ancestors are the father's father, grand-father and great-grand-father. Here the father is excluded, because the son's name must not be identical with that of his father, since this would lead to confusion.

223. Compare *Carakasaṁhitā* 4.8.50 (in Chatterji 1972, p. 32).

224. Compare *Āśvalāyanagṛhyasūtra* 1.15.5–6, and *Pāraskaragṛhyasūtra* 1.17.2.

225. Compare *Pāraskaragṛhyasūtra* 1.17.2.

226. The rule reads *pañcamī bhayena*. By splitting it we obtain two rules :

(*a*) *pañcamī*, a general prescription of cp.-formation with a word ending in the abl. case ending, and

(*b*) (*pañcamī*) *bhayena*, which specifies the word (*bhaya*) with which a word in the abl. is to be compounded.

Compare Filliozat (1975), p. 65, n. 4. The idea of splitting the rule appears to be Kaiyaṭa's. Since *yogavibhāga* practically amounts to *supsupāsamāsa*, Nāgeśa suggests to have *supsupāsamāsa* straightway, without *yogavibhāga*.

227. Normally, the expression should read *daśamyuttarakāle*, to be analysed a *daśamyāḥ uttare kāle* 'at a time following after the tenth (day)'. But the text says *daśamyuttarakālam*. To justify this expression, Kaiyaṭa proposes cp.-formation in two stages :

(1) from *daśamyāḥ uttaraḥ* we derive the abl. tp. cp. *daśamyuttara*,

(2) in the sense of *daśamyuttaraḥ kālaḥ yasmin karmaṇi yathā syāt tathā* 'in the action (of naming) the time following after the tenth (day) is taken into account' we derive the adverbial bv. cp. *daśamyuttarkālam*. Compare further *ATA*, p. 10, fn. 52.

myuttarakālam 'at a time after the tenth (day)', Even the authors of *gṛhya (sūtras)* who read *daśamyāṁ putrasya* 'on the tenth (day after the birth) of a son' have to explain the word *daśamyām* as (representing) an *adhikaraṇa* 'location' which is approximative.[228]

(On) 'beginning with a voiced sound'. The sounds which are voiced are shown in the *śikṣā*,[239] (The text says) 'beginning with such (a sound)'.

(On) 'it (should) have a semivowel inside'. That is to say, it (should be name) containing *y r, l,* or *v* in the middle.

(On) *tripuruṣānūkam* 'it (should) sound after (the name of one of) the three ancestors'. As regards name-giving, the father is the competent person. *Tripuruṣānūkam* (is derived in the sense of) *trīn puruṣān anukāyati* (i.e.,) *abhidhatte* 'it mentions (one out of) the three (direct) ancestors' of him.[230] Lengthening (of the *u* in *anūka* takes place) by P. 6.3.137.[231]

42. *(Bhāṣya : Fourteenth quotation)*

(In connection with) *sudevo asi.* (The text says) *sudevó asi varuṇa yásya te saptá síndhavaḥ / anukṣáranti kākúdaṁ sūrmyàṁ suṣirā́m iva* 'you are a good god, Varuna, in whose gorge the seven rivers flow, like in a hollow tube'.[232]

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228. *Daśamyām* means 'on the tenth (day)'. But this day forms itself part of the period of birth-impurity *(jananāśauca)*. Therefore it is not proper to name the child on the tenth day. Accordingly, we must take the (locative, *adhikaraṇa*) word *daśamyām* as an approximation, in the sense of 'on about the tenth (day)', that is, on the eleventh day after birth.

229. The collective name for treatise dealing mainly with phonetics not confined to a particular Vedic *śākhā*.

230. That is, of the father.

231. The *Dhātupāṭha* 1.964, mentions a verbal base *kai-*, which, together with *gai-* is prescribed in the sense of *śabda* '(producing) sound'. *Anukai-* (or *anuka-*) therefore means 'to produce sound in conformity with (something).'

The derivation of the noun *anūka* is as follows :

anukai	
anukā	P.6.1.45
anukā + Ka	P.3.1.136
anuk + a	P.6.4.64
anūka	P.6.3.137
anūka.	

This word *anūka,* forms an *upapada*-cp. with *tripuruṣa,* a *dvigu* cp., which functions as the *upapada.* Nāgeśa explains that this cp.-formation is by *Vt*.II on P.3.2.5. Apparently, the *mūlavibhujādi-gaṇa* mentioned here is taken as an *ākṛtigaṇa.*

232. Ṛgveda 8.69.12. The stanza forms part of a hymn to Indra. The translation follows K. F. GELDNER (*Der Rigveda*....Zweiter Teil....H.O.S. Vol. 34, Cambridge Mass. 1951, p. 394). Geldner translates *kakudam* as 'Schlund' and explains that the ocean is the 'Schlund' of Varuṇa. Thus the simile makes sense. *Kākuda* may be taken to mean 'cavity', not necessarily the cavity of the mounth, i.e., the palate, but rather that of the throat.

(On) *sudevo asi varuṇa.* (Here *sudevo asi* means) *satyadevo 'si* 'you are the truth-deity'.[233]

(On) *yasya te sapta sindhavaḥ.* (Here *sapta sindhavaḥ* means) *sapta vibhaktayaḥ* 'the seven *vibhaktis.*'[234]

(On) *anukṣaranti kākudam. Kākudam* (means) *tālu* 'palate' (sg. acc.).[235] *Kāku* (means) *jihvā* 'tongue'.[236] (In the sense of) *sāsmin nudyate* 'that (tongue) is moved up against it' (we derive) *kākudam.*[237]

(On) *sūrmyaṁ suṣirāmiva.* (*sūrmyam*, i. e., *sūrmim* means) *śobhanām ūrmim* 'a beautiful flow' (sg. acc.).[238] To explain, (like) a fire having entered a hollow cast form burns,[239] in the same way those seven rivers. (That is,) the seven *vibhaktis*, flow along the palate.[240] Therefore you are the truth-deity.

So that we may become truth-deities, grammar must be studied. (So much for) *sudevo asi.*

Kaiyaṭa

(On) *sudevo asi.* This (stanza is in) praise of Varuṇa. For which reason (namely,) on account of his knowledge of grammar, Varuṇa is the truth-deity, for that reason others also become truth-deities.[241] This is the meaning (of the passage).

According to the *Bhāṣyakāra's* interpretation, the stanza has a quite different meaning namely, 'you are the truth-deity, o Varuṇa, along whose palate the seven *vibhaktis* flow like (fire) in a hollow form'.

The stanza has also been quoted in *Nirukta*, 5.27, and is already commented upon, by way of introduction, at the end of *Nirukta* 5.26.

233. This explanation is not found in *Nirukta* 5.26–27. See further Note (18).

234. This explanation is not found in *Nirukta* 5.26–27, but appears to be the invention of the *Bhāṣyakāra*. For the seven *vibhaktis* see fn. 173.

235. This is the explanation given by *Nirukta* 5.26.

236. This explanation is not found in *Nirukta* 5.?6–27, Nāgeśa has noted that the derivation given may be read as *sāsmin nudyate* 'that (tongue) is pushed against it', and adds the rules required for further derivation. Compare Filliozat (1975), p. 67.

237. This is supported by *Nirukta* 5.26.

238. This is the explanation given by *Nirukta* 5.27. But it does not have the support of the *Padapāṭha*, which does not separate *su* and *ūrmi* by means of an *avagraha*. L. SARUP (*The Nighaṇṭu and the Nirukta*. Delhi, Second reprint. 1967, translation, p. 88) renders *su-ūrmi* as a bv. cp. 'having beautiful waves'), for which there is no support in the text.

The word *sūrmi* occurs in *Manusmṛti* 11.104. Here reference appears to be to a hollow cast metal image (compare G. BÜHLER, *SBE*, Vol. XXV, 1886, p. 452). Compare *Āpastambagṛhyasūtra* 1.9.25.2.

239. This explanation is not found in *Nirukta* 5.26–27. Why the *upamāna* is phrased in this way, is not clear.

240. Once *kākuda* has been explained as 'palate', *anukṣaranti* can hardly mean anything else but 'they flow along'.

241. Taken mainly from the *MBD* (p. 14, line 16).

(On) *sindhavaḥ*. That is to say, case endings are like rivers,[242]

(On) *anukṣaranti*. That is to say, having reached the palate they become manifest.[243]

(On) *sāsminn udyate*. That is to say, (*udyate* means) *utkṣipyate* ' it is thrown up (against) ', because verbal bases have many meanings.[244]

(On) *sūrmyam*. When there is a possibility to derive (the form) *sūrmim*, (then) because of the continuation of *vā chandasi* in P. 6.1.107, substitution of a *yaṇ*-letter (takes place).[245]

Nāgeśa

Sūrmim (means) *śobhanām ayaḥpratimām* 'a beautiful metal image' sg. acc. fem.)[246]

(*Praviśya....*) That is to say, like fire having entered (and) having burnt the dirt present there to ashes, purifies the image, in the same way, the *vibhaktis* (that is,) words provided with *vibhaktis*, having become manifest in the region of the palate remove the badness belonging to the body. Hereby it is stated that the reward (of the study of grammar) lies in reaching paradise.

Note (18)

The *Bhāṣya* clearly presents another case (compare *Bh*. Nos. 36 ff.) of reinterpretation of a Vedic stanza in order to gain Vedic support for the study of grammar. Possibly the need for Vedic sanction arose due to (pressure from Mīmāṁsā.

The presiding deity, this time, is Varuṇa. He is called *sindhupati* (Ṛgveda 7.64.2, together with Mitra), and he is known to hate falsehood. The *Bhāṣyakāra* calls him *satyadeva* ' truth-deity '. On that account he may be considered to be a deity favouring grammatical truth and correctness also.

The reinterpretation itself mainly turns on the words *sapta*, *anukṣaranti* and *kākudam* in the stanza. Just as there are seven rivers, there are seven *vibhaktis*. Rivers flow, so do the *vibhaktis*, or rather words ending in the

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242. The common feature is probably provided by *anukṣaranti* ' they flow (along) '

243. That is, they become manifest as articulated sounds.

244. Kaiyaṭa's question is, how can *vad-*, which usually means ' to speak ', convey the required sense of movement in a particular direction ? That is why the maxim that verbal bases have many meanings is invoked.

245. In the stage *sūrmi+am* the application of P.6.1.107 results in the form *sūrmim*. But the text says *sūrmyam*. To justify this form, Kaiyaṭa says that the single substitution prescribed by P.6.1.107 is optionally applicable in *chandas*. The optional application is obtained by continuing P. 6.1.106, *vā chandasi*, in P. 6.1.107. The *yaṇ-ādeśa* takes place by P.6 1.77.

246. Nāgeśa tries to combine the traditional *vigraha* of *sūrmi* (*su = śobhana*) with the meaning of *sūrmi* (= *ayaḥpratimā*).

vibhaktis. These words become manifest, are produced in the mouth. The condition for the articulation of words is provided by the *kākuda*, the arching roof of the mouth, in interaction with the tongue.

43. (*Bhāṣya : Question*)

But why is the use explained for those who want to study grammar, but not (for those who want to study) something else (like those who) having said *om* recite the words *śam*, etc., section by section ?[247]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' But why ' (etc.). (Objection) But how can the same person who has asked : ' But what (are the uses) of this (instruction in words) '[248] ask ' But why ' (etc.).[249] ? (Answer) (If what you say is) so, then (we will say that) the *Bhāṣyakāra* shows a demarcation between domains in connection with the exposition of uses.[250] Formerly[251] grammar was studied before the study of the Veda was taken up. (In those days) those (students) couldn't ask questions because of their young age. But nowadays life is very short. Therefore the main subject (that is,) the Veda, is studied first of all. This is how (it happens that students) ask, what is the use of studying grammar, because they have become capable of asking questions. That is why (this) use must be necessarily explained (to them).

(On) ' but not....something else '. That is to say, for those who want to study the Veda.

(On) ' having said *om* '. That is to say, having agreed.[252]

(On) ' section by section '. A *vṛttānta* is called a *prapāṭhaka* ' section of the Veda which is to be memorized in a particular time '. (*Vṛttāntaśaḥ* means) *vṛttāntaṁ vṛttāntaṁ prati* ' section after section '.[253]

Nāgeśa

(On) ' (If what you say is) so, then '. (The *Bhāṣyakāra* shows) a demarcation between domains in this form : the exposition of uses (happens)

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247. That is, those who undertake the study of the Atharvaveda in the Paippalāda-recension. Compare fn. 24. A Veda recitation is to be introduced with the word *om*, see *Aśvalāyana-gṛhyasūtra* 3.2.5, *Āpastambadharmasūtra* 1.4.6, and *Manusmṛti* 2.74.

248. Reference is to *Bh*. No. 16.

249. The first question was about the uses of grammar, and that has been answered. Now why is the question about *prayojanas* raised again ?

250. The only reason for the question raised in *Bh*. No. 43 is to assume that the *Bhāṣyakāra* wanted to point out a difference between the study of the Veda–which is a *nitya karman* anyway, and has no special rewards or benefits–and that of other branches of learning.

251. Kaiyaṭa refers to the next *Bhāṣya* (*purā = purākalpe*).

252. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 14, lines 22–23). Thus *om* is not understood as the sound introducing Vedic recitation, but as a particle of affirmation, implying that the question of use or utility has no place here.

253. The suffix *śas* is added by P.5.4.43, in the sense of *vīpsā* ' (logical) distribution '.

in the domain (of studies) which is different from the Veda, but not in the domain (formed) by the Veda.

44. *(Bhāṣya : Answer)*

In olden days[254] it was like this : brahmins studied grammar after their (initiation-) ceremony.[255] After they had learnt the different places of articulation, the articulatory organs[256] and the extra-buccal process of articulation,[257] they were taught the Vedic words. Nowadays, it is not like this. Having learnt the Veda (the students) are quick to say : *vedān no vaidikāḥ śabdāḥ siddhāḥ, lokāc ca laukikāḥ. Anarthakaṁ vyākaraṇam* ' the Vedic words are known (to us) from the Veda, and the ordinary words from common speech. (So) grammar is useless '. To those students entertaining false notions the *Ācārya* ' teacher ' teaches this science (of grammar) saying : *imāni prayojanāny adhyeyaṁ vyākaraṇaṁ* ' these are the uses, (therefore) grammar must be studied '.[258]

Kaiyaṭa

The word *adyatve* is a *nipāta* ' particle '. It is used in the sense of *asmin kāle* ' in the present time '.[259]

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254. *Purākalpe.* This refers to historic times, not to a mythological age, as Nāgeśa interprets it.

255. As is clear from the next sentence, the word *vyākaraṇa* ' grammar ' in the present sentence is used in a loose sense. What is meant is *śikṣā*. Thus in olden times, before taking up the study, that is, the memorization, of the Veda, or parts of it, the students were taught the rudiments of phonetics. In these days, grammer, in the sense of Pāṇinian grammer, had not been developed yet as a separate field of study. But afterwards the course of study was changed. *Śikṣā* became the introduction to *vyākaraṇa*. Compare *Mbh.* I, p. 208, lines 18–19, *sthānakaraṇānupradānāni. Vyākaraṇaṁ nāmeyam uttarā vidyā* ' the places of articulation, the organs of articulation and the extra-buccal process of articulation. What is called *vyākaraṇa* is a science which comes subsequently '. Since this *vyākaraṇa* was a difficult subject for many students, they tried to dodge it, for instance, by declaring it to be useless. This, again, made it necessary for the teacher to explain the uses of grammar, in order to provide the students with a motive for studying Pāṇini.

256. The word used is *karaṇa*. It means ' articulatory organ '. Since these organs are located in the mouth, *sthāna* and *karaṇa* together may be taken to represent the *ābhyantaraprayatna*.

257. The word used is *anupradāna*. Compare W. S. ALLEN, *Phonetics in Ancient India*. London 1953, p. 23, and the criticism by P. THIEME in his review of Allen's book, in *Kleine Schriften*. Teil 2. Wiesbaden 1971, p. 719, regarding Allen's rendering of the term *anupradāna* used in *Prātiśākhyas*.

258. This statement refers to the uses summed up in *Vt.* II (according to the present translation), and explained in *Bh.* Nos. 17–21. It follows that the teacher referred to is Kātyāyana. On this point see further fn. 262.

259. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 15, lines 5–6). The point made is that *adyatve* should not be taken as a *tva*– derivation in the sense of *bhāva* (P. 5.1.119), which would result in the sense of ' today-ness '. *Adyatve* merely means ' today ' and is a synonym of *adya*. Therefore it must be a *nipāta*. The word *adyatve* is used twice only in the *Mbh.* Elsewhere *adya* is used.

(On) ' quick '. (That is to say, they are off in a hurry) to marry, etc.[260]

Nāgeśa

(The *Bhāṣyakāra*) states the answer (to the question raised) in the *Bhāṣya* by (the words) *purākalpe* ' in olden days ' (etc.). That is to say, *yugāntare* ' in a different age '.[261]

(On) *karaṇa* ' the articulatory organs '. (That is,) *ābhyantaraprayatna* ' the intra-buccal process of articulation. '

(On) *anupradāna* ' the extra-buccal process of articulation '. (That is,) *nādādibāhyaprayatna* ' the extra-buccal process of articulation in the form of voice, etc. '.

That is to say, (after they had learnt) grammar and *śikṣā* ' phonetics '.

By the word *ācārya* in the *Bhāṣya* the teacher of grammar (that is,) the author of the *Bhāṣya* himself, is intended (to be referred to).[262]

45. (*Bhāṣya : Summing up*)

We have discussed about word. We have also discussed about (its) nature. We have also discussed about the uses (of the study of grammar).

Nāgeśa

(On) ' We have discussed about word ' in the *Bhāṣya*. That is to say, we have discussed about word as the subject-matter (of grammar) by (the statement) *laukikānāṁ vaidikānāṁ ca* ' of (words) belonging to ordinary speech and of Vedic (words)'.[263]

(On) ' about (its) nature '. (Namely,) by (the statement) *atha gauḥ* ' Now, in *gauḥ* ' (etc.).[264]

This is the summing up of (the discussion in) the text, in order to inform us that, so far, an investigation has been carried out into the subject-matter (of grammar) and into the uses (of the study of grammar).

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260. The *Āpastambadharmasūtra*, 2.6.13–14, quotes a rather unflattering statement which may, to some extent, explain the hurry, namely, *vastaś ca śrotriyaś ca strīkāmatamau* ' a he-goat and a student who has completed his Veda-course evince the strongest sex-urge. '

261. Apparently, Nāgeśa takes *kalpa* in the sense of a world-age, for which compare *Manusmṛti* 1. 68–72. But, as explained in fn. 255, the *Bhāṣyakāra* refers to a development which has taken place in historic times.

262. Nāgeśa thinks that the first *Vt.* is *siddhe śabdārthasaṁbandhe* (*Mbh.* I, p. 6, line 16) and that therefore, the word *ācārya* in the present passage (*Mbh.* I, 0. 5, line 10) can only refer to Patañjali. But it has been pointed out by F. KIELHORN and R. G. BHANDARKAR in two articles in the *Indian Antiquary* of 1873 that the word *ācārya* in the beginning of the *Mahābhāṣya* may refer to Pāṇini or Kātyāyana, but never to Patañjali, See S. D. JOSHI, " Sanskrit Grammar ", in : *Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar as an Indologist* A Symposium edited by R. N. DANDEKAR, Poona (B.O.R.I.) 1976, p. 123–24.

263. Reference is to *Bh.* No. 3.

264. Reference is to *Bh.* No. 4.

III

(SECTION DEALING WITH THE METHOD OF GRAMMAR)

46. *(Bhāṣya : Question regarding method)*

Now instruction in words should be given. How should this be done? Whether by teaching the correct words, or by teaching the incorrect words, or by teaching both?

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' by teaching both '. If (both) what is to be rejected and what is to be accepted is taught (one obtains) a clear understanding. Therefore the teaching of both has been proposed.

47. *(Bhāṣya : Answer)*

The teaching of either one will do.[265] To explain, from a restriction (imposed) on what can be eaten we understand a prohibition regarding what should not be eaten. (For example,) when it has been stated *pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ* ' five (kinds of) five-toed (animals) may be eaten ',[266] we understand this (namely,) that others than these must not be eaten.

And from a prohibition regarding what must not be eaten (we understand) a restriction (imposed) on what can be eaten. To explain, when it has been stated *abhakṣyo grāmyakukkuṭaḥ, abhakṣyo grāmyasūkaraḥ* ' a domestic cock should not be eaten, a domestic pig should not be eaten ',[267] we understand this (namely,) that the wild (variety) can be eaten.

In the same way here also. If, to begin with, the correct words are taught, (then) when (the word) *gauḥ* ' cow ' is taught, we understand this (namely,) that *gāvī*, etc. are incorrect words.[268] If, on the other hand, the incorrect words are taught, (then) when (the words) *gāvī* ' cow ', etc. are taught, we understand this (namely,) that this (form) *gauḥ* is a correct word.

Kaiyaṭa

Although we would have a clear understanding, still (teaching of both the correct and the incorrect words) would lead to *gaurava* ' unwieldiness '. That is why (the *Bhāṣyakāra*) says ' of either one '. That is to say, of the correct words or of the incorrect words.

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265. Of the correct words or the incorrect words.

266. Compare *Gautamadharmasūtra* 17.27. Here six kinds of eatable five-toed animals are listed. The *Āpastambadharmasūtra*, 1.5.17.37, lists seven kinds.

267. Compare *Manusmṛti* 5.19; *Gautamadharmasūtra* 17.29, and *Āpastambadharmasūtra* 1.5.17.29 and 32.

268. Reference is to *Bh.* No. 26.

The words *anyatara* and *anyatama*, which are *avyutpanna* 'left without derivation (in Pāṇini's grammar)' are used on account of their intrinsic value[269] in the sense of *nirdhāraṇa* 'specification' out of two or out of many.[270]

(On) 'five' (etc.). Because one needs (to eat), eating is *prāpta* 'already made available'.[271] Being restricted to five (kinds of) five-toed (animals), it stops at other (than the five kinds of five-toed animals), because otherwise the injunction would be redundant.[272] This is not a *vidhi*, because *aprāpti* 'not being available (from another source)' is lacking.[273]

Note (19)

The discussion in the *Bhāṣya* and in Kaiyaṭa's commentary involves some Mīmāṁsā technicalities. The relevant concepts are *vidhi*, *niyama* and *parisaṁkhyā*.

A *vidhi* connects a particular aim (*phala*) with a particular means (*yāga*, etc.). The means consists in an action. If the means to reach the aim is not known from any other source but the *vidhi* in question, the *vidhi* is called *apūrvavidhi*. The stock-example is *agniṣṭomena yajeta svargakāmaḥ* 'let him who desires paradise sacrifice with the Agniṣṭoma (sacrifice)'. But for this injuction we wouldn't know the means to reach *svarga*.

It happens that means are known from *vyavahāra* 'common practice', independently from a particular *vidhi*. In fact, *vyavahāra* may offer us alternative means to reach the aim intended. In such a case, the *vidhi* enjoining one of the alternatives already known from *vyavahāra* must be regarded as *niyama* or as *parisaṁkhyā*.

The stock-example for *niyama* is *vrīhīn avahanti* 'he ponuds the rice', which is regarded as a Vedic injunction. Here the action of pounding is known from *vyavahāra*, independently from the injunction. Therefore it need not be specially prescribed. In husking the grains several courses of action are open to us: we may pound them, rub them together, or simply use our finger-nails. Mīmāṁsā-authors point out that these three courses of action cannot be adopted at the same time. Now the injunction is interpreted to mean *vrīhīn avahanty eva* 'he only pounds the rice'. That is to say,

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269. *Svabhāvāt.*

270. The word *anya* is not among the words after which the suffixes *DataraC* and *DatamaC* have been prescribed in the sense of *nirdhāraṇa* by P. 5.3.92–93.

271. That is to say, eating is a course of action which comes naturally to us. We don't need an injunction to that effect.

272. *Sāmarthyāt.* Precisely because eating is something we'll do anyway, there is no point in saying that we must eat five kinds of five-toed animals, unless this injunction is taken as a *niyama*. In that case, eating becomes restricted to these animals only.

273. Kaiyaṭa means to say, it is not an *apūrvavidhi*, the essential feature of which is *aprāpti*. See further Note (19).

only the pounding of the rice is allowed. The other means are disallowed. Thus in *niyama* one alternative course of action is a must, the others are to be discarded. It is, of course, possible that quite independently from the injunction, one may decide to pound the rice. In that case, the injunction, becomes an *anuvāda* ' re-statement (of what has been already adopted)'.

The stock-example for *parisaṁkhyā* is *pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ*. Here the action of eating is naturally (*rāgataḥ* ' by instinct ') known to us, independently from the injunction. Therefore it need not be specially prescribed. In eating several courses are open to us: we may eat the five kinds of five-toed animals, or other five-toed animals, or, may be, other animals and things also. Mīmāṁsā authors like to point out that these alternative courses of action can be adopted simultaneously, that is, during one and the same meal, The injunction stated is interpreted to mean that the eating of animals other than the five kinds of five-toed animals is forbidden, excluded. On the other hand, the injunction does not say that the five kinds of five-toed animals must be eaten. That is left to our own discretion. Thus, in *parisaṁkhyā*, the alternatives other than the one mentioned are a must-not, whereas the alternative mentioned is not a must.

The subject is dealt with in the *Mīmāṁsānyāyaprakāśa* (*The Mīmāṁsā-Nyāya-Prakāśa*....translated....by F. Edgerton. New Haven; Yale University Press 1929, paras 239–244). Here we find a *kārikā* (originally from the *Tantravārttika*, see K. Ch. Chatterji 1972, p. 43) which briefly states the essential points: *vidhir atyantam aprāptau niyamaḥ pākṣike sati / tatra cānyatra ca prāptau parisaṁkhyeti gīyate* ' (we speak of *apūrva-*) *vidhi*, when (the means enjoined) is totally unavailable (to us, from another source). (We speak of) *niyama*, when (the means enjoined) is alternatively (unavailable to us). It is called *parisaṁkhyā*, when (the means enjoined) is available (to us, by instinct, or from *vyavohāra* or in some other way) both with regard to that (which has been stated in the injunction) and with regard to something else (which has not been stated in the injunction)'. That is to say, an *apūrvavidhi* enjoins a course of action which in view of the end to be reached is totally new to us. In the case of *niyama* we have alternative courses of action to reach the aim desired, and they are known to us independently from the injunction. If we think of adopting one of the alternative courses not mentioned in the Vedic statement, the statement becomes a *vidhi*, because it prescribes a new course of action, which is alternatively unavailable to us. It says that we must adopt the course of action prescribed. If, on the other hand, we have already adopted the course of action mentioned in the statement, this statement does not prescribe anything new. Therefore it becomes an *anuvāda* ' a (mere) re-statement (of what was already known to us)'. In the case of *parisaṁkhyā* we are also faced with alternatives, known to us from *vyavahāra* or by instinct, like eating five kinds of five-toed animals and eating other animals, understood as different courses of action. The *parisaṁkhyā* is not concerned with the undertaking of the course of action mentioned, but with the non-undertaking of other courses of action.

To sum up, a *niyama* is a positive statement which states a restriction regarding possible courses of action with the help of *eva*. Only that particular course of action which has been mentioned is to be adopted (*vrīhīn avahanty eva* 'he is supposed to only pound the rice'). A *parisaṁkhyā* is a negative statement which excludes possible courses of action with the help of *na*. The injunction *pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ* intends to say : *apañcapañcanakhā abhakṣyāḥ* '(animals) other than the five five-toed ones are not to be eaten'.

The question remains, why the *Bhāṣyakāra* quotes the example *pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ* as an instance of *niyama*. The point has been discussed by Nāgeśa on the present *Bhāṣya*. His answer is that here the *Bhāṣyakāra* does not distinguish between *niyama* and *parisaṁkhyā*. Compare Filliozat (1975), p. 72, n. 3. However, the *Bhāṣyakāra* may not have known the distinction at all. Later grammarians, although they are aware of the distinction, use the term *niyama* for what is known as *parisaṁkhyā* in Mīmāṁsā.

48. (*Bhāṣya : Question*)

But which is the better (method of teaching) her ?

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'But which' (etc.). As compared to teaching both (the correct and the incorrect words, which results in) complication, the two (other methods) are preferable. (Now the question is,) out of these two, which is the better one ? This is the meaning (of the passage).[274]

49. (*Bhāṣya : Answer*)

The teaching of the correct words (is the better method), because it is more economical. (That is to say,) teaching the correct words is easier (but) teaching the incorrect words is more difficult. (Because) for each single correct word there are many incorrect words. To illustrate, for the correct word *gauḥ* 'cow' we have the incorrect forms *gāvī*, *goṇī*. *gotā* and *gopotalikā*, etc.[275] Moreover, (in this case what we have) is the explanation of the things desired.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'things desired'. That is to say, on account of the use of correct (words) we obtain *dharma* '(religious) merit'. Or rather, (the author) means to say that by teaching (words) which are acceptable (we obtain) a direct knowledge.[276]

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274. Kaiyaṭa silently corrects the expression *kim....jyāyaḥ* of the *Bhāṣyakāra* to *kaḥ (upadeśaḥ) jyāyaḥ*.

275. Reference is to *Bh*. No. 26.

276. We may say that the teaching of correct words increases *puṇya*. Or we may say that from this teaching we derive direct knowledge. If the incorrect words were taught, the correct words would be known indirectly only, namely, by exclusion.

50. (*Bhāṣya : Objection*)

But if this teaching of the correct words is (adopted, the question is) whether for understanding the correct words a word-by-word list is to be made. (That is to say,) should the (correct) words *gauḥ* 'cow', *aśvaḥ* 'horse', *puruṣaḥ* 'man', *hastī* 'elephant', *śakuniḥ* 'bird', *mṛgaḥ* 'deer', *brāhmaṇaḥ* 'brahmin', etc. be listed ?[277]

51. (*Bhāṣya : Answer*)

No, he[278] says. This word-by-word listing for the understanding of the correct words is no good.[279] For thus it is heard : Bṛhaspati recited the *śabdapārāyaṇa*[280] of words spoken word after word to Indra for a divine (period of) thousand years, and (still,) he had not reached the end. And (here) it was Bṛhaspati who was the teacher and Indra who was the student. And the time of study was a divine (period of) one thousand years. And (still,) he had not reached the end. (Then) what of today? He who lives long by any standard lives for one hundred years (only).

Learning becomes useful in four ways : on account of the time (spent) in acquiring (it), on account of the time (spent) in memo-

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277. The list repeats the enumeration in *Bh.* No. 3.

The *MBD* on this passage (p. 16, lines 18–20) observes that at this point of the discussion the speaker thinks that listing each single correct word is easy, because it frees us from having to memorize rules. The only thing we have to do is utter (and memorize) words. Teaching grammatical analysis (into stem and suffix) requires more time.

278. The *Bhāṣyakāra*.

279. *Anabhyupāya* literally means 'a non-means'.

280. The word *pārāyaṇa* is listed in P.5.1.72, together with two words indicating *vratas* 'vows'. According to Haradatta (commenting on the *KV* on P.5.1.72), *pārāyaṇa* means *ādita ārābhyāntād avicchedena vedādhyayanam* 'the uninterrupted repetition of the Veda (for the sake of memorization) from the beginning up to the end'. According to B. S. AGRAWAL (1963), p. 293, *pārāyaṇa* means Vedic study in the sense of recitation without attending to meaning. Plain memorization. Thus *śabdapārāyaṇa* may be taken to mean 'the repetition (for the sake of memorization), from the beginning to the end, of all correct words'. This is the *yoga* (or *yaugika*) 'etymological' sense of the word intended in the passage under discussion.

The *MBD* (p. 17. line 1) says that *śabdapārāyaṇa* is a *rūḍhiśabda* 'word conveying a conventional meaning'. in the sense that it is the title of a treatise. Kaiyaṭa tries to combine this with the idea that *śabdapārāyaṇa* is a *yaugika* word by saying that it is a *yogarūḍha* word. But the ideas of the *MBD* and of Kaiyaṭa here appear to be misconstructions. The practice of the traditional memorization of a Vedic text is like this: the teacher recites a sequence of some eight or ten words and the student repeats after him. Since one repetition is not sufficient for the student to memorize the sequence, it is repeated a number of times, and again on subsequent days, may be 64 times in all. This is how the student memorizes the text, and this is what is called *śabdapārāyaṇa*. But if *śabdapārāyaṇa* is taken to be the title of a book, the teaching and memorization procedure itself, which is essential in the passage under discussion, is swept under the carpet.

rization, on account of the time (spent) in exposition (and) on account of the time (spent) in (its) practical application. But among these (four periods) life would be spent by the time of acquiring (it) only. That is why word-by-word listing for the understanding of the correct words is no good.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' Bṛhaspati....to Indra '. This is an *arthavāda* ' merely illustrative passage ' in order to inform (us) that it is impossible to list each and every correct word.[282]

(On) ' (the *śabdapārāyaṇa*) of correct words (stated word by word)'. The word *śabdapārāyaṇa* which is *yogarūḍha* 'conveying both its etymological and its conventional sense',[283] stands for a particular textbook. This being so, the word *śabdānām* ' of words ' is (explicitly) used, although its meaning is (already) implicitly understood, for the sake of the mention of the objective *pratipadoktānām* ' (of....) spoken word after word '.[284]

In daily life we say *upayuktam* ' used ' even on account of a partial use. For instance, (we have) the usage[285] *upayuktaṁ ghṛtam* ' the ghee has been used ', although the ghee to which medicine has been added has been partially used only.[286] (But) not so here.[287] That is what (the author) makes us understand by (saying) ' in four (ways) ', etc.

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281. The story is not recorded in extant *śruti* literature. The nearest aproximation is the story in the *Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa*, 3.10.11.3–4, of the ṛṣi Bhāradvāja who was granted a span of 300 years by Indra to study the Veda, and who, still, could not finish in time. Compare V. TRAPP (1933), p. 41, n. 44, and K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1972), p. 48–49.

282. The idea of *arthavāda* is taken from the *MBD* (p. 16, line 23). For the role assigned to *arthavāda* passages in the Veda by Mīmāṁsā theorists see G.JHA, ***Pūrvamīmāṁsā in its sources***. Second Edition, Varanasi, 1964, p. 177–180.

283. See fn. 280.

284. Kaiyaṭa thinks that in *pratipadoktānāṁ śabdānāṁ śabdapārāyaṇam* ' the complete word-repetition of words spoken word after word ' the form *śabdānām* is redundant, because its meaning is already understood from the constituent *śabda* in the cp. *śabdapārāyaṇam*. To justify the *Bhāṣyakāra's* expression, Kaiyaṭa says that *śabdanām* has nevertheless been stated, because otherwise the qualifying word *pratipadokta* would be left hanging.

Actually, *śabdapārāyaṇa* refers to a particular method of memorization. See fn. 280. Therefore the *Bhāṣyakāra's* expression is correct and Kaiyaṭa's attempt at justification lacks sufficient ground.

285. *Vyavahāra*.

286. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 17, lines 5–7).

287. In the case of learning. Here we do not say that learning or knowledge which is partial only, that is, restricted to a particular time, becomes useful. See further Note (20). The word *upayukta* is interpreted both in the sense of ' used ' and in the sense of ' useful ', depending on the context.

Āgamakālaḥ (means) *grahaṇakālaḥ* ' the time (or period) of acquisition '.

Svādhyāyakālaḥ (means) *abhyāsakālaḥ* ' the time (or period) of recitation '.

Pravacanakālaḥ (means) *adhyāpanakālaḥ* ' the time (or period) of teaching '.

Vyavahāra (in *vyavahārakālaḥ* means ' the putting into practice ') at the performance of a sacrifice.[288]

Nāgeśa

(*Caturṣu kāleṣu,* etc.), The resulting meaning is that learning becomes useful in four periods. In the first two among these (four) the usefulness consists in receiving food and clothes accompanied with compliments like *vidyārthy ayaṁ buddhimān* ' this student is intelligent '. In the third (period the usefulness consists in) prestige, the earning of money through taking on good students, and in a particular honour. In the fourth (period) the usefulness (consists in) the absence of expiatory rites due to the use of incorrect words during the performance of a sacrifice, etc., the complete performance of the sacrifice (with all subsidiaries), the receipt of the *dakṣiṇā* ' sacrificial fee ' and in prestige. Such usefulness (results) in the case of a complete study (through all four periods) only.

Note (20)

As interpreted by the commentators, the word *caturbhiḥ* in *caturbhiś ca prakāraiḥ* ' in four ways ' is meant to exclude the idea that learning could become useful when the full course of study has not yet been completed. Kaiyaṭa tries to clarify this by means of an example of the opposite. When we use the expression *ghṛtaṁ upayuktam* ' the ghee has been used ' with reference to medicated ghee which is to be taken in prescribed doses, the word ' ghee ' here does not stand for the entire amount of medicated ghee, but only for a particular doses. Still, we say : the ghee has been used. This does not happen in the case of learning. We do not say that learning is useful (*upayukta*), just because one has acquired the rudiments of a science or because one has memorized a text. One must be able to teach and to put one's learning into practice also. Only then we are entitled to say *vidyā upayuktā bhavati* ' learning becomes useful '.

52. (*Bhāṣya : Question*)

Then how are these words to be known ?

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288. All explanations are taken from the *MBD* (p. 17, lines 7-10).

53. *(Bhāṣya : Answer)*

Some kind of body of rules[289] containing the general and the particular (conditions) has to be devised. And with the help of that (body of rules students) may, with a small effort, come to know big, big strings of words.

But what (do you mean by) that (body of rules containing the general and the particular conditions)? *Utsarga* 'general rule' and *apavāda* 'special rule'. (That is,) a particular general rule has to be phrased (and) a particular special rule.[290]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'Some kind of' (etc.). (In the sense of) *sāmānyaviśeṣau yasmin tat* 'that in which (we find) the general and the particular (conditions)' (we derive) *sāmānyaviśeṣavat.*[291] Like (the rules) *karmaṇy aṇ* (and) *āto' nupasarge kaḥ.*[292]

54. *(Bhāṣya : Question)*

But what kind of general rule is to be phrased (and) what kind of special rule?[293]

Nāgeśa

(On) 'what kind of', in the *Bhāṣya*. That is to say, in which way (do we phrase general and special rules)? Hereby it is indicated that Pāṇini's undertaking of teaching the correct words by means of a grammar of this type (showing an arrangement by means of general and special rules) is the proper thing.

55. *(Bhāṣya : Answer)*

A general rule is to be phrased with the help of a general (condition). For instance, *karmaṇy aṇ.* The *apavāda* 'exception' to that (general rule) (is to be phrased) with the help of a particular (condition). For instance, *āto 'nupasarge kaḥ.*

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289. The word used by the *Bhāṣyakāra* is *lakṣaṇam.* This word is known to Kātyāyana and to Patañjali in the sense of 'rule (of grammar)' (*sūtra*). Compare, e.g., *Vt.* XIV in the *Paspaśāhnika* and *Mbh.* I, (p. 12, line 17). By extension it is taken to mean 'body of rules'. Nāgeśa, commenting on the passage under discussion, says that *lakṣaṇa* here means *śāstra* 'grammar'.

290. That is to say, rules have to be phrased as general rules and as special rules. Special rules are considered to be exceptions to the general rules, and therefore prevail over the general rules in the domain indicated.

291. Reference is to P. 5.1.16 (*tad asmin*) and to P. 5.2.94.

292. P. 3.2.1 and P. 3.2.3 respectively. Here *karmaṇy aṇ* is the *utsarga* and *āto' nupasarge kaḥ* is the *apavāda.* Kaiyaṭa takes the examples from *Bh.* No. 55.

293. The *Bhāṣyakāra*, by his question, shows that he has accepted the principle of *utsarga* and *apavāda.*

Note (21)

P. 3.2.1, *karmaṇy aṇ*, says that the suffix *aṆ* is added after a verbal base (*dhātoḥ*, continued from P. 3.1.91), when a word representing the grammatical object and functioning as the *upapada* 'accompanying word' (P. 3.1.92) precedes. P. 3.2.3 says that the suffix *Ka* is added after a verbal base which ends in long *ā* and which is not preceded by a preverb, when, etc.

Here P. 3.2.1 is the general rule (*utsarga*), because it contains the general (*sāmānya*, i.e., shared) conditions *dhātoḥ*, *karmaṇi* and *upapade*. P. 3.2.3 is the special rule, because apart from containing the general conditions, it states special (*viśeṣa*, i.e., particular) conditions, namely, *ātaḥ* (the verbal base must end in long *ā*) and *anupasarge* (the verbal base must not be preceded by a preverb). Under these special conditions the suffix *Ka* must be added. Conversely, where the special conditions do not hold, that is, elsewhere, *aṆ* is added. These 'elsewhere' conditions, which, in fact, consist in particular morphophonemic environments, have not been specified in the general rule, because this would involve *gaurava* 'unwieldiness'. But we have to assume them there on account of the *utsarga-apavāda* relation. This is an ordering relation used by Pāṇini for the arrangement of rules which share general environments.

IV

(SECTION DEALING WITH THE QUESTION WHETHER A WORD STANDS FOR *ĀKṚTI* OR *DRAVYA*)

56. (*Bhāṣya : Question*)

But (the question is,) whether the word-meaning is *ākṛti* 'class' or rather *dravya* 'a (single) thing'[294]

294. That is to say, whether a word refers to an *ākṛti* or to a *dravya*. Questions of meaning in Sanskrit grammar are questions of reference. 'Meaning' here is the thing-meant.

The controversy mentioned is one of the big issues in Sanskrit grammar. It is associated with the names of Vājapyāyana (exponent of the *ākṛti*-view) and Vyāḍi (exponent of the *dravya*-view) by Kātyāyana, see Note (22). Unfourtunately, the issue has been obscured by a confusion of some of the terms used.

The terms in question are *ākṛti*, *dravya*, *jāti* and *vyakti*. Here *ākṛti* originally stands for a perceptible shape or form common to members of a given class or genus. It is generally defined as an *avayavasaṁsthāna* 'a particular arrangement of parts' by commentators. Apparently, the term is used in an attempt at classification by overall resemblance, which, to some extent, works in the case of things like pots and cows. Sreekrishna SARMA, "The use of *ākṛti* and *jāti* in the *Mahābhāṣya*", *The Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol. XXI, Madras, 1957, p. 59, 60 and 61, renders *ākṛti* as 'structural form'.

Dravya, used in opposition to *ākṛti*, usually stands for a single individual possessing such a structural form which it shares with other individuals (for an altogether different sense of *dravya* see *Bh.* No. 76). *Jāti* stands for the concept of a class or genus. It is, later

57. *(Bhāṣya : Answer)*

He[295] says : both. (But) how do you know ? (Because) the *Ācārya* ' teacher '[296] has stated rules in both ways. Thinking that *ākṛti* ' class ' is the word-meaning he says *jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām.*[297] (On the other hand,) thinking that *dravya* ' a (single) thing ' is the word-meaning, he tackled (the subject of) *ekaśeṣa* ' the retaining of one only ' by (the rule) *sarūpāṇām (ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau).*[298]

Kaiyaṭa

Because we cannot manage by having recourse to (just) one of the two views in order to account for the whole of grammar, (the author) has recourse to two views after first introducing a question (namely,) ' But (the question is) whether ' (etc.).

If recourse is had to the *ākṛtipakṣa* ' view according to which the word-meaning is a generic shape ', we cannot justify (the *pb.*) *sakṛdgatau vipratiṣedhe (yad bādhitaṁ tad bādhitam eva)* ' in the case of a conflict, when (two rules) become applicable simultaneously, (then a rule) which has been set aside once, is set aside once for all (and there is no possibility of applying it after the other rule has been applied). '[299] If, on the other hand, the

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on, also used in the sense of an essence-determining quality, which is regarded as constitutive of a class, like *gotva* ' cow-hood ' for all cows, and *śuklatva* ' whiteness ' for all that is white in colour. In addition, this quality (" generic quality ") is thought to be the *pravṛttinimitta* for the use of a word with reference to a particular thing. *Vyakti,* used in opposition to *jāti* ' class ', stands for the single individual manifesting the relevant generic quality.

The terms *jāti, ākṛti* and *vyakti* are used in the *Nyāyasūtras* in the sense of ' class ', ' shape ' and ' individual ' respectively (*Nyāyasūtras* 2.2.59, 66–68, reference in Sreekrishna SARMA, art. quoted, p. 55, n. 2).

Rather early, however, the terms *ākṛti* and *jāti* came to be regarded as synonyms in the sense of *jāti* ' class '. This use is already found in the *Mbh.* In the present *Bhāṣya* this sense for *ākṛti* follows from the illustration offered in the next *Bhāṣya.* On the other hand, the same word *ākṛti* is also used in the sense of ' shape ', in *Bh.* Nos. 76 and 77.

The *jāti-dravya* controversy is mentioned by Bhartṛhari, *VP*, 3.1.2 (and also, in connection with *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*, in VP 1.96 (= 1.93, ed. K. A. Subramania IYER), for which see Note (9). In his commentary on this stanza, Helārāja mentions a third view' according to which the word-meaning is the *dravya* as qualified by the *jāti* (*Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari. . . . Kāṇḍa* III, Part 1. Edited by K. A. Subramania IYER, Poona, 1963, p. 8, lines 5–6).

295. The *Bhāṣyakāra*, who is referred to in the third person singular, as if the work consists of notes taken down by a student.

296. Pāṇini.

297. P.1.2.58. See Note (22).

298. P. 1.2.64. See Note (22) and *BDA*, fn. 617.

299. *PN, pb.* 40. The idea is taken from the *MBD* (p. 18, lines 19–20). See also Nāgeśa's discussion in *PN*, Part II, p. 190–94.

vyaktipakṣa ' view according to which the word-meaning is an individual (object) ' (is adopted), (the *pb.*) *punaḥprasaṅgavijñānāt (siddham)* ' we can manage on the assumption that there is a possibility (for the rule which has been set aside) to apply again (afterwards) '[300] does not fit. Therefore, to account for the examples a particular view is accepted in (accordance with) a particular example (where a rule becomes applicable).

This being so, the advocates of the *jātipakṣa* ' view according to which the word-meaning is a *jāti* ' say that words convey a *jāti* only, because (otherwise) we couldn't understand the relation (between a word and its meaning), since individuals are innumerable. And it is an established fact that there is a *jāti,* because we experience that we have the notion of one and the same shape with regard to all individuals (belonging to a given class or genus).[301] This being so, the words *gauḥ* ' cow ', etc. stand for a *jāti,* which inheres in different individuals. Once this *jāti* has been understood (as the word-meaning), we (also) understand an individual delimited by that *(jāti),* because (the *jāti*) enters into that (individual).

The words *śukla* ' white (colour) ', etc. stand for a *jāti* which inheres in a quality. But cognition (takes place) with regard to the quality on account of its relation with that *(jāti),* (and) cognition (takes place) with regard to the *dravya* ' thing ' on account of its relation with the relatum.[302]

Proper names also stand for a *jāti* in the form of *ḍitthatva* ' Ḍittha-hood ', etc., (the notion of) which is based on the knowledge of something which remains identical, in the form of *sa eva ayam* ' he is that very same (person) ', although the condition of (the person called) Ḍittha changes from his birth till his death, in youth, adulthood, etc.

In actions also we find a *jāti,* (and) that is expressed by a verbal base. Because an identical idea is present in *paṭhati* ' he recites ', *paṭhataḥ* ' the two of them recite ' (and) *paṭhanti* ' they recite ', we accept a *jāti* (in the case of actions also), which is the base of that (identical idea).

The advocates of the *vyaktipakṣa* ' view according to which the word-meaning is an individual ' say that the individual only is the meaning expressed. But since *jāti* is resorted to by way of *upalakṣaṇa* ' accessory determining factor ',[303] there is no occasion for the defect of (having to assume) innumerable relations (between a word and its meaning).[304]

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300. *PN, pb.* 39. Apparently, this idea is Kaiyaṭa's own contribution.

301. To Kaiyaṭa, the *ākṛtipakṣa* and the *jātipakṣa* are simply exchangeable views, just as is the case with the *dravyapakṣa* and the *vyaktipakṣa.*

302. The relatum, in the present context, is the *dravya* in which the quality inheres in which, again, the *jāti* ' generic feature ' (like *nīlatva* ' dark-blue-ness ') inheres. Thus the *jāti* is indirectly related to the *dravya.*

303. *Upalakṣaṇa* is a feature, which helps us to determine an object. The *VP* 3.2.3. provides an illustration : *adhruveṇa nimittena devadattagṛhaṁ yathā / gṛhītaṁ* ' like the house of Devadatta being recognized on account of an impermanent cause (of recognition, in the form of a crow sitting on the house) '.

Note (22)

The question whether a word stands for *ākṛti* or *dravya* is one of the great controversial issues of Sanskrit grammar. The controversy was already known before Kātyāyana who, in this connection, refers to earlier teachers of grammar. *Vt.* XXXV on 1.2.64, the rule dealing with *ekaśeṣa*, says *ākṛtyabhidhānād vaikaṁ vibhaktau vājapyāyanaḥ* 'or (we need not phrase P. 1.2.64, because) Vājapyāyana (thinks that,) since (a word) conveys *ākṛti* "common shape as a generic character", a single (word will do) before a case ending'. That is to say, since a word stands for an *ākṛti*, there is no possibility of using more than one word to refer to more than one item. Therefore we need not phrase the *ekaśeṣa*-rule. *Vt.* XLV on the same rule says *dravyābhidhānaṁ vyāḍiḥ* 'Vyāḍi (thinks that a word conveys) a *dravya* "(single) thing"'. Here Vyāḍi appears to think more in terms of reference, whereas Vājapyāyana seems to be more concerned with the *pravṛttinimitta* 'ground for using (a particular word with reference to a particular thing)'. That *pravṛttinimitta* Vājapyāyana finds in the *ākṛti*.

The *Bhāṣyakāra* says that in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* both views are accepted. Reference in this connection is to P. 1.2.58 (*ākṛtipakṣa*) and to P. 1.2.64 (*dravyapakṣa*). Actually, the first rule does not speak of *ākṛti*, but of *jāti*. To the *Bhāṣyakāra*, like to Kaiyaṭa later on, these must have been exchangeable terms. The rule says that, when the meaning *jāti* 'class' or 'genus' is to be conveyed, the plural may be used, when reference is to (just) one (entity, in the form of a particular class or genus). An example quoted by the *KV* on P. 1.2.58 is *pūrvavayā brāhmaṇaḥ pratyuttheyaḥ* 'a young brahmin is to be greeted by rising from one's seat'. Instead of this, we may also say *pūrvavayaso brāhmaṇāḥ pratyuttheyāḥ* 'young brahmins are to be greeted by rising from one's seat'. The *jāti*-word here is, obviously, *brāhmaṇa*. Thus, even though reference is to just one particular class, namely, that of the young brahmins, according to P. 1.2.58, the plural may be used, because what is stated with reference to the class holds good for all its members. But since a *jāti* is one entity only, we cannot justify the addition of a plural suffix after a word conveying *jāti*, unless a special rule to that effect is phrased. This rule is P. 1.2.58.

The second rule, P. 1.2.64, says that out of words showing the same form one only is retained before one and the same case ending. The examples

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Helārāja on *VP*, 3.1.3 ab (*Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari*.... *Kāṇḍa* III, Part I. Edited by K. A. Subramania Iyer. Poona, 1963, p. 10, lines 19–20), where Bhartṛhari says that, according to some, the *jāti* is *śaktyupalakṣaṇam* 'the means of *śakti* "denotative power of words)", explains the word *upalakṣaṇa* as *upāya* 'means'.

304. This refers back to what was stated earlier by Kaiyaṭa in connection with the *jātipakṣa*. A defect in the *vyaktipakṣa* is that, since words are assumed to stand for individual items, we must establish as many relations between words and their meanings as there are individuals to be referred to. But here the *jāti* becomes helpful in deciding the use of a particular word with reference to a particular individual. See further Note (22).

quoted by the *KV* on this rule are *vṛkṣaś ca vṛkṣaś ca vṛkṣau* '(in the sense of) *vṛkṣaś ca vṛkṣaś ca* "(one) tree and (one) tree" (we derive) *vṛkṣau* "the two trees"', and *vṛkṣaś ca vṛkṣaś ca vṛkṣaś ca vṛkṣaḥ* '(in the sense of) *vṛkṣaś ca vṛkṣaś ca vṛkṣaś ca* "(one) tree and (one) tree and (one) tree (we derive) *vṛkṣāḥ* "trees"'. The derivation of the forms *vṛkṣau* and *vṛkṣāḥ* assumed here clearly shows that, according to the author of the rule, the utterance of a word once only refers to a single item only. Therefore, to refer to two items, the twice utterance of the same word is required, and, to refer to more items, the utterance of the same word as many times as there are things to be referred to is required. This is, of course, theory, because in actual usage such a repetition is not seen. That is why the *ekaśeṣa* rule has been phrased. It says that out of the several repeated words one only is retained. In this way, in the derivation of every case of the dual and plural members the *ekaśeṣa* rule must be applied.

Actually, P. 1.2.64 in the traditional interpretation stated above is based on a misconception, namely, the confusion of lexical (for instance "tree") and non-lexical categorical (in the present case: grammatical number) meaning. The idea of grammatical number is not conveyed by the repetition of wordstems, but by particular suffixes. Therefore, since the assumption of repetition of lexical stems to account for plural or dual number is unwarranted, the theoretical solution of deletion of one or two (or more) of these repeated stems is futile.

Strictly speaking, the *ekaśeṣā* rule can have scope only where the addition of grammatical number-suffixes cannot explain the desired meaning. This will be clear from the following discussion. Suppose that the scope of the *ekaśeṣa* rule lies in proper names which happen to be homonyms. An instance is the word *rāma*. It may refer to Rāmacandra or to Paraśurāma. Now, since a difference in meaning is involved, reference to the two Rāmas requires the twice mention, that is, the repetition of the lexical stem *rāma*, or what amounts to that. In such a case, the *ekaśeṣa* rule is needed to justify usages like *rāmau āgatau* 'the two Rāmas have come'. Here, from the number-indicating dual suffix we wouldn't know anything more than reference to two items, which need not be dissimilar at all, like in the case of two trees. But once reference to two dissimilar items, each of them, in fact, unique, is made, we have to accept *ekaśeṣa* in order to justify usage.

Kaiyaṭa rejects the *dravyapakṣa*, which he calls *vyaktipakṣa*. Words like *gauḥ* 'cow' cannot stand for single items, because that would lead to *ānantya* 'innumerability' of the semantic relation involved, that is, of the relation between the word used and the item referred to. In fact, each time a word is used with reference to the particular item referred to, a separate meaning relation, that is, a separate convention has to be established. This is not possible. To remove this difficulty, the *vyaktivādin* says that in reference *jāti* acts as an *upalakṣaṇa*. The *jāti* itself does not belong to the area of denotation of the word used, but it is theoretically helpful in deter-

mining reference to individuals, because it helps us to understand all individuals which come under that *jāti*.

According to Kaiyaṭa, the concept of *jāti*, which is at the very basis of our knowledge of identity, and of recognition, is arrived at through *ākṛti*, the perceived common form shared by individuals. *Jāti* inheres in :

(1) individuals (*dravya*, for instance, as *gotva* 'cow-hood'),
(2) in qualities (*guṇa*, for instance, as *śuklatva* 'whiteness'), and
(3) in actions (*kriyā*).

In the latter case, forms like *paṭhati*, which refer to acts of reciting under which various other supporting activities are subsumed (the example in the *MBD*, p. 18, lines 7–8, is *pacati*) may be considered to convey the *kriyājāti*, the idea of which is expressed by the connected verbal base.

Jāti even inheres in proper names (*saṁkhyāśabdas*, for instance, as *ḍitthatva* 'Ḍittha-hood', which is supposed to account for Ḍittha's identity in various stages of life).

As regards the question, how the *jāti* is related to that in which it inheres, Kaiyaṭa follows Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views taken from the *MBD*. A *jāti* like *nīlatva* inheres in a quality like *nīla* 'purple' (colour). It is connected with a *dravya*, like a purple thing, through that quality, which itself inherer in the *dravya*. Thus the *jāti* is only indirectly connected with the *dravya*.

To show the extent to which Kaiyaṭa borrows from or summarizes a discussion in the *MBD*, the translation of the passage concerned (*MBD*, p. 17, lines 16–p. 18, line 12) is added here. The *MBD*-passage itself is a commentary on *Bh*. No. 56, in which the question about word-meaning is raised.

The translation is as follows :

" Doubt arises, because there is a difference of opinion among the teachers. According to Vājapyāyana, *ākṛti* (is the word-meaning). But according to Vyāḍi (it is) *dravya*.

In this respect, some (grammarians) explain that, although (the opinions of Vājapyāyana and Vyāḍi) have been phrased in a general way (as applying to all words), still, this (question in the *Bhāṣya*) is asked with regard to suitable words (only), with regard to which it is possible (to assume that they stand for) both, *ākṛti* and *dravya* (according to the view adopted). (That is to say,) with regard to (words) like *gauḥ* 'cow', *aśvaḥ* 'horse', etc., but not with regard to (proper names) like *ḍitthaḥ*, etc.

But other (grammarians) say that the word *ākṛti* expresses the highest characteristic (i.e., the generic feature) as much as the entity (*sattva*, characterised by that). (By deriving the word *ākṛti* in the sense of) *ākriyate yena* 'by which (an item) is given shape' (that is,) *paricchidyate yena* 'by which (an item) is delimited' a specific shape (read ; *bhinnākṛtiḥ* for *bhinnakriyā*) is marked off.

Still others say that (to assume *ākṛti* as the word-meaning) is possible with regard to all (words). (What) is conveyed (by words) is *jāti*.

This being so, according to Vājapyāyana, a word stands for *ākṛti* only, not for *dravya*, etc. (for " etc. " see the third view mentioned in fn. 294). To explain, the word *nīla* ' purple (colour) ', when (its connection with) another meaning (in the form of a substantive expressing the purple coloured thing) is not taken into account, acquires the nature of *guṇasāmānya* 'quality in the abstract' (i.e., *nīlatva* " purple-ness "). This being so, having acquired its peculiar nature, (then) when expressing the quality *(nīla)*, which is the substratum of that *(nīlatva)*, it attains the status of what possesses that property *(nīlatva)* (that is, it attains) inherence by means of *nīlatva*, because *nīla* " purple (colour) " always goes together (with *nīlatva* "purple-ness " which inheres in *nīla*). (That is to say,) it comes to the state of secure union *(ekayogakṣematā)*, because there is no separation (of *nīla* and *nīlatva*). Being totally overwhelmed by *ākṛti* (in the form of *nīlatva* the word *nīla*) provides the cognition of a *guṇa* ' quality ' (namely, *nīla* ' purple colour '). Just like a piece of crystal is perceived as having the quality of a particular object (like the red colour of a flower), because it happens to be near to that (object).

This word *nīla*, when it stands for a *dravya* on the other hand, provides the cognition of the *dravya*, which is itself the substratum of that *(nīlatva)*, although (the cognition of the *dravya*) is separated (from that of *nīlatva*) by (that of) the quality *(nīla)*, on the strength of *samavetasamavāya* ' indirect inherence ', in the form of : this (purple coloured object) is the substratum of the quality *(nīla)*, which is the substratum of *nīlatva*, which is (the word's) own meaning.

Similarly, (an *ākṛti* may form a relation) with a different object also, (like) two pieces of red cloth. A piece of white cloth (put) between two pieces of red cloth is perceived as having the quality (i,e., the red colour) of these two indirectly, on account of *samyuktasamavetasamavāya* ' inherence in (something) which inheres in something which is connected '. (That is to say, *raktatva* " red-ness " inheres in the quality *rakta* ' red colour ' which inheres in the red cloth, and we see the white cloth as red through its connection or contact with the pieces of red cloth).

In the same way, this word *gauḥ*, having acquired its own nature in (denoting) *gotva* ' cow-hood ', is used in the sense of a *dravya* (that is, a particular cow), which is the substratum of that *(gotva)*.

In the same way, what is manifested (by the word *pacati* ' he cooks') as the common (idea) which inheres in the single meaning (of ' cooking ') (and) which covers all *(sarvaviṣaya)*, together with the actions of *adhiśrayaṇa* ' putting on the fire ', etc. in the abstract which hold good in every single instance (of *adhiśrayaṇa*, etc.) (and) which are subsumed under the word *pacati* ' he cooks ', that is the meaning of the word *pacati*.

(That is to say,) the word *pacati* stands for an *ākṛti*, namely, cooking as such. But a particular instance of cooking cannot take place without the support of several other actions, like *adhiśrayaṇa* or *adhaḥśrayaṇa* 'taking (the pot) from the fire' etc. These actions, in their turn, each single instance of them, are determined by an *ākṛti* of their own. All these activities are subsumed under the one idea of cooking, expressed by *pacati*. Or to put it slightly differently, the verbal base *pac-* stands for *pāka*, the general idea of cooking. This is the *ākṛti* which inheres in every single act of cooking *pacatikriyā*) under which various other activities, each of them possessing an *ākṛti* of its own, are subsumed.)

Just like *bhramaṇatva* 'the generic quality of moving about', which covers each single action, is called *bhramaṇa* 'moving about', in the same way, with regard to Ḍiṭṭha also, what (remains identical) from his birth to his death, that we have in the form of: this is Ḍiṭṭha, that is Ḍiṭṭha. Through youth, adulthood and old age the identical cognition (we have) in the form of: he is that very same (person), that is the *ākṛti* which is the meaning of the word (*ḍiṭṭha*)".

To sum up, at the beginning of his commentary, the author of the *MBD* enumerated four views on the word-meaning conveyed by a word :

(1) Words stand for *ākṛti* and *dravya*, that is, each separately. But this is only possible for words like *gauḥ* or *aśvaḥ*, not for proper names like *ḍiṭṭha*.

(2) Words stand for *ākṛti* and *dravya* at the same time. To justify this, we derive the word *ākṛti* in the sense of *ākriyate yena*, that is, *paricchidyate yena*. Thus proper names like *ḍiṭṭha* may be assumed to stand for *ākṛti* also.

(3) Words stand for *ākṛti* anyway. Here *ākṛti* means *jāti*.

(4) Words stand for *ākṛti* only, even in the case of proper names. This is Vājapyāyana's view, and that is treated in detail.

V

(SECTION DEALING WITH THE *NITYATVA* OR *KĀRYATVA* OF WORD)

58. (*Bhāṣya* : *Question*)

But (the question is,) whether the word is ***nitya*** 'permanent'[305] or rather *kārya* 'to be produced'.[306]

305. Or 'eternal', in the sense that we cannot point to a beginning in time at which words came into existence. This is the Mīmāṁsā view, for which see G. Jha (1942, second ed., 1964), p. 131, 'The main thesis of the *Mīmāṁsaka*.... '. It is opposed to that of the Naiyāyikas to whom word, that is, sound, is always produced (by the speech-organs).

In the context of grammar the words *nitya* and *kārya* may be interpreted in a grammatica sense. Here *nitya* may be taken to refer to words insofaras they are a natural

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(On) 'But....whether' (etc.). Doubt arises, because there is a difference of opinion.[307] Some say that the word is manifested by sound, consisting of phonemes (and) eternal.[308] Others maintain that (the word is the) *padasphoṭa* 'single meaning-conveying unit in the form of a word', which is over and above the phonemes.[309] Still others proclaim that (the word is the) *vākyasphoṭa* 'single meaning-conveying unit in the form of a sentence'.[310] Others, again, tell (us) that the word is nothing but sound, because we do not preceive anything other than sound (and) that, as such, it is *kārya* 'to be produced'.[311]

Note (23)

The *MBD* also has commented on the present *Bhāṣya*. Part of this commentary (*MBD*, p. 19, line 22–p. 20, line 16) has been translated as follows :

" Here also there is a difference of opinion. According to those who know the Veda,[312] (the word) is eternal. According to others, (it is) non-eternal.

Or rather, the sense (of the passage) is like this: External only are those words, like *gauḥ* 'cow), etc. for (those), according to whom, however (the word is) characterised by *ākṛti*.[313]

Or rather, this (word *gauḥ*, etc.) is a thing to be produced only. This doctrine has been evolved by the *vācikas* 'grammarians'.[314]

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datum of language, independently of grammar, that is, insofaras they are not generated by rules of grammar. This in contrast with *kārya*, which may be taken to characterise the generative approach. See *BDA*, Introduction, p. xix–xx, xxiv–xxv. Thus *nitya* comes to mean 'un-generated (by rules of grammar)'.

306. In the context of grammar *kārya* may be taken to mean 'to be generated (by rules of grammar)'.

307. Taken almost literally from the *MBD* (p. 19, lines 21–22) compare ibid. (p. 17, lines 16–17).

308. This is the Mīmāṁsā view. See *SN*, p. 62–63.

309. This is the view held by a school of grammarians. See *SN*, p. 77–78.

301. This is the view held by another school of grammarians. See *SN*, p. 79.

311. This is the Nyāya view. See *SN*, p. 70–71.

312. The Mīmāṁsakas.

313. That is, to whom, like Vājapyāyana, the word stands for *ākṛti* only. See Note (22).

314. The word *vācika* here is taken as an analogous formation after *śābdika*, to be derived by P.4.4.34. The *KV* on this rule states the derivation of *śābdika* in the sense of *śabdaṁ karoti, śābdiko* (i.e.,) *vaiyākaraṇaḥ*. The sense of *vācika* is assumed to be identical with that of *śābdika*.

Some think like this: Those words only, which are *prākṛta* 'original', are eternal. (The word) *prākṛtāḥ* (is derived in the sense of) *prakṛtau bhavāḥ* 'arising from the origin' (pl. nom. masc.).[315]

Others think: *iyaṁ daivī vāk* 'this divine speech' (etc.).[316] But this speech has become contaminated through the incompetence of men or through laziness.[317] Just as a boy who learns to say *svasti* 'hail!' pronounces it wrongly.[318]

Or rather, just like a thing in this world happens to exist in two ways, on account of the difference between *dravya* 'instance' and *ākṛti* 'type', so the word also. Regarding these words, (the question is,) whether they represent a *śabdākṛti* 'wordform-type', or rather a *śabdavyakti* 'wordform-instance'. This being so, as regards this (word) *vṛkṣa,* the wordforms *v-ṛ-kṣ-a,* etc., which originate in succession (and) which lack simultaneity, become the causes of the manifestation of an *ākṛti* 'type (sound)', which is without succession, in the form of the wordform-type *vṛkṣa* 'tree', just like *sāsnā* 'dewlap', etc. (become the cause of manifestation of *gotva* 'cowhood'. Afterwards, the understanding of meaning (arises) from the wordform-type *vṛkṣa.*[319] And that *(ākṛti)* is eternal.[320] And due to practice

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315. In the *vṛtti* on *VP* 1.182 (= 1.154, ed. K. A. Subramania IYER) it is explained that although in olden days *(purākalpa)* speech was free from corrupt forms *(apabhraṁśa)*, still, in the course of time, corruption crept in. So much so that the corrupt form came to be considered as the original form. The derivation *prakṛtau bhavam prākṛtam* is stated in the *vṛtti.*

The opinion referred to may be that of Jaina grammarians who wanted to upgrade the status of Ardhamagadhi, their canonical language, as against Sanskrit. Compare M. M. DESHPANDE, *Sociolinguistic attitudes in India. Linguistica Extranea,* Studia 5. Ann Arbor, 1979, p. 13–14, and the references given by V. PITANI, "On the origin of prākṛtam and pāli as language-designations", *Dr. S. K. Belvalkar Felicitation Volume,* Banaras, 1957, p.185–86.

316. Here *iyaṁ daivi vāk* is taken as a *pratīka,* namely, of *VP* 1.182 (= 1.154, ed. K. A. Subramania IYER), which, actually, reads *daivī vāg. . . . iyam.*

317. The first line of *VP*.1.182 says that this divine speech (i.e., Sanskrit) has been *vyatikīrṇa* 'contaminated' by *aśaktāḥ abhidhātāraḥ* 'incompetent speakers'. The alternative cause of corruption, *ālasya* 'laziness', is not found mentioned in the stanza, nor in the corresponding *vṛtti.*

318. It is not stated in what the wrong pronuniciation consists. Reference is to *VP*. 1.179 (= 1.151, ed. K. A. Subramania IYER). Here the text says *ambvambv iti yathā bālaḥ śikṣamāṇo 'pabhāṣate* 'just as a boy who learns to speak wrongly says *ambu, ambu* (for *ambā, ambā* "mother, mother!")'. The reading *ambāmbeti* is clearly a corrected reading, which misses the point. Compare fn. 822.

319. Reference is to *VP*. 1.96 (= 1.93, ed. K. A. Subraminia IYER). The stanza says that the *jāti* 'type (-sound)', which is manifested by several *vyaktis* 'instances (of utterance)' is traditionally said to be the *sphoṭa,* and that by some (grammarians) the *vyaktis* themselves are conceived as *dhvani* 'sound'. Thus, according to this view recorded by Bhartrhari, individual utterances, with all their individual variations, of sound-sequences like *v-ṛ-kṣ-a* are nothing but the representatives of a common sound-form *vṛkṣa* which is known to the listener. Compare *SN*, p. 23, 32, 35, 40, and 51.

320. The *vṛtti* on *VP*.1.96 states that some teach the eternity of words on the basis of the eternity of the *ākṛti (= jāti).*

that *ākṛti* is understood by any man through several individual instances of (a succession of) phonemes (as in *v-ṛ-kṣ-a*).

Or, (according to those) who from the mere outline in a painting understand that this (represents) a man, not an elephant, in that view the word is eternal.[321]

Moreover, in this connection, this has been stated (namely,) *ubhayataḥ sphoṭamātraṁ pratinirdiśyate. Raśruter laśrutir bhavatīti* 'in both cases (of *r* and *l*), the mere *sphoṭa* is referred to. (This amounts to saying) that the (common) *l*-sound comes in the place of the (common) *r*-sound'.[322]

Even according to (him) who (accepts) *śabdavyakti* '(the view that words represent) a wordform-instance' the word is eternal. But that (word) is manifested through sounds. Just like the eye, etc. are the specific manifestors with regard to colour, etc. and follow the increase and decrease of colour (etc.), (and) just like reflections in mirrors, etc. are seen as long, round, big and otherwise, in the same way, words also differ on account of the difference in sounds.[323] Just like the moon, which is one, is seen as more than one in the water, due to the difference in waves, and just as a shadow differs due to the difference in lamps, and just as there is a difference

321. Reference is probably to *VP*.1.92 (= 1.89, ed. K. A. Subramina IYER). The stanza says that from a wrong perception (the example in the *vṛtti* is mistaking a tree for an elephant), seeing a general shape only, we are led to seeing things as they are. The point of the statement we find in 1.93 (= 1.90). Here the text says that when a sentence is being manifested (through sounds in succession), we first have the impression that the sentence comes in parts (i.e., phoneme after phoneme). But this impression is wrong, because, as the *vṛtti* explains, the sentence is an indivisible entity.

322. *Mbh.* I, p. 26, lines 1–2. The passage refers to P.8.2.18. The *KV* on this rule explains that the *r* here represents a *śrutisāmānya* 'a common sound (-element)'. The same holds for the *l*. The idea is that *raśruti* includes both the consonant *r* and the vowel *ṛ*, and that *laśruti* includes both the consonant *l* and the vowel *ḷ*. The common element in the sounds concerned is called *sphoṭa (mātra)* by the *Bhāṣyakāra*. Compare *SN*, p. 15–16.

323. Reference is to *VP*. 1.102 (= 1.99, ed. K. A. Subramania IYER). The stanza says that the object manifested follows the differences in the manifestors, and that this is evident from the reflection which differs according to the reflecting media, like oil or water, etc.

The *vṛtti* explains that the stanza is the answer to a *pūrvapakṣa*, which is reconstrued from the stanza. The assumed *pūrvapakṣa* states, with the help of examples, that changes in the manifestors do not show in the things manifested. Therefore it cannot be maintained that the word (*śabda*, i.e., the wordform) is a manifested entity.

Against this, the stanza, with the help of other examples (like a *cīnaśastra* "Chinese dagger" in which a face is proportionally reduced, and concave and convex mirrors which distort a face), points out that the object manifested does follow the difference of manifestors. Actually, one can think of innumerable examples, the *vṛtti* says.

The similarity between this part of the *MBD*-passage and the *vṛtti*-passage has been noted by K. A. Subramania IYER, *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari* with the *Vṛtti*. Chapter I, English Translation, Poona, 1963, p. 96. The *vṛtti* has only cut on the number of examples offered in the *MBD* here.

in reflection due to the difference in mirrors. Therefore *vyaktiśabdas* 'word-forms (taken to represent) instances (only)', which are manifested by specific sounds (and) which follow *hrāsa* 'shortening' and *vṛddhi* of sounds, are also eternal.'[324]

59. *(Bhāṣya : Answer)*

This (subject) has been mainly examined in the *Saṁgraha*[325] (namely, whether the word is) *nitya* or *kārya*. There the defects (in both views) have been pointed out (and also the respective) merits. There, however, the final conclusion is this : irrespective of whether (the word is) *nitya* or *kārya*, in both (views) a body of rules[326] has to be devised.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) *Saṁgraha*. (The word is used) in the sense of a particular book.

Nāgeśa

It is wellknown that the *Saṁgraha* is a work composed by Vyāḍi, counting 100,000 stanzas.[327]

(On) 'in both (views) in the *Bhāṣya*. And thus the investigation is futile. This is what (the author) means to say. The purport (of the passage is) that, in order to have the knowledge of the correctness (of words), in both (views) grammar is necessary.

VI

(SECTION DEALING WITH ASSUMPTIONS OF GRAMMAR)

60. *(Bhāṣya : Introduction to Vt. III)*

But in which way has this body of rules been devised by the revered Teacher Pāṇini ?[328]

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324. How can words be *nitya* in the *śabdavyaktipakṣa* ? The explanation may be that although words uttered by different people each time appear to be different, these differences are *aupādhika* 'associative, i.e., non-essential, features'. That is to say, the seemingly different realization of the phonemes involved are irrelevant from the point of view of the phoneme, which is one only. What is one, is *nitya*, like *ākāśa* 'space'. Compare *SN*, p. 83–84, where Nāgeśa's *vyaktisphoṭavāda* is discussed.

325. The lost work of Vyāḍi, a grammarian usually situated in the time between Pāṇini and Kātyāyana (who mentions him as the exponent of the *dravyapakṣa*, in *Vt.* XLV on P. 1.2.64). The work (or parts of it) was still known to the commentator on the first *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*, but it was apparently lost already in Kaiyaṭa's days.

326. *Lakṣaṇam*. Compare *Bh.* No. 52.

327. According to the *MBD*, p. 20, lines 4–5, the *Saṁgraha* contained 14,000 *vastus* 'topics', which seems to be a remarkable number. Nāgeśa's statement may be taken to imply that the *MBD* was not known to him.

328. This is the first reference to Pāṇini by name in the *Mbh*.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'But in which way' (etc.). The question is, whether the Teacher himself is the inventor of words, meanings and the relations (between them), or (merely) the reproducer.[329]

Nāgeśa

(On) *śabdārthasaṁbandhānām* 'of words, meanings and the relations (between them)'. This is a *dvandva* cp. (to be derived in the sense of) *śabdāś ca arthāś ca saṁbandhāś ca* 'words and meanings and the relations (between them)'.[330] And thus the purport (of the passage is) that the point of the question lies in this, whether grammar generates relations (of words) with particular meanings through generating new words, or whether (grammar merely) informs us of words, meanings and the relations (between them) which have already been established (by the speech-community).

Note (24)

The question raised in *Bh.* No. 53 was about the method to be adopted by grammar. The question in the present *Bhāṣya*, to which *Vt.* III is supposed to give the answer, concerns the assumptions of grammar with regard to language, especially, words and their meanings.

III. (Vārttika, first part : Assumption that the relation between word and meaning is siddha)

When (it is assumed that) the relation between a word and (its) meaning has already been (established on account of the usage of people).[331]

61. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*[332]

When (it is assumed that) the word, (its) meaning and (their) relation is *siddha*.[333]

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329. The contrast is between *sraṣṭṛ* and *smartṛ*.

330. This analysis follows the *Bhāṣyakāra's* analysis of the word *śabdārthasaṁbandhe* in *Vt.* III.

331. The word *lokataḥ*, which forms the second part of *Vt.* III, is read here already, to make the sense of the first part clear. The word 'meaning' as the translation of the word *artha* should be understood throughout as the thing-meant, like pots and cows.

How this part-*Vt.* can be turned into a complete sentence by supplying the words *śāstraṁ pravṛttam* 'grammar starts' is stated by Kaiyaṭa on *Bh.* No. 83.

The word *śabdārthasaṁbandhe* can be analysed in two ways :

(1) As stated by Nāgeśa in connection with *Bh.* No. 60. When derived in this way, the cp. is a *samāhāradvandva (śabdāś ca arthāś ca saṁbandhāś ca. Teṣāṁ samāhāraḥ, śabdārthasaṁbandham. Tasmin.).*

(2) As a genitive *tp. (śabdaś ca arthaś ca, śabdārthau. Tayoḥ saṁbandhaḥ śabdārthasaṁbandhaḥ. Tasmin.)*

The *Bhāṣyakāra* opts for (1). In the translation (2) is adopted. One reason that Kātyāyana never uses a *samāhāradvandva.*

332. The more correct title of the *Bhāṣya* would be : Reinterpretation. Read in this connection *ATA*, Introduction, p. ii (sub 1.2).

333. The word *siddha* is left untranslated here, in view of the *Bhāṣyakāra's* later nterpretation.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'when. . . .established '. Among these (three), the word which is characterised as *jātisphoṭa* 'a single meaning-conveying unit (conveying) *jāti*' or as *vyaktisphoṭa* 'a single meaning-conveying unit (conveying) *vyakti*' is *nitya* 'permanent'.[334] Even for those who hold that the word is *kārya* 'to be produced' (the word is *nitya*, on account of the *pravāhanityatā* 'permanence in the form of a continuous flow'.[335] Meaning also, which is characterised by *jāti*, possesses eternity. Even in the *dravyapakṣa*[336] words are *nitya*, because they (ultimately) express the *brahma*—reality which is delimited by unreal *upādhis* 'superimposed features',[337] or on account of the *pravāhanityatā*. The relation (between words and their meanings) also possesses an eternal character, because it has no beginning, (that is) on account of the *vyavahāraparamparā* 'the (supposedly) unbroken tradition of (language used in) daily communication'.

62. (*Bhāṣya : Question*)

Now what is the meaning of the word *siddha* (here) ?[338]

Kaiyaṭa

We see that the word *siddha* (is used) in the sense of *nitya* 'permanent' and of *anitya* 'non-permanent'. Therefore (the *Bhāṣyakāra*) asks 'Now' (etc.).

63. (*Bhāṣya : Answer*)

The word *siddha* is a synonym of *nitya* 'permanent'. How do you know? (Because) it is used to refer to things which are *kūṭastha* 'unchangeable' and *avicālin* 'immovable'. For instance, *siddhā dyauḥ* 'the sky has been firmly established' *siddhā pṛthivī* 'the earth has been firmly established' (and) *siddham ākāśam* 'space has been firmly established'.

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334. Kaiyaṭa already takes it for granted that the word *siddha* in the *Vt.* means *nitya*. For the view mentioned see *SN*, p. 46–49, 81–84.

335. One of the forms of *nityatā*, namely, flow- or stream-like continuity, which has no beginning to which we can point, and which, therefore, is eternal. Compare K. A. Subramania IYER (1969), p 74.

336. See Note (22).

337. Straight from Helārāja on *VP*, 3.1.2 (see *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari*. . . . *Kāṇḍa* III, Part 1. Edited by K. A. Subramania IYER, Poona, 1963, p. 9, lines 18–19, *tattadupādhyāvacchinnaṁ vā brahma dravyaśabdavācyaṁ sarvaśabdānām viṣaya iti vakṣyata eva* 'or, *brahman* which is delimited by different *upādhis* "superimposed features" (and) expressed by words standing for a *dravya* "(single) thing" is the (denotative) domain of all words, thus it is definitely stated').

338. The *MBD*, p. 22, lines 5–6, says that the question is not of the etymological meaning (*avayavārtha* 'meaning of the constituents'), but of the *laukika* 'conventional meaning (*samudāyārtha* 'meaning of the whole').

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'a synonym of *nitya*'. (*Nityaparyāyavācī* means) *nityalakṣaṇasyārthasya paryāyeṇa vācakaḥ* 'expressive in turn of a meaning characterized as *nitya*'. That is to say, the same meaning is sometimes expressed by the word *nitya*, sometimes by the word *siddha*.[340]

Kūṭastheṣu (means) *avināśiṣu* 'imperishable' (pl. loc. masc.).[341]

Avicāliṣu (means) *deśāntaraprāptirahiteṣu* 'which do not reach a different place' (pl. loc. masc.).[342]

Nāgeśa

(On) *kūṭastheṣu*. *Kūṭaṁ* (means) *ayoghanaḥ* 'iron hammer'. (*Kūṭastheṣu* means) *kūṭaṁ tadvat tiṣṭhanti ye teṣu* 'which are like an iron hammer', pl. loc. masc. That is to say, *svayam anaṣṭeṣu* 'which themselves remain undestroyed' (pl. loc. masc.), although what comes into contact (with them) is destroyed. (Objection.) But then the iron hammer would be considered to be *nitya* 'permanent'. (Answer:) That is why (the author) says *avicāliṣu*. The illustrations in the *Bhāṣya* by means of sky, earth, etc. have been given with the intention of *vyāvahārikanityatva* 'permanence from the point of view of our daily dealings in life'.[343] The Teacher[344] accepts the *vyavahāranityata* of *ākāśa* 'space' also. And thus (that word *siddha*) is mentioned there, which is expressive of *nityatva* 'permanence' only, because it (is a word) taken in its conventional sense.[345] This is what (the author) means to say.

64. *(Bhāṣya : Objection)*

But, sir, isn't it a fact that (the word *siddha*) is used to refer to (things) which are *kārya* 'to be produced' also ?[346] For instance, *siddha odanaḥ* 'the rice has been prepared', *siddhaḥ sūpaḥ* 'the soup has been prepared' (and) *siddhā yavāgūḥ* 'the gruel has been

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339. The *MBD*, p. 22, line 23, observes that the *ārhatas* (Jainas) and the Mīmāṁsakas do not believe in the final dissolution of the world. Thus, in their view, the word *siddha* here refers to absolute (not merely relative) eternity.

340. Literally from the *MBD* (p. 22, lines 7–8).

341. The *MBD*, p. 22, lines 15–16, explains that the word *kūṭastha* is used in connection with that which does not change. For instance, *kuṭasthāṁ rāśiṁ kuru* 'keep this heap as it is ".

342. Almost literally from the *MBD* (p. 22, lines 16–17).

343. That is, *nityatva* in a limited, relative sense, and not from the point of view of ultimate, absolute reality *(paramārthataḥ)*. The reason is that from the latter point of view everything is *anitya*. See also fn. 440.

344. Patañjali.

345. See fn. 338.

346. *Nanu ca bhoḥ* is the polite standard expression used ironically to refute a statement by the *siddhāntin*, often by reminding him of something.

prepared '. Since (the word *siddha*) is used to refer to (things) which are to be produced also, why (assume) mention of (the word *siddha*) there[347] as a synonym of *nitya* 'permanent', but not (mention of that word *siddha*) which (is used) in the sense of *kārya* 'to be produced'?

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'But' (etc.). That is to say, from the word *siddha* we understand also the meaning *kriyāniṣpanna* 'produced by means of an action'.[348]

65. *(Bhāṣya : Answer)*

In the *Saṁgraha*,[349] to begin with, we think, mention is (of the word *siddha*) as a synonym of *nitya* 'permanent', because it (is used) as an antonym of *kārya* 'to be produced'. Precisely that (mention we find) here also.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'In the *Saṁgraha*, to begin with' (etc.). Because an investigation is conducted into two views, namely, whether the word is *kārya* 'to be produced', or rather *siddha*.[350] There it is a fact that the word *siddha* conveys a meaning which is the opposite of *kārya*, because (the context) requires so.[351] Since we have to do with the same science as that,[352] it is appropriate (to assume that the word *siddha* conveys meaning) in the same way here also.

66 *(Bhāṣya : Another answer)*

Or rather, there are restrictions which consist of single words. For instance, *abbhakṣaḥ* 'one who lives on water', *vāyubhakṣaḥ* 'one who lives on wind'. We understand (by implication): *apa eva bhakṣayati* 'he lives on water only', *vāyum eva bhakṣayati* 'he lives on wind only'.

In the same way, here also (we implicitly understand the word *siddha* as) *siddha eva* 'effected only', not (as) *sādhya* '(still) to be effected'.

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347. In *Vt.* III.

348. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 23, lines 2–3).

349. See fn. 325.

350. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 23, lines 15–16).

351. *Sāmarthyāt*. Literally, 'on the strength', namely, of the fact that two opposite views are discussed there.

352. That is, as the one treated in the *Saṁgraha*, namely, grammar.

353. Taken almost literally from the *MBD* (p. 23, lines 19–20).

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' Or rather ' (etc.). When the word *eva* ' only ' is used (explicitly), because we need the word *eva* in its function of *dyotaka* ' indicative ' (of restriction),[354] then (we have) a restriction which consists of two words. But when restriction is implied on account of *sāmarthya,* without (the use of the) *dyotaka* (word *eva*), that (restriction) is said to be *ekapada* ' consisting of one word '.[355]

This being so, the *śruti*-passage regarding *abbhakṣa* ' living on water ' which says *sarva evāpo bhakṣayanti* ' all, without exception, live on water ',[356] on the strength (of its being stated),[357] makes us understand a restriction in the form of *apa eva (bhakṣayati)* ' (he lives) on water only '.[358]

Here also[359] a restriction is implied, in the form of *siddha eva* ' effected only ', because the word *siddha* has been mentioned (and) because there is no other alternative apart from (that of) *nitya* ' eternal ' or *anitya* ' non-eternal '.[360]

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354. Normally *dyotakatva* is opposed to *vācakatva*, see fn. 16. But in the present passage it is opposed to *sāmarthya*, for which compare *ATA*, fn. 586. Kaiyaṭa means to say that, if we want to indicate restriction explicitly, we have to use the word *eva*, which is *dyotaka*.

355. In the case of *sāmarthya*, we make the assumption of restriction, which has not been indicated by means of the word *eva* in the sentence. Therefore *dyotakatva* is different from *sāmarthya*. Accordingly, a difference is made between *ekapada-avadhāraṇa*, where the word *eva* is not used and restriction is assumed on account of *sāmarthya*, and *dvipada-avadhāraṇa*, where the word *eva* is used and restriction is indicated. Thus *abbhakṣa* in the sense of ' living on water only ', where the restriction ' only ' is implied, is an instance of *ekapada-avadhāraṇa*, whereas *abbhakṣa eva* ' living on water only ', where the restriction ' only ' has been mentioned, is an instance of *dvipada avadhāraṇa*.

The discussion is taken from the *MBD* (p. 24, line 23–p. 25, line 2).

356. References for *abbhakṣa* are given by K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1972), p. 62.

357. *Sāmarthyāt*. That is, because otherwise there would be no point in making the statement.

358. The passage is taken almost literally from the *MBD* (p. 25, lines 2–3).

The *śruti* says : everybody lives on water. Then what is the point in saying again that somebody lives on water ? The only way to make the latter statement meaningful is to assume that it conveys an implied sense, namely, that somebody lives on water only. That is to say, we have to assume a restrictive sense *(niyama)*.

359. In *Vt.* III.

360. The discussion is taken from the *MBD* (p. 25, lines 5–9). Here the example *abhirūpāya kanyā dītavyā* ' the daughter should be given to the most deserving one ' (*Bh.* No. 5 on P.1.4.42, see *KARA*, p. 140) is quoted in line 7.

We have only one alternative : words are *nitya* or *anitya*. Both possibilities are accepted. In the context of this alternative the word *siddha* is used. But the word *siddha* is not required, because it merely repeats what is already known, namely, that a word is either *nitya* or *kārya*. Therefore the word siddha is *vyartha* ' redundant '. To render the use of this word meaningful, it is assumed that it conveys the meaning of *niyama* ' restriction ', n the form of *siddha eva*. *Siddha eva* can only be said of things which are always there. Therefore *kārya* things, which are characterized by *prāgabhāva* or *pradhvaṁsābhāva*, are out.

But things which are *kārya* 'to be produced' (and) which (therefore) are in the condition of *prāg(-abhāva)* 'antecedent (non-existence)' or of *pradhvaṁsa(-abhāva)* 'subsequent (non-existence)'[361] lack the status of (something which is) *siddha* 'effected'. Therefore those things cannot be (said to be) *siddha eva* 'effected only'.[362]

67. *(Bhāṣya : Still another answer)*

Or rather, we must consider (that) here[363] deletion of the first constituent (has taken place).[364] (That is to say, from) *atyanta-siddhaḥ* 'effected once for all' (we derive) *siddhaḥ*.[365] (Like) for instance, (from) *devadattaḥ* (we derive) *dattaḥ* (or, from) *satya-bhāmā* (we derive) *bhāmā*.[366]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'Or rather' (etc.). (Objection:) But, once the word *devadatta* has been assigned (to somebody) as a name, how can part (of that name) be used? Because this (part) has not been assigned (to somebody) as a name. Moreover, it is not correct (to assume that) a whole becomes *vācaka* 'meaning-conveying', when it is being remembered on account of a part.[367] The reason is that what is being understood cannot be *pratyāyaka* 'a conveyor of meaning', (whereas) what is being uttered only can be *vācaka* 'meaning-conveying'.[368] (Answer:) (If this is) so, then (we will say that),

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361. For the four kinds of *abhāva* accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas see S. N. DASGUPTA, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1922, p. 359–360. *Prāgabhāva* means the non-existence of a thing before its coming into being, and *pradhvaṁsābhāva* means the non-existence of a thing in the form of its annihilation.

362. See fn. 360.

363. In the word *siddha* in *Vt.* III.

364. By part of a *ślokavārttika* (*apratyaye tathaiveṣṭaḥ*, supply : *lopaḥ pūrvapadasya*) quoted in the *Bhāṣya* on P.5.3.83 (*Mbh.* II, p. 425, line 9). The statement says that deletion of the *pūrvapada* is also desired, when the suffix concerned is not added. The *RV* on P.5.3.83 quotes the statement in a different version, as *vināpi pratyayena pūrvottarapadayor vibhāṣā lopo vaktavyaḥ* 'deletion must be prescribed optionally of the *pūrvapada* or the *uttarapada* even without (the addition of) the suffix'. The examples are *deva* or *datta* for *devadatta*. The statement quoted in the *Mbh.*, however, only allows *datta*.

365. Thus *siddha* is interpreted to mean 'what is always there', that is, in the sense of *nitya*.

366. Instances of the shortening of names and of pet names in general are given by K. Ch. CHATTERJI, (1972), p.62–64. It may be noted that, according to the *KV* on P.3.3.174, the name *devadatta* does not simply mean 'given by God', as assumed by Chatterji, ibid., p. 63, but *devā enaṁ deyāsuḥ* 'may the gods give him', namely, in answer to a woman's prayer for a son.

The *MBD*, p. 23, lines 21–22, observes with regard to the present *Bhāṣya* that it has been phrased without reference to another book, like the *Saṁgraha* in the case of *Bh.* No. 65.

367. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 24, lines 18–19).

368. Taken from the *MBD* (P. 24, line 19). The idea is that once the name Devadatta has been given to a person, the name Datta won't work to refer to the same person

at the time when (names) are assigned (to persons), names[369] which will be used later on (and) which are similar in part (to the full name) have been already assigned (to the persons concerned). But deletion is declared, so that (mere) sounds (by way of names) should not be regarded as correct.[370]

Here also, since there is no difference as regards *niṣpannatva* ' the fact of being there ' between what is *nitya* ' eternal ' and what is *anitya* ' non-eternal ',[371] the statement of (the word) *siddha* makes us understand *prakarṣa* ' a higher degree ' in the form of *atyantasiddha* ' effected once for all '.[372]

68. (*Bhāṣya : Still another answer*)

Or rather, we will explain that mention is of (the word *siddha*) as a synonym of *nitya* ' permanent ' on the basis of (the *pb.*) *vyākhyānato viśeṣapratipattir, na hi saṁdehād alakṣaṇam* ' the understanding of something particular (among two or more possibilities should be decided) on the basis of *vyākhyāna* " reasoned explanation ". For (a rule should) not (be regarded as) a bad rule (simply) because of doubt (regarding its meaning). '[373]

To remove this difficulty, it is suggested that by hearing the name Datta we are reminded of the name Devadatta, which is the full name. But the suggestion is rejected. The reason is that, if A (Datta) is used to convey B (the name Devadatta), then B cannot convey, i.e., cannot be used to refer to C (the person called Devadatta), at the same time. Compare *VP* 3.3.26.

The argument comes from the *Bhāṣya* on P.1.1.69 (*Mbh.* I, p. 178, lines 2–4). According to P.1.1.69, the phoneme *a* stands for 18 varieties. Among these varieties, the phoneme *a* is also understood (*pratīyamāna*). But we are not to assume that this *a* again stands for 18 varieties. What is *pratīyamāna* cannot be *pratyāyaka* at the same time. In another context, however, the *a* may be *pratyāyaka*, namely, when it is employed in its own form.

369. That is, at the time of the naming ceremony. See *MBD*, p. 24, line 20.

370. Taken from the *MBD*, p. 24, lines 23–25. The examples are *jye* for *jyeṣṭhā* and *khā* for *viśākhā*. Compare also *VP*.2. 361–363.

371. The argument is taken from the *MBD* (p. 25, lines 3–7).

372. Compare the argument in *Bh.* No. 4 on P.1.4.29 (*KARA*, p. 29). Thus the mention of the word *siddha* is considered to carry emphasis.

373. *PN*, *pb.* 1. Kielhorn renders the word *vyākhyāna* as ' interpretation '. So does P. THIEME, " ' The interpretation of the learned ' ", *Dr. S. K. Belvalkar Felicitation Volume*, Banaras, 1957, p. 54, and *passim*. The *PN*, Part II, p. 2, n. 1, quotes a stanza which enumerates six means of *vyākhyāna*. Among them are *ākṣepa* ' objection ' and *samādhāna* ' answer ', which clearly refer to the procedure adopted in a *bhāṣya*, in particular the *Mahābhāṣya*, and which is intended to arrive at a definite conclusion regarding a doubtful point by means of argument and counter-argument. This constitutes the hard, logical core of the process of interpretation or explanation.

An *alakṣaṇa* is not a non-definition (as assumed by Thieme, art. quoted, p. 53, in his translation of *pb.* 1), but a rule which, for some reason or other, does not convey what it should convey.

The idea of the *pb.* is that doubt leaves us with alternatives : either this or that, or perhaps something else still, and that, on the basis of *vyākhyāna*, the several possibilities or options should be limited to one.

Kaiyaṭa

Or the *nityatva* 'eternal nature' of words, etc. has been established on the basis of reasoning.[374] With that intention (the *Bhāṣyakāra*) says 'Or rather' (etc.). Because (we do) not (assume that a rule has) the status of bad rule simply because of doubt, since subsequently (we determine its meaning) on the basis of a conclusion arrived at with the help of some other means (of cognition).[375]

Nāgeśa

But an explanation without arguments is not appropriate, because it leaves room for the opposite (position) also. With that intention (Kaiyaṭa) says 'or....on the basis of reasoning'. On the basis of *vṛddhavyavahāra* 'the usage of elderly people' it has been established in the *Saṁgraha*, etc. that words, meanings, and their relation are eternal.[376] From this explanation (we understand that) the word *siddha* conveys precisely that (*nityatva* 'status of being eternal').[377]

Note (25)

The point of the quotation in the *Bhāṣya* has been explained by P. Thieme (art. quoted in fn. 373, p. 54) as follows : 'In distinguishing '*vyākhyāna*' from the procedures he has tried first.... Patañjali... means to say : Since it is an established fact that *siddha* may be used in the sense of "eternal" and in that of "made ready...." and, hence, there may arise a doubt....as to the sense in which Kātyāyana used the word in his first vārttika, we have to look at the context of the whole first vārttika... and to ascertain from the fact that it yields a consistent sense, only if we take *siddha* in the sense of *nitya*....'. According to Thieme (ibid., p. 53) the *pb.* states a principle followed by any modern philologist, namely, that in interpreting a text our basic assumption is that the author means to make sensible statements and to be consistent with himself. Our endeavour therefore

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374. Kaiyaṭa in his comment on *Bh.* No. 44 on *Śivasūtra* 6 (NSP ed., p. 145) accepts two ways of establishing meaning (compare Thieme, art. quoted, p. 58–59). He says *nyāyād āgamād vā śabdaśaktir anusārīyā* 'the force (i.e., the specific meaning) of a word should be found out on the basis of reasoning or on that of *āgama*'. Here Nāgeśa explains *āgama* as *upadeśaparaṁparā* 'the (supposedly) unbroken tradition of teaching'.

375. Any *pramāṇa* in the technical sense of the word. Kaiyaṭa's comment has been translated (its first part misconstrued) by Thieme, art. quoted, p. 56, n. 6.

376. This is probably a tradition known to Nāgeśa. The *vṛddhavyavahāra* is referred to by Kaiyaṭa in his comment on *Bh.* No. 61 (*vyavahāraparaṁparā* 'the (supposedly) unbroken tradition of (language used in) daily communication'. For the *Saṁgraha* see fn. 325.

377. Nāgeśa's comment has been translated (with wrong assumptions) by Thieme art. quoted, p. 56 (continued on p. 57), n. 6. The wrong assumptions are detailed on p. 57, n. 7.

must be to construct and understand his sentences in such a way that they yield sense and consistency. This, as Thieme says, is the principle applied by Patañjali in interpreting Pāṇini and Kātyāyana. Rather unfortunately, the application of the principle doesn't stop Patañjali from re-interpreting the statements of the earlier authors, when he sees fit to.

To return to the *Bhāsya :* It is subject to doubt whether *siddha* means *nitya* or *kārya.* The *pb.* quoted says that for that reason alone we should not reject *Vt.* III (or the part-*Vārttika* discussed so far). Rather we should try to remove the doubt with the help of reasoning. As explained by Nāgeśa who appeals to the authority of the *Saṁgraha,* the reasoning is based on *vṛddhavyavahāra.* In the usage of the elder generation, which goes back to still earlier generations, and so on to the hoary past, we see that the word *siddha* is used in the sense of *nitya.* Therefore we may confidently assume that the word *siddha* in *Vt.* III also stands for *nitya.* Another way of reasoning to arrive at the same result will be stated in the *Mbh.* in connection with the word *lokataḥ* in the same *Vt.*

69. *(Bhāṣya : Objection)*

But what is the use of this (word *siddha*) which needs (so much) explanation ? Why hasn't the word *nitya* itself been mentioned in a loud voice,[378] which being mentioned, leaves no room for doubt.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' which needs (so much) explanation '. That is to say, which is to be explained with an effort.

70. *(Bhāṣya : Answer)*

For the sake of auspiciousness.[379] (That is to say,) the Teacher desirous of good fortune uses the word *siddha* at the beginning of the great stream of his treatise for the sake of good luck. Because treatises which start with an auspicious word spread (wide and far) and breed heroes and long-living people, and (the word *siddha* is also used) so that people who read (this work) may obtain their objectives.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' desirous of good fortune '. The attainment of a desired objective which is not censured (by people), (that is) *maṅgala.*[380] The Teacher whose purpose is that, (is called) *māṅgalika.*[381]

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378. That is, confidently. The idea is that when we state something we are not certain about we speak *upāṁśu* ' in a low voice '.

379. In the *NSP* ed. (Bombay, 1951, p. 61) this statement is printed as a *Vt.*

380. The *MBD*, p. 25, line 13, explains that *maṅgala* means *nirupakruṣṭābhimatārthasiddhiḥ*, which is exactly what Kaiyaṭa says in different words.

(On) ' spread (wide and far) '. (Namely,) due to the absence of a break in study.[382]

(On) ' breed heroes '. Because the students (of grammar) are never defeated by others.

(On) ' breed.... long-living people '. Because, if one performs the things (stated) in a *śāstra* ' authoritative treatise ', *dharma* ' religious merit' increases. Therefore the span of life (also) increases.

(On) ' obtain their objectives '. Their success lies in the completion of their study only.[383]

71. *(Bhāṣya : Answer continued)*

As a matter of fact, this word *nitya* is not necessarily used to refer to things which are *kūṭastha* ' unchangeable ' and *avicālin* ' immovable '.[384] Then (to) what? It is also used in the sense of *ābhīkṣṇya* ' frequent repetition '.[385] For instance, *nityaprahasitaḥ* ' one who always laughs ', *nityaprajalpitaḥ* ' one who always chatters '.[386] Since it is used in the sense of *ābhīkṣṇya* also, here also meaning should (be decided) on the basis of this (statement) only, namely *vyākhyānato viśeṣapratipattir, na hi saṁdehād alakṣaṇam* ' the understanding of a particular thing (among two or more possibilities should be decided) by *vyākhyāna* " reasoned explanation ". For (a rule should) not (be regarded as) a bad rule (simply) because of doubt (regarding its meaning) '.[387]

But the Teacher[388] considers like this : the word *siddha* shall be used at the beginning, for the sake of good luck, and also I shall be able to explain it as a synonym of *nitya* ' permanent '.[389] Therefore the word *sidda* only has been mentioned, not the word *nitya.*

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' not necessarily '. And therefore only those words would be explained (in grammar) which are used frequently (by people) from cowherds to women, (but) not words which are rarely used.[390]

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381. The word is derived with the suffix *ṬHaÑ* (= *ika*, P.7.3.50) in the sense of *prayojana* ' purpose ' by P.5.1.109. The *MBD*, p. 25, line 15, explains it as *maṅgalaṁ prayuṅkte* ' he aims at *maṅgala* '.

382. That is to say, they continue to be studied.

383. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 25, line 18).

384. Reference is to *Bh.* No. 63.

385. Note that in the examples the constituent *nitya* functions as an adverb.

386. ' Always ' means ' very frequently '.

387. Reference is to *Bh.* No. 68. Thus we have to come to a decision about whether *nitya* means *kūṭastha/avicālin*, or whether it stands for *ābhīkṣṇya*, that is, for something which happens frequently. The decision is to be reached on the basis of *vyākhyāna*.

388. Kātyāyana.

389. This is, in fact, the answer to the question raised in *Bh.* No. 69.

390. Taken literally from the *MBD* (p. 25, lines 21-22). If *siddha* means *nitya* and if *nitya* means ' frequently ', then *Vt.* III *(siddhe śabdārthasaṁbandhe)* would imply that grammar deals only with those words which are used frequently in language.

The word *nitya*, which is used to convey the sense of *ābhīkṣṇya* 'frequent repetition', is also used without a verb.[391] Like in *āścaryam anitye* '(the word) *āścarya* (is used) in the sense of *anitya* "unusual",[392] or in *nityavīpsayoḥ* '(a word is repeated) to convey the sense of "always" or of "(logical) distribution".[393]

Note (26)

The argument of the *Bhāṣya* is that even if the word *siddha* in *Vt.* III is taken in the sense of *nitya*, we are still in doubt about its meaning, because apart from 'permanent' *nitya* may mean 'frequently' also. As pointed out by the author of the *MBD*, followed by Kaiyaṭa, this latter meaning has an undesired consequence. But, since we are in doubt anyway, why not use the word *siddha*, as the *Vt.* does? *Siddha* has the advantage of being an auspicious word, and on the basis of *vyākhyāna* we will explain that *siddha* means *nitya*.

72. *(Bhāṣya : Question)*

Now, with which meaning (of the word *siddha*) in mind is the following constituent analysis made, namely, *siddhe śabde arthe saṁbandhe ca* 'when the word, the meaning and (their) relation are *siddha*'?

Note (27)

The *MBD* (p. 26, lines 1-3) has a short note here, which says that question is raised with regard to that meaning which is conveyed by a word (read *śabdena* for *śabde*). That is to say, with which idea about the thing-meant has the constituent analysis stated been given?

73. *(Bhāsya : Answer)*

He[394] says: The *ākṛti*.[395] Why (is) that (so)? Because the *ākṛti* is *nitya* 'permanent',[396] (whereas) the *dravya* 'individual thing' is *anitya* 'non-permanent'.

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391. This refers to the *MBD* (p. 25, lines 20 and 23). If *nitya* 'frequently' is an adverb, it requires a verb. But in *Vt.* III the word *nitye* (that is, *siddhe*) cannot be an adverb. To show that *nitya* conveys the meaning of *ābhīkṣṇya* even in the absence of a verb Kaiyaṭa quotes examples.

392. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 25, line 22). The example is P.6.1.147, where the word *āścarya* is mentioned as a *nipātana* (with the added *āgama sUṬ*) in the sense of *anitya* 'unusual'.

393. P.8.1.4.

394. It is not clear whether Patañjali here refers to the author of his source, or whether a later redactor of the *Mahābhāṣya* refers to Patañjali. Compare *Bh.* Nos. 6, 8, 10 and 12.

395. It is not clear what is meant by *ākṛti* here, the general shape common to individuals belonging to the same genus or class, or the *jāti*. Therefore the word has been left without translation.

396. Or, 'eternal'.

Note (28)

The *MBD* (p. 26, lines 3–14) comments on the present *Bhāṣya* as follows: 'A word detached from (its) connection with other meanings[397] acquires its essential nature in the *jāti*[398] only, among (the categories) *jāti*, *guṇa* "quality", *kriyā* "action" and *yadṛcchāśabda* "proper name".[399] But *dravyas* "individual things", etc. are expressed through *tādrūpyāpādana* "particularization".[400] Like (in *gaur vāhīkaḥ* "the Vāhīka is (stupid like) an ox" (the meaning) *vāhīka* (is particularized) by the word *go*.[401]

An individual thing which moves[402] (is particularized) by a proper name. This being so, an individual object which comes into contact with an action, in the form of *gām ānaya* "fetch the cow" is particularized by a form of movement.[403]

In the same way, (in the expression) *śuklā gauḥ* "the white cow" (a particular object is referred to). (Because) *gotva* "cow-hood" together with[404] *śuklatva* "white-ness" is understood on account of *samavetasamavāya* "indirect inherence"[405] in one and the same object.[406] (In the expression) *eko brāhmaṇaḥ* "one single (a particular) brahmin is referred to, because *brāhmaṇatva* "brahmin-hood" (is understood) together with *ekatva* "single-ness".

Every word expresses an *ākṛti*.[407] But we cannot assume that this (*ākṛti*) becomes operative at the same time with regard to the cognition of *tattva* "identity" and *anyatva* "otherness".[408] Like (it is not correct to

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397. Like words listed in a dictionary or *kośa*.

398. For the meanings of *jāti* see fn. 294. Since later on the relation of *samavāya* 'inherence' is mentioned in connection with *gotva* and *śuklatva*, the term *jāti* here is probably to be taken in the sense of 'class-feature' or 'generic feature'.

399. Reference is to the enumeration given by Patañjali in his *Bhāṣya* on *Vt.* I on *Śivasūtra* 2 (*Mbh.* I, p. 19, line 20). Here Patañjali says that words are used in four ways, namely, to express the four categories summed up. For the inclusion of *yadṛcchāśabdas* here see Filliozat (1975), p. 192, n. 2.

400. Literally, through bringing about *tādrūpya* 'having this (or that) form'.

401. "Is particularized" means: is expressed through the process called particularization. The expression *gaur vahīkaḥ* is always used with reference to a particular peron although *go* and *vahīka*, by themselves, are class-names.

402. That is, which is connected with an action.

403. That is, by a particular action, namely, fetching.

404. That is, as particularized by.

405. Literally, inherence in what inheres.

406. Namely, the cow.

407. In his comment (on the *Bhāṣya* which speaks of *ākṛti*) the author of the *MBD* does not clearly distinguish between *ākṛti* and *jāti*, since he first deals with *jāti* and then shifts to the term *ākṛti*.

408. For the argument involved see *VP*. 3.1.92–94 and 98, and the explanations added in K. A. Subramania IYER (1971), p. 57–58 and p. 60.

Nāgeśa

Now (the author) in the *Bhāṣya* speaks of the *nityatva* ' permanence ' of the *ākṛti* ' shape ', which has the form of a particular arrangement of parts (and) which manifests the *jāti* ' generic notion ',[450] even though the origination and destruction (of the *ākṛti*) happen every time in between as long as the *vyavahāra* ' our dealings in daily life ' lasts, in a different way by (saying) ' Or rather ' (etc.).

In the definition (the word) *dhruva* itself is explained as *kūṭastha* ' unchangeable '.[451] *Vicāla* (means) the taking on of another form, like milk takes on the form of curds, etc. Thereby the *pariṇāmānityatā* is rejected. Since *utpatti* ' origination ' results in *sattā* ' existence ', the two modifications of being in the form of *janma* ' origination ' and *sattā* ' existence ' have been rejected. The third (modification of being), in the form of *vṛddhi* ' growth ' (has been rejected) by (the word) *avṛddhi*. The fourth (namely,) *pariṇāma* ' transformation ' (has been rejected) by (the word) *anupajana*. The fifth (namely,) *apacaya* ' decay ' (has been rejected) by (the word) *anapāya*. The sixth (namely,) *vināśa* ' destruction ' (has been rejected) by (the word) *avyaya*.

This *nityatva*[452] concerns both the *brahman* and the things-meant which remain in one and the same form as long as *vyavahāra* ' our dealings in daily life ' lasts. (But) this is not the only meaning of the word *nitya*, because we speak of *nityatva* ' permanence '[453] also of a thing which is not like that,[454] in the case of non-interruption of continuity.[455] That is why (the author) in the *Bhāṣya* says ' that also '.

(On) ' with regard to which the *tattva* ' (etc.). That is to say, that (thing) with regard to which, even when it has been destroyed, the *dharma* ' basic character ' residing in that, is not destroyed. This refers to the *pravāhanityatā* ' permanence in the form of a continuous flow '.[456] Even if destruction of that (*ākṛti* ' shape ' takes place), its *dharma* ' basic character ' is not destroyed, because the continuous flow which is the substratum (of the *ākṛti*) is not interrupted. This is what (the author) means to say.

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450. Thus Nāgeśa says that the *ākṛti* ' shape ' consists in a particular arrangement of parts, and that it is that feature on the basis of which we form the concept of *jāti* ' class (or genus) '. The latter is what is meant by *jātivyañjaka*. In this respect Nāgeśa differs from Kaiyaṭa (see fn. 446).

451. Nāgeśa says so, because he wants to connect the enumeration of characteristics in the definition in *Bh.* No. 78 with the *bhāvavikāras* mentioned in *Nirukta* 1.2 as an opinion of Vārṣyāyaṇi. Here the *bhāvavikāras* are stated as *jāyate* ' originates ', *asti* ' exists ', *vipariṇamate* ' changes ', *vardhate* ' grows ', *apakṣīyate* ' decays ' and *vinaśyati* ' perishes '. It is difficult to connect the word *dhruva* with any of these *bhāvavikāras*.

452. Characterized by *kūṭasthatva*, etc.

453. *Nityatvavyavahārāt*. For the sense of *vyavahāra* here see fn. 447.

454. That is, not a thing which remains in one and the same form throughout *vyavahāra*.

455. *Pravāhāviccheda*.

456. Compare fn. 335.

Note (31)

The question is still of the constituent analysis of *Vt.* III (first part) *siddhe śabdārthasaṁbandhe.* *Bh.* No. 77 says that we can have the analysis *siddhe śabde arthe saṁbandhe ca*, even if the *artha* is assumed to be the *ākṛti* in the sense of ' shape '. But *Bh.* No 76 has shown by means of examples that the *ākṛti* is destructible. So it cannot be *siddha*, i.e , *nitya*. This is the difficulty.

The answer provided by *Bh.* No. 77 is that, even if shapes are destroyed somewhere, they will remain in existence elsewhere. So shapes are always there. There is not a single moment at which we can say that there are no shapes. That is why the *ākṛti* may be said to be *nitya* ' permanent '. It always continues somewhere.

Bh. No. 78 tries to improve on this answer, which is felt to be unsatisfactory, because *nityatva* implies *kūṭasthatva* ' unchangeability ', etc. We will change the definition of the concept *nityatva*. We don't say that *nitya* thing are characterised by *kūṭasthatva*, etc., namely, of their form, but that they are characterised by the continuity of their *tattva*. The question is, what does *tattva* mean ?

The author of the *MBD*, commenting on the passage ' Or rather, the definition of *nitya* ....is not like this' (etc.), after having introduced the threefold division of *anityatā*, refers to Sāṁkhya. He says (p. 28, lines 8–10) that the old definition has an undesired consequence, namely, the *anityatā* of the *pradhāna* (i.e., the *prakṛti*, the principle of matter out of which the world evolves). The author characterizes this *pradhāna* as *vikāradharmin* ' the possessor of the property *vikāra* " change " '. As the author of the *MBD* sees it, the undesired consequence is prevented by the new definition. He then quotes (by way of *pratīka*) the *Mbh.* text in a slightly different reading from the Kielhorn version (*Mbh.* I, p. 7, line 22) as *idam api nityalakṣaṇaṁ yasmiṁs tattvaṁ na vihanyate* ' this also is a definition of *nitya* (namely,) in which the *tattva* is not destroyed '. After this, the words *tan nityam* ' (in which...) that is *nitya* ' are supplied to complete the relative clause construction. This is commented on as follows : ' (That is to say, whether the *ākṛti* is destroyed or not) there is an equal cause of the notion (of identity) in the form of *sa eva ayam* " this is he/it ". (Here) *sa eva ayam* (refers to) the *ātman* " essential character ". And the *ātmavastu* " essential character - entity " of a thing (read *vastunaḥ* for *vastunāḥ*) is indestructible, like *ghaṭatva* " pot-ness ", etc. '. The argument amounts to this : the *ākṛti* ' shape ' is *nitya*, because its *tattva* " essential character " is indestructible. In his comment on the next *Bhāṣya*, the author of the *MBD* (p. 28, lines 15–16) specifies that the *nityatā* meant here is either the one assumed by Sāṁkhya for the *pradhāna*, etc., or the one assumed by the *kṣaṇikatvavādins* in the form of uninterrupted origination.

Kaiyaṭa does not comment on the word *tattva*. He explains the *nityatva* of the *ākṛti* by identifying the latter with the *jāti* and attributing a

svāra.[419] If (the statement) in phrased in this way, namely, as *siddhe śabde saṁbandhe ca* " since the word and the relation is permanent ", the following would also be implied, namely *śabdasya yaḥ svayākṛtyā saṁbandhaḥ, tasmin, nitye* " the relation which a word has with its own *ākṛti*, (that *saṁbandha*), sg. loc. (*saṁbandhe*) *nitye* " when (that) relation is permanent ".[420] But when mention is (made) of (the word) *artha* (as part of the cp. *arthasaṁbandha*) we understand (relation with) the *abhidheya* " thing-meant ".[421]

(Objection :) But how could there be a permanent relation with meaning (i.e. a thing-meant) which is not permanent ? The answer is : like (in the case of) *samavāya* " inherence ". (That is to say,) like (the relation of) inherence is permanent, when it concerns permanent things, (and also) permanent, when it concerns permanent and non-permanent things, and (purely) non-permanent things.[422] In the same way, it could be here also.

Or rather, (it is not *samavāya*, but) *aśūnyatā* " non-emptiness ", which (is the relation which) a word has with (its) meaning at all times. (That is to say,) a wordform which is completely penetrated by meaning at all times.[423] Taking into account *yogyatā* ' fitness ' in that respect, by way of a property of the word, (the author) has made this statement '.[424]

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419. Reference is to P.8.4.2. The *SK* on this rule says *numgrahaṇam anusvāropalakṣaṇārtham*, the very statement of the *MBD*. The idea is that the word *nUM* here does not mean the augment *nUM*, but the *anusvāra* which replaces *n*, by P. 8.3.24. An example quoted by the *Tattvabodhinī* on the *SK* in question is *bṛṁhaṇam.*

420. Suppose the text just reads *siddhe śabde saṁbandhe ca*. Then, since *saṁbandha* without qualification is *nitya*, it would imply that the relation between a word and the *ākṛti* also is *nitya*. See fn. 421.

421. If the word *artha* is separately mentioned in the *vigraha* (as *siddhe arthe*), it would mean that the thing-meant is *nitya*. But, clearly things (and things-meant) are *anitya*. Therefore *artha* cannot be separately mentioned. On the other hand, mention of the word *artha* cannot be altogether omitted for the reason mentioned in fn. 420, and also because in that case we canot prove that the relation with meaning (i. e., the thing-meant) is *nitya*, even if the meaning itself is *anitya*. Therefore, the correct *vigraha* can only be *śabde arthasaṁbandhe ca siddhe*. Here it is specified that the relation which a word has with its meaning is permanent. Now the question is, how a *nitya* relation with an *anitya* thing can be assumed.

422. The *samavāya*-relation (for an enumeration see Helārāja on *VP*. 3.3.8, ed. K. A. Subramania IYER, 1963, p. 131, line 6) may hold between *nitya* things, like *ākāśa* and *dhvani* (= *śabda*), or between one *nitya* and one *anitya* thing, like *jāti* and *dravya*, or between two *anitya* things, like a pot and a cloth which are in contact (*saṁyoga*). The relation of *saṁyoga* inheres in both through *samavāya.*

423. The text says *āviṣṭam evārtharūpeṇa śabdarūpam*. And therefore the wordform is never empty, i.e.,devoid of meaning.

424. Read *śabdadharmatvena* for *śabdadharmeṇa*. Reference is to *VP*. 3.3.31. Here, after having rejected *samavāya* as the relation between a word and its meaning, Bhartṛhari introduces the relation which he calls *yogyatā*. Thus words are assumed to be permanently fit to convey meanings, i. e., to refer to things-meant. There is no moment at which they are not.

Here we note the following points :

(1) If *dravya* is accepted as the word-meaning, that is, if words are considered to refer to individual things only, the only function to be assigned to the *ākṛti* can be that of *pravṛtti-nimitta*. That is to say, the *ākṛti* does not form part of the reference of the word, but only helps to determine that reference.

(2) The *dravya* = *artha* = thing-meant is impermanent. It cannot be called *siddha*. Therefore the constituent analysis of the cp. *śabdārthasaṁbandhe* must be such that the constituent *artha* is not separately connected with *siddha*. This is achieved by taking *arthasaṁbandha* as an instrumental *tp*. cp., in which *artha* functions as an *upalakṣaṇa* of *saṁbandha*.

(3) As regards the nature of the permanent relation which holds between a word and its meaning, two views are proposed :

(i) it is like the *samavāya*-relation,

(ii) it is the *yogyatā*-relation. The latter view is preferred in accordance with the discussion in *VP*, 3.3.8-31.

75. *(Bhāṣya : Answer)*

As *siddhe śabde arthasaṁbandhe ca* ' when the word and the relation with (its) meaning is *siddha* " permanent " '.[425] (That is,) when (items) which possess meaning have a permanent relation with meanings.[426]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) *arthasaṁbandhe*. Because in the *dravyapakṣa* ' view according to which words stand for individual objects only ' the individual object is not permanent, the word *artha* ' meaning ' has been mentioned as a qualifier of *saṁbandha* ' relation '. When (it is asked), how can the relation (with *artha*) be permanent, if the *artha* ' thing-meant ' is not permanent, (we answer that this) relation is characterized as *yogyatā* " fitness ".[427] And there is nothing wrong in (assuming that) the word is permanent, because the word functions as the *āśraya* ' substratum ' of that (*yogyatā*).[428]

The *VP*. 3.3.29 says *anādir arthaiḥ śabdānām saṁbandho yogyatā* . . . . " the relation of words with (their) meanings (i.e., the things-meant) is *yogyatā*, which has no beginning ". Here one aspect of the meaning of *nitya* is emphasized, namely, *anāditva* " having no (traceable) beginning ". In *samavāya* another aspect is stressed, namely, that of unchangeability.

425. The point of this *vigraha* has been explained in the *MBD*-passage translated in Note (29), and in the points noted here, sub (2).

426. That is, things-meant.

427. See fn. 424.

428. Thus the relation between a word and *yogyatā* is conceived as *āśrayāśrayibhāva*, that is, a kind of contact. Accordingly, the relation between a word and its meaning is construed as follows :

(1) A word is related to the thing-meant by *yogyatā*. and

(2) The *yogyatā* is related to the word as the *āśrayin* to the *āśraya*.

76. *(Bhāṣya : Alternative answer dealing with dravya)*

Or rather, this constituent analysis *siddhe śabde arthe saṁbandhe ca* ' when the word, the meaning and (their) relation is permanent '[429] is appropriate when the word-meaning is *dravya*[430] only. Because the *dravya* is permanent, (but) the *ākṛti* ' shape ' is not.

How do you know ? Because in daily life we see like this : clay connected with some shape becomes a lump. By destroying the shape of the lump, *ghaṭikās* ' small-size water-vessels ' (of a particular shape) are made. By destroying the shape of the *ghaṭikās kuṇḍikās* ' small-size pots ' (of different shapes) are made.

Similarly, gold connected with some shape becomes a lump. By destroying the shape of the lump, *rucakas* ' neck-laces ' are made. By destroying the shape of the *rucakas*, *kaṭakas* ' bracelets ' are made. By destroying the shape of the *kaṭakas* (ornaments in the shape of) *svastikas* are made. The lump of gold, restored again (to its original shape), connected with a different shape, becomes a pair of earrings[431] having the colour of the glowing embers of Khadira wood.

The *ākṛti* ' shape ' becomes each time different, but the *dravya* ' matter ' remains identical. On the destruction of *ākṛti*, the *dravya* only remains.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' Because the *dravya* is permanent '. That is to say, the meaning of the word *dravya* (here) is the *brahmatattva* ' *brahman*-essence ' delimited by unreal *upādhis* ' (imposed) limiting factors '.[432]

(On) *ākṛti*. (It means) *saṁsthānam* ' shape '. And in the *brahmadarśana* ' view according to which all things are identical with the *brahman*'[433]

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429. First stated in *Bh.* No. 72, and declared correct in the *ākṛtipakṣa* in *Bh.* No. 73.

430. From the examples it will be clear that here the word *dravya* has a rather different meaning from the one used so far.

431. The example of the gold fashioned into the different, non-permanent forms of *rucakas* and of *kuṇḍalas* re-appears, but with a different point, in *VP.* 3.2.4 and 15.

432. Reference is probably to *VP.* 3.2.16 (the *parā prakṛti*, i.e., the *brahman*, is the meaning (*vācya*) of all words. Compare further Helārāja on *VP.* 3.2.1, where he says that *dravya* may be *pāramārthika* ' relating to absolute reality ' *(i.e., dravya = brahmatattva)* or *saṁvyāvahārika* ' relating to the dealings of daily life ' (i.e., *dravya* = an individual thing). Here the *brahmatattva* is the divine stuff *(dravya)* which, for reasons unknown, takes on different forms which we, in delusion, believe to be the world, including ourselves.

The *MBD* (p. 27, lines 4–5), in elucidation of the passage *dravyaṁ hi nityam*, says that the element earth (i.e., clay) is *nitya*; that the real thing *(satya)* in this element is *vikalpa* ' concept '; that the real thing in *vikalpa* is *jñāna* ' knowledge '; that the real thing in *jñāna* is *om* (for which see VP. 1.9–10, and the *vṛitti* on that); and that *om* is *brahman*

433. I.e., *advaitavedānta*.

a *jāti* 'genus' like *gotva* 'cow-hood' is impermanent, because it is also unreal. (This is so,) on the basis of the *śruti*-statement (which says) *ātmaivedaṁ sarvam* 'all this is the *ātman* only'.[434]

Note (30)

So far, the *ākṛti-dravya* contrast has been used in the context of a discussion on word-meaning. Here *ākṛti* may be taken to stand for the class and *dravya* for the particular. The present *Bhāṣya* shows that it is used with a different meaning of the word *dravya* in a different context also. It is assumed that this context was originally provided by a discussion on causation in early Sāṁkhya known to Patañjali. See further Note (31).

The examples illustrate the product-material relation, which is itself a causal relation. Here the *dravya* taken in the sense of 'material' or 'matter' is *nitya*, whereas the *ākṛti* (= *ākāra*) 'shape' is *anitya*. Shapes come and go, but the material, like clay or gold, remains.

77. (*Bhāṣya : Alternative answer*)

Also when the word-meaning is the *ākṛti*, this constituent analysis is appropriate, namely, *siddhe śabde arthe saṁbandhe ca* 'when the word, the meaning and (their) relation is permanent'.[435]

But you said : *ākṛtir anityā* 'the *ākṛti* is not permanent'.[436]

This is not correct. The *ākṛti* is *nitya* 'permanent'.

How (is that possible)?

By considering that, when (the *ākṛti* 'shape') has come to an end in some cases, it has not come to an end in all cases.[437] (That is to say, because) it is perceived to reside (still) in other *dravyas* 'individual things'.[438]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'when....has come to an end in some cases....not'. That is to say, (*uparata* 'come to an end' means) *anabhivyakta* 'not manifested'.[439]

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434. *Chāndogya Up.* 7.25.2 (*Ānandāśramasaṁskṛtagranthāvaliḥ*, No. 14, Poona. 1934, p. 432).

435. See *Bh.* No. 72.

436. In *Bh.* No. 76.

437. The argument is, of course, fallacious. If the *ākṛti* comes to an end in some instances, the possibility of its impermanance has been proved. Therefore it cannot be said to be *nitya*. See fn. 439.

438. Here the *Bhāṣyakāra* returns to the earlier meaning of *dravya*.

439. Kaiyaṭa's difficulty is that it is contradictory to say that the *ākṛti* has come to end in some instances, but goes on existing in other instances. Therefore he explains *uparata* as *anabhivyakta* 'not manifested' (but still present in a latent form). Here Kaiyaṭa follows the author of the *MBD* (p. 27, lines 14–19). The argument is that when saying that the *ākṛti* is destroyed (and is produced again), the *Bhāṣyakāra* does not speak in terms of *utpatti* 'origination' and *vināśa* 'destruction', but in terms of *āvirbhāva* 'manifestation' and *tirobhāva* 'hiding'.

Because our dealings in ordinary life are not according to *advaita* (-doctrine). In our daily dealings the *ākṛti* 'shape' functions as the cause of our *parāmarśa* 'cognition' of one and the same appearance. Therefore it is permanent.[440]

Nāgeśa

(*Nanu paramārthadṛṣṭyā)*. But from the point of view of ultimate reality everything is *anitya* 'non-permanent'. That is why (Kaiyaṭa) says '(not) according to *advaita* (-doctrine)'.

(On) 'is permanent'. (Kaiyaṭa) means to say that the *ākṛti* is also permanent on account of its fixed character, etc., because as long as the time of our dealings in daily life lasts, we experience the cognition of one and the same shape everywhere.[441]

78. (*Bhāṣya : Alternative answer dealing with nityatva)*

Or rather, the definition of *nitya* 'permanent' is not like this: *nitya* is that which is *dhruva* 'fixed', *kūṭastha* 'unchangeable', *avicālin* 'immovable', *an-apāya-upajana-vikārin* 'not subject to decrease, increase or change', *anutpatti* 'without origination', *avṛddhi* 'without growth' (and) *avyayayogin* 'not connected with decay'. (Because) that also is *nitya* in which the *tattva* is not destroyed.[442]

But what is the *tattva*? *Tattva* is *tadbhāva* 'the essential character of that'.[443] In the *ākṛti* 'shape' also the essential character is not destroyed.[444]

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440. Kaiyaṭa wants to point out that there the *Bhāṣyakāra* does not speak from the point of view of ultimate, absolute reality, because in that case all is *anitya*, including *ākṛti*. In saying that the *ākṛti* is *nitya*, the *Bhāṣyakāra* takes into account the *vyāvahārika* point of view (compare fn. 343).

441. Nāgeśa says that, according to Kaiyaṭa, in view of its role in cognition, that is, in recognition, in *vyavahāra*, a limited *nityatva* must be attributed to *ākṛti*, namely, a *nityatva* which lasts as long as *vyavahāra* itself.

442. Helārāja, in his commentary on *VP*. 3.2.11, quotes this sentence from the *Bhāṣya*. The commentary refers to *Bh*. No. 77, and says that just as gold, which is the real thing, remains after the destruction of the neck-laces, etc., so also the *brahman*, which is the real thing and which is *nitya* in the absolute sense of the word, remains after the destruction, at the time of *pralaya*, of the whole of endless *vikāras* 'changes'.

The sentence quoted from the *Mbh*. is *translated* by K. A. Subramania IYER (1971), p. 70, as 'That also is eternal which does not lose its identity'. The translation of *tattva* adopted here is probably based on the *MBD*.. See further Note (31).

443. Reference is to P. 5.1.119, which prescribes the suffix *tva* in the sense of *tasya bhāvaḥ*. Thus *tattva* in its etymological sense means 'the state of being that', like *aśvatva* 'the state of being a horse', that is, the horse-state.

Patañjali, in his *Bhasya* on *Vt*. IV on P. 5.1.119 (*Mbh*. Vol. II, p. 366, lines 23–26) says *athavā yasya guṇāntareṣv api prādurbhavatsu tattvam na vihanyate tad dravyam. Kiṁ punas tattvam. Tadbhāvas tattvam. Tad yathā. Āmalakādīnāṁ phalānām raktādayaḥ pītādayaś ca guṇāḥ prādurbhavanty āmalakaṁ badaram ity eva bhavati. Anvarthaṁ khalv api nirvacanam. Guṇasaṁdrāvo dravyam iti* 'or rather, that of which the *tattva* is not des-

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'Or rather' (etc.). Although, really speaking, it is *anitya* 'non-permanent'[445] the permanence of the *jāti* 'genus'[446] is established by having recourse to *vyavahāra* 'our dealings in daily life'.[447]

And *anityatā* 'non-permanence' is threefold :

(1) *saṁsargānityatā* 'non-permanence due to contact', like the appearance of the colour of something else in a crystal, on account of the hiding of its own colour, when lac, etc. has been placed near it, but when the substance placed near has been removed, (the crystal re-) appears with its own colour, so there is no (question of) *pariṇāma* 'transformation',

(2) *pariṇāmānityatā* 'impermanence due to transformation',[448] like the appearance of red colour in a *badara* fruit, when the black colour has disappeared, and

(3) *pradhvaṁsānityatā* 'impermanence due to destruction', (that is,) complete annihilation.[449]

In order to make us understand *nityatā* 'permanence' by way of rejecting that three-fold non-permanence, (the author) says *dhruvam*, etc. Here the *saṁsargānityatā* is rejected by (the words) *dhruva* (and) *kūṭastha*, the *pariṇāmānityatā* by (the word) *avicālin*, (and) the *pradhvaṁsānityatā* by (the words) *anapāya*, etc.

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troyed even when different qualities become manifest, is the *dravya*. But what is the *tattva* ? The *tattva* is the essential character of that (whatever we refer to). For instance, in fruits like the *āmalaka* qualities like red (and) yellow become manifest, (but, still, the thing, we call *āmalaka* (or) *badara* only is there. Certainly, this is also a meaningful explanation, namely, a *dravya* is a *guṇasaṁdrāva* " a grouping together of qualities". ' Here the *tattva* is seen as that which remains identical even when appearances change, the essential character of a thing which is the condition for our knowledge of identity.

444. And therefore the *ākṛti* may be considered *nitya*. The words *ākṛtāv api* may be nterpreted in at least three ways, namely,

(1) *ākṛtāv api padārthe* 'also when the word-meaning is the *ākṛti*' (see the opening words of *Bh.* No. 77),

(2) *ākṛtāv api vihanyamānāyām* 'even when the *ākṛti* is destroyed' (see the argument in *Bh.* No. 76), and

(3) *ākṛtāv api* 'in the *ākṛti* also (just like in the *dravya* in the sense of 'material')

Here (3) is adopted, because it gives us the precise meaning, as explained in Note (31). and because it relieves us of the necessity to supply words.

445. Here Kaiyaṭa speaks from the point of view of ultimate reality. Compare fn. 440.

446. Thus Kaiyaṭa identifies the *ākṛti* with *jāti*.

447. More specifically, *vyavahāra* here means the non-philosophic way of expression used in daily communication. Compare fn. 441.

448. *Pariṇāma* also means 'ripening'.

449. The threefold division of *anityatā* is taken straight from the *MBD* (p. 28, lines 2-6). Here, instead of *pradhvaṁsānityatā* the term *vastuvināśānityatā* 'non-permanence due to the destruction of a thing' is used.

hold that) the same person is Yajñadatta and different from Yajñadatta. But having noticed here in Mathurā (read *mathurāyām* for *madhurāyām*) a weak boy of light-brown colour and in Pāṭaliputra a stout one, of dark colour, the *astitva* " existence " (of the *ākṛti*) is decided on the basis of recognition, in this way : the object noticed by me as connected with *balatva* " boy-ness ", etc. is the same as the one (noticed as) connected with *nīlatva* " dark-coloured-ness ", etc.[409] And recognition of what has not been noticed before does not occur. Certainly, a thing is noticed earlier, since it is recognized (later).

Among those who hold that for all (things), without exception, there is a separate *jāti*, there is no difference of opinion as regards the *nityatva* ' permanence ' (of words, etc.). With this intention, this is stated.

(On) ' Because the *ākṛti* is *nitya* '. But that *(ākṛti)* is manifested by many *dravyas* ' individual beings ' which are *anitya* ' non-permanent '. This is the great contribution[410] of the *dravyas*. '[411]

Here we note the following points :

(1) Words stand for an *ākṛti* or *jāti* in the first place, and are used to refer to individuals through a process called *tādrūpyāpādana*. This process consists in particularizing the *ākṛti* or *jāti* by connecting the word expressing it with words which express a *guṇa*, *kriyā* or *saṁjñā* ' proper name '.

(2) Identification in recognition is only possible on the assumption that some things must have remained identical in changing circumstances. This proves the existence of *ākṛti* (or *jāti*).

(3) The illustration used to prove the existence of the *ākṛti* contains the expression *iha. . . .mathurāyām* 'here in Mathurā'. The reading *mathurāyām* is almost certainly the correct one, because this is the place-name which in the *Mbh.* is connected with Pāṭaliputra. The illustration itself is not found in the *Mbh.*, so chances are that it is not a quotation, but an

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409. Thus the object which I noticed in Mathurā as :
(1) a boy,
(2) somewhat sickly,
(3) of light-brown colour, is recognized by me later on and in a different place as that very same object, although the features (2) and (3) have changed.

This can only be explained, if there is something which remains identical. That entity which remains the same, even when change takes place in some respects, and which makes recognition possible, is the *ākṛti*. In the present passage, *ākṛti* may be taken in the sense of an identical general appearance or shape.

410. *Vyāpāra*. literally, ' activity ' or ' function '.

411. That is, only when *dravyas* are perceived, we can have the cognition of a *jāti ākṛti*.

instance taken from daily life by the author. This being so, the suggestion may be ventured that the author of the *MBD* lived in Mathurā.

74. (*Bhāsya : Question*)

But if the word-meaning is a *dravya* ' individual thing ', how do we form the constituent analysis ?

Note (29)

The *MBD* (p. 26, line 16–p. 27, line 1) comments on the present *Bhāṣya* as follows : ' The *dravya* " individual thing " only is expressed (by a word).[412] *Gotva* " cow-hood ", etc., which are not expressed (but which) are *upādhis* " limiting factors " of (the denotation of) a word, (function as) the *pravṛttinimitta* " ground for using (a particular word in a particular meaning) ".[413] Like a *svastika*, etc. are not expressive of Devadatta's house, but function as its *upalakṣaṇa* " external feature (helpful in identifying an object) ".[414]

And because the *dravya* is seen to be destructible, alternatively, the following constituent analysis is to be formed for this (expression under discussion), namely, *siddhe śabde arthasaṁbandhe ca* " when the word and the relation with (its) meaning is permanent ".[415] (In the sense of) *arthena saṁbandhaḥ* " the relation with (its) meaning " (we derive) *arthasaṁbandhaḥ*, sg. loc. *(arthasaṁbandhe) nitye* " when the relation with (its) meaning is permanent ".[416]

In this way, there is no mention of *artha* " meaning " for its own sake[417] in the paraphrase.[418] Then (as) what (has *artha* been mentioned) ? As the *upalakṣaṇa* " distinguishing feature " of *saṁbandha* " relation ". Like (the word) *nUM* has been mentioned to serve as the *upalakṣaṇa* of *anu-*

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412. That is, by means of words we always refer to individual beings. See Note (22).

413. " In a particular meaning " means : with reference to a particular thing-meant.

414. Here by *upalakṣaṇa* a feature is meant which does not form part of the general denotation (reference) of the word, which is *dravya*, but which is helpful in determining the referent.

415. Read *athavā dravyasya ca vināśadarśanāt tatraiṣa vigrahaḥ kartavyaḥ* for *dravyasya ca vināśadarśanāt. Athavā tatraiṣa vigrahaḥ kartavyaḥ*, which does not make sense. The idea is that since a *dravya* is destructible, we cannot say *siddhe (= nitye) arthe* ' since meaning (i.e., the thing-meant) is permanent '. Therefore the constituent analysis is to be phrased as stated.

416. Read *arthena saṁbandhaḥ, arthasaṁbandhaḥ, tasmin, nitye.* Here *tasmin* is indicative of the use of the sg. loc. (in *arthasaṁbandhe*), whereas *nitye* renders *siddhe*, which s part of the text.

417. That is, as an independent word.

418. *Vākya.* That is, the *laukikavigrahavākya.*

limited *nityatva* to it, from the Vedānta point of view. Nāgeśa does comment on the term *tattva*, which he renders as *dharma*. By *dharma* he understands the basic character of a thing which makes it what it is, and which is indestructible. Since this *dharma* (= *tattva*) is indestructible, the *ākṛti* cannot be totally annihilated either. Therefore it is *nitya*. The *nityatva* is described as *pravāhanityatā*, a flow-like continuity in which we find the change and destruction of shapes, but which, at the same time, provides the basis for the emergence of new shapes and forms which have retained something in common with the old shapes, namely, their basic character.

As stated earlier (Note (30)), the discussion started in *Bh.* No. 76 (and ending with *Bh.* No. 78) originally belongs to a non-linguistic context known to the *Bhāṣyakāra*. This context must have been provided by a discussion on causation, because the product-material relation is a variation of the cause-effect relation. The question is, which theory of causation provides the framework for the opinions stated in *Bh.* Nos. 76-78 ?

Actually, as explained by the author of the *MBD*, two theories may be considered here, the Sāṁkhya theory and that of the Buddhist *kṣaṇikatvavādins*. Both theories have been briefly discussed in *KARA*, Note (72).

According to the *pariṇāmavāda*, that which does not exist cannot come into existence, and that which exists cannot pass out of existence. Therefore it is assumed that the effect lies hidden in the cause, in a latent, seed-like state. What we call coming into being is nothing but the manifestation of what was hidden, and what we call destruction is nothing but the concealment of what was manifest. Thus the difference between a cause and an effect is that between a thing in its latent, potential state, and the same thing in its manifest, actualized state.

This theory, if it forms the framework for *Bh.* Nos. 76-78, can be applied in two ways. It may serve to show the *nityatva* of the cause (or the material cause), but also to show the *nityatva* of the effect (or the product). The first way is applied in *Bh.* No. 76, the second in *Bh.* No. 78. Here the *ākṛti* (of the pots and the gold bangles, etc.) may be considered to be an effect. Since it may be considered to be an effect, it is *nitya*.

According to the *kṣaṇikatvavāda* 'theory of momentariness' (= *kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda*) as adopted by the *vijñānavādins*, what we call a 'thing' comes into being as the effect of its predecessor 'thing', it lasts for a moment only and passes out of existence the next moment as the cause of its successor 'thing'. The rapidity of the cause-effect succession gives us the impression of the continued existence of the 'thing'. In fact, what we call 'things' are mere mental concepts, in the continuous flow of the consciousness which we call mind. In this way also, the *nityatva* whether of the material or the form that is, the impression of continuity we have with regard to both, can be explained.

Thus the discussion on *ākṛti* and *dravya* and their *nityatva* may be divided into two parts. The first part (specifically *Bh.* Nos. 73–75) is based on Mīmāṁsā doctrines which because of their connection with the Veda may be regarded as the older ones. In the second part (*Bh.* Nos. 76–78) the *Bhāṣyakāra,* changing the meaning of the word *dravya,* presumably brings in a philosophical doctrine (the *satkāryavāda* as taught by Sāṁkhya, or a doctrine developed in the Buddhist *vijñānavāda*) from elsewhere, because he thought that this doctrine might be helpful to throw light on the topic of discussion, namely, the *nityatva* of word-meaning. This is the type of procedure which must have earned the *Mahābhāṣya* the name of *sarveṣāṁ nyāyabījānāṁ nibandhanam* ' a composition of all seeds of reasonings ' (*VP.* 2.482 cd, see *ANA,* Introduction, p, xxxii, fn. 222).

79. (*Bhāṣya : Futility of the discussion*)

Or rather, what use do we derive from (saying) that this is *nitya* ' permanent ' (and) that is *anitya* ' non-permanent ' ? By considering that what (ever) is *nitya* is the word-meaning, the following constituent analysis is made : *siddhe śabde arthe saṁbandhe ca* ' when the word, the meaning and (their) relation is permanent '.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' what (ever) is *nitya*'. The meaning of a word is what appears in the mind.[457] Whenever a word is uttered, the mind subsequently assumes the shape of the thing-meant. In this way, meaning is *nitya* ' permanent ' due to the *pravāhanityatva* ' permanence in the form of a continuous flow '.[458]

Nāgeśa

(On) ' what (ever) is *nitya* '. That is to say, what (ever) is *nitya* ' permanent ' among the *vyakti* ' individual thing ', *jāti* ' generic notion ' and *ākṛti* ' common (i.e., generic) shape '.

(Objection :) But how can there be *nityatva* 'permanence' of a hare's horn, etc., because they have no *svarūpa* ' form of their own ' ? (Answer :)

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457. Here Kaiyaṭa seems to refer to the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine of the *vijñānavādins.* According to this school of thought, things have no existence apart from our cognition. They are, in fact, nothing but mental constructs. See S. N. DASGUPTA, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1922, p.146, ' There is nothing which may be called external, but all is the imaginary creation of the mind....which has been accustomed to create imaginary appearances from beginningless time ', and ibid p. 148–49, ' In reality there is nothing which is produced or destroyed, it is only our constructive imagination that builds up things as perceived....and ourselves as perceivers. It is simply a convention (*vyavahāra*) to speak of things as known. Whatever we designate by speech is mere speech- construction....'

458. This is consistent with the assumption that Kaiyaṭa here refers to the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine, because, according to this doctrine, the consciousness called *ālayaviñāna* is a beginningless and endless stream of constructs. See fn. 457.

That is why (Kaiyaṭa) says 'what appears in the mind'. In the *śābdabodha*[459] 'cognition arising from words' the content is not an external object, but a mental object.[460] And that is *pravāhanitya* 'permanent by way of a continuous flow'. This is what (Kaiyaṭa) means to say. And this has been discussed at length in the *Mañjūṣā*.[461]

80. *(Bhāṣya : Introduction to Vt. III, second part)*

But how do you know that the word, (its) meaning, and (their) relation is *siddha* 'permanent'?

Note (32)

The logical sequence of *Vt.* III, first part, and the *Bhāṣya* with the ideal explanation would be as follows :

(1) *Vt.* III, first part.

(2) *Bh.* No. 61+, which explains what the *Vt.* means to say : 'when the relation between a word and its meaning has been established'.

(3) *Bh.* No. 62+, which by way of introduction to *Vt.* III, second part, asks : 'but how do you know that (this relation has been established)'.

(4) *Vt.* III, second part, namely, *lokataḥ* 'on account of (the usage of) people'.

Instead of *Bh.* Nos. 61+–62+, however, what we have is the sequence of *Bh.* Nos. 61–80. In this sequence the attempt is made to introduce the Mīmāṁsā doctrine of the *nityatva* of the word. This has two important consequences, namely, in the first place, the reinterpretation of the word *siddha* in the *Vt.*, and in the second place, the necessity of such a constituent analysis for the word *śabdārthasaṁbandhe* in the *Vt.* that it becomes possible to connect the constituent *śabda* directly with *siddhe*. This is only possible by assuming a *dvandva* cp. construction here.

The question is, why did the *Bhāṣyakāra* take so much trouble ? The answer may be found in what L. Sarup (1920), Introduction to the Nirukta, p. 70, called anti-Vedic scepticism. Attacks on the position of the Veda,

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459. The term *śābdabodha* is explained by the *Nyāyakośa* as *śabdāj jāyamāno bodhaḥ* 'a cognition arising from a word' (*Nyāyakośa* or Dictionary of Technical Terms of Indian Philosophy by MM. Bh. JHALAKIKAR. Revised and re-edited by MM. V. S. ABHYANKAR. *Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series*, No. XLIX, Poona, 1928, p. 873, s.v. *śābdabodhaḥ*). A *śābdabodha* arises, whether the thing-meant is a product of fantasy or not. As a cognition it has a purely mental existence.

460. I.e. bauddha.

461. See the *Vaiyākaraṇa-Siddhānta-Laghu-Mañjūṣā of Nāgeśabhaṭṭa* up to the end of the *tātparya nirūpaṇa*. With the commentary *Ratnaprabhā* and Notes by Pr.Sabhāpati SHARMA Upādhyāya. *The Kashi Sanskrit Series* 163, Varanasi, 1973, p. 203–367.

with which the doctrine of the *nityatva* of the word is mainly concerned, have been known from early days. The names of Kautsa and of Gautama, the Buddha, are wellknown in this respect (see L. Sarup, *op. cit.*, Introduction to the Nirukta, p. 71-78). It may be assumed that in the *Bhāṣyakāra's* days (that is, if we identify him with Patañjali, somewhere between 85 B.C. and 250 A.D.) the impact of Buddhist doctrines had increased to such an extent that a defence of the orthodox position regarding the Veda seemed urgent, even if it meant the re-interpretation of a *Vt.* and adding a sequence of *Bhāṣyas* containing seven alternative and not too convincing answers to the question how *siddha* can mean *nitya*. In this connection it may be noted that the *Nirukta* also mentions an opinion on the *nityatva* of words, or rather of speech. It is the opinion of Audumbarāyaṇa who says (*Nirukta* 1.1) that speech (*vacana*) is *indriyanitya*. L. Sarup in his edition of the *Nirukta* (translation, p. 6) renders the latter word as 'permanent in the organs only', and provides several references (translation, p. 6, fn. 3).

III. (Vārttika, Second part : The relation between word and meaning/thing-meant is established by usage)[462].

On account of (the usage of) the people.

81. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

Because, in daily life, having brought to mind different things[463] (people) use words. They do not put in an effort to make these (words). On the other hand, they do put in an effort to make things which are *kārya* 'to be produced'.[464] For instance, one who needs a pot for some purpose,[465] goes to the house of a potter and says : 'You make a pot. I need a pot for some purpose'.[466] (But)

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462. Here the *NSP* ed. is followed, which takes *lokataḥ* as a separate (part-) *Vārttika*. This appears to be correct, because the *Bhāṣyakāra*, by his question in *Bh.* No. 80 shows that *lokataḥ* is to be connected with *Vt.* III, first part, as the reason for a statement. The Kielhorn ed. (*Mbh.* I, p. 7, line 26) takes *lokataḥ* here as part of the *Bhāṣya*, and starts the following *Vārttika*—like statement (ibid., p. 8, line 5) with another word *lokataḥ*.

How the present part-*Vārttika* may be turned into a complete sentence by supplying the word *jñāyate* 'it is known' is shown by Kaiyaṭa on *Bh.* No. 83.

463. *Artha* in the sense of thing-meant, see fn. 331.

464. *Tāvat* is taken here as a particle indicating emphasis ("do" in 'do use'). A *kārya-bhāva* here is a technical product, like a pot.

465. *Ghaṭena kāryaṁ kariṣyan* literally means 'one who wants to do a job by means of a pot'. That is, one who needs a pot for something. The expression *kāryam* + the future of *kṛ-* + instrumental occurs in *Mbh.* p. 7, line 29, *kāryam etena kariṣyāmi.*

466. Here the *MBD* (p. 29, lines 2-4) has the following beautiful reflection to offer (if, at least the interpretation of *śārikrīḍāvat* is correct, but compare ibid, lines 5-6, (*śukasārikākrīḍāvat*) : 'Thus, if words were produced for purposes of daily life by (grammarians) from Pāṇini onwards, like the play (-ful sound-imitations) of a Maina bird, then an uneducated person would treat able grammarians as his servants'. That is to say, any illiterate would instruct Pāṇini and his worthy successors like so many Maina birds to produce words at command.

one who wants to use words does not go to the house of a grammarian and say : 'You make words. I want to use them'. (On the contrary,) having brought to mind (a thing), without further ado,[467] he uses words.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'On account of (the usage of) the people'. People behave in one way with regard to things which are *kārya* 'to be produced' (but) in a different way with regard to things which are *nitya* 'permanent'. And communication by means of words[468] is based on training in the beginning-less (unbroken) tradition of the usage of the older generation.[469] That is why words, etc. are *nitya* 'permanent'.[470] But pots are brought from somewhere else by people who want to use them for some purpose, and they are seen to be liable to origination and destruction. Words, etc. are not like that.

(On) *tāvaty evārtham* 'having brought to mind different things, withought further ado'. That is to say, having pictured in their mind the thing (intended).[471]

Nāgeśa

(On) '(That is why) words are *nitya*'. That is to say, they are not produced by grammar.

(On) *tāvaty eva* 'without further ado'. That is to say, not having gone to the house of a grammarian at all.

Note (33)

In the present (part-) *Vārttika* the answer to the question put in *Bh.* No. 60 is stated. The question was about the assumptions of grammar with regard to language. *Vt.* III, as a whole, says that the relation between a word and its meaning, in the sense of the thing-meant, is established by the people who use the language, i.e., by the speech-community. The *Bhāṣya* explains that grammar does not produce words like a potter his clay products. The words are already there, ready for use. What grammar does is something different. See *VIBHA*, Introduction, sub 1.1.2, and S. D. Joshi and J. A. F. Roodbergen, " The structure of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* in Historical Perspective " in : *Proceedings of the International Seminar on Studies in the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini*, University of Poona, Pune, 1983, sub 1.1.

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467. *Tāvaty eva.* For a different explanation see Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa.

468. *Śabdavyavahāraḥ*, analysed as *śabdasya vyavahāraḥ*.

469. *Anādivṛddhavyavahāraparaṁparā.* Compare Kaiyaṭa on *Bh.* No. 61.

470. And not *kārya*. Compare fn. 343.

471. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 29, line 5), *buddhau samīkṣya* 'having viewed in his mind'.

82. (*Bhāṣya : Introduction to Vt. IV*)

Then, if the people are the authority with regard to these[472], what is the use of grammar?

IV. (*Vārttika : The task of grammar*)[473]

When (it is assumed that) the use of words is occasioned by the thing-meant, grammar (provides) a restriction (on the use of words) for sake of *dharma* **'religious merit'.**[474]

83. (*Bhāṣya : Explanation*)

When (it is assumed that the use of words is occasioned by the thing-meant, on account of the usage of) the people,[475] grammar provides a restriction (on the use of words) for the sake of *dharma* 'religious merit'.

What is this (thing called) *dharmaniyama* 'restriction for the sake of religious merit'? (The word *dharmaniyama* may be explained as follows :) (In the sense of) *dharmāya niyamaḥ* 'a restriction for religious merit' (we derive) *dharmaniyamaḥ*. Or, (in the sense of) *dharmārtho niyamaḥ* 'a restriction for the sake of religious merit' (we derive) *dharmaniyamaḥ*. Or, (in the sense of) *dharmaprayojano niyamaḥ* 'a restriction aiming at religious merit' (we derive) *dharmaniyamaḥ*.[476]

Kaiyaṭa

Here the *Bhāṣyakāra*, without taking into account the possibility of *ekavākyatā* 'the status of a single sentence',[477] has established three senten-

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472. Probably, with regard to words, meanings and their relation.

473. The word *lokataḥ* is dropped in the translation of what is assumed to be *Vt.* IV, because it is regarded as a necessary part of *Vt.* III, see fn. 462. *Vt.* IV, as assumed here, makes sense as a separate statement without the word *lokataḥ*. The *Vt.* means to say that grammar provides us with the criteria which enable us to distinguish between the correct and the incorrect words.

474. For *dharma* = *puṇya* see fn. 126.

475. *Lokataḥ*, which the *Bhāṣyakāra* reads in the present statment. But see fn. 473.

476. The *Bhāṣyakāra* often paraphrases *caturthīsamāsa* in this way, by offering alternative paraphrases in the way shown here (dative ending, or *-artha*, or *-prayojana*). Compare e.g., *Mbh.* I, p. 13, lines 5-6.

477. The single sentence may be rendered as follows (in the *Bhāṣyakāra's* interpretation followed by Kaiyaṭa) : When (it is assumed that) a word, (its) meaning and (their) relation are permanent, on account of (the usage of) the people, (then) when (it is assumed that) the use of words is occasioned by the thing-meant on account of (the usage of) the people, grammar (provides) a restriction (on the use of words) for the sake of religious merit.

Ekavākyatā and *vākyabheda* are concepts developed in Mīmāṁsā. The *Jaimini-mīmāṁsā-sūtra*, 2.1.46, says *arthaikatvād ekam vākyaṁ sākāṅkṣam ced vībhāge syāt* 'on account of its serving a single purpose (a group of words) forms one single sentence, if,

ces. One sentence is *siddhe śabdārthasaṁbandhe* (supply:) *śāstraṁ pravṛttam* 'when (it is assumed that) the word, (its) meaning and (their) relation is permanent, (grammar starts)'.[478] When the question (is raised): How do you know this ?, the second (sentence) says : *lokataḥ* (supply:) *jñāyate* '(it is known) on account of (the usage of) the people'. The third (sentence), with repetition of (the word) *lokataḥ*, says : *lokato 'rthaprayukte* 'when (it is assumed that the use of word is) occasioned by the thing-meant on account of (the usage of) the people', etc.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'When... the use of words'. By the mention of (the word) *prayoga* 'use' it is said that *dharma* 'religious merit' (comes) from the use (of correct words), not from their mere knowledge.[479]

(*Arthena* means) *ātmapratyāyanāya* 'in order to communicate itself (i.e., the thing-meant)'.[480] (In the sense of) *arthena prayuktaḥ* 'occasioned in order to communicate the thing-meant' (we derive) *arthaprayuktaḥ*.

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on separation, it turns out to show *ākāṅkṣā* "semantic and syntactic incompleteness"'. Compare G. JHA (1942), p. 168, for a more elaborate rendering. This is the definition of the sentence referred to in *VP.* 2.4, *sākāṅkṣāvayavaṁ bhede parānākāṅkṣ śabdakam / karmapradhānaṁ guṇavad ekārthaṁ vākyam ucyate* 'a sentence is said to be :

(1) a group of words which does not require other (words for the completion of its sense), (but),

(2) of which the parts show *ākāṅkṣā*, when separation (is introduced,),

(3) in which the verb is the main element,

(4) which contains qualifying words, and (5) which serves a single purpose'.

Vākyabheda is defined by *Jaiminīyamīmāṁsāsūtra*, 2.1.47, as *sameṣu vākyabhedaḥ* 'when (groups of words are mutually) equal (i.e., independent, because none of them shows expectancy of the other), (then we speak of) *vākyabheda* "different sentences"'. Compare G. JHA (1942), p. 169. In both definitions, *ākāṅkṣā* is regarded as the sentence-criterion. See K. Kunjunni RAJA, "*Ākāṅkṣā* : The main basis of syntactic unity", *The Adyar Bulletin*, Vol. XXI, Madras, 1957, p. 282–295, in particular, p. 287-88, '*Ākāṅkṣā* consists in a word not being able to convey a complete sense in the absence of another word; literally it is the desire on the part of the listeners to know the other words or their meaning to complete the sense. A word is said to have ākāṅkṣā for another, if it cannot without the latter produce knowledge of its interconnection in an utterance.'

In Mīmāṁsā *vākyabheda* is considered to be a *doṣa* 'flaw' in interpretation. See F. EDGERTON (1929), Glossarial Index of Sanskrit words, p. 293, s.v. and *PRA*, fn. 77. Thus, as compared to *vākyabheda*, the assumption of *ekavākyatā* is regarded as the preferred alternative, wherever possible. In the same way, in the interpretation of *Pāṇinisūtras*, *yogavibhāga* 'splitting the rule (into separate rules)' is to be avoided as long as we can manage by the assumption of a single rule.

478. Translation according to the *Bhāṣyakāra*'s interpretation.

479. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 30, lines 15–16). Reference is to the discussion connected with the *Vts* numbered VI–IX in the Kielhorn edition (Mbh. I, p. 10–11), and which is introduced by the question *kiṁ punaḥ śabdasya jñāne dharma āhosvit prayoge* 'but (the question is) whether *dharma* "religious merit" lies in the (mere) knowledge of the (correct) word, or rather in its use'.

480. Here Kaiyaṭa explains the instrumental (*arthena*) as a dative of purpose (*ātmapratyāyanāya*). This is accepted in grammar. See the *SK* on P.2.3.23, which quotes the example *adhyayanena vasati* in the sense of 'he stays in order to study'.

(On) *dharmāya niyamaḥ.* The dative ending conveys *tādarthya* ' (the relation of) being meant for that '.[481] But the cp. (*dharmaniyama*) is to be formed by applying the genitive ending in the sense of relation in general, because *caturthīsamāsa* ' cp.-formation with (a word ending in) the dative case ending' has been prescribed in the sense of the *prakṛtivikārabhāva* ' product-material relation' only.[482]

(On) *dharmārthaḥ.* Since (*niyama*) is for the sake of *dharma* ' religious merit ', *niyama* ' restriction ' itself is conveyed by the word *dharma.* Therefore (*dharma-niyama*) is a *kdh.* cp.[483]

(On) *dharmaprayojanaḥ.* That is to say, (the restriction) is due to *dharma,* which is the domain (assigned) to (the verbal edings called) *lIṄ*, etc.,[484] (and) which is called *niyoga* ' command '.

Nāgeśa

(On) *lokataḥ.* The meaning of this (word) is *lokavyavahārataḥ* ' on account of the usage of people '.

(On) ' *lIṄ*, etc. '. This (has been stated) according to the view adopted by Prabhākara. Because, in his view, the meaning of (the verbal endings called) *lIṄ*, etc. is the *kārya* ' thing to be effected ' in the form of *apūrva.*[485] And that (*apūrva*) only, which prompts a man for its own sake is called *niyoga* ' command'. That (*niyoga*) itself is *dharma*[486]

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481. By P.2.1.36.

482. The point regarding *caturthīsamāsa* or *ṣaṣṭhīsamāsa* is taken from the *MBD* (p. 30, lines 21–24). *Vt.* I on P.2.1.36 restricts *caturthīsamāsa* to instance conveying a product-material relation. Therefore, in the general sense of *tādarthya,* dative cp.-formation is not allowed. *Vt.* III on the same rule says that, if the restriction is accepted, we need an additional rule to include cps like *aśvaghāsa* ' fodder for horses ' and *śvaśrūsuram* ' liquor for mother-in-law '. But *Bh.* No. 15 on P.2.1.36 says that the additional rule is not required, because *ṣaṣṭhīsamāsa* will take care of the examples concerned. See *ATA,* Note (132), and the discussion in K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1972), p. 72–76.

The author of the MBD (p. 30, line 24, p. 31, line 2) says that *dharmaniyama* may be regarded as an *uttarapadalopin* cp. of the *śākapārthiva* type (see *KA,* Note (172)), on the assumption that the constituent *artha* is dropped.

483. Since *niyama* is meant for *dharma,* it is said to be *dharma,* by way of figurative use (*upacāra*). The oft-quoted example is *āyur ghṛtam* ' ghee means long life '. Logically, the relation between ghee and the long life is a *tādarthya*-relation, which may be expressed as *āyurarthaṁ ghṛtam* ' ghee is for the sake of a long life '.

Kaiyaṭa's explanation is not satisfactory, because in scientific language this type of figurative use does not occur.

484. As prescribed by P.3.3.161, 164 and 172 for *lIṄ*, and by P.3.3.173 for *āśīrliṅ.*

485. By *kārya* is meant the effect of the action of sacrifice, which inheres in the sacrificer, and which, in due time, leads him to *svarga.* Since this effect cannot be known by any means of cognition, it is called *apūrva* ' not known before (it is experienced) '. See G. JHA (1942), p. 228–29, for *kārya* and *apūrva,* and F. EDGERTON (1929), Introduction, p. 11, for *apūrva.*

486. Reference is to a basic difference between the views of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara in respect of the meaning of Vedic injunctions as expressed by the suffix *lIṄ*

V. (Vārttika : Illustration)

Like in (the case cf precepts) found in *loka* ' non-ritual literature ' and in the Veda.[487]

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in the relevant verb-forms. The Bhāṭṭa view is summed up in the word *iṣṭasādhanatva* ' being instrumental in gaining the desired end ' (see F. EDGERTON, 1929, paras 328 and 368, where the *iṣṭasādhanatva* is rejected). For every prescribed action there is an incentive in the form of a prospect held out, namely, the obtaining of the desired end. The Prābhākara view, on the other hand, is summed up in the word *niyoga* ' command '. To perform what is prescribed is a must. There is no particular benefit to be gained from the action which may serve as an incentive for its performance. See G. JHA (1942), p. 227–31, mainly from the Prābhākara point of view, and F. EDGERTON (1929), Introduction, p. 5–7, for an analysis of the meaning conveyed by the optative ending, according to Mīmāṃsā, For a short summary of the difference between Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa see also K. Kunjunni RAJA, " Ākāṅkṣā : The main basis of syntactic unity ", The Adyar Library Bulletin, Vol. XXI, Madras, 1957, p. 290–91. On p. 91, fn. 1, reference is made to *Bhagavadgītā*, 2.47, *karmaṇy eva adhikāras te mā phaleṣu kadācana* ' let your effort be directed to action only, never to the benefits (arising from it) '. According to Kunjunni RAJA, this line is reminiscent of Prabhākara's view.

Since Patañjali accepts *dharmaprayojanaḥ niyamaḥ* as a paraphrase of the cp. *dharmaniyamaḥ*, it appears that he regards *dharma* ' religious merit ' as a desired end, and, at the same time, as the incentive to the action of using the correct words. That is to say, he must have accepted what became known later on as the Bhāṭṭa view. This is confirmed by the author of the *MBD* who says (p. 31, line 2) that this, namely, the paraphrase *dharmaprayojanaḥ niyamaḥ*, represents the Mīmāṁsā view. He then (p. 31, lines 2–5) says : ' *dharma* has been absolutely fixed. And it is revealed by (acts) like the *agnihotra* etc. On the other hand, (the act) prompted by that *(dharma)* becomes fruit-bearing. Just as a lord, with a view to the benefit (arising from it) is prompted by the service (rendered) by his servants (to employ servants), in the same way, with a view to yielding a benefit, this restriction (becomes) the prompter of *dharma* " religious merit " '. That is to say, just as the lord sees that the service of his servants does him good, and by that is prompted to employ servants, in the same way, the restriction with regard to the use of correct words results in *dharma* ' religious merii ' and therefore functions as an incentive to use correct words.

Here, apparently, the author of the *MBD* regards *dharma* as an incentive for using correct words. In this respect, like the *Bhāṣyakāra*, he follows the later Bhāṭṭa view. Kaiyaṭa, on the other hand, clearly shows his Prābhākara bias, and, against the *Bhāṣyakāra's* intention, identifies *dharma* with *niyoga*. In other words, the author of the *MBD*, who probably interprets the *Bhāṣya* correctly, says that the desired result, namely, the increase of *dharma*, is an incentive for using correct words, whereas Kaiyaṭa says that the use of correct words is by itself a binding obligation, never mind incentives.

487. In the translation the *Bhāṣyakāra's* alternative interpretation is followed, in which the word *kṛtānteṣu* is supplied. For the translation of this word see fn. 492.

As is clear from the examples quoted in the present *Bhāṣya* and in the next, the *laukika* precepts deal with rules of conduct to be adopted in daily life, whereas the *vaidika* precepts, all of them, relate to sacrifice. Therefore the difference between *loka* and *veda* is assumed to be one between non-ritual (literature) and ritual (literature).

The statement *yathā laukikavaidikeṣu* appears again in *Vt.* III on *Śivasūtra* 2, and in *Vt.* IV on P.1.1.1. The expression *yathā loke* is also used, at least twice (*Vt. V* on p.1.1.6, and *Vt.* II on P.1.3.1). Thus the statement that people from the Deccan are fond of *taddhita*-formations does not seem to be particularly applicable to Kātyāyana on the ground used.

84. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

People from the Deccan[488] are fond of (using) *taddhita* (-formations).[489] Instead of saying *yathā loke vede ca* ' like in non-ritual literature and in the Veda ', they say *yathā laukikavaidikeṣu* ' like in non-ritual literature and in the Veda '.[490]

Or rather, the *taddhita*-meaning is appropriate (here).[491] (The *Vt.* means :) *yathā laukikeṣu vaidikeṣu ca kṛtānteṣu* ' like in precepts found in non-ritual literature and in the Veda '.[492] In non-ritual literature, to begin with, it is stated *abhakṣyo grāmyakukkuṭaḥ abhakṣyo grāmyasūkaraḥ* ' a tame cock and a tame pig should not be eaten '.[493] But what is called *bhakṣya* ' food ' is taken for the appeasement of hunger. And, (going) by this (statement),[494] it is possible to appease hunger by (eating) the meat of a dog, etc.[495] With regard to this, a restriction is made, namely, this may be eaten, that must not be eaten.[496]

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488. The part of the Indian subcontinent south of the Vindhya mountains which are mentioned as the south border of Āryāvarta in *Manu* 2.21.

489. Which are the more resounding wordforms as compared to the corresponding *kṛt*-formations.

490. In this interpretation, *laukika* is taken to mean *loka*, and *vaidika* is taken to mean *veda*. What is left unexplained here is the plural ending of the cp. *laukikavaidikeṣu*.

491. In this interpretation, *laukika* and *vaidika* are taken as adjectival meanings in connection with which a substantive is to be supplied. Here the plural ending of the cp. *laukikavaidikeṣu* can be easily explained.

492. The other of the *MBD* (p. 31, line 13) explains *kṛtānta* as *siddhānta*, which is again explained as *samayagranthasaṁdarbha* ' a composition in the form of a work on precepts '. That is, a *dharmaśāstra*-type of work. The suitable meaning in the *Vt*, however, is rather that of ' precept ', not ' a book on precepts '.

The other possibility is not to supply *kṛtānteṣu*, but *niyameṣu* ' in (the case of) restrictions ', as apparently done by Abhyankar-Shukla (1975), p. 31.

493. Reference is probably to the *Baudhāyanadharmaśūtra* 1.5.1 + 3, which reads *abhaksyāḥ..grāmyāḥ..tathā kukkuṭasūkaram* 'not to be eaten....the tame ones.... similarly, the cock and the pig ' (*The Baudhāyanadharmaśāstra*, edited by E. Hultzsch. *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*. VIII. Band. No. 4. Leipzig 1884. Nachdruck Nendeln 1966, p. 22, Compare *Manu* 5.19, where the tame pig and the cock are also mentioned.

494. *Anena*. The pronoun *idam* always refers back to smoething which has been mentioned earlier. Therefore *anena* can hardly be taken to refer to anything else than the statement just quoted. In this interpretation, *anena* is an instrumental case representing the *karaṇa*, whereas *śvamāṁsādibhiḥ* represents the agent.

In the Marathi translation by V. S. Abhyankar (*Śrimadbhagavatpatañjaliviracita Vyākaranamahābhāṣya*. Mūḷa āṇi marāṭhī bhāṣāntara. Bhāga 1 (adhyāya 1, pāda 1.2). Pune, 1938, p.18), *anena* is taken as the agent (" by someone ") and *śvamāṁsādibhiḥ* as the *karaṇa*.

495. For reference to the eating of dogs see K. Ch. Chatterji (1972), p. 81–82. *Manu* (10.106 and 108) mentions two *ṛṣis* who took to eating dogs to save their lives.

496. Since no statement is required for the appeasement of hunger, because everybody knows that he has to eat in order to kill his hunger, the statement *abhakṣyo*, etc. is regarded as restrictive. That is to say, if one wants to eat at all, one should not eat a tame cock, etc.

In the same way, attraction to women exists because of the sex urge. But one may satisfy the urge equally with a woman fit for cohabitation and a woman not fit for cohabitation. With regard to this, a restriction is made, namely, this one is fit, that one is not.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' fond of (using) *taddhita* (-formation) '. This (word *laukikavaidikeṣu*) is not an incorrect word,[497] but (we must take into account here that) the parts which are located in *loka* and in the Veda can be expressed by the words *loka* and *veda*.[498] On the assumption of the *ādhārādheyabhāva* ' relation of substratum and superstratum ',[499] however, the *taddhita* (-suffix) is used due to the fondness of *taddhita* (-formations). Like someone uses (the word) *vanaspatayaḥ* ' plants ' (but) somebody (else uses) *vānaspatyam*, which ends in a suffix expressing *samūha* ' aggregation '.[500]

(On) ' Or rather '. In this (interpretation) there is no division into parts and a whole. Then what? The word *(laukikavaidika)*, which shows the form of *bhava* ' located (there) ',[501] refers to a *siddhānta* ' work on precepts ', which is different from (the meanings conveyed by the words) *veda* and *loka*. A *laukika (-siddhānta)* ' (work on) wordly (precepts) ' is composed in the form of a *smṛti*, (whereas) a *vaidika (-siddhānta)* ' (work on) Vedic (precepts) ' is composed in the form of a *śruti*.

(On) ' And, (going) by this (statement) '. After (the verbal base) *śak-* ' to be able ' a *kṛtva*-suffix (has been added) in the sense of a general object,[502] which (suffix) is connected with the neuter gender as the general

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497. Pāṇini knows the word *laukika*, which he derives in the sense of *loke viditaḥ* ' known among people (but not found in the Veda) ' (P.5.1.43–44). He has not phrased a separate rule for the word *vaidika*. In fact, this word is derived by *Vt.* I on P. 4.3.60, for which see fn. 31.

498. By saying *lokavedayor bhavā avayavāḥ* ' the parts located/found in the loka and in the *veda* ' Kaiyaṭa indicates that he derives the words *laukika* and *vaidika* uniformly in the sense of *tatra bhavaḥ* (P.4.3.53) ' located/found in that '. The *taddhita*-suffix used here is *ṭhaÑ*. For the complete derivation see Filliozat (1975), p. 101, fn. 2.

Kaiyaṭa further refers to the view that words standing for a part may be used with reference to the whole also. See *Bh.* No. 31 on P.2.2.6 (*TA*, p. 100), where exampler are quoted. One of the examples is *tailaṁ bhuktam* ' the oil has been consumed '. In the present context, *laukika* and *vaidika* are the words standing for parts located in a whole, whereas *loka* and *veda* stand for the respective whole. Conversely, words standing for the whole, like *loka* and *veda*, may be used with reference to the respective parts also.

499. Strictly speaking, if parts are to be expressed, a *taddhita*–suffix must be added after the word standing for the whole, which is the *ādhāra* 'substratum ', in order to convey the sense of ' something located in that (whole) ' *(tatra bhavaḥ)*.

500. *Vānaspatyam* is derived in the sense of *tasya samūhaḥ* ' the aggregation of that ', by P.4.2.37 and P.4.1.85. The suffix is *Ñya*. Here *vanaspati* stands for the part (the superstratum), and *vānaspatya* for the whole (the substratum).

501. That is, which is derived with the help of a suffix prescribed in the sense of *tatra bhavaḥ* (P.4.3.53).

502. And thus we have a passive construction in which no mention is made of the object, by P.3.4.70.

presentation of gender.[503] Then, even if (the question of) feminine gender arises later on, due to the connection with another word, (this gender) being *bahiraṅga* 'extraneous' does not render the *antaraṅgasaṁskāra* 'modification (of the wordform) based on word-internal considerations' ineffective. Therefore (the expression) *śakyam.... kṣut* is correct.[504]

But when one intends to express a particular (grammatical object) already on beforehand, then (the expression) *śakyā....kṣut* is certainly allowed.[505]

And when *kṣudh* 'hunger' is the grammatical object of (the action of) appeasement itself, but (the action of) appeasement (in its turn) is (the grammatical object) of (the action expressed by) *śak-* 'to be able', then (the expression) *kṣudhaṁ pratihantuṁ śakyam* is allowed.[506]

(On) 'because of the sex urge'. (In the sense of) *khedayati* 'it makes (one feel) exhausted' (we derive) *kheda* (i.e.,) *rāga* 'amorous passion'. Or, *kheda* (means) the inability to control one's senses.[507]

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503. For the word *sarvanāman* in this sense see *Mbh.* III, p. 234, line 21, where it is stated that *ekaśruti* is the general representation of accent, and that the neuter gender is the general representation of gender. Literally, *sarvanāman* means 'general designation'.

504. Kaiyaṭa's difficulty is that the fem., word *kṣudh* is construed with the neuter word *śakyam*. We would have expected *śakyā kṣut*. To justify the *Bhāṣyakāra*, Kaiyaṭa sets up the following argument. Suppose, we first derive the form *śakyam*, without thinking of any special grammatical object like *ksudh*. In that case, *śakyam* conveys the sense of a general grammatical object, to express which the neuter is used. Then we connect *śakyam* with the outside word *kṣudh*. A grammatical operation (in our case, the addition of the fem. suffix *ṬāP*) dependent on the connection of two words (in our case, *śakya* and *kṣudh*) is regarded as *bahiraṅga* 'extraneous' with regard to the operation (in our case, P.7.1.24) which led to the formation of the word *śakyam* by itself. In relation to the *bahiraṅga* operation, the latter operation is *antaraṅga*, that is, based on word-internal considerations only. Being *antaraṅga*, it prevails over the *bahiraṅga* operation, which requires connection with an outside word. The result is that the connection of the word *kṣudh* with the word *śakyam* cannot produce any change in the wordform *śakyam*.

Here Kaiyaṭa appears to adopt the *padasaṁskārapakṣa*, to justify the construction. In the *vākyasaṁskārapakṣa* this construction can hardly be justified. For the two *pakṣas* see *VIBHA*, Introduction, p. i–vi.

Compare further the observations made in this connection by K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1972), p. 78–81.

505. Thus the question of *padasaṁskārapakṣa* and *vākyasaṁskārapakṣa*, according to Kaiyaṭa, is a mere matter of *vivakṣā*. But see *VIBHA*, Introduction, sub 1.1.3.

506. In constructions involving forms in *tumUN* (and *Ktvā*) the point is often made by commentators that one and the same thing may be regarded as the grammatical object of two actions, namely, the one expressed by the form ending in *tumUN* or the one expressed by the main verb. In the present context, *kṣudh* may be regarded as the object of *śak-* or of *pratihantum*. In the first alternative, *kṣudh* must be used in the nominative, because its grammatical function of *karman* is *abhihita* '(already) expressed', namely, by the *kṛtya*-suffix in *śakya*. That gives us *kṣut pratihantuṁ śakyā*. In the second alternative, *kṣudh* must be used in the accusative, because its grammatical function is *anabhihita* 'not (already) expressed'. That gives us *kṣudhaṁ pratihantum śakyam*. The construction of an invariable *śakyam* with a masc. or fem. agent has been noted by J. SPEYER, *Sanskrit Grammar*, Leiden. 1882, para 388. Its grammatical explanation is not clear.

507. Both explanations have been taken from the *MBD* (p. 32, lines 3–4).

85. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation continued)*

In the Veda, certainly, also, it is stated *payovrato brāhmaṇo yavāgūvrato rājanyaḥ āmikṣāvrato vaiśyaḥ* ' a brahmin observes the vow of living on milk, a *kṣatriya* of living on gruel, a *vaiśya* of living on *āmikṣā* ' panīr '.[508] But what is called *vrata* ' vow ' is observed for the sake of taking food. And, (going) by this (statement), it is possible to observe a vow of living on rice and meat also. With regard to this, a restriction is made.[509]

Similarly, it is stated *bailvaḥ khādiro vā yūpaḥ syāt* ' the post (to which the sacrificial animals are tied) should be of *bilva* wood or of *khadira* wood '.[510] But what is called *yūpa* ' sacricial post ' is taken for the sake of tying the sacrificial animals to it. And, (going) by this (statement), it is possible to tie the animals to any piece of wood, having raised it up or not.[511] With regard to this, a restriction is made.

Similarly, when the potsherds have been put near the fire, the Vedic formula *bhṛgūṇām aṅgirasāṁ gharmasya tapasā tapyadhvam* ' be you heated with the heat of the sweat of the Bhṛgu's and the Aṅgirasas ' is recited.[512] Even without the formula, the fire, whose action is to burn, heats the potsherds. And with regard to that, a restriction is made, namely, that when it is being done in this way,[513] it leads to *abhyudaya* ' bliss (in the form of *svarga*) '.

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508. *Panīr* is a soft, white, non-salty kind of cheese known all over North India like cottage cheese. It is prepared of boiled milk to which a coagulant has been added and from which the watery part has been removed.

The question is found, with a variation, in the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, 6.2.5, and translated by Keith (*The Veda of the Black Yajus School* entitled *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, Part 2 : *Kāṇḍas* IV–VII. Translated..by A. B. KEITH, H.O.S. Vol. 19, Cambridge, Mass. 1914 (p. 506) as ' Gruel is the drink of the Rājanya....Curds (is the drink) of the Vaiśya.... Milk (is the drink) of the Brahmin..'.

509. Namely, that the brahmins concerned are not supposed to live on anything other than milk. The ritual is that of the Soma sacrifice.

510. Compare *Aitareyabrāhmaṇa* 2.1, where it is stated (*The Aitereya Brahhmanam of the Rigveda* containing the earliest speculations of the brahmans on the meaning of the sacrificial prayer and on the Origin, Performance, and Sense of the Rites of the Vedic Religion. Edited, Translated, and Explained by M. HAUG. Vol. II, Translation, with Notes, Bombay, 1863, p. 73) ' He who desires heaven, ought to make his Yūpa of Khādira wood. ....) He who desired food and wishes to grow fat ought to make his Yūpa of Bilva wood.' The symbolic meaning of putting the *yūpa* upright, point turned upwards, is explained ibid., p. 72–73.

511. A *paśu* may be tied to a post which lies down or to a post which is standing.

512. *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, 1.1.7 (which omits the word *gharmasya* ' of the sweat. ' The trans–by Keith (work quoted in fn. 508, Vol. I, p. 7) reads : ' Be ye heated with the heat of the Bhṛgus and the Aṅgirasas '. The items addressed are the potsherds.

513. The idea is that, although the fire will heat the potsherds anyway, one has to utter the *mantra*, because otherwise *abhyudaya* is lost. According to Keith (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, from the heated potsheds (*kapālas*) a pot or plate is made. This is wrong.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) *payovrataḥ* (etc.). On the supposition that one feels desirous (of taking food), we have a *niyama* ' restriction ' in the form of *paya eva vratayati* ' one takes the vow of living on milk only ', and not a *vidhi* ' injunction '. The reason is that if one does not feel desirous (of taking food) there is no ground (for taking food) '.[514]

86. (*Bhāṣya : Conclusion*)

In the same way here also, when meaning can be understood equally from correct words and incorrect words,[515] a restriction is made for *dharma* ' religious merit ', namely, that meaning is to be conveyed by correct words only, not by incorrect words, (because) if it is being done in this way, (the use of words) leads to *abhyudaya* ' happiness (in the form of *svarga*) '.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' equally '. Although incorrect words are not expressive of meaning directly, they convey meaning through the intervention of correct words which are brought to mind.[516] But (according to) some, incorrect

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514. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 32, lines 8–9). If the statement *payovrato brāhmaṇaḥ*, etc. would be interpreted to mean that, in a given ritual, the brahmins concerned must live on mlik, which is to be taken at set times, whether they feel hungry or not the statement would have the character of a *vidhi* ' injunction '. But it does not mean that. The intention of the statement is that, if the brahmins concerned feel hungry and want to take food, they must take milk only. Therefore *payovrato brāhmaṇaḥ*, etc. is a *niyama*. For a discussion on *niyama* and *vidhi* see Note (19).

515. *Śabda* and *apaśabda* are taken as *jātyekavacanam* ' a singular indicating class (P.1.2.58).

516. The *pūrvapakṣa* implied in Kaiyaṭa's comment may be reconstructed as follows : The *Bhāṣya* says that correct and incorrect words equally convey meaning. But the *pūrvapakṣin's* view is that incorrect words are not directly *vācaka* 'expressive of meaning'. They are *vācaka* only through the intervention (*vyavadhāna*) of correct words. For instance, when somebody says *gāvī*, we understand the meaning intended, only because *gāvī* reminds us of *gauḥ*, which is the correct word, and from *gauḥ* we understand the meaning directly. So how can the *Bhāṣyakāra* say that meaning is understood from both equally ?

In answer to this, Kaiyaṭa points out that the *Bhāṣyakāra* does not speak about the way in which we understand, but only about the result. The result is equal in both cases. The issue at the back of the argument is, of course, the relation of the vernaculars (generally indicated as *apaśabda*) and Sanskrit.

Kaiyaṭa's reference is to *VP*. 1.180 (= 1.152, ed. K. A. Subramania IYER). The text says *evaṁ sādhau prayoktavye yo 'pabhraṁśaḥ prayujyate / tena sādhuvyavahitaḥ kaścid artho ' bhidhīyate* ' in the same way, by the *apabhraṁśa* (-word), which is used instead of the correct (word), a particular meaning is conveyed through the intervention of the correct (word) '. The *vṛtti* adds that here we have a case of *anumāna* ' inference ' : from the incorrect word we infer the correct word, from the correct word we infer the meaning, just like from smoke we infer the occurrence of fire.

We note that the *VP* uses the word *apabhraṁśa*, whereas Kaiyata speaks of *apaśabda*. Apparently, the terms are felt to be interchangeable by Kaiyaṭa.

words have come to be received on account of tradition, (and) they convey meaning without causing (people) to remember the correct words at all.[517]

Still others think that, like correct words, the incorrect words also are directly expressive of meaning.[518]

Nāgeśa

(On) 'if it is being done in this way' in the *Bhāṣya*. That is to say, when (words) are uttered on the basis of knowledge of grammar.

VII

(SECTION DEALING WITH *APRAYUKTA* 'NON-USED' WORDS)

87. *(Bhāṣya : Introduction to Vt. VI)*[519]

(The *Vārttikakāra* says) *asty aprayuktaḥ*. (That is to say,) words which are not in use do exist.[520] For instance, *ūṣa* 'you

517. Reference is to *VP*. 1.181 (= 1.153, ed. K. A. Subramania IYER). The text says *pāraṁparyād apabhraṁśā viguṇeṣv abhidhātṛṣu / prasiddhim āgatā yena teṣāṁ sādhur avācakaḥ* 'in the case of speakers (however,) who lack refinement, apabhraṁśa (words) have gained currency through tradition, so that for them (it is) the (corresponding) correct (word) which is not *vācaka* "expressive of meaning"'. The *vṛtti* explains that women, *śūdras* and *caṇḍālas* are in the habit of using *apabhraṁśa* words, and that these words are also popular with people who are drunk. The sad result is that in *vyavahāra* 'daily communication' the *apabhraṁśa* words are mainly used. For these people the non-correct word is *vācaka* 'expressive (of meaning)', and it is the meaning of the correct word which is established by inference.

After this stanza in the *VP*, the stanza beginning with *daivī vāg* follows, For its first line see fn. 317. This line says that divine speech, i.e., Sanskrit, has been spoilt by bungling speakers. The second line then says *anityadarśīnāṁ tv asmin vāde buddhiviparyayaḥ* 'but those who think that words are *anitya* "non-permanent" have the opposite idea with regard to this point of controversy'. Here the *vṛtti* explains that the *anityavādins* do not believe that the use of correct words results in *dharma* 'religious merit'. They rather think that the decision regarding the correctness of a word is like a convention adopted by wrestlers. They further hold that the whole of correct words is *prākṛta* in the sense of *prakṛtau bhavaḥ* 'located/found in *prakṛti* 'original matter', and that afterwards changes have been introduced by people having different ideas, by means of accent, *saṁskārv* grammatically processing words' and all that. See also fn. 315.

518. In this view, the vernaculars are graded equally with Sanskrit. This view has not been mentioned in the *VP*, but it has been stated by the *MBD* (p. 32, lines 17–18). Here the text says : '....incorrect words *(apaśabdas)* also, like correct (words), are *vācaka* "expressive (of meaning)". Thus the understanding of meaning is the equal visible result (of the use of both correct and incorrect words). But here (in the case of correct words) there is an *adṛṣṭaṁ phalam* (read thus for *dṛṣṭaṁ phalam*) 'unseen benefit' (and that is *abhyudaya*)'.

519. According to tradition, as followed by the *NSP* edition, the words *asty aprayuktaḥ*, which are taken out from the *iti cet* part of *Vt*. VI, are regarded as a separate *Vt*. The Kielhorn text, which is followed in the translation, regards *asty aprayuktaḥ* simply as part of the *Bhāṣya*. In this connection, the reader is referred to *BDA*, fn. 633, '....it is

(plur.) have dwelt',[521] *tera* 'you (plur.) have cooked',[522] *cakra* 'you (plur.) have made',[523] (and) *peca* 'you (plur.) have cooked'.[524]

So what, if (words) which are not in use do exist?

The difficulty is that[525] you decide the correctness of words on the basis of (their) use.[526] (Therefore words) which are not in use nowadays couldn't be correct.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) *asty aprayuktaḥ*. Since this *smṛti*[527] is based on the use (of words), (and) since (grammar) explains words, even though they are not

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assumed that Patañjali may or may not take off that part of the *Vārttika* which precedes *iti cet*, and separately comment on it, as an introduction to the following *Vārttika*. These statements should be considered to be part of the *Bhāṣya*, and not be taken as separate.... *Vārttikas*'.

For a translation of this and the following passages see R. G. BHANDARKAR, "Development of Language and Sanskrit", First Wilson Lecture, repr. in *A Reader on the Sanskrit Grammarians*, Edited by J. F. STAAL. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1972, p. 89–91.

520. Thus the *Bhāṣyakāra* takes the word *śabdaḥ*, which is supplied in connection with *aprayuktaḥ*, as an instance of *jātyekavacanam* 'singular number expressing a class' (P. 1.2.58).

521. For the derivation see Filliozat (1975), p. 107, fn. 3.

522. The derivation is as follows:

		tṝ	+	*lIṬ*	P.3.2.115	
tṝ	+	*tṝ*	+	*lIṬ*	P.6.1.8	
tṝ	+	*tṝ*	+	*tha*	P.3.4.78	
tṛ	+	*tṛ*	+	*a*	P.3.4.82	
tṝ	+	*tar*	+	*a*	P.7.4.11	
		ter	+	*a*	P.6.4.122	(in this stage P.6.4.120 was applicable, but is prohibited by P.6.4.126 in the case of a*guṇa*-vowel. Therefore a special provision is made by P.6.4.122)
		tera.				

523. The derivation is as follows:

		kṛ	+	*lIṬ*	P.3.2.115
kṛ	+	*kṛ*	+	*lIṬ*	P.6.1.8
kṛ	+	*kṛ*	+	*tha*	P.3.4.78
kṛ	+	*kṛ*	+	*a*	P.3.4.82
ka	+	*kṛ*	+	*a*	P.7.4.66; P.7.4.60
ca	+	*kṛ*	+	*a*	P.7.4.62
ca	+	*kr*	+	*a*	P.6.1.77
cakra.					

524. The derivation follows mainly that of *tera*.

With regard to the four forms *ñṣa*, etc. compare *ATA*, Introduction, p. vii.

525. *Hi.*

526. Reference is to *Vt.* IV.

527. The *vyākaraṇasmṛti*, which remembers the words from usage and then explains them. It is especially the Mīmāṁsakas who regard grammar as a *smṛti*.

in use, (Kātyāyana) fears that (grammar) cannot claim authority (in deciding the correctness of words).

Note (34)

The status of the words *asty aprayuktaḥ* in the present context has been discussed in fn. 519. Taken by itself, this expression may be interpreted in two ways :

(1) there are words which are not in use, and

(2) there are words which are not in use now.

According to (1), grammar derives words which are not used at all in spoken language, whereas, according to (2), grammar derives words which have become obsolete.

However, the difficulty mentioned in the present *Bhāṣya* does not concern the word *aprayuktaḥ* in the expression quoted, but rather the word *asti*. To this word the *Bhāṣyakāra* assigns an emphatic value: *asti* is rendered as *santi vai* 'they do exist', and, in doing so, he introduces the question of existence. Then the difficulty is developed as follows : How can words which are not in use be said to exist? And if they do not exist, and can still be derived by grammar, it means that usage, i.e., words in existence, is no longer the basis of grammar, as was declared by *Vt.* IV. But if usage is no longer the basis of grammar, how can grammar decide the correctness of usage? And if grammar cannot decide the correctness of usage, what remains of the authority of grammar?

88. (*Bhāṣya : Objection*)

To begin with, it is contradictory to say 'words which are not in use do exist'. (Because,) if they exist, they (can) not (be) not in use. But if they are not in use, they do not exist. (To say that) they both exist and are not in use, is contradictory. Precisely while using (them) you say that words which are not in use do exist. And (therefore) which other person of your standing could now be (assumed to be) correct in the matter of the use of words?

Kaiyaṭa

(We do not understand the existence) of words in the same way as the existence of pots, etc. is understood (even) without (their being involved in) a purposive action.[528] Because (words) are always judged to be existing, when they are used for communication.[529] That is why (the author) says '(To begin with,) it' (etc.)

(The words) 'And (therefore) who . . now' (etc.) convey derision.

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528. Like expressed by *ghaṭam ānaya* 'bring the pot'.

529. Kaiyaṭa's observations here are taken from the *MBD* (p. 33, lines 3-5), for which see Note (35).

Nāgeśa

(On) 'And (therefore,) who. . ...now' (etc.). After he himself uses (the words concerned), who can be (assumed to be) *sādhu* (i.e.,) *yogya* 'competent' (as a grammarian), when he uses an expression like *santi cāprayuktāḥ* '(words) which are not in use do exist' ?[530] This is the meaning (of the passage). (The author) means to say that it is contradictory to say (the words) are not in use, because from your use (of them) itself we understand that they are used.

Note (35)

The argument of the present *Bhāṣya* is that *śabdas* 'words' owe their very existence to their use. In that way, words are different from pots, which remain in existence, even when they are not used. Therefore, to say *asty aprayuktaḥ* with regard to *śabdas* is a contradiction. Proof for the argument is found in the opponent's statement itself. Since he actually uses the forms *ūṣā*, *tera*, etc., how can he say that they are not used? He merely defeats himself. Unfortunately, however, the argument of the present speaker is based on the confusion of words quoted and words used, that is, words in use.

In connection with the present *Bhāṣya*, the *MBD* offers four comments, out of which two will be translated here. The first of these comments (*MBD*, p. 33, lines 3–6) has to do with the argument that is contradictory to say that words which are not in use do exist. The translation of the comment is as follows : 'This argument holds good for those objects which are wellknown (to be there, even) without (being involved in) a purposive action. Like a pot, without (being involved in) a purposive action of its own, like bringing water, etc., is wellknown as *siddha* "being there". But this (item called) word is not wellknown as *siddha* "being there" without (being involved in) a purposive action of its own (namely, speaking). (On the contrary,) it assumes existence on the basis of (its) use only. This being so, the type of (statement employed) here is just like (when) somebody (uses words and then says they do not exist) because they are not in use.'

The following comment (*MBD*, p. 33, lines 7–13) concerns the statement 'Precisely while using (them) you' (etc.) in the *Bhāṣya*. It is translated as follows : 'He says *aprayukta* "not in use" with the activity of his speech-organs (in producing the word in question) still going on. (This) bespeaks a use of (fairly) recent origin, (because) this (word) has been used just now. Like (when) somebody says : "I have taken a vow of silence for life. Therefore I don't speak." (But, still, he says it.) In exactly the same way this (is said) by you.

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530. Nāgeśa quotes the opening line of *Bh.* No. 87 with a slight variant : *ca* instead of *vai*.

This being so, if one thinks : " because of (its) non-use (a word does not exist) ", (then) one may think (also, that a word exists) because it is used, in the sense that you use (the word). (But this is wrong.) On the other hand, if you think that these (words) do not exist, because they are not used by somebody else, in the sense that I use (them), but others do not, this is also wrong. Because these words may not be uttered by others, but (this does) not (mean that) they do not exist. Because (there are) many words (which) are not uttered by women. But if your idea is this : " what does it matter whether I utter words ? I am of no account ", (then the *Bhāṣyakāra*) makes his statement in order to cheer you up, in this way : don't have a low opinion of yourself, you are somebody who counts. '

The last part of the *MBD*'s second comment removes some misconceptions which might arise from the statement that in the case of words use and existence are indissolubly bound together, and that, consequently, non-use implies non-existence. One might ask, non-use by whom ? Does the *Bhāṣyakāra* mean to say that a word does not exist if I don't use it, although others do ? Or that a word does not exist, if others do not use it, but I do ? According to the *MBD*, both opinions are wrong. Nor should the *Bhāṣyakāra's* statement be interpreted to mean that the "I" who uses or does not use a particular word is of no account. The reasons for all this will be stated in the next *Bhāṣya* which the author of the *MBD* has anticipated here.

89. (*Bhāṣya : Objection answered*)

This is not contradictory. To begin with, we say that (these words) exist, because those who know grammar prescribe (them) following (the rules of grammar. (But) we say that they are not in use, because they are not used among people.[531] And as regards your statement also, namely, "which other person of your standing could now be (assumed to be) correct in the matter of the use of words ? ",[532] we do not say that we do not use them. Then what (do we say)? (We say that) they are not used among people.

Kaiyaṭa

The answer, however, says that, according to the view of grammar, the existence (of words) is inferred from the fact (that they involve) stems, suffixes, etc. But (this does) not (mean that) they appear in ordinary speech.[533]

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531. *Loke* may mean 'among the people as the speech-community', or 'in ordinary, daily speech'. The choice among these two meanings depends on the context.

532. See *Bh.* No. 88.

533. *Loke.* Kaiyaṭa means to say that derivability in grammar does not necessarily imply being used in ordinary speech.

Note (36)

The objection was that to say *asty aprayuktaḥ* 'words which are not in use do exist' is contradictory. The answer points out that *asti* and *aprayuktaḥ* have different referents. *Asti* refers to forms derivable by and quoted in grammar, whereas *aprayuktaḥ* refers to words not used in daily speech for purposes of communication. Thus *aprayuktaḥ* has to do with the usage of a speech-community, whereas *asti* deals with existence in the sense of derivability or mention in grammar. This is how the contradiction is removed.

The *MBD* (p. 33, lines 14–19) has the following to say: 'What he means is this. Existence is twofold: directly available and based on inference. Among these two, directly available are (forms like) *dādharti* (and) *dardharti*.[534] But (existence) based on inference should be assumed in accordance with the teaching of stems and suffixes. (....) But we have come to this conclusion (of *ānumānikī sattā* "existence based on inference"), because (the forms concerned) have not been written in texts. (On) *santy ete*.[535] Still, they are not used in ordinary speech. That is why we say *aprayuktaḥ* "not in use".[536] But while uttering (them), how can I say *aprayuktaḥ* "not in use"?'. The last sentence of this *MBD*-passage has to do with the argument stated at the beginning of Note (35).

90. (*Bhāṣya : Objection sustained*)

But, sir, isn't it true that you too are one among the people?

91 (*Bhāṣya : Objection removed*)

I am one among the people, but I am not the people.

Kaiyaṭa

(on) '**but I am not the people**'. That is to say, I have not used these (words *ūṣa*, etc.) to convey meaning in the same way people use words to convey meaning.[537] But these words refer to their own form.[538]

VI. (*Vārtitika : Refutation of an objection*)

If (it is argued) that there are (words) which are not in use, (we say, this is) not (so), because of the use of words to refer to a thing-meant.

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534. Reference is to Vedic forms quoted as *nipātanas* in P. 7.4.65. Both forms are derived from the verbal base *dhṛÑ dhāraṇe* (*Dhātupāṭha* 1.948) and not from *dhṛÑ* as stated in the text of the *MBD*.

535. A *daṇḍa* is read after *avasitam* in the text of the *MBD*, because otherwise the statement does not make sense.

536. Reference is to the introductory part of *Vt.* VI.

537. "Meaning" stands for the thing-menant, here as elsewhere.

538. Literally, Kaiyaṭa says that these words have a meaning (*padārtha*) which is their own form. That is to say, they are words quoted.

92. (*Bhāṣya : Explanation*)

If (it is argued) that (words) do exist which are not in use,[539] (we say,) this (is), not (so), Why (not) ? because of the use of words to refer to a thing-meant. (That is to say,) words are used to refer to a thing-meant, and the things-meant of these words exist to refer to which (the words) are used.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' because of the use of words to refer to a thing-meant '. The presence of a thing-meant is indicative of the presence of the word. Because without the word the communication of a thing-meant cannot be justified.

Note (37)

The difficulty is about *aprayukta* words, Patañjali, in *Bh*. No. 87, has quoted examples, *ūṣa, tera,* etc. Clearly, the *Vārttikakāra* and the *Bhāṣyakāra* deny that there are *aprayukta* words. The reason seems to be a very simple one: since there are meanings, that is, things-meant, there must be words to refer to them. So there cannot be *aprayukta* words, pointless words not connected with a meaning. For instance, we know a meaning which can be put as ' you have dwelt '. Since this meaning exists, there must be a word to convey it. Such a word is *ūṣa*. Therefore it cannot be said to be *aprayukta*.

The *MBD* (p. 33, line 22 – p. 34, line 2) comments on the portion *na arthe śabdaprayogāt* ' not (so), because of the use of words to refer to a thing-meant ' in the *Vt*. The translation is as follows: ' It is known that objects like man, etc. exist. But a word must be closely associated with the main thing (i.e., the thing-meant), because a word is subordinate to the other thing, namely, the thing-meant. Or alternatively, the understanding of a thing-meant serves to infer the existence of the (corresponding) word. This being so, just as the words *svarga* " dwelling-place of the blessed ", *apūrva* " the mysterious force which connects a sacrifice with its result " and *devatā* " deity " being understood serve to infer the existence of the things-meant which are not seen ever, in the same way, why not assume that a thing-meant being understood serves to infer the existence of a word ? '. Thus Bhartṛhari offers two explanations. The first posits a main-subordinate relation between the thing-meant and the corresponding word. The second says that words possess an existence which is based on inference. Words are not primary data of experience like the things-meant, but we reach them only through the medium of the things-meant. This second explanation is also the one of the *Bhāṣyakāra* and of Kaiyaṭa, and presumably the one given by the *Vārttikakāra*.

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539. Here, although formally the *Bhāṣyakāra* repeats the words of the *Vt*., he must have interpreted them as he did before, in *Bh*. No. 87.

Attention may be drawn here to *VP.* 2.119 which offers a verbal similarity at any rate with the *MBD*-passage just referred to. The text says *asty arthaḥ sarvaśabdānām iti pratyāyyalakṣaṇam / apūrvadevatāsvargaiḥ samam āhur gavādiṣu* 'a thing-meant is there for all words. This is the defining characteristic of meaning to be conveyed. In the case of words like *go* 'cow' they say it is the same as with *apūrva, devatā* and *svarga*'. That is to say, just as we assume things-meant for the words *apūrva*, etc., so also in the case of *go*, etc.

VII. (Vārttika : A cause of aprayoga 'non-use' (of words))

Non-use (of words) due to the fact that usage has become different.

93. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

The non-use, indeed, of these words[540] is appropriate. Why? Because of the fact that usage has become different. (That is to say,) because (people) use other words to express the meaning conveyed by these words. To illustrate, (people use) *kva yūyam uṣitāḥ* in the sense of the word *ūṣa*.[541] (Or people use) *kim yūyaṁ tīrṇāḥ* in the sense of *tera*.[542] (Or people use) *kiṁ yūyaṁ kṛtavantaḥ* in the sense of *cakra*.[543] (Or people use) *kiṁ yūyaṁ pakvavantaḥ* in the sense of *peca*.[544]

Kaiyaṭa

A different (participant in the discussion) says that (what we want) can be established in a different way, with (the words) 'The non-use' (etc.).[545] Since other words are there expressing these meanings, their inference is not justified.[546] Even though *uṣita* is not synonymous with *ūṣa*, because we do not understand a special meaning like *parokṣatā* '(the speaker) not being a witness (of the action stated)',[547] still, in order to convey that *(parokṣatā)* (the word *uṣita*) is used in the company of other words.[548]

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540. Mentioned in *Bh.* No. 87.

541. Literally, *kva yūyam uṣitāḥ* means 'where did you (pl.) live ?' The significance of the words *kva* and *yūyam* here is brought out by Kaiyaṭa.

542. Literally, *kiṁ yūyaṁ tīrṇāḥ* means 'what did you (pl.) cross ?'.

543. Literally, *kiṁ yūyaṁ kṛtavantaḥ* means 'what did you (pl.) do ?'.

544. Literally, *kiṁ yūyaṁ pakvavantaḥ* means 'what did you (pl.) cook ?'.

545. Since *Vt.* VII appears to justify the existence of *aprayukta* words, Kaiyaṭa assumes a different speaker for this *Vt.*, that is, different from the one who took the stand formulated by Vt. VI.

546. That is to say, since expressions like *kva yūyam uṣitāḥ* are used to express the meanings 'you have dwelt', etc., we cannot infer the existence of forms like *ūṣa* on the basis of these meanings, as was done by *Vt.* VI and the corresponding *Bhāṣya.*

547. Reference is to P.3.2.115. Kaiyaṭa borrows his remark from the *MBD* (p. 34, lines 5–6).

548. Like *kva* and *yūyam* indicating the fact that the speaker was not an eyewitness, and indicating the 2nd person pl. respectively.

Note (38)

It may be helpful at this stage to have a look at the sequence of the *Vts.* so far, in order to determine the position taken by *Vt.* VII. *Vts.* III–VI then present the following picture : (III) When (it is assumed that) the relation between a word and (its) meaning has already been established on account of (the usage of) the people (grammar starts); (IV) When (it is assumed that) the use of words is occasioned by the thing-meant, grammar (provides) a restriction (on the use of words) for the sake of religious merit; (V) Like in (the case of precepts) found in *loka* ' non-ritual literature ' and in the Veda; (VI) If (it is argued) that there are (words) which are *aprayukta* ' not in use ', (we say, this is) not (so), because of the use of words to refer to a thing-meant. Now *Vt.* VII acknowledges the existence of *aprayukta* words and even states the cause : usage has changed As explained by the *Bhāṣya*, words which were in use have been replaced by other words and expressions. It follows that *Vt.* VII reinforces the existence of *aprayukta* words denied by *Vt.* VI, but also slightly changes the meaning of the term *aprayukta*. In Vt. VI *aprayukta* means ' not in use ', because the word concerned has no referent. In *Vt.* VII *aprayukta* means ' no longer in use ', because the word concerned has been replaced.

It may be noticed that especially *Vts.* III and IV state some principles of grammar which can be put as follows :

(1) Meaning, that is, the sum-total of things-meant is basic, because it determines the use of words,

(2) The relation between the things-meant and the words used to refer to them lies outside the domain of grammar,

(3) In relation to usage, grammar is secondary : it merely imposes a restriction on the use of words by telling us which are the correct words, namely, the words derivable by rules of grammar.

The *Aṣṭādhyāyī* derives words by means of general and special rules. As regards their attestation, usage may show gaps in the case of words derived by general rules, but the words derived by special rules must have been attested somewhere. In any case, the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* does not derive totally new words. It does not add new, unused lexical items to the stock of available items. It does not invent words, but it bases its analysis and subsequent derivation on words in spoken use among the speech-community and used in available literature at a given point of time. Now we see that grammar derives words like *ūṣa*, which are *aprayukta*. *Vt.* VI denies that *ūṣa* is *aprayukta*, because it has a referent. People know a meaning which can be put as ' you have dwelt '. The word to convey this meaning is *ūṣa*. *Vt.* VII admits that *ūṣa* is *aprayukta*, because it has been replaced by another expression. That is to say, the meaning ' you have dwelt ' must still have a word or expression to convey it. But this word or expression is not necessarily *ūṣa*.

In this connection a few more considerations are offered regarding the nature of Sanskrit as a language in development. The examples quoted by Patañjali in *Bh.* No. 93 are usually taken as indicative of a linguistic change in the development of spoken Sanskrit as a living language : perfect forms are discarded in the favour of participle forms. But the difficulty is precisely that we do not know in which sense Sanskrit can be called a spoken language in Patañjali's days, roughly around the beginning of our era. In any case, it was not a spoken language like the prakrit vernaculars used by brahmins and non-brahmins alike for everyday purposes. It is clear also that Sanskrit was not such a spoken language already much earlier, namely, at the time when the Buddha started to preach his sermons in the vernacular to reach the common man. This must have happened at a time not very far removed from that of Pāṇini. If this is accepted, one may wonder what was the linguistic base of Sanskrit in Pāṇini's days, and whether Sanskrit has ever been more than a learned language and a language to be learnt in *pāṭhaśālās* by an elite. If these considerations carry any weight, it seems possible to view the change-over from perfect forms to participle forms in an altogether different light. It need not be taken as a linguistic change testifying to the nature of Sanskrit as a language still living in Patañjali's days, but it could be taken as a change testifying to the easy-going nature of those who never possessed a native speaker's ability, and who preferred the easier participle forms to the more difficult perfect forms.

The *MBD* (p. 34, lines 3–5) comments on *Vt.* VII as follows : 'in connection with the reason mentioned for the existence (of these words *ūṣa*, etc.) in the form of meaning without words (read : *aśabdakasyārthasya* for *aśabdaḥ kasyārthasya*, if we say that there are no (words) expressive of these meanings, we would have accepted the existence of these (words *ūṣa*, etc.). But since (other words and expressions like *kva yūyam uṣitāḥ*) are there, this (argument that since the meaning exists and is known, the corresponding word must be there, and therefore *ūṣa*, etc. must be there) cannot be the reason '.

VIII. (Vārttika : Illustration)

(Treatment) like a Soma-sacrifice continued for a long time[549] in connection with (a word which is) ***aprayukta*** **' not in use (any more) '.**

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549. *Satrras* are sacrificial sessions which last from 12 days to 1000 years. One current subdivision of *sattras* is called *sāṁvatsarika* ' lasting for a year (or more) '. These *sāṁvatsarika sattras* are all of them modelled upon the *gavāmayana* sacrifice. See. P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. II, Part II. Poona. 1941, p. 1239, 1245–46. The *Kātyāyanaśrautasūtra* (*The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series*, Nos.415, 434, 447, 448, 449, 456. Benares City 1933–1937, p. 13, 821) 1.6.17–27, mentions different opinions on the subject of the performance of the 1000 year sessions, and the alternative explanation of *saṁvatsara* here as *ahan* ' day '. The same work, 24.5.23–24, ascribes the performance of the 100 year and the 1000 year sessions to supernatural beings, namely, the Sādhyas and the Visvasṛjas. While commenting on *Jaiminisūtra*, 6.7.13.31, Śabara notes that, alternatively, the word

94. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

Although (these words) are *aprayukta* 'not in use (any more)', they must necessarily be prescribed by means of rules, like (what happens in the case of) a Soma-sacrifice continued for a long time. To explain, nowadays nobody engages in Soma-sacrifices continued for a long time, extending over 100 or 1000 years. Merely thinking that (to continue) the tradition of the ancient sages (results in) *dharma* 'religious merit', the ritualists prescribe them in the *(kalpa-) śāstra.*

Kaiyaṭa

Even if (words) are not used nowadays, instruction (as to how to derive them) should be given, because they have been used previously. That is why (the author says) 'in connection with (a word which is) *aprayukta* 'not in use (any more)'.

(On) 'the tradition of the ancient sages'. That is to say, the study of the Veda.[550]

Note (39)

The point of the *Vt.* is that just as the textbooks of the *yājñikas* still prescribe sacrifices from a hoary past, so also grammar contains rules to derive words which are not in use any more today. Grammar also includes older strata of language.

The *MBD* (p. 34, line 8) says that the author establishes the existence of these words like *ūṣa* by reference to an earlier period.

IX. (Vārttika : Alternative explanation of aprayukta)

All (of these words which one may think of as *aprayukta* 'not in use' are, in fact, used) in other regions.

95. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

All of these words (which one may think of as *aprayukta* 'not in use') are, in fact, used in other regions.

Kaiyaṭa

What (the author) means amounts to this. The use or non-use (of words) is not determined by just somebody's statement, but by a statement of the *śiṣṭas* 'learned brahmins' only.[551]

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saṁvatsara 'year' in *sahasrasaṁvatsara* may be taken in the sense of *divasa* 'day', an interpretation already allowed by *Jaiminisūtra* 6.7.13.40 (*Srimajjaiminipraṇīte Mīmāṁsādarṣane ....caturtho bhāgaḥ. Ānandāśrama-saṁskṛtagranthāvaliḥ*, No. 97. Poona, 1932, p. 1502, 1506).

550. Kaiyaṭa's difficulty, as explained by Nāgeśa, is that the *dīrghasattras* prescribed in the *kalpasūtras* do not really constitute the *ṛṣisaṁpradāya* 'tradition of the ancient sages'. Rather it is the recitation and the study of the Veda.

551. The translation here follows the order of the *NSP* edition. But it seems quite possible that Kaiyaṭa's comment belongs to *Vts.* VII and VIII. What Kaiyaṭa wants to

Note (40)

The historical perspective adopted by the *Vārttikakāra* in *Vts.* VII and VIII does not explain everything about *aprayukta* words, even if *aprayukta* is taken in the sense of ' not in use nowadays '. Because present-day usage also shows variations: words may be *prayukta* in some region, but *aprayukta* elsewhere. Therefore, when dealing with the question of *aprayukta* words, regional variation must also be taken into account. That is why the *Vārttikakāra* switches from the historical perspective of language to what looks like a geographical one : words not used in a particular linguistic area (i.e., *aprayukta* words) may be used in another area.

The *MBD* (p. 34, lines 14–15) has the following interesting comment: ' But ritualists, who have a tradition of long standing,[552] even today use *ari* for *hari.* Still, we say that all of these (words) are used in a different region '.[553]

96. (*Bhāṣya : Objection*)

But they are not at all known.[554]

97. (*Bhāṣya : Answer*)

An effort should be made to know (them). The area in which words are used[555] is vast. The earth with its seven continents, the

point out is that, as regards the use or non-use of words, the *śiṣṭaprayoga* ' usage of the *śiṣṭas* ' only is authoritative.

The *Bhāṣya* on P.6.3.109 (*Mbh.* III, p. 174, lines 4–10), in a wellknown passage, gives a description of the *śiṣṭas.* They are known from their behaviour and from their dwelling-place, Āryāvarta. Those brahmins who live in this home of the Āryas, who store only so much cereals as can be contained in, or measured by one *kumbhī* ' earthen vessel ', who are not greedy, who are *agṛhyamāṇakāraṇa,* and who are, by nature past masters of any science, those noble persons are the *śiṣṭas.* Manu 4.7, in a passage dealing with the duties of the householder, uses the word *kumbhīdhānyaka,* translated by G. BÜHLER (*The Laws of Manu, SBE,* Vol. XXV, Oxford 1886, p. 129) as : ' He may....possess....a store filling a grain-jar '. For different opinions on the quantity stored see Bühler, ibid., p. 129, note on stanza 7. For *agṛhyamāṇakāraṇa* compare P. THIEME, "The interpretation of the learned", in : *Kleine Schriften.* Teil 2. Wiesbaden 1971, p. 610, n. 12, who mentions several translations. For parallel passages in *dharmaśāstras* compare P. V. KANE, *Hisotory of Dharmaśāstra,* Vol. II, Part II. Poona. 1941, p. 971. V. S. AGRAWALA, *India as known to Pāṇini.* Second Edition. Varanasi, 1963, p. 354, deals with the *śiṣṭas* in the context of Sanskrit as a spoken language.

552. *Ciraṁ jīvantaḥ* literally means ' who live for a long time '.

553. According to the author of the *MBD, ari* is a regional variant of *hari.* More probably, *ari* is a misunderstood Vedic relic, for which see P. THIEME, *Der Fremdling im Ṛgveda. Abh. für die Kunde des Morgenlandes,* Bd. XXIII, Nr. 2. Leipzig 1938. Nachdruck Nendeln 1966, 2. Kapitel.

554. The implication is that therefore the words concerned are *aprayukta* ' not used (at all) '.

555. *Prayogaviṣaya* in *śabdasya prayogaviṣayaḥ* is an instance of *asamarthasamāsa*. Here *śabdasya,* an outside word, is to be connected with the first cp.-constituent *prayoga.*

three worlds, the four Vedas with their ancillaries[556] and Upaniṣads, divided in various ways, the 101 recensions of the *adhvaryus*,[557] the Sāmaveda of the 1000 paths,[558] the twenty-one-fold *bāhvṛcya*,[559] the nine-fold Veda of Atharvan,[560] the *vākovākya*,[561] *itihāsā*,[562] *purāṇa*,[563] (and) the science of medicine. So vast is the area in which words are used. Without taking into consideration that the aıea in which words are used is so vast, to say that there are words which are *aprayukta* 'not in use' is sheer foolhardiness only.

Kaiyaṭa

The word *vākovākya* refers to a text in the form of question and answer.[564] Like *kíṁsvid āvápanaṁ mahát, bhū́mir āvápanaṁ mahát* 'what is a big vessel? The earth is a big vessel'.[565]

Itihāsa (means) the narration of stories from the past.[566] *Purāṇa* (means) the enumeration in order of the genealogy (of kings), etc.[567]

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556. For an enumeration of the *vedāṅgas* see J. GONDA, *Vedic Literature. A History of Indian Literature.* Vol. I, Fasc. 1. Wiesbaden 1975, p. 34.

557. The Yajurveda, which in this enumeration of separate Vedas takes the first place. For the surviving five recensions, three for the Black and two for the White Yajurveda, see Gonda, *op. cit.*, p. 324, 327–28.

558. Traditionally, this is taken to refer to 1000 *saṁhitās*, see Gonda, *op. cit.*, p. 313. However, Patañjali does not use the word *śākhā* here (like in the case of the *adhvaryus*), nor does he use a formation in *-dhā* (like in the case of the *bāhvṛcya* and the Atharvaveda), which refer to recensions. Instead, he uses the word *-vartman* 'way'. It is therefore suggested that *sahasravartman* refers to the musical execution of the Sāmaveda which is known to show a great variation in different parts of India. See also Gonda, op. cit., p. 315–16.

559. A *bahvṛca* is a Ṛgvedin. P.4.3.129 prescribes the addition of the suffix *Ñya* to *bahvṛca* in the sense of *tasyedam* 'this belongs to him' (P.4.3.120). Kātyāyana, in *Vt.* XI on P.4.3.120 restricts the addition of *Ñya* to words signifying a *caraṇa* 'Vedic school' to the meanings *dharma* 'the way of life followed by those belonging to a particular Vedic school' and *āmnāya* 'Veda'.

560. See Gonda, *op. cit.*, p. 272, for the two surviving recensions.

561. The riddle-literature. See Gonda, *op. cit.*, p. 304, 408.

562. The collection of popular stories and legends from the past. See Gonda, *op. cit.*, p. 407. More specifically, *itihāsa* refers to the great epic of India. Yāska, in the *Nirukta* 2.10, uses the word *itihāsa* to refer to the legend of Devāpi and Śantanu.

563. See P. V. KANE, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. V, Part II. Poona. 1961, p. 883–912; and for a brief reference Gonda, *op. cit.*, p. 407–408.

564. Kaiyaṭa takes his comment straight from the *MBD* (p. 34, lines 15–16).

565. *Vājasaneyi-Mādhyandina-Śukla Yajurveda-Saṁhitā*. Ed. S. D. SANTABALEKAR, Aundhrājdhānī 1928, p. 119 (= *VS.* 23.45 d, reading *kim u* for *kiṁsvid*, and 46 d; reference in Filliozat, p. 115).

566. Kaiyaṭa takes his comment straight from the *MBD* (p. 34, line 16).

567. Reference is to the wellknown definition *purāṇaṁ pañcalakṣaṇam* 'a *purāṇa* contains five typical topics', *Amarakośa*, 1.6.5 d.

98. (*Bhāṣya : Regional variations in usage*)

In this very vast area of use of words particular words are shown (to be in use) in a particular definite area. To illustrate, (the verbal base) *śav-*, which denotes the action of moving,[568] is used in the Kamboja-country only.[569] The Āryas[570] use it in speech in the sense of *vikāra* ' decomposition ', (compare) *śava* ' corpse '. (The verbal base) *hamm-* (is used in the sense of moving) in the Surāṣṭra-country,[571] (and the verbal base) *raṁh-* (is used in the same sense) in the Prācya-country and in Madhya (deśa).[572] But the Āryas use (the verbal base) *gam-* only (in the sense indicated). In the sense of *lavana* ' cutting ' (the verbal base) *dā-* (is used) in the Prācya country, (but only the *kṛdanta* form) *dātra* ' sickle ' in the Udīcya-country.[573]

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568. Böhtling, in his edition of the *Dhātupāṭha*, 1.761, mentions *śavA gatau*, but adds that this base does not belong here. No reason is stated. The *Nighaṇṭu*, 2.14 (L. SARUP's ed. of the *Nighaṇṭu* and *Nirukta*, text, p. 11, line 3, and p. 12, line 4), mentions *śavati* as a *gatikarman* ' (verbal base) conveying the action of going '. According to. P. THIEME's review of T. BURROW, *The Sanskrit Language*, London 1955, in *Kleine* Schriften. Teil 2. Wiesbaden 1971, p. 712–13, *śav-* is of Iranian origin the nearest Sanskrit base being *cyu-*.

569. The name Kamboja is mentioned in P.4.1.175. V. S. AGRAWALA, *India as known to Pāṇini*. Second Edition. Varanasi 1963, p. 38, locates Kamboja in the region of Badakshan–Pamir. Compare ibid., p. 48–49, and B. N. PURI, *India in the time of Patañjali*. Second Edition. Bombay 1968, p. 68.

570. In Patañjali's time the Āryas are located in Āryāvarta. See Puri, *op. cit.*, p. 64–64, 74–76.

571. *HammA*, together with *dramA* and *mīmṚ*, is mentioned in the *Dhātupāṭha*, 1. 494–496, in the sense of *gati*.

The name Surāṣṭra seems not to be known to the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Patañjali mentions it only here. The *KV* on P.6.2.37 mentions the names Kunti-Surāṣṭrāḥ and Cinti-Surāṣṭrāḥ (see Agrawala, *op. cit.*, p. 62). According to the map added in Agrawala's book and the one opposite p. 62 in Puri's book, Surāṣṭra/Saurāṣṭra is located mainly in the Kathiawad peninsula.

572. *Raṁh*—is mentioned as *rahI gatau* in the *Dhātupāṭha*, 1.768.

The form *prācyamadhyeṣu* is taken as a *dvandva* cp. after *prācyabharateṣu* in P.2.4.66. According to Agrawala, op. cit., p.39, Prācya is one of the two broad divisions of the country known to Pāṇini. Together with Udīcya it formed the cradle of the language standardized for all times in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. The difficulty, is, however, that most of the rules containing the words *prācām* ' (in the speech) of the Easterners ' and *udīcām* ' (in the speech) of the Northerners ' occur in rules belonging to the *taddhita*-section which may be considered to be a later addition. If this is correct, the traditional view that Pāṇini based his grammar on two dialects may have to be discarded. In addition, we will hardly be in a position to state the extension of the country known to Pāṇini.

As regards Patañjali, our guess is that in his days the name Prācya refers to the country east of Prayāg/Kāśī (compare Puri, a.w., p. 63, n. 7). Madhya, if identical with the Madhyadeśa known from Manu (2.21), may stand for the Gaṅgā–Yamunā basin, plus the adjoining part south of it.

573. The *Dhātupāṭha*, 2.50, mentions the varbal base *dāP* in the sense of *lavana*. The translation, which takes *dāti* as the quotation form of *dā-*, agrees with the one given

Kaiyaṭa

(On) *vikāra* 'decomposition'. That is to say, the condition of being dead for one who lived (is called) *vikāra* in relation to that (earlier living one).[574]

Note (41)

The lines *śavatir gatikarmā kambojeṣv eva bhāṣito bhavati vikāra enam āryā bhāṣante śava iti (.....) dātir lavanārthe prācyeṣu dātram udīcyeṣu* in the *Bhāṣya* occur almost identically in *Nirukta* **2.2,** as noted by L. Sarup, *The Nighaṇṭu and the Nirukta.* Second Reprint. Delhi 1967, translation p. 22, n. 5, and by Bhartṛhari before him (*MBD*, p. 34, line 22–p. 35, line 1).

99. (*Bhāṣya : Final opinion*)

But those words which you think are *aprayukta* 'not in use' are founn to be used also. Where ? In the Veda, namely, *yád vo revatī revatyaṁ tád ūṣa / yán me náraḥ śrútyaṁ bráhma cákra* 'that which is bountiful for you, o radiant ones, you have bestowed. An extolment which is worthy to be heard by me,[575] a men, you have com-

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by L. SARUP for the *Nirukta*-passage (see Note 41). Nāgeśa, however, takes *dāti* as a *kṛdanta* form like *ātra*, and is followed by Filliozat (p. 115). The translation shows correspondence with the earlier passage : *śavatir gatikarmā....śava : dātir lavanārthe.... dātra.* P.3.2.182 teaches the addition of the suffix *tra* after *dā*– (*dāP*) in the sense of *karaṇa* 'instrument'.

Udīcya in Patañjali's time may be taken to refer to the country north and north-west of Delhi, including the Panjab and the former North West Frontier Province.

574. Kaiyaṭa takes his comment from the *MBD* (p. 34, line 21). Here Bhartṛhari says that what is *prakṛti* 'the natural state' for a living being, is *vikāra* 'decomposition' for a dead body. Alternatively, he explains *vikāra* as *gater vikāraḥ*, that is, *gatyuparama* 'the cessation of moving'.

It may be added here that Kālidāsa sees it the other way round. The *Raghuvaṁśa*, 8.87 ab, says *maraṇaṁ prakṛtiḥ śarīriṇāṁ vikṛtir jīvitam uchyate budhaiḥ* 'the natural state of body possessors is death, The wise say that life is (merely) an altered state'.

575. In the first part of the quotation different texts have been combined. Ṛgveda 4.51.4 d, a hymn addressed to Uṣas, says *saptā́sye revatī revád ūṣá* 'on the seven-mouthed one, o radiant ones, you have bestowed prosperity'. The *Kāṭhaka-Saṁhitā*, 1.8,says *yad vo revatī revatyam* 'the prosperity for you, which, o radiant ones....'. Thus the word *ūṣa* of the Ṛgveda text has been added to the *Kāṭhaka-Saṁhitā* text. The second part of the quotation is from Ṛgveda 1.165.11. The identification of the *Kāṭhaka-Saṁhitā* passage is due to V. P. LIMAYE, *Critical Studies on the Mahābhāṣya.* Hoshiarpur 1974, p. 31. The occurrence of a contamination of two texts has been noted earlier by V. TRAPP (1933), p. 46, n. 81.

Apparently, the word *ūṣa* in the Ṛgveda-passage is to be derived from *vas*– 'to shine', 'to bestow by shining'. In the previous isolated occurrences of *ūṣa* in the *Paspaśāhnika* the translation 'you have dwelt' has been adopted in accordance with Patañjali's understanding of the word rendered as *kva yūyam uṣitāḥ* (*Bh.* No. 93).

The form *revatya* is especially derived (with two other forms also occurring in the *Kāṭhaka-Saṁhitā*) by P.4.4.122 in the sense of *praśasya* '(something) to be praised'. That is to say, *revatya*, etc. are to be used in a context of praise.

posed'. (And) *yátrā naś cákra jarásaṁ tanū́nām* ' in which you have fixed the duration of life for our bodies '.[576]

Note (42)

The *Bhāṣyakāra* may have deliberately put perfect 2nd pl. forms like *ūṣa, tera* in the mouth of the *pūrvapakṣin,* in order to establish that grammar does not derive *aprayukta* words, because these forms can be shown to occur in the Veda. But even if he had chosen perfect 2nd pl. forms which are not attested in the Veda, the conclusion would have been the same, namely, that grammar does not derive *aprayukta* words. Once the pattern is provided by usage, we are justified in regarding even non-attested forms derivable by grammar as possible, correct usage.

For a discussion of the point involved, namely, the relation between grammar and usage, see *ATA,* Introduction p. vi–x. The observations made by S. D. Laddu, *Evolution of the Sanskrit Language from Pāṇini to Patañjali.* Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona, Poona, 1974, Introduction, p. 3 (" that Sanskrit was the means of communication in the ordinary usage during the period " indicated), p. 4–8, 12–17, do not establish that Sanskrit as standardized by Pāṇini has ever been a living, spoken language in the usual sense of the word, like Hindi, Marathi or English. That is, a language not restricted to a comparatively small group of the population; a language not learnt by drill at school only; and a language not used for purposes of literature and learned discussions only. See further Note (38).

VIII

(SECTION DEALING WITH THE TOPIC OF KNOWLEDGE VERSUS USE)

100. *(Bhāṣya : Question introducing Vt. X)*

But the question is whether *dharma* ' religious merit ' (lies) in *jñāna* ' (the grammatical) knowledge ', or rather in *prayoga* ' (the practical) use of (correct) words '.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' But.... whether '. There is a *śruti*-passage which says *ekaḥ śabdaḥ samyak jñātaḥ suprayuktaḥ svarge loke kāmadhug bhavati* ' a single word correctly known (and) well-used becomes wish-fulfilling in *svarga* and in this life '.[577] In this connection, the question is whether the meaning is

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576. Ṛgveda 1.89.9, a hymn addressed to *viśve devāḥ*. K. F. GELDNER, *Der Rig-Veda....*Vol. I (*Harvard Oriental Series,* Vol. 33) Cambridge, Mass. ,1951, p. 114, translates : ' (hundert Jahre liegen vor (uns)), in denen ihr uns das Alter der Leiber bestimmt habt.... '.

577. *Mbh.* III, p. 58, lines 14–15. Daṇḍin, *Kāvyādarśa,* 1.8 ab, says *gaur gauḥ kamadughā samyak prayuktā smaryate budhaiḥ* ' a word correctly used is traditionally said to be a wish-fulfilling cow by the wise '.

that (the word) correctly known becomes wish-fulfilling while the fact of being correctly known is inferred from its being well-used; or whether the meaning is that a well-used word becomes wish-fulfilling, because its being well-used is due to correct knowledge.

Note (43)

The *Bhāṣyakāra* puts the question whether it is our good grammatical knowledge of words which leads to *dharma*, or rather our good use of words. Kaiyaṭa points out the deep intention of the question: is the good use more important, because it forms the base of good knowledge, or is it the good knowledge, because that provides the test for good usage? The point at issue is discussed in two other well-known passages in the *Mbh.*, one dealing with the *śiṣṭas*,[578] the other with a dialogue between a grammarian and a charioteer.

The first passage (*Mbh.* III, p. 174, lines 10–15) says: 'If then the *śiṣṭas* are our authority with regard to words, what is the use of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*? The *Aṣṭādhyāyī* serves to find out who are the *śiṣṭas*. But how can the *śiṣṭas* be known from the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*? (Suppose) one who has studied the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* sees somebody else who has not studied it, (but) uses words which have been prescribed there. He (then) thinks it over: certainly, (it must be) a favour shown by fate to him, or his innate competence (*svabhāva*), that without having studied the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* he still uses those words which have been prescribed there. Certainly, he must know the other (words prescribed there) too. In this way, the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* serves to find out who are the *śiṣṭas*'.

The second passage (*Mbh.* I, p. 488, lines 18–22) says: 'In this way, as is known, a certain grammarian said: 'Who is the *pravetṛ* "driver" of this chariot?' The charioteer said: 'O long living one, I am the *prājitṛ* "driver"'. The grammarian said: 'This is an *apaśabda* "incorrect word". The charioteer said: 'Your Honour is *prāptijña* "one who knows (the outcome of) the application (of the rules)", but not *iṣṭijña* "one who knows the desired usage". This form (*prājitṛ*) is desired'. The grammarian said: 'Well, by that Duruta we are pressed hard indeed'.[579] The charioteer said: 'Certainly, (the word) *sūta* "charioteer" is not (a derivation) from (*su* + *uta* derived from the verbal base) *veÑ* "to weave", but *sūta* (is derived) from (the verbal base) *sū-* "to set in motion" only. If your abusive term (had been derived) from *sū-*, you should have used (the correct form) *duḥsūta* "a bad charioteer".'

The first passage follows after the refutation of an objection. The objection is one of *itaretarāśraya* 'vicious circle'. It is formulated as

578. See fn. 551 for the immediately preceding part.

579. Duruta, which here refers to a charioteer, literally means 'one who has been badly woven'.

śāstrapūrvikā śiṣṭiḥ 'accepted usage is dependent on grammar' and *śiṣṭipūrvakaṁ śāstram* 'grammar is dependent on accepted usage' (*Mbh.* III, p. 174, lines 5–6). Thus, on the one hand, grammar, that is, the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, would provide the test for accepted usage, whereas, on the other hand, that very same usage would provide the base of grammar. The objection is refuted by saying that accepted usage is not decided by grammar, but by the *śiṣṭas*. And to decide who are the *śiṣṭas*, the text says, we have recourse to *ācāra* 'conduct' and *nivāsa* 'dwelling-place', namely, Āryāvarta, which is geographically defined (*Mbh.* III, p. 174, lines 7–8). Then the question is raised, if the *śiṣṭas* are our authority with regard to usage, what is the use of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*? To this question a rather surprising answer is given: the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* serves to find out who are the *śiṣṭas*. Isn't this directly at variance with the earlier statement about *ācāra* and *nivāsa*?

In this connection the following considerations are offered. In the first place, the *itaretarāśraya* stated above only holds, if the time-dimension is left out of account. It is certainly true that Pāṇini while composing his grammar based it on available usage at that time. It also true that the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, once composed and completed, became the grammatical standard for the language called Sanskrit for all times to come, afterwards. No logical fallacy is involved here. In the second place, apparently, in Patañjali's days, Sanskrit had become a *śiṣṭabhāṣā* 'language spoken by the *śiṣṭas*'. From this, it may be inferred that it was not in common use any more. Further we are informed that the *śiṣṭas* are able to speak good Sanskrit without having studied the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Nothing surprising, because nobody acquires the speaking ability of a language from studying its grammar. However, once a language has lost its broad base among a population and has become a group-language for restricted purposes, it is in constant danger of losing its identity (or its purity) because the influence of the surrounding language or languages for every-day use will make itself felt on different levels. To counter this effect, and to maintain the language, even as a group-language, in its pristine glory, a grammatical standard is required. This standard is provided for Sanskrit in the form of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Thus, even if in order to know accepted Sanskrit usage we will turn to the *śiṣṭas* whose education was in Sanskrit, and even if in order to know who are the *śiṣṭas* we will turn to *ācāra* and *nivāsa*, still to determine the grammatical correctness of their usage, we have only one authority, namely, the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. In that sense the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* serves to find out who are the *śiṣṭas*.

It follows that a distinction should be made between accepted usage and grammatically correct speech. Accepted usage implies a social norm: the usage is accepted by a community, however small. Correct speech implies a grammatical norm: Sanskrit speech is judged correct, because it is in accordance with the rules laid down for the derivation of words and utterances in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.

The second passage offers a nice illustration of the point of acceptibility and grammaticality. P. 2 4.56 says that the verbal base *vī-* is substituted for *aj-*, when an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix follows. Patañjali comments that the rule is to be regarded as an instance of *vyavasthitavibhāṣā* 'limited option' (see *KA*, fn. 278). On this assumption we are able to derive the word *prājitṛ*. The grammarian who only knows Pāṇini's rule, declares *prājitṛ* to be an *apaśabda*. The charioteer, with a hint of sarcasm in his way of addressing the grammarian, says that the trouble with the grammarian is that he does not know usage.

The *MBD* (p. 35, lines 2–14) first refers to *Vt.* IV which says that grammar provides a restriction on the use of words, that is, lays down a standard for their use, for the sake of *dharma*. Now the question is to know whether this restriction results from *jñāna* '(grammatical) knowledge' or from *prayoga* 'usage'. Then the *MBD* goes on to discuss technical points regarding the relation between *śruti* and *smṛti* as far as authority is concerned. When in a given case a relevant *śruti*-passage is not found to back up a *smṛti*-passage, the existence of the *śruti*-text may be inferred. When both texts are available, but the one contradicts the other, the *śruti* prevails. That, at least, is the official doctrine, although our *MBD*-text does not explicitly say so. See P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. III, Poona, 1946, p. 827–36 863–70; and MM. Dr. G. Jha, *Pūrvamīmāṁsā in its sources*, Second Edition, Varanasi, 1964, Chapter XXI (especially p. 187–88, 190, 195, 217–24).

There are also *smṛti*-passages which are assumed to be *adṛṣṭārtha* 'meant for an invisible purpose (or result)'. That is to say, since no visible purpose is obvious, an unseen purpose is ascribed to the injunctions concerned. The unseen purpose is equated with *dharma* in the sense of *puṇya*. But judging from the examples quoted in the *MBD* (p. 35, lines 8–10) the question is of *dṛṣṭārtha smṛti*-passages only. Therefore it is proposed that the reading *cādṛṣṭārtha* (line 8) be emended to *ca 'dṛṣṭārtha*. These *smṛti*-passages are based on the practice of people. And the practice has developed on account of *laulya* 'one's own satisfaction' (compare Manu, 2.6, *ātmanas tuṣṭiḥ*), or of *rāga* 'craving'. Now, in connection with the present *Bhāṣya* we have a *smṛti*-statement. It says *ekaḥ śabdaḥ samyag jñātaḥ śāstrād viduṣā prayuktaḥ svarge loke kāmadhug bhavati* 'a single word correctly known from grammar (and correctly) used by a learned man becomes wish-fulfilling in *svarga* and in (this) world'. The two significant words here are *jñātaḥ* and *prayuktaḥ*. Knowledge alone is not sufficient. One must prove it by using the word known. Usage alone is not sufficient either. One must be able to prove that it is correct usage. That is where knowledge comes in. At this point the *Bhāṣyakāra* raises his question: is it knowledge which leads to *dharma*, or usage ? Then, at the end of his comment, Bhartṛhari wonders what is the *śruti*-authority for the *smṛti*-statement just quoted.

101. *(Bhāṣya : Counter-question introducing a Vt.)*

What difference does it make ?

X. (Vārttika : Jñāna may lead to dharma or adharma)

If (it is argued) that *dharma* ' religious merit ' (lies) in *jñāna* ' (grammatical) knowledge ', (then we say that) there would be a chance for *adharma* ' religious demerit ' as well.

102. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

If (it is argued) that *dharma* ' religious merit ' (lies) in *jñāna* ' (grammatical) knowledge ', (then we say that) there would be a chance for *adharma* ' religious demerit ' as well. Because one who knows the (correct) words also knows the *apaśabdas* ' incorrect words '. just as religious merit (lies) in the knowledge of (correct) words, so also religious demerit (lies) in the knowledge of incorrect words.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' If (it is argued) that *dharma* (lies) in *jñāna* (then) there would be a chance for *adharma* as well '. Like an oily thing[580] (causes) *prakopana* ' excess ' of mucus, a non-oily[581] (thing causes) excess of wind. The same applies here also.[582] That is what (the author) means to say.

Note (44)

The *MBD* (p. 35, line 16, p. 36, line 5) comments on the *Vt.* as follows : ' This is stated after having introduced distinctions.[583] If religious merit (lies) in the knowledge of (correct) words, (then,) this being so, religious demerit (results) from the knowledge of incorrect words. (Objection) in this connection, it would be possible (to argue) that religious demerit (results) from the killing of a brahmin, but religious merit from restoring (him) to life.[584] However, it cannot be said that religious demerit (results) from killing a brahmin (and) religious merit from killing a *śūdra*.[585]

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580. An oily type of food.

581. Literally, something harsh.

582. Two opposite things lead to different results.

583. That is, different opinions on the subject.

584. The question is of finding out whether *apaśabdajñāna* is the true opposite of *śabdajñāna*. First an example is stated of true opposites, namely, *brāhmaṇavadha* and *brāhmaṇajīvana*. Note that here the opposition is expressed by a change of the second member of the cp.

585. *Śūdravadha* is not the true opposite of *brāhmaṇavadha*. Here an attempt has been made to express opposition by means of a change in the first member of the cp., like in *apaśabdajñāna* versus *śabdajñāna*.

In this connection, the correct thing would be (to say) : if religious merit (results) from the knowledge of (correct) words, there would be a chance for religious demerit (resulting) from the absence of knowledge of the very same (correct) words.[586] The answer is (like this). (Somebody) says that the present *smṛti*-statement has the same status as a *smṛti*-statement which is *dṛṣṭārtha* ' meant for a visible result '.[587] In a medical *smṛti*-text meant for a visible result (it is said that) the opposite (of the cause which leads to) excess of mucus, (namely,) non-oily (food causes excess) of wind.[588] In the same way (some hold that) religious merit (does) not (result) from the knowledge of (correct) words, nor religious demerit from the knowledge of incorrect words.[589]

Others think that religious merit (results) from the knowledge of correct words, but not religious demerit from the knowledge of incorrect words. Like (Patañjali) will say later on : *śabdapramāṇakā vayam* ' we go by (correct) words (only) '.[590] Still others think that religious merit and demerit (result) from the knowledge of (correct) and incorrect words (respectively). But (here) religious demerit is overpowered by religious merit, as (Patañjali) is going to mention (in the case of) a man who digs a well.[591] This makes it (nevertheless) clear that religious demerit (results)

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586. The true opposite to *śabdajñāna* is not *apaśabdajñāna*, but *śabda-ajñāna*. Therefore the *Bhāṣya*-statement can be improved.

587. For *dṛṣṭārtha* and *adṛṣṭārtha* see MM. Dr. G. JHA, *Pūrvamīmāṁsā in its sources*, Second Edition, Varanasi, 1964, p. 194–195, ' Thus all the *Smṛtis* and the *Auxiliary Sciences* are authoritative; they derive their authority directly from the Veda. In the case of all these we find two kinds of results depicted—those to appear in the very remote future, and those to appear immediately in the present; and the texts pertaining to the former are based on the Veda, while those relating to the latter kind have their basis in ordinary experience '.

See further P. V. KANE, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. III. Poona 1946, p. 836–838; and S. N. DASGUPTA, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. IV. Cambridge 1949, p. 5–6. The *Arthasaṁgraha of Shri Laugākshi Bhāskara*. Edited by S. S. SUKTHANKAR. Bombay, 1931, p. 53, and Notes, p. 62–63, also knows a variety called *dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārtha*, which seems of theoretical value only. When a visible purpose is assumed, an invisible one is out of the question. The stock-example of *dṛṣṭārtha* is the unhusking of the grains before the grains can be turned into flour.

588. Unidentified *smṛti*. The cause which leads to an excess of mucus is taking an oily type of food, see Kaiyata's comment on the present *Bhāṣya*.

589. Here the text of the *MBD* has been emended to read *evaṁ śabdajñāne na dharmo nāpy adharmaḥ apaśabdajñānāt*. The difficulty is that the opinion referred to must be one of the *dṛṣṭārtha* type, like the medical *smṛti*. This means that no connection with an invisible result, whether *dharma* or *adharma*, is possible. It is assumed that the scribe has wrongly divided the sentence, namely, as *evaṁ śabdajñānān na dharmo nāpy adharmaḥ*, thus leaving the portion *apaśabdajñānāt* dangling. To complete this portion, he rather naturally added the words *tv adharmaḥ*.

590. *Mbh.* I, p. 11, line 1.

591. *Mbh.* I, p. 11, line 7. The man will be covered with dust and mud, but that will be washed away by the water.

from the knowledge of incorrect words.[592] (The implication is that) the study of grammar leads to disaster.[593] Therefore this statement *na cāntareṇa vyākaraṇaṁ śabdāḥ śakyā jñātum* 'and without (the help of) grammar (correct) words cannot be known'[594] is useless. Then let us put it this way. The religious merit (will be) greater, the religious demerit less. But this is not true. Since there are more incorrect words, the (corresponding) retribution (must be proportionately) greater. That is why (the intention of the *Vt.* is assumed to be this :) *adharma eva bhūyān prāpnoti* 'there would be a greater chance for religious demerit only'.

Given the statement of the *Vt.* (namely, if *dharma* results from *śabdajñāna*, then *adharma* may result also), and the statement of the *Bhāṣya* (namely, if *dharma* results from *śabdajñāna*, then *adharma* may result from *apaśabdajñāna*), the *MBD*'s concern is first to find out the true opposite to *śabdajñāna*-which results in a correction of the *Bhāṣya*-, and then to quote a number of opinions to clarify the intention of the *Vt.*

According to the corrected *Bhāṣya*-statement, *śabdajñāna* leads to *dharma*, whereas *śabda-ajñāna* leads to *adharma*. Clearly, here *śabdajñāna* and *śabda-ajñāna* are *adṛṣṭārtha*, connected with an invisible result. Against this, an opinion is quoted which says that *śabdajñāna* and its opposite (whether *śabda-ajñāna* or *apaśabdajñāna*) are *dṛṣṭārtha*,, not connected with *dharma* or *adharma*. An illustration is provided from a medical text which is also *dṛṣṭārtha*. The next opinion holds that *śabda-* and *apaśabdajñāna* give rise to *dharma* and *adharma* respectively, but in such a way that *dharma* prevails. To support this view, an illustration is given. But against this view it may be urged that it has an undesirable consequence, namely, that grammar is studied at a risk, because once we know the correct words, we know the incorrect ones also, and that results in *adharma*. This risk may be minimized by assuming that, as compared to the quantity of *adharma*, the quantity of *dharma*, is greater. But this is manifestly untrue, because there are more incorrect words than correct ones. Therefore we stick to a modified earlier view : *śabda-* and *apaśabdajñāna* give rise to *dharma* and *adharma* respectively but the chances for *adharma* are greater. This is what the *Vt.* means.

103. *(Bhāṣya : A greater chance for adharma)*

Or rather, there would be a greater chance for *adharma* 'religious demerit'. (Because) the incorrect words are more, the correct words less in number. For each single correct word there are many incorrect words. To illustrate, for (the correct word)

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592. Even though the dust and mud are washed away, they were there. This proves that the use of incorrect words results in *adharma*.

593. To know the correct words is allright, but it implies knowing the incorrect words also, which is bad.

594. *Mbh.* I, p. 1, line 21 (= *Bh.* No. 20).

gauḥ 'cow' (we have) the incorrect forms *gāvī*, *goṇī*, *gotā* (and) *gopotalikā*, etc.[595]

XI. (Vārttika : Reminder of a restriction)

A restriction (holds) relating to *ācāra* '(ritual) practice'.[596]

104. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

The *ṛṣi* 'ancient sage' communicates a restricting to *ācāra* '(ritual) practice' with (the words) *te 'surā he 'layo he 'laya iti kurvantaḥ parābabhūvuḥ* 'those demons uttering (the words) *he 'layo he 'layaḥ* "o enemies, o enemies" have been defeated'.[597]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'relating to *ācāra*'. (*Ācāre* means) *prayoge* 'relating to usage'.

(On) *ṛṣiḥ* (That is to say,) the Veda.[598]

Note (45)

The restriction stated earlier in the context of the uses of grammar says that a brahmin must not speak like *mleccha*, because, as happened in the case of the *asuras*, he will be defeated. *Bh.* No. 119 will make it clear that reference is especially to the use of incorrect words during sacrifial rituals. However, if incorrect words are used in ordinary conversation, even by *ṛṣis*, it has no consequences. No religious demerit is incurred.

105. *(Bhāṣya : The prayoga alternative is accepted)*

Then let (*dharma* 'religious merit') lie in *prayoga* 'usage'.

XII. (Vārttika : A flaw in the prayoga alternative)

(If) in *prayoga* 'usage' (then) everybody (might be associated with bliss).

106. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

If *dharma* 'religious merit' (lies) in *prayoga* 'usage', (then) everybody might be associated with bliss.[599]

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595. The part *ekaikasya....apabhraṁśāḥ* occurs identically in *Bh.* No. 51, in the context of grammatical method.

596. The discussion of the *Vārttikakāra*, after having exhausted the *jñāna*-alternative (see *Bh.* No. 100), now turns to the *prayoga*-alternative.

597. See fn. 102.

598. The *ṛṣi* is the speaker in the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*-passage quoted. Kaiyaṭa merely points out that the *Bhāṣya* refers to a Vedic passage.

599. *Abhyudaya* is bliss enjoyed in *svarga*.

107. *(Bhāṣya : Objection)*

But what grudge do you bear now, if everybody might be associated with bliss ?

108. *(Bhāṣya : Answer)*

No question of bearing a grudge at all. But (the point is that) effort becomes futile. Certainly, effort must have its reward. And effort must not be separated from reward.[600]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'And effort....not'. If there is reward without effort, the (undesired) consequence would be the futility of effort.

109. *(Bhāṣya : Objection)*

But isn't it a fact that those who make an effort will use words more correctly (and that) therefore they will be associated with bliss more fittingly ?[601]

110. *(Bhāṣya : Answer)*

The contrary is certainly also seen. Because we see (people) who make an effort, but do not acquire proficiency.[602] On the other hand, (we see people) who do not make an effort, but acquire proficiency. This being so, there should be (room for) a disparity between (effort and) reward also.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'The contrary' (etc.) (Patañjali is in) a joking mood.

Note (46)

The point made earlier (*Bh.* No. 108) was that we should have an even proportion between effort and reward. Against this, the present *Bh.* refers to a fact of experience. We see people who study grammar for the canonical twelve years, and, still, they cannot use Sanskrit correctly. On the other hand, there are also apparently gifted people who do not study grammar or perhaps study it for a short while only, and somehow acquire proficiency in the correct use of the language. Now to maintain an even proportion between the effort put in and the reward in these cases seems unjustified. But, according to Kaiyaṭa, the present *Bh.* is not to be taken seriously.

The *MBD* (p. 36, lines 15–18) comments as follows : 'Even if there is usage without (the study of) grammar, still, effort is not futile. Just as

600. See Trapp (1933), p. 46, n. 85. The reward should not be out of all proportion to the effort made.

601. As pointed out by Nāgeśa, *sādhīyas* functions as an adverb here.

602. Namely, in using words correctly.

some people, because they enjoy a natural state of health, may go on living refusing the advice of doctors, this (should not be taken to mean) that the science of medicine (need) not be taught. (Because) some people do become sick and they are diagnosed with the help of that (science of medicine) only. In the same way, grammar must also be taken up and be studied '.

111. *(Bhāṣya : Another proposal, introducing Vt. XIII)*

(If this is) so, then (we assume that) *dharma* ' religious merit ' (does) not (lie) in *jñāna* ' (grammatical) knowledge ' alone, nor in *prayoga* ' use ' alone. (But) then, in what (does it lie) ?

XIII. (Vārttika : Dharma lies in the combination of jñāna and prayoga)

If bliss (lies) in *prayoga* ' use ' preceded by (the study of) grammar, this is equal to *vedaśabda* ' the *veda*-word '.[603]

112. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

One who uses preceded by (the study of) grammar[604] is associated with bliss. (On) ' This is equal to *vedaśabda* '. (That is to say,) the Veda-words also proclaim similarly, (like in) *yó 'gníṣṭomena yájate yá u cainam evám véda* ' (he) who sacrifices by means of the Agniṣṭoma (sacrifice and) who knows (how to perform) it ',[605] (and) *yò 'gním nāciketám cinuté yá u cainam evám véda* ' (he) who piles up the Nāciketa fire-altar (and) who knows (how to do) it '.[606]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' This is equal ' (etc.). (In the sense of) *vedaḥ śabdo yasyārthasya* ' for which meaning[607] the Veda is the word (conveying it) ' (we

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603. An ambiguous cp., as will be seen from the sequel.

604. " Preceded by (the study of) grammar " practically means : in conformity with the rules of grammar.

605. The nearest approximation to this passage is *Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 7.1.1.3, *yá evám vidvān agniṣṭoména yájate* ' he who knowing thus sacrifices by means of the Agniṣṭoma (sacrifice) ' (*Kṛṣṇayajurvedīyataittirīyasaṁhitā, tatra....aṣṭamo bhāgaḥ. Ānandāśramasaṁskṛta-granthāvaliḥ*, No.42. Poona, 1951, p. 2490, line 10). For the translation compare A. B. KEITH, *The Veda of the Black Yajus School* entitled Taittirīya-Sanhitā. Part 2 : Kāṇḍas IV–VII. *Harvard Oriental Series*, Vol. 19, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1914, p. 557. The Agniṣṭoma is the model for all Soma sacrifices. It lasts for one day only. See P. V. KANE, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. II, Part II, Poona, 1941, p. 1133–1203.

606. This is a stock-phrase in *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa*, 3.11.7–10. Here the story of Naciketas is told in the section 3.11.8. 1–8. Compare P.–E. DUMONT, " The special kinds of Agnicayana (or special methods of building the fire-altar according to the Kathas in the Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa ". *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,* Vol. 95. 1951 p. 651 ff. For the rewards promised in relation with the Nāciketa fire-altar see ibid., p. 655–56.

607. Namely, that practice should be accompanied and preceded by knowledge.

derive) *vedaśabdaḥ*.[608] Just as the performance of that (sacrifice) comes after possessing the know-how, in the same way, the use of (correct) words is preceded by the knowledge of the analysis into stem, etc.

Note (46)

The word *vedaśabda* in the *Vt.* can be explained in three ways. Patañjali, in his *Bhāṣya*, takes it to mean *vedaśabdāḥ* 'the Veda-words', that is, the words of the Veda, or the Vedic statements. Kaiyaṭa explains that it stands for the meaning conveyed by the Vedic texts. But there is another possibility overlooked by tradition and modern interpreters alike, namely, to regard *veda* in *vedaśabda* as an instance of self-reference. When interpreted in this way, *vedaśabda* means : the word *veda* (*veda iti śabdaḥ*), namely, in the expression *yá....evám véda* in the Vedic statements quoted. The point is that the use of the word *veda* 'he knows' here itself indicates the importance attached to knowledge in the performance of a sacrifice. Accordingly, the expression 'this is equal to' in the *Vt.* should be taken to mean : this is implied, namely, by the use of the word *veda* in the statements quoted.

The general idea of the *Vārttikakāra* is best explained with the help of a comparison. Just as the man who knows how to perform a Vedic sacrifice must know the relevant procedure before, so also a man who wants to use Sanskrit words correctly, must possess grammatical knowledge beforehand. As indicated by Nāgeśa, the reward promised for the correct use of Sanskrit words has been stated by the passage *ekaḥ śabdaḥ*, etc. (Kaiyaṭa on *Bh.* No. 100; compare *MBD*, p. 35, lines 10–11).

The *MBD* on the passage 'This is equal to *vedaśabda*' (p. 36, line 26, p. 27, line 1) says : *vedaśabdito yo 'rthas tena tulyam.* Here a very slight emendation (namely, *śabdato* for *śabdito*) would provide the meaning proposed above. The text, as it is, means: equal to that meaning which has been expressed with the help of words by the Veda. Clearly, this is the source of Kaiyaṭa's analysis of the cp. *vedaśabda*. The *MBD* further points out that only a *vidvān* 'a man who knows' is competent to perform the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice and to reap its reward, namely, bliss in *svarga*.

113. (*Bhāṣya : A different opinon*)

With respect to *tat tulyaṁ vedaśabdena* 'this equal to *vedaśabda*',[609] a different (grammarian) says (the following). Just as the words of the Veda, when they have been studied in accordance with the *niyama* 'restriction',[610] bring their reward, in the same way,

608. The idea behind the *bv.* analysis of the word *vedaśabda* is that the knowledge does not lie in the Vedic texts as such, but in the meaning conveyed by them.

609. In *Vt.* XIII.

610. The word *niyamapūrvam* may be explained in different ways. As interpreted by the *MBD*, *niyama* here means a self-imposed discipline, like *brahmacarya.* As indicated by Trapp (1933), p. 46, n. 89, reference may be to *Nirukta* 1.15. This text says *niyatavāco*

the man who uses words preceded by (the study of) grammar is associated with bliss.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'A different (grammarian) says' (etc.). (In the sense of) *vedaś ca śabdaś ca* 'at the same time the Veda and words' (we derive the word *vedaśabda*) as a *kdh*. cp.[611]

Note (47)

The *MBD* (p. 37, lines 3–5) on the passage 'A different (grammarian) says' comments as follows: 'Now Vedic statements are themselves the examples. Just as when they have been studied by persons who have imposed a (particular) discipline (on themselves) in the form of *brahmacarya* "celibacy", they become the means of *dharma* "religious merit", in the same way, *jñāna* "knowledge" preceded by (the study of) grammar becomes the means of *dharma* "religious merit" in connection with *prayoga* "use" (as the practical application of that knowledge). Therefore it has been established that *abhyudaya* "bliss" (results) from *prayoga* "use" as qualified'.[612]

114. *(Bhāṣya : The earlier position adopted)*

Or rather, let *dharma* 'religious merit' (lie) again in *jñāna* '(grammatical) knowledge' alone.[613]

115. *(Bhāṣya : Reminder)*

But hasn't been pointed out that if (it is argued) that *dharma* 'religious merit' (lies) in *jñāna* '(grammatical) knowledge', (then) there would be a chance for *adharma* 'religious demerit' as well?[614]

116. *(Bhāṣya : Answer)*

No difficulty. We go by words.[615] What the words say, that is our authority.[616] And the words say that religious merit (lies) in the knowledge of (correct) words. They do not say that religious demerit (lies) in the knowledge of incorrect words. And what has

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yuktayo niyatānupūrvyā bhavanti '(Vedic) sentences have their words fixed by means of a fixed order (of words)'. The third, preferred possibility is to take *niyama* in the sense of 'rules and regulations', namely, those dealing with accentuation and recitation.

611. The *kdh.* sense simply amounts to 'a Vedic text'.

612. Namely, by being preceded by the study of grammar.

613. *V*. X, first part.

614. *V*. X, complete text.

615. That is to say, we keep strictly to the words of a text, and we do not go beyond that.

616. Compare *SA*, *Bh.* No. 104.

not been prescribed or prohibited, that does not lead to harm or to bliss. To illustrate, hiccoughing, laughing, scratching do not lead to harm nor to bliss.[617]

Note (48)

The *MBD* (p. 37, lines 6–9) has the following to say: 'This statement of religious merit lying in (grammatical) knowledge alone) is not a *smṛti* 'rule of traditional law' equal to one which is *dṛṣṭārtha* "meant for a visible purpose". This being the case, this (statement) that religious merit (results) from the knowledge of (correct) words has come down to us, uninterruptedly, from tradition. This being so, what has been prescribed or prohibited on the authority of the *āgama* 'Veda', that only is (to be) done or (to be) refrained from. But there is no such (read: *na tv idam* for *nanv idam*) statement (saying) that there is either religious demerit (resulting) from the knowledge of incorrect words, or religious merit not (resulting) from the knowledge of incorrect words. And what has not been prescribed or prohibited, in doing that, or in refraining from that, there is no virtue nor harm'.

Thus, the *MBD* informs us that the statement *jñāne dharmaḥ* (first part of *Vt.* X), which may be rendered of *śabdajñānād dharmaḥ* 'religious merit (results) from the knowledge of (correct) words' is a *smṛti*-statement of the *adṛṣṭārtha* type (see fn. 587), parallel to the statement *ekaḥ śabdaḥ*, etc. It has come down to us by a long and continuous tradition. On the other hand, we don't have a similar authoritative statement saying that religious demerit results from the knowledge of incorrect words. Therefore we need not bother about the possible bad effect of knowing incorrect words.

117. *(Bhāṣya : An alternative)*

Or rather, the knowledge of incorrect words is only helpful for the knowledge of correct words. (Because the man) who knows incorrect words, knows the correct words also. Therefore, in this way, for (him) who says that religious merit (lies) in (grammatical) knowledge, it naturally follows that religious merit (lies) in the knowledge of correct words preceded by the knowledge of incorrect words.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'Or rather' (etc.). Since knowledge of correct words is inseparably bound up with the knowledge of incorrect words, there is no separate retribution for the knowledge of incorrect words. This is the meaning (of the passage).

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617. That is, outside a ritual context. For rules of conduct within such a context compare P. V. KANE, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. II, Part II, Poona, 1941, p. 1243, in connection with the *gavāmayana* sacrifice.

Note (49)

Bh. No. 114 proposes that religious merit should be assumed to lie again in grammatical knowledge alone, not in the combination of this knowledge and practical use. *Bh.* No. 115 reminds us of the consequence of this assumption : once we have the knowledge of correct words, we also have that of incorrect words, and that involves demerit, since it is bad knowledge. *Bh.* No. 116 removes the difficulty by saying that we should go strictly by what the text, namely, *jñāne dharmaḥ* in *Vt.* X, says. It speaks of merit attached to knowing the correct words. It does not say that demerit results from knowing the incorrect words. So why bother about this ? But apparently the insufficiency of this view is realized, because, still, the incorrect words are there. What to do about them ? At this point, *Bh.* No. 117 presents a solution. We will say that the incorrect words are useful, namely, in so far that they enable us to know the correct ones. They have the status of a means for something else.

The *MBD* (p. 37, lines 10–15) comments as follows : 'That is the means of something without which one cannot proceed at all. Like someone thinks that religious merit (lies) in (seeing) the whiteness belonging to the earth.[618] (But) that (earth) is dark. He, looking (at the earth) cannot discover any whiteness on it. Therefore that (darkness is assumed to be) the means for seeing the whiteness. (Or,) like the *hiṁsādharma* "duty of violence" becomes bliss only in the *aśvamedha*, etc. (sacrifice).[619] Similarly, the knowledge of (correct) words is closely connected with the knowledge of incorrect words. The latter has no relation with religious demerit. In this way, the *smṛti*-statement has been confirmed (and) in this way, the *smṛti*-statement does not become meaningless'.[620]

118. *(Bhāṣya : Another alternative)*

Or rather, this will be like a well-digger.[621] To explain, although the well-digger, while digging the well, becomes bespattered with mud and dust, once the water wells up, he acquires that

618. Presumably Bhartṛhari thinks of a moonless night which in the *śuklapakṣa* is followed by a moonlit night. But the passage is not clear.

619. For the violence as part of the ritual see P. V. KANE, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. II, Part II. Poona 1941, p. 1231 (armed guards protecting the horse and offering battle) and p. 1234 (the killing of the horse).

620. The *smṛti-statement* referred to is *jñāne dharmaḥ* (*V*. X, first part), which had been rejected earlier.

621. Trapp (1933), p. 46–47, n. 94, refers to the *kūpakhānakanyāya* mentioned in Jacob's wellknown collection of *nyāyas*. The precise reference here is to Colonel G. A. JACOB, *Laukikanyāyāvaliḥ. Tṛtīyaḥ bhāgaḥ.* A third handful of popular maxims, Bombay (*NSP*) 1904, p. 24.

The *Bhāṣya* on P.3.1.145 (*Mbh.* Vol. II, p. 92, line 20) mentions an *iṣṭi* prescribing the suffix *ṢvuN* after the verbal base *khan-*. The resulting form will be *khanaka*. The derivation by P.3.1.133, which prescribes *ṆvuL*, results in the form *khānaka*.

guṇa 'quality' (of being clean) which removes that *doṣa* 'imperfection' (of being dirty), and he becomes associated with greater happiness.[622] In the same way, here also. Although religious demerit (lies) in the knowledge of incorrect words, still, by the religious merit which (lies) in the knowledge of (correct) words the *doṣa* 'harm' will be removed,[623] and he will be associated with greater bliss.[624]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'harm' (etc.). That is to say, when a result in the form of greater merit has been obtained even at the cost of a very small result in the form of religious demerit, (the latter) becomes practically non-existing.[625]

Note (50)

The alternative proposed by *Bh.* No. 117 is rejected, because the utility attributed to the knowledge of incorrect words as a means to the knowledge of correct words is doubtful. The new solution consists in a quantifying approach : we weigh the demerit incurred from *apaśabdajñāna* against the merit resulting from *śabdajñāna*. In comparison with the resulting merit, the demerit incurred is nowhere.

The *MBD* (p. 37, lines 15-22) says the following : 'The argument goes like this. Although religious demerit (results) from the knowledge of incorrect words, it (amounts to) little (only). But the abundant merit (resulting) from the knowledge of (correct) words only is greater. Therefore one simply continues to study (grammar), although it involves (some) *doṣa* 'harm'. But that is understood on the strength of the reference to the *smṛti*-passage only, namely, that an abundant merit (results) from the knowledge of (correct) words.[626] The example for this is the well-digger. Just as he, expecting association with greater happiness, goes on digging the well, although the work involves discomfort, with the idea : I can overcome even that discomfort. And, in this way, indirect praise is expressed for the knowledge of (correct) words. (To explain,) a man with his head bowed down should not pile up the *śyena* (fire alter),[627] because (if he does) his

622. In this secular context *abhyudaya* merely means happiness in the sense of a feeling of well-being.

623. *Nirghāniṣyate*, a passive future form allowed by P.6.4.62. Actually, the form is built upon the passive aorist *aghāni.*

624. Compare the opinion mentioned by the *MBD* on *Vt.* X, for which see Note (44), "The next opinion holds....*dharma* prevails".

625. Literally, practically non-produced.

626. The *smṛti* here is the passage *ekaḥ śabdaḥ*, etc., for which see Kaiyaṭa on *Bh.* No. 100.

627. Reference is to the *agnicayana*. See P. V. KANE, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. II, Part II. Poona, 1941, p.1249, 'The altar may have different forms such as that of.... *śyena* (hawk) ....'.

sacrificial patron is liable to perish.[628] (But) this (should not be taken as) censure of the man with his head bowed down. Then how (do we take it)? (In the sense that) hereby praise is expressed for the man who keeps head up'.[629]

119. *(Bhāṣya : Removal of an objection against the second alternative)*

As regards that which was stated also, namely, *ācāre niyamaḥ* 'a restriction (holds) relating to *ācāra* '(ritual) practice',[630] that restriction concerns sacrificial ritual. For it is heard like this. There were *ṛṣis* 'ancient sages' (nick-) named the *yarvāṇastarvāṇas*.[631] They possessed a direct perception of *dharma*,[632] they knew the far and the near,[633] they knew what could be known[634] (and) they had come to realize ultimate reality.[635] These worthy persons used (the expression) *yarvāṇas tarvāṇaḥ*, when they should have used *yad vā*

628. *Pramāyuka*. The word is derived from *pra+mi-* (*mināti*) with the help of the suffix *ukaÑ*, by P.3.2.154. But Pāṇini does not list the verbal base *mi-* here. The substitution of *ā* for the *ī* (in *mī-*) is by P.6.1.50, in which *aśiti* is continued from P.6.1.45

629. Compare P. V. KANE, *op. cit.*, p. 1255, 'One who has performed the piling up of the fire-altar should observe certain *vratas* for a year, viz. he should not bow to any one....'.

630. *Vt*. XI.

631. *Yarvāṇastarvāṇaḥ* cannot rightly be interpreted as names of two *ṛṣis*, because, clearly, the text nowhere uses dual forms here, but only plurals, like *ṛṣayo....babhūvuḥ*. On the point of the nickname the commentators (*MBD*, Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa) are remarkably silent.

632. It is not clear what *dharma* means here. It could mean 'what is right', or 'a constituent element of reality', like the *tattvas* of Sāṁkhya, just to mention a few possible interpretations. The *MBD* (p. 38, line 7) explains *pratyakṣadharmāṇaḥ* as 'for whom the *dharmas* which are beyond ordinary people are directly perceptible'. Here again it is not clear what Bharṛrhari means by *dharmas*.

633. Or, the higher and the lower, as two divisions of the Veda or of reality. Compare *The Ṛgveda-Prātiśākhya* with the commentary of Uvata. Edited....by M. D SHASTRI, Volume I, Varanasi, 1959. Introductory stanza 1, *parāvare brahmaṇi yaṁ sadāhur vedātmānam....munīndrāḥ* 'whom the great sages in the higher and the lower Veda always state to be the essence of the Veda'.

The *MBD* (p.38, lines 8–9) explains *parāparajña* as 'knowing what is proper and what is improper'. The difficulty for Bhartṛhari seems to be that once it is said that the *ṛṣis* are *pratyakṣadharman*, they must know the *parāpara* too. Therefore such a meaning must be found for parāparajña which is not already included in *pratyakṣadharman*. That meaning is assumed to be *yuktāyukta(jña)*.

634. The *MBD* (p. 38, lines 9–10) explains *viditaveditavya* as : '(they were) fit for (taking part in) sacrifice'. (That is to say,) although they used incorrect words outside the sacrificial ritual, still, they have not been defeated'.

635. Nāgeśa explains that *adhigatayāthātathya* stands for *sākṣātkāra*, the intuitive realization of the ultimate, or the divine in oneself, whatever that may be. The *chāyā* says that *yāthātathya* is a *ṢyaÑ*-derivation without change of meaning. Why this should be so is not clear, because *yāthātathya* has an abstract meaning (*bhāve*, p.5.1.124), which is lacking in *yathātatha*.

naḥ tad vā naḥ 'whatever (happens) to us, (let) that (happen) to us '.[636] But they did not use incorrect words at the time of a sacrificial ritual. But the demons did use incorrect words at the time of a sacrified ritual. Therefore they have been defeated.[637].

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'They possessed a direct perception of *dharma*'. (That is to say,) they understood everything by means of the direct perception which is peculiar to yogins.

(On) 'they knew the far and the near'. (That is to say,) they knew the division into *vidyā* '(true) knowledge' and *avidyā* 'wrong knowledge'.[638]

Note (51)

The position taken by *Bh.* No. 118 was that the religious merit accruing from the knowledge of correct words will overwhelm the demerit resulting from the knowledge of incorrect words. But then, what about the statement *ācāre niyamaḥ*? Doesn't it say that regarding the use of words a restriction holds in the sense that correct words only are effective? The present *Bhāṣya* answers that the restriction holds for ritual usage only, not for everyday, colloquial speech. This is illustrated by the story of the *ṛṣis*, nicknamed *yarvāṇastarvāṇaḥ*, and by the reference to the demons. The *ṛṣis* suffered no harm, because they did not use incorrect words during the performance of a ritual. The demons suffered defeat, because they did precisely that.

The *MBD* (p. 38, lines 1–4) comments on the passage '(that) restriction concerns sacrificial ritual'. It refers to the statement *ācāre niyamaḥ* apparently as a *śruti*, but this may be just another misreading of the printed text for *smṛti*. It observes that this statement is nor *sāmānyānuvādin* 'laying down a general (line of conduct)', but *prakaraṇānuvādin* 'laying down (a line of conduct) in a particular context'. The particular context is that of ritual. Outside this context the restriction does not hold. This is illustrated by a number of curious practices like *agamyāgamana* 'intercourse with a woman one should not have intercourse with' (mentioned in the Gosava sacrifice), *surāpāna* 'drinking of an alocoholic drink' (mentioned in the Sautrāmaṇi sacrifice), and *brāhmaṇavadha* 'the killing of a brahmin' (men-

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636. The forms *yarvāṇas* and *tarvāṇas* are to be explained as instances of retroflexation of the original *d* (in *yad* and *tad*), and of a subsequent substitution of *r* for the retroflex. See J. WACKERNAGEL, *Altindische Grammatik*, Introduction générale....par L. RENOU. Gottingen, 1957, p. 212. M. M. DESHPANDE, *Sociolinguistic attitudes in India*. A Historical Reconstruction. Ann Arbor 1979, p. 9, mentions the forms to demonstrate the influence gained by Prakrit on Sanskrit speakers at an early time.

637. See *Bh.* Nos. 23 and 104.

638. Thus Kaiyaṭa gives a Vedantic twist to *para* and *apara*. In this connection. compare P. V. KANE, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. V, Part II. Poona 1962, p.1498–1500.

tioned in the Sarvamedha sacrifice). For the first two compare P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. II, Part II, Poona, 1941, p. 1231, n. 2644, and p. 1224. For the Sarvamedha sacrifice no reference has been found. From the examples it is clear that what is permitted or prescribed within a ritual context, is not allowed outside that context. Thus, the *niyama* which holds for *ācāra*, does not hold outside *ācāra* '(ritual) practice '.

The fact itself that the restriction was phrased is rather telling, because it says something about the state of the language at the (presumably early) time when the rule was formulated. Apparently, a corrupt form of Sanskrit was on its way to be used even during the ritual. This, again, implies that the general level of competence among officiating priests had gone down alarmingly. To counter this tendency, the rule *ācāre niyamaḥ* was phrased. Still, outside the ritual context, it allows the speakers of Sanskrit a free hand. This can only mean, that in colloquial speech either a prakritised form of Sanskrit was used, or a Prakrit.

IX

(NOW STARTS THE SECTION DEALING WITH THE MEANING OF THE TERM *VYĀKARAṆA*)

120. *(Bhāṣya : Question introducing Vt. XIV)*

Now what is the meaning of the term *vyākaraṇa?* (It means) *sūtra* '(body of) rules '.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' Now (etc.). The following statement has been made : *na cāntareṇa vyākaraṇam* ' and without (the help of) grammar '.[639] This being so, since we notice flaws in both sides (of the alternative),[640] the question regarding the meaning (of the term *vyākaraṇa*) has been raised.

XIV. (Vārttika : Objection against the view that vyākaraṇa means sūtra)

If (the term) *vyākaraṇa* means *sūtra* '(body of) rules ', (then) the meaning of the genitive ending cannot be justified.

121. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

If (the term) *vyākaraṇa* means *sūtra* '(body of) rules ', (then) the meaning of the genitive ending in *vyākaraṇasya sūtram* '(the body

639. See *Bh.* No. 20. In the phrase quoted the word *vyākaraṇa* has been used. So what does it mean ?

640. The alternative is made clear in the sequel : *vyākaraṇa* either means *sūtra* the position presupposed by *Vt.* XIV), or it means *śabda* ' word (analysed) ' (the position presupposed by *Vt.* XVI).

of) rules of *vyākaraṇa* ' cannot be justified. Because what other thing than *sūtra* could that *vyākaraṇa* be to which *sūtra* belongs ?[641]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' the meaning of the genitive ending '. Since both the words (*vyākaraṇa* and *sūtra*) stand for the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, there can be no *vyatireka* ' (genitive relation indicating) separateness ' (between them).[642] But there is no contradiction in using the two (words) by way of a general and a particular word.[643] But when a part of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is referred to by the word *sūtra*, then also the meaning of the genitive ending can be justified.[644]

Note (52)

The *MBD* (p. 38, lines 11–20), commenting on the question in *Bh.* No. 120, says the following : ' What is conveyed by that (word *vyākaraṇa*), whether (its) meaning is *rūḍha* " conventional " (or not) (read : *kvārtho rūḍha* for *kvārtharūḍha*), this (the author) asks by means of (the word) *padārtha* " meaning ". Because sometimes a homophone, being employed with a different meaning (and a different *(pravṛtti-) nimitta* " ground for using (a particular word with reference to a particular object) " (and) without the one requiring the other[645] (read : *parasparānapekṣamāṇaḥ* for *parasparam apekṣamāṇaḥ*) is used. Like the word *aśvaḥ* (read : *aśvaḥ śabdaḥ* for *aśvaśabdaḥ*), which is both *subanta* " ending in a case termination ' and *tiṅanta* " ending in a personal ending ".[646] But sometimes (a word) is used

641. That is, how could *vyākaraṇa* be something different from *sūtra*, if *sūtra* in the sense of ' (body of) rules ' is precisely what constitutes *vyākaraṇa* ?

642. From the point of view of reference, the genitive ending is supposed to express a relation of separateness between the items referred to. Or, in other words, the use of the genitive ending indicates absence of co-referentiality. For instance, the use of the genitive ending after *rājan* in *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* ' the king 's officer ' indicates that reference is to two different, separate items, namely, *rājan* and *puruṣa*. Compare *SA*, fn. 50. Similarly, the use of the genitive ending after *vyākaraṇa* in *vyākaraṇasya sūtram* indicates that *vyākaraṇa* and *sūtra* are two different items, each of them separate from the other. If, on the other hand, the words *vyākaraṇa* and *sūtra* refer to one and the same thing, the only syntactic relation which can hold between them is that of syntactic agreement, as in *vyākaraṇaṁ sūtram.*

643. Kaiyaṭa's observation is directly borrowed from the *MBD*, see Note (52). *Sūtra* may be taken as a general term, standing for *sūtra*-literature in general, whereas *vyākaraṇa* may stand for a particular type of *sūtra*-lieterature. In this case, the two words will be used in syntactic agreement.

644. Kaiyaṭa's observation is directly borrowed from the *MBD*, see Note (52). *Sūtra* may be taken to stand for an individual rule of grammar, like *vṛddhir ādaic*. To express a part—whole relation, the genitive ending is used.

645. That is, the homophones are not dependent on each other from the semantic point of view. Their conventional meanings do not show a mutual connection any more.

646. *Aśvaḥ* is either the sg. nom. of the noun *aśva* ' horse ', or the 2nd person sg. aor. of *śvi- (svayati)* ' to swell '. Even the accent of the two homophones is the same (*ādyudātta*).

because it has the same (*pravṛtti-*) *nimitta*. Like the word *ap* " water " (is used) to refer to *samudra* " sea " and to *bindu* " drop ", the (*pravṛtti-*) *nimitta* being the *jāti* " generic property ".[647] Sometimes (a word) is used even when there is a difference of generic property (in the objects referred to), by taking into consideration that the action behind the conventional meanings is the same. Like (the word) *akṣa* (which is derived) from *aś-* " to reach ", (or the word) *pāda* (which is derived) from *pad-* " to fall ", (or the word) *māṣa* (which is derived) from *mā-* " to measure "[648] (read : *aśnoter akṣaḥ* for *sarvaḥ aśnoter akṣaḥ*).[649] In these cases, we can manage because of the common action (in the background).[650] Sometimes (a word is used) because the character of something is attributed (to something else),[651] or because of superimposition. Like (the use of) the word *go* " ox " with reference to an inhabitant of Vāhīka,[652] or (the use of) the word *sarpa* " snake " with reference to a piece of rope. This being so, (the author) makes an introductory statement to inform (us) of the *pravṛttinimitta* of the word (*vyākaraṇa*) in this manner : as being of what nature (exactly) is this word *vyākaraṇa* intended ?[653] This (expression) *na cāntareṇa vyākaraṇam* " and without

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647. The *jāti* which serves as the *pravṛttinimitta* is *aptva* ' the property of being water ', which holds good both for the sea and for the drop, in order to justify reference to them by means of the word *ap*.

648. *Akṣa* may mean 1. axle, 2. die, 3. eye. *Pāda* may mean 1. foot, 2. a ray of light, 3. quarter-verse. *Māṣa* may mean 1. bean, 2. a weight of gold. Since *akṣa* has at least three different meanings, we may assume at least three different words *akṣa*, which are homophones. The same holds, *mutatis mutandis*, for *pāda* and *māṣa*.

The context in which Patañjali mentions these examples is that of *ekaśeṣa* (P.1.2.64). In the examples stated *ekaśeṣa* is not allowed, because it is restricted to homophones conveying the same lexical meaning. But Kātyāyana (*Vt.* LIX on P.1.2.64) says that even in the case of homophones conveying different lexical meanings *ekaśeṣa* is allowed, provided that we can show a common action in the etymological background. The common actions are indicated by *aś-*, etc. Thus even homophonous words referring to objects which are generically different, but whose derivation involves a common action, can be said to be *sarūpa* (P.1.2.64) in the sense that they possess the same form and the same meaning, namely, a common action.

649. Here the *MBD* text has been emended in accordance with *Mbh.* I, p. 247, line 14. In the *Mbh.* text the word *sarvam* (which has been changed to *sarvaḥ* in the printed text of the *MBD*) belongs to the preceding sentence.

How to explain the presence of *sarvaḥ* in the text of the *MBD* ? A possible explanation is to assume that part of the text has been lost here. The original text may have read *bhinnārtheṣu sāmānyāt siddhaṁ sarvam*, which is a nearly literal quotation from the *Mbh* (*Vol.* I, p. 247, line 14). Here the portion *bhinnārtheṣu....siddham* was lost, maybe due to the bad condition of the ms. Then *sarvam* remained, which was changed to *sarvaḥ* to establish syntactical agreement with *akṣaḥ*, even though neither *sarvam* nor *sarvaḥ* makes any sense here.

650. The phrase *tatra kriyāsāmānyāt siddham* is taken from the *Mbh.* (Vol. I, p. 247, line 15).

651. *Tadbhāvāpādanena.*

652. This is the form read by P.5.3.114. See further *KA*, fn. 409.

653. Whether it has a conventional meaning, or whether its *pravṛttinimitta* is a *āti*, etc.

(the help of) grammar ", which has been repeatedly stated, (and this expression) *tan nāvaiyākaraṇaḥ* " this a non-grammarian (can) not (determine) ",[654] in these (expressions), you, sir, must explain the meaning of this (word *vyākaraṇa*).

(On) *sūtra* (in *Bh.* No. 120). Its meaning is the body of the rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.

(On) ' the meaning of the genitive ending cannot be justified ' (in *Vt.* XIV). (Objection) But isn't it true that the use of the word *sūtra* (itself) cannot be justified ? The answer is (as follows). (The word) *sūtra*[655] (is used) in order to convey the introduction of a general idea.[656] (As in) *kiṁ sūtram* " what (kind of) *sūtra* ? " (to which the answer) *vyākaraṇam* as a specification (becomes) fitting.[657] Like (in the case of) *vṛkṣaḥ śiṁśapā* "the *śiṁśapā* tree ".[658] But the meaning of the genitive ending (in *vyākaraṇasya sūtram*) is not appropriate, because there is no difference (between the items concerned)[659] (read : *ṣaṣṭhyarthas tu*...*ayuktaḥ* for *śabdārthas tu*...*aprayuktaḥ*). But when the word *vyākaraṇa* stands for the whole (and) the word *sūtra* is taken to refer to some part (of it), like *vṛddhir ādaic*, etc., then the meaning of the genitive ending can be justified. But when both (words *vyākaraṇa* and *sūtra*) stand for a whole, there is no room for the genitive ending. This is what the question is about.

VI. (Vārttika : Another objection)

(There would be a chance for) not knowing the words.[660]

122. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

There would be a chance for not knowing the words. As (the phrase) says : *vyākaraṇāc chabdān pratipadyāmahe* ' we know the words from *vyākaraṇa*. '[661] Because the words are not just known from *sūtra* ' the rules '. Then how (do we know them)? From *vyākhyāna* ' explanation ' also.

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654. See *Bh.* Nos 20 and 21 respectively. The text in *Bh.* No. 21 *Mbh.* I, p. 2, line 1) reads *tāṁ nāvaiyākaraṇaḥ*.

655. In *vyākaraṇasya sūtram*.

656. *Sāmānyopakrame ' bhidhāne* literally means ' in the sense of an expression in which there is the introduction of something general '. Here *sāmānyopakrama* functions as a *bv.* cp. The idea becomes clear from the question and answer in the following sentence.

657. We ask : what kind of *sutra* ? Here *sutra* stands for a general notion, namely, *sūtra*-literature in general. The answer is : *vyākaraṇaṁ sūtram* ' a *sūtra* (-text) in the form of *vyākaraṇa* '. Here *vyākaraṇa* specifies a type of *sūtra*-literature.

658. See *KA*, *Bh.* Nos 5–6 on P.2.1.57.

659. See fn. 642.

660. That is, the words to be derived and to be used as correct Sanskrit words.

661. As indicated by *iti*, the statement *vyākaraṇāc*, etc. represents a quotation. The source of the statement has not been identified.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' not knowing the words '. Because the words are not known from hearing the mere rules, without (any) explanation.[662]

Note (53)

The question was, what does the term *vyākaraṇa* mean ? The answer was, that it means *sūtra* ' the rules '. Against this, an objection was raised (*Vt.* XIV) : if *vyākaraṇa* means *sūtra*, we cannot justify the genitive ending in the expression *vyākaraṇasya sūtram*, because the use of the genitive ending presupposes a difference between the items called *vyākaraṇa* and *sūtra*. Now the second objection says, that we cannot justify the statement *vyākaraṇāc chabdān pratipadyāmahe* either. This apparently authoritative statement explicitly says that we know the words from *vyākaraṇa*. The implication is that we do not know them from *sūtra*.

The *MBD* (p. 39, lines 3-4), first commenting on ' not knowing the words ', says : ' Because from *vṛddhir ādaic* we do not know the words '. Then, commenting on ' Then how... From *vyākhyāna*', the *MBD* says : ' On the basis of the examples we know the words which belong to the same category '.[663]

123. (*Bhāṣya : Objection removed)*

But isn't it true that this very *sūtra* ' (body of) rules, when divided up (into its constituent words) becomes the *vyākhyāna* ' explanation ' ?

124. (*Bhāṣya : Objection sustained)*

The mere (separate) words resulting from *carcā* ' (the process of) repeating (the words of a given text) ',[664] as *vṛddhiḥ, āt aic*, do not constitute *vyākhyāna* ' explanation '. Then (in) what (does *vyākhyāna* consist) ? (In) *udāharaṇa* ' example ', *pratyudāharaṇa* ' counterexample ',[665] (and) *vākyādhyāhāra* ' completion of the utte-

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662. For instance, from merely hearing *karmaṇy aṇ* (P.3.2.1) we will not know the word *kumbhakāra* ' pot-maker '. The point is that the rules for derving the words have been phrased in an abstract manner. They are meta-language in the sense of statements about linguistic elements obtained through analysis.

663. *Udāharaṇa* 'example' is one of the parts of *vyākhyāna* mentioned by Patañjali in *Bh.* No. 124. Once we know that *kumbhakāra* is an example of *karmaṇy aṇ*, we may easily guess that *nagarakāra* ' city-founder ' belongs to the same category, and also comes under *karmaṇy aṇ*. Compare *Bh.* Nos. 53–55.

664. *Carcā* is the process of repeating words in Vedic recitation as part of the training in recitation. See V. S. AGRAWALA, *India as known to Pāṇini*, Second Edition, Varanasi, p. 336–337. The word *carcā* is known to Pāṇini (P.3.3.105).

665. A *pratyudāharaṇa* is the example in which a given rule does not apply on account of a condition stated in that rule.

rance (by supplying words) '.[666] All of that taken together becomes the *vyākhyāna* ' explanation '.[667]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' All..taken together '. That is to say, from the whole taken together only a definite meaning arises.[668]

Note (54)

The *MBD* (p. 39, lines 5-8), first commenting on ' But isn't it true that this very *sūtra*..when divided up becomes the *vyākhyāna*.. ? ' says: *vyākhyāna* is the means of explaining the meaning of the rules. Like the explanation of the meaning of *vaṭavṛkṣasthito daṁṣṭrī* ' the wild boar located near the fig-tree ' is given as *vaṭe vṛkṣe sthito daṁṣṭrī*.[669] Then, commenting on ' The mere..words resulting from *carcā*..not ', the *MBD* says : ' From a *sūtra* which has been divided up (into its constituent words) one does not understand meaning in the same way as from the (separate) word-constituents resulting from *carcā* in *vaṭe vṛkṣe* (etc.) '.[670]

125. *(Bhāṣya : Introducing a Vt.)*

(If this is) so, then[671] (*vyākaraṇa* means) *śabda* words '.[672]

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666. *Vākyādhyāhāra* simply refers to the process of *anuvṛtti*. Compare V. S. AGRAWALA, *op. cit.*, p. 32. Nāgeśa, however, offers two different explanations. The first says that *adhyāhāra* means *kalpana* ' assumption ', namely, the assumption that what is marked with *svarita* presents itself in the succeeding rules also (P.1.3.11). The second refers to a principle applied by Pantañjali in his *bhāṣya* on P.1.1.45 (*Mbh.* I, p. 111, line 22). According to this principle, parts of sentences may be used to convey the meaning of whole sentences. The example is *praviśa piṇḍīm.* ' please come in, (have) a cookie '. The application of this principle in the present context, according to Nāgeśa, amounts to this, that since the *Vārttikas* are concerned with the intention of the *sūtras*, thay may be regarded as complements (*adhyāhāra*) of the original *sūtras*.. That is to say, the *vidheya* ' predicate ' and further suitable conditions of the original *sūtras* are supplied in the *Vārttikas*. It goes without saying that especially Nāgeśa's second explanation is beside the point.

667. Compare V. S. AGRAWALA, *op. cit.*, p. 32–33.

668. Kaiyaṭa means to say that our knowledge of the meaning of *sūtras* comes in successive steps only. For instance, from hearing *ād guṇaḥ* (P.6.1.87) we have some idea. Then, when the *anuvṛtti*-elements are supplied, we have a better idea. The example and counterexample provide still more knowledge. Finally, from the whole process together we have a definite understanding.

669. In ordinary speech, if expressions are divided up into their constituents, this may contribute to better understanding of the expressions. The example given is one of replacing a cp. by its corresponding wordgroup.

670. In a *sūtra* we do not deal with language, but with meta-language, see fn. 662. Therefore dividing up a *sūtra* into its constituent words is quite different from dividing up an utterance used in daily speech.

671. *Evaṁ tarhi* is the standard expression used to indicate that the previous objection or objections has or have been accepted, and that a new position is taken up.

XVI. (Vārttika : Objection against the view that vyākaraṇa means śabda)

If (it is accepted that *vyākaraṇa* means) *śabda* ' words ', (then) the meaning of (the suffix) *LyuṬ* (cannot be justified).

126. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

If *vyākaraṇa* (means) *śabda* ' words ', (then) the meaning of (the suffix) *LyuṬ* cannot be justified. (Because) *vyākaraṇa* (is derived in the sense of) *vyākriyate 'nena* ' it is analysed by that '.[673] (But) certainly, by words nothing at all is analysed. Then by means of what (do we analyse) ? By means of *sūtra* ' rules '.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' If . . *śabda* '. (The suffix) *LyuṬ* is prescribed in the sense of *karaṇa* ' instrument '.[674] And *śabda* ' words ', on account of their being analysed, become the object[675] (of the action of analysing), but not the instrument. This is what (the author) means to say.

Note (55)

The *MBD* (p. 39, lines 9–13), first commenting on ' If *śabda*, (then) the meaning of . . *LyuṬ* (cannot be justified) ' says : ' We understand the meaning of the genitive ending, when there is a difference (between the items concerned).[676] *Sūtra* " the rules " becomes connected with *śabda* " the words ", because it analyses (the words) '.[677] Then, commenting on ' But the meaning of (the suffix) *LyuṬ* cannot be justified ', the *MBD* says : ' Because the words being processed[678] are the main thing, since they are not subservient to something else (read : *aparārthatvāt* for *parārthatvāt*).[679]

672. *Śabda* is interpreted as an instance of *jātyekavacana*, by P.1.2.58. Nāgeśa explains that *śabda* means *lakṣya* ' example (taken from usage) '. In the new interpretation proposed we can justify the expression *vyākaraṇasya sūtram*. It amounts to *śabdasya sūtram* ' rules about words '.

673. A passive form followed by the instrumental case of a pronoun is the standard way in which commentators indicate that a word is to be derived in the sense of *karaṇa*. Apparently, the practice dates back to Patañjali already.

674. By P.3.3.117.

675. Or the aim at which the action of analysis is directed. Therefore, according to Mīmāṁsā theory, the words become *pradhāna* ' the main thing ' as opposed to what is *guṇa* ' the subservient thing '.

676. See fn. 642.

677. *Sūtra* is *anvākhyāyaka* ' the means of analysis ', whereas *śabda* is *anvākhyeya* ' (the object) to be analysed '.

678. *Saṁskriyamāṇa.*

679. In accordance with *Jaiminimīmāṁsāsūtra* 3.1.2, *śeṣaḥ parārthatvāt*, which is explained by Śabara as *yaḥ parasyopakāre vartate sa śeṣa ity ucyate* ' that is called *śeṣa* which is of service to something else '. As explained by Śabara in the sequel of his comment,

And the status of *karaṇa* ' instrument ' is not fitting for the main thing. Just as in (the actions of) collecting the ingredients, preparing[680] and discarding[681] the *puroḍāśa* " sacrificial cake "[682] because of its ingredients being collected together, its being prepared and discarded becomes the *pradhāna* " main thing " only.[683] (But in the present interpretation of *vyākaraṇa*) the knowledge of words (would become) *guṇa* " subordinate ". '[684]

XVII (a) (Vārttika : Another objection)[685]

In the sense of *bhava* ' located (in that) '.[686]

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the idea is that something is called *śeṣa*, when it is always subservient to something else, not just incidentally. See *Śrīmajjaiminipraṇīte mīmāṁsādarśane....dvitīyabhāgasya pūrvārdhaḥ. Ānandāśramasaṁskṛtagranthāvaliḥ*, No. 97, Poona, 1930, p. 658–59.

680. *Saṁskāra.*

681. *Pratipatti*, or rather *pratipattikarma* is the action at the end of a sacrifice by which things used during the sacrifice, but to keep which has become bothersome are disposed of. See *The Mīmāṅsā-Nyāya-Prakāśa......*translated......by F. EDGERTON, New Haven : Yale University Press, 1929, p. 230. *upayuktasyākīrṇakaratānivartakaṁ karma pratipattikarma* ' a concluding act is one which prevents something that has been employed from littering up the place (trans., p. 111). '

682. Balls prepared out of rice-flour with the help of ghee, in the shape of a tortoise, underneath flat and convex on the upper side, of the height of a horse's hoof. They are baked on potsherds which are arranged in a particular order. Portions of these *puroḍāśas* are taken and offered to Agni and other deities. The remainder is partaken of by the officiating brahmins and the *yajamāna*. Their preparation is prescribed in detail in the *Āpastambaśrautasūtra*, and in the *pauroḍāśikakāṇḍa* of other texts on ritual. Compare P. V. KANE, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol.II, Part II, Poona, 1941, p. 1046–47, 1062, 1068, and V. S. AGRAWALA, *India as known to Pāṇini*, Second Ed., Varanasi, 1963, p.335–36. For the name *pauroḍāśika* (and *puroḍāśika*) see P.4.3.70.

The *paśupuroḍāśa* is also prepared out of rice-flour only, but used during a *paśuyāga*. It is not prepared out of meat.

683. For the Mīmāṁsā terminology of *pradhāna* and *guṇa* see *The Mīmāṁsā Nyāya-Prakāśa*, ed. quoted, p. 230, *kriyārūpāṇi ca dvividhāni : guṇakarmāṇi pradhānakarmāṇi ceti;* translation, p. 110, ' and those (subsidiaries, *aṅgas*, of an action) consisting (themselves) of actions are of two sorts, secondary actions and primary actions '. Here the primary actions contribute directly to the main action, whereas the secondary actions only contribute indirectly. Compare further MM. Dr. G. JHA, *Pūrvamīmāṁsā in its sources*, Benaras Hindu University, 1942, p. 265, where it is said that the distinction between *pradhāna* and *guṇa* is different from that between *aṅga (śeṣa)* and *aṅgin (śeṣin).*

684. This is not desired, and it forms precisely the objection phrased in terms of Mīmāṁsā against the view presupposed by *Vt.* XVI.

685. According to the Kielhorn text, which is followed in the translation, *bhave proktādayaś ca taddhitāḥ* forms one *Vt.* Patañjali, in *Bh.* No. 130, assumes two separate *Vts*, which came to Kātyayāna's mind successively, but in *Bh.* No. 129 he mentions just one statement *bhave proktādayaś ca taddhitāḥ*. The *NSP* ed. (*Navāhnikam*, Bombay, 1951, p. 78) prints two separate *Vts*, the first reading *bhave ca taddhitaḥ*, the second *proktādayaś ca taddhitāḥ*. In any case, if the statement was originally one, it may have been divided up into two very easily for the sake of separately commenting on them.

686. Reference is to P. 4.3.52. Thus, whereas earlier a difficulty was raised in connection with the genitive ending, now it is with the locative ending.

127. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

Nor can (the addition of) a *taddhita* (suffix) in the sense of *bhava* ' located (in that) ' be justified. (For instance), a regulation located in *vyākaraṇa* (is said to be) *vaiyākaraṇa*. (But) certainly, the regulation is not located in words. Then in what (is it located)? In *sūtra* ' the rules '.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' Nor . in the sense of *bhava* '. If (it is argued) that a regulation can be located in words also, because it analyses (words), (we say, no,) because (in that case) *vaiyākaraṇatva* ' the being located in *vyākaraṇa* ' would hold good for the regulations of the Mīmāṁsakas, etc. also, since they undertake an investigation with regard to words.[687]

Note (56)

The *MBD* (p. 39, lines 14–15), commenting on *bhave*, says : '(Objection) But isn't it true that (regulations) may be located in that (namely, in words), because their function is to analyse (words) ? (Answer), In that case, every regulation whatsoever would be called *vaiyākaraṇa* " located in *vyākaraṇa* " (but this is not desired). Therefore, what is intended here is a ' part-whole relation '.

The present position is that *vyākaraṇa* means *śabda* ' the words '. But we have the expression *yogaḥ vaiyākaraṇaḥ*, in which the word *vaiyākaraṇa* is derived in the sense of *tatra bhavaḥ*. If *vyākaraṇa* is taken to stand for *śabda*, then the expression would mean that regulations (regarding words) are located in the words they regulate, which seems doubtful. Now the question in the mind of the author of the *MBD* is, what could be the relation between *śabda* and *yoga* ' regulation ', which is expressed by the locative case ? It may be an *anvākhyāyaka-anvākhyeya* relation (see fn. 677), or a part-whole relation, because the parts are located in the whole. In the first case, the undesired consequence is that the rules of any system would be called *vaiyākaraṇa*. Thus the distinction between grammar and other sciences like Mīmāṁsā might be in danger of being lost. Therefore the only relation which remains is the part-whole relation. But, we may add, this does not solve the problem either, because regulations / rules are not parts of words, but of an organized system of rules.

XVII (b) (Vārttika : Objection continued)

And the *taddhita* (suffixes conveying the sense of) *prokta* ' promulgated (by him) ', etc.[688]

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687. Kaiyaṭa takes his comment from the *MBD*, see Note (56).

688. Reference is to P.4.3.101 specifically, and to P.4.3.115 and 116 implicitly. For the meaning of *prokta* (and *upajñāta*) see V S. AGRAWALA, *India as known to Pāṇini*,

128. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

And the *taddhita* (suffixes conveying the sanse of) *prokta* 'promulgated (by him)', etc. could not be justified. (For instance, in the sense of) *pāṇininā proktam* 'promulgated by Pāṇini' (sg. nom. ntr.) (we derive) *pāṇinīyam.* (In the same way, we derive) *āpiśalam* 'promulgated by Āpiśali' (sg. nom. ntr) (and) *kāśakṛtsnam,* 'promulgated by Kāśakṛtsna' (sg. nom. ntr.).[689] (But) certainly, Pāṇini did not promulgate the words (themselves). Then what (did he promulgate)? The rules.

129. *(Bhāṣya : Objection against the phrasing of Vt. XVII)*

For what purpose are these two things stated, namely, *bhave proktādayaś ca taddhitāḥ* '*taddhita* (suffix prescribed) in the sense of *(tatra) bhavaḥ* and (in the sense *tena*) *proktam,* etc.'? Wouldn't a *taddhita* (suffix prescribed) in the sense of *(tatra) bhavaḥ* be also enjoined by just (saying) *proktādayaś ca taddhitāḥ*?

Note (57)

The *Bhāṣya* points out that the separate mention of *bhave* in the statement *bhave proktādayaś ca* taken as one single statement is not really necessary. The reason is that a *taddhita* suffix prescribed in the sense of *bhava* could be included in *proktādayaḥ*, or rather in *ādi* in *proktādayaḥ.* Therefore the separate mention of *bhave* seems redundant.

130. *(Bhāṣya : Objection removed)*

(We assume that) first the *ācarya*[690] has noticed this, namely, *bhave taddhitaḥ* 'a *taddhita* (suffix prescribed) in the sense of *(tatra) bhavaḥ*' (and) that he has formulated (as a *Vārttika*). Then, at a later time, he has noticed this, namely, *proktādayaś ca taddhitāḥ* 'and *taddhita* (suffixes conveying the sense of *tena*) *proktam,* etc.' (and)

Second Edition, Varanasi, 1963, p. 314–16. On p. 316 the author says : '*Uupajñāta* formed a special class under *Prokta* literature, since the grammatical treatises of Āpiśali, Pāṇini etc. are both regarded as *prokta* and *Upajñāta* (*Pāṇininā proktam, Pāṇininā upajñātam* both were *Pāṇinīyam*)'. The examples *pāṇinīyam,* etc. are not mentioned in the *Bhāṣya* on P. 4.3.101, and Patañjali does not separately comment on P.4.3.115. But in the *KV* on P.4.3.101 and on P.4.3.115 the examples are quoted.

689. For Āpiśali and Kāśakṛtsna see G. CARDONA, *Pāṇini : A Survep of Research,* The Hague-Paris, 1976, p. 147, 148–149, and p. 151–52.

690. According to Manu, 2.140, the title of *ācārya* is given to the teacher who performs the initiation and introduces a student to the Veda together with the science of sacrificial ritual *(kalpa)* and the Upaniṣads *(rahasya).* But, apparently already in Patañjali's days, the same title was given to teachers who either founded a *śāstra* or enjoyed great authority in a particular field. In his *Mbh.* Patañjali uses the term *ācārya* in connection with Pāṇini mainly, but also in connection with Kātyāyana. For references in connection with Panini see e.g. V. S. AGRAWALA, *India as known to Pāṇini,* Second Edition, Varanasi, 1963, p. 6–7, 283.

that he has formulated (as a *Vārttika*) also.[691] But nowadays, once the *ācāryas* have phrased rules, they do not take them back.[692]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' And nowadays....not '. There is no difficulty, because (just) like original *sūtras, Vārttikas* may (also) be justified by (assuming the relation of) *lakṣaṇa* ' general rule ' and *prapañca* ' development in detail ' (between them).[693]

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691. That is to say, Kātyāyana must first have noticed that, if *vyākaraṇa* is identified with the words it studies, we cannot justify the derivation of *vaiyākaraṇa* in *yogaḥ vaiyākaraṇaḥ* by P. 4.3.52. Then it must have come to his notice that derivations by means of *taddhita*-suffixes in other senses, like that of *pāṇinīya* in the sense of *tena proktam* would also fail. These two ideas Kātyāyana must have combined by saying *bhave proktādayaś ca taddhitāḥ*.

692. *Nivartayanti*. Patañjali's remark is directed at Kātyāyana, and is another instance of Patañjali's critical attitude with regard to Kātyāyana, shown earlier in the remark about Kātyāyana's predilection for *taddhita*-suffixes (see *Bh.* No. 84 above; *Mbh.* I, p. 8, lines 8–9). The word *idānīm* ' nowadays ' points out the contrast with the practice of earlier days, that is, Pāṇini's days in which the *ācāryas* who were real authorities sat down in a clean place and phrased rules with a great effort, so that the rules did not contain one single superfluous letter (*Mbh.* I, p. 39, lines 10–12). But where does one find that now ? Nowadays the *ācāryas* produce sloppy pieces of work. Just look at what Kātyāyana does here.

For the contrast mentioned see Y. OJIHARA, " Sur une formule patañjalienne : *Na cedānīm ācāryāḥ sūtrāṇi kṛtvā nivartayanti* ", *Indologica Taurinensia*, Official Organ of the International Association of Sanskrit Studies, Vol. VI, Torino, 1978, p. 227, 229.

In the same article, p. 228–30, Ojihara proposes a different sense for *nivartayanti* in the present *Bhāṣya*, namely, ' they cut (their *sūtras* short) '. For this sense he refers to the use of *nivartayati* in *śrauta* literature, in connection with the object *keśān* ' hairs '. Outside *śrauta*-literature this use is not found, as admited by Ojihara, art. quoted, p. 230, Ojihara's idea is that Patañjali must have used *nivartayanti* in this sense as a kind of sly joke, which, unfortunately, was lost upon the commentators (art. quoted, p. 228). In that case, the passage means : ' But nowadays, once the *ācāryas* have phrased rules, they do not trim (them any more) '.

Against Ojihara's proposal it may be argued that :

(1) The causative of *nivṛt-* is used in the *Mbh.* basically in the sense of ' to cause to turn away '. In the special instances, this is rendered as ' to disallow ',

(2) The *śrauta*-literature presents an instance of meaning-specialisation in connection with the object *keśān* only, and

(3) The basic sense ' to cause to turn away ', that is, ' to remove ' or ' to withdraw ' fits in the *Mbh.*-passage under discussion.

For these reasons Ojihara's proposal, although it is ingenious and makes good sense, is rejected.

The implication of the phrase in the sense accepted is that, in previous days, the *ācāryas* did take back rules which were found wanting in some respect. This should be taken as an indication of the care they bestowed on phrasing them. Precisely that careful attitude is lacking nowadays. This is Patañjali's complaint.

693. Kaiyaṭa takes his comment from the *MBD*, see Note (58). The *prapañca* consists in specifying the instances which come under a general rule. By way of examples

Note (58)

The *MBD* (p. 39, lines 17–18), commenting on 'first..this' Because in the *Bhāṣyasūtras*[694] prolixity and economy (of phrasing) has not been taken into consideration, and because (the technique of) *lakṣaṇa* 'general rule' and *prapañca* 'development in detail' has been adopted even in the original *sūtras*, in the present case also procedure is by means of *lakṣaṇa* and *prapañca*.

131. (*Bhāṣya : Removal of the objection stated in Vt. XVI*)

To begin with, as regards what was said, namely, *śabde lyuḍarthaḥ* 'if (it is accepted that *vyākaraṇa* means) *śabda* "words", (then) the meaning of (the suffix) *LyuṬ* (cannot be justified)',[695] this is not a difficulty. (The reason is that the suffix) *LyuṬ* is not necessarily prescribed in the sense of *karaṇa* 'instrument' or *adhikaraṇa* 'location' only.[696] Then (in) what (other sense)? In the sense of other *kārakas* 'syntactic functions' also, (by the rule) *kṛtyalyuṭo bahulam*.[697] Take an example, *praskandanam* 'that from which one leaps', *prapatanam* 'that from which one falls'.[698]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) *praskandanam*. Although this (word) is (read in the) *bhīmādi*-list,[699] still, (we will say that) P. 3.4.74 is the *prapañca* 'development in detail' of P. 3.3.113. This is what (the author) means to say.[700]

Nāgeśa refers to the sequence P.2.1.57–71, (*viśeṣaṇaṁ viśeṣyeṇa bahulam*) functions as the general rule, and the following rules as the *prapañca*, and the *aluk*-section (P.6.3.1–24). The terms *lakṣaṇa* and *prapañca* are used by Patañjali in *Bh.* No. 6 on P.2.1.57 (see *KA*, p. 156).

694. That is the *Vārttikas*. As distinct from these, the *MBD* refers to Pāṇini's *sūtras* as *mūlasūtras* 'the original *sūtras*'. It may be remembered that sometimes Patañjali refers to the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* by the name of *Vṛttisūtra*. See SA, Note (144) and *The Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali.* Edited by F. Kielhorn, Vol. II. Bombay, 1906, Preface to the first edition, p. 22, note continued from p. 21. V. S. Agrawala, *op. cit.*, p. 31 observes that 'The title *Vṛtti-sūtra*....means that the *sūtras* of Pāṇini were the subject of a *vṛtti* or commentary which was the result of his own teaching'.

Just going by Pāṇini's rules, the word *vārttika* is a *ṬHaK*-derivation in the sense of *tad adhīte tad veda* (P. 4.2.59) from *vṛtti* (no. 20 in the *ukthādi* list. P.4.2.60). Thus *vārttika* comes to mean 'one who studies or knows the *vṛtti*'. But for the usually accepted meaning see P. Thieme (reviews of T. Burrow, *The Sanskrit Language*, and of L. Renou, *Terminologie grammaticale du Sanskrit*), *Kleine Schriften*, Teil 2, Wiesbaden, 1971, p. 697, n. 1, and p. 731–32.

695. *Vt.* XVI.

696. By P.3.3.117.

697. P.3.3.113. The rule says that the suffixes called *kṛtya* and the suffix *LyuṬ* are variously applied, that is, in other senses also than the ones enumerated so far.

698. Both words are formed with the suffix *LyuṬ* (replaced by *ana*, P.7.1.1). The translation is strictly according to the meaning attributed to the suffix.

699. The *gaṇa* mentioned in P. 4.3.74, which prescribes the sense of *apādāna* 'fixed point from which something moves away' for the suffixes used to derive the word listed.

Note (59)

The argument of the *Bhāṣya* is that we need not take *vyākaraṇa* in the sense of *karaṇa* ' instrument (by which the words are analysed) '. We may take it in a different sense also, for instance, in the passive (*karmaṇi*) sense. In that case, *vyākaraṇa* comes to mean ' that which is analysed '. That which is analysed is *śabda* ' the words ', and that is precisely the meaning assumed for *vyākaraṇa* in the present stage of the discussion. The examples quoted by Patañjali, to illustrate a different meaning from that of *karaṇa* (or *adhikaraṇa*), are examples for the sense of *apādāna*. This sense is not applicable in the case of the word *vyākaraṇa*. But the word *bahulam* ' variously ' in P. 3.3.113 permits us to select any other suitable *kāraka*-sense.

The *MBD* (p. 39, lines 19-21), commenting on ' Take an example '. says : ' (Objection) But isn't it true that these words (*praskandanam* and *prapatanam*) are read in the *bhīmādi*-list ? The answer is (as follows). Precisely this is what (the rule *kṛtya-*) *lyuṭo bahulam* tells (us).[701] namely, that the *bhīmādi*-list is the *prapañca* " development in detail " of this (rule) '.

The difficulty noted by the author of the *MBD* is that P. 3.4.74 explicitly prescribes the sense of *apādāna* for the suffixes assumed in the words *bhīma*, etc. Then why does Patañjali refer to P. 3.3.133 ? The answer is that P. 3.3.133 is a general rule for which P. 3.4.74 gives the details.

132. (*Bhāṣyā : Vindication of the sense of karaṇa for vyākaraṇa*)

Or rather,[702] (we will assume that) words are explained[703] by means of words also. To illustrate, when (the word) *gauḥ* ' cow ' has been uttered, all doubts are removed, because it is neither *aśva* ' horse ', not *gardabha* ' donkey '.[704]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' when. .*gauḥ*. .has been uttered '. When it is said *ayaṁ gauḥ* ' this is an ox ' to somebody, with reference to (an object) which possesses a dewlap, then what happens is the elimination[705] of other (words as) ex-

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700. Instead, Kaiyaṭa should have said : This is how the *MBD* explains. Because Kaiyaṭa's comment is a mere copy of the *MBD*'s comment.

701. Or rather, the word *bahulam* in this rule.

702. *Athavā* may be used to introduce a preferred alternative. But in the present case it rather serves to insert or append material which is only loosely connected with the argument. Thus the impression that the *Mbh.* is of a compilatory nature is strengthened.

703. *Vyākriyante*. Here for *vyākṛ-* a sense different from the one used so far (namely, ' to analyse ') is assumed.

704. The statement *nāśvaḥ na gardabhaḥ* is ambiguous, because it may refer to the words *aśva* and *gardabha*, or to the objects named so. Kaiyaṭa takes it in the first way. Taken in the second way, the *Bhāṣya* says : ' . . . .all doubts are removed, because (we know that the object referred to is) neither a horse nor a donkey '.

705. *Nivṛtti*.

pressive (of the object). In the same way,[706] when one single example has been introduced, all other utterances similar to that are understood (also).[707]

Note (60)

The *MBD* (p. 39, lines 21–24), commenting on 'Or rather..words are explained by words', says: A word, certainly, manifests[708] *svarūpa* 'one's own form'. It discloses that an opposite (form) has not been uttered.[709] It conveys (the knowledge of) other utterances which belong to the same category. (On the other hand,) the removal takes place of what does not belong to the same category, even if that is a correct (form). Since in this respect the *Bhāṣya* shows one side[710] (only), it says *nāśvo na gardabhaḥ* "neither horse nor donkey".'

The difficulty before Patañjali was that, if the word *vyākaraṇa* means *śabda*, and if *vyākaraṇa* is derived in the sense of *karaṇa* 'instrument', we cannot say *vyākaraṇena śabdāḥ vyākriyante*, because that would amount to saying *śabdena* (i e., *śabdaiḥ*) *śabdāḥ vyākriyante* 'words are analysed by means of words', which is absurd. The only thing we can say is *sūtreṇa śabdāḥ vyākriyante* 'words are analysed by means of rules' (see *Bh.* No, 126). But, according to the present *Bhāṣya*, it is possible to say *śabdaiḥ śabdāḥ vyākriyante*. The question is, in what sense, and, more specifically, what does *vyākriyante* mean here?

To clarify his intention, Patañjali provides an example. Suppose, we are in doubt. The doubt may regard the appropriate word to be used with reference to a given object, or it may regard the object itself: we are not sure what it is. Here the more likely interpretation is the first, because the text says *śabdaiḥ śabdāḥ vyākriyante* 'words are explained by means of words', and not *arthaiḥ śabdāḥ vyākriyante* 'words are explained by means of the things-meant'. In that situation of doubt the word *gauḥ* is uttered. By this utterance the doubt is removed. We know that it is neither *aśva* nor *gardabha*. That is to say, we know that *aśva* or *gardabha* are not the appropriate words to be used here. This is what is probably expressed by the phrase *śabdaiḥ śabdāḥ vyākriyante*.

It is clear that there can be no question of analysis of words by means of words. Analysis of words can only mean that words are divided up into

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706. Just as other words are excluded, so also utterances belonging to the same category are included.

707. The second part of Kaiyaṭa's comment is borrowed from the *MBD*, see Note (60).

708. *Codayati.*

709. 'Opposite' means : an utterance having a different *svarūpa.*

710. As stated by the *MBD*, the phonetic/accoustic form of words has two functions : it includes similar utterances and it excludes dissimilar utterances. Of these two functions the *Bhāṣya* shows one side only, namely, the exclusion.

their constituents. But this is not what happens in the situation described by the *Bhāṣya*. Here what happens is that our mind is cleared of doubts. These doubts are not at all connected with the analysis of words, but, probably, with the use of words : how to name an object ?

Thus, in connection with the *Bhāṣya*, the following points may be noted :

(1) It is probably concerned with the topic of appropriately naming object,

(2) This implies a shift away from the topic of grammatical analysis.

(3) *Vyākṛ-* means ' to explain ', ' To explain ' means : to remove doubts.

(4) The removal of doubts is expressed both positively, by mentioning the appropriate word, and negatively, by mentioning two inappropriate words (*na*..*na*..iti). Only by taking into account these points we can justify the phrase *śabdaiḥ śabdāḥ vyākriyante*.

Still, the question remains, what does this phrase mean ? As its probable interpretation the following three stages are proposed :

(1) words are explained by means of words,

(2) doubts regarding words are removed by means of words,

(3) doubts regarding the word to be used in connection with a given object are removed by the use of the appropriate word.

In this last sense we can justify the expression *śabdaiḥ śabdāḥ vyākriyante*, and that was the only concern we may add, not a very illuminating one of the *Bhāṣya*.

The use of the negative expression in connection with the meaning-explanation of *gauḥ* is vaguely reminiscent of the *apohavāda*. According to this theory, a word-meaning consists in *atadvyāvṛtti* ' exclusion of what is other than that ' (see *Nyāyakośa* ...By MM. Bh. Jhalakīkar. Revised.... by MM. V. S. Abhyankar. Poona (B. O. R. I.) 1928, s. v. *apoha*). But whether Patañjali in saying *nāśvaḥ na gardabhaḥ* had the *apoha*-theory, or rather an early form of this theory in mind, seems doubtful.

According to the *MBD*, a word once uttered, manifests its own type-form, and by that removes or excludes its opposite. Thus it will include similar utterances by different speakers, and it will exclude dissimilar utterances. Here reference may be to *VP* 1.96 (ed. W. Rau, *Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya. Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes.* Band XLII, 4. Wiesbaden 1977) which says *anekavyaktyabhivyaṅgyā jātiḥ sphoṭa iti smṛtā / kaiś cid vyaktaya evāsya dhvanitvena prakalpitāḥ* 'some hold that the *sphoṭa* is the *jāti* " generic property " manifested by the several individual instances (and) its individual instances themselves are assumed to be the sounds'

(compare S. D. Joshi, *The Sphoṭanirṇaya of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa. Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit.* Class C. No. 2. Poona 1967, p. 32, and p. 28–29 for a discussion).

133. *(Bhāṣya ; Reminder of a previous objection)*

Then[711] the difficulty remains this, namely, (what was stated by) *bhave proktādayaś ca taddhitāḥ* [712]

134. *(Bhāṣya : Introducing a Vt.)*

(If this is) so,[713] then (we will assume a new meaning for *vyākaraṇa*).

XVIII. (Vārttika : A new meaning for vyākaraṇa)

Vyākaraṇa (**means**) *lakṣya* **and** *lakṣaṇa.*

135 *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

This whole (consisting of) both *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa* becomes *vyākaraṇa*. But what is *lakṣya* and what is *lakṣaṇa*? *Lakṣya* is *śabda* 'the words' and *lakṣaṇa* is *sūtra* 'the rules'.

Note (61)

The *MBD* (p. 40, lines 1-4), commenting on '(If this is) so, then *vyākaraṇa* (means) *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa*' says : 'What we should understand is this. For instance, one word *bilva* stands for *vanaspati* "a forest tree" (and) a totally different (word *bilva*) stands for a fruit (called *bilva*).[715] Nor (is the word *vyākaraṇa*) like the word *ap-* 'water' in the sense that there is one single *śabdanimitta* "ground for using a (particular) word (with reference to a particular object)".[716] Nor (is the word *vyākaraṇa*) like (the word) *akṣa* in the sense that there is a common action (in the background).[717] Nor should we have recourse to *ekaśeṣa* "retaining of one

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711. *Tarhi*, like *evaṁ tarhi*, indicates that a previous objection stands, and that we must look for a different solution.

712. *Vt.* XVII a. and b. See *Bh.* Nos. 127 and 128.

713. For *evaṁ tarhi* see fn. 671.

714. Literally, *lakṣya* means the examples taken from speech and literature, which are to be processed by grammar.

715. Some phrase like 'the word *vyākaraṇa* is not like that' is to be understood. Reference is to P.4.3.163. This rule prescribes *luk*-elision of a suffix conveying the sense of *phala* 'fruit'. Thus the word standing for the tree and the word standing for the fruit of the tree become homophones. But we should not apply this to the word *vyākaraṇa*. There is not one word *vyākaraṇa* meaning *lakṣya*, and other homophonic word *vyākaraṇa* meaning *lakṣaṇa*.

716. See Note (52) and fn. 647. There is no common feature *(vyākaraṇatva)* which explains that the word *vyākaraṇa* may be applied to *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa*.

717. See Note (52) and fn. 648. There is no common action, like *vyākṛ-*, in the etymological background which explains that the word *vyākaraṇa* applied in the sense of *lakṣya* and in that of *lakṣaṇa* is originally one and the same word.

(only) " [718] (here in the sense of *vyākaraṇa*) because, if this is the assumption, each and every word would fit the *Bhāṣya*'.[719]

136. *(Bhāṣya : Objection)*

Even then the difficulty (would be) this, that the word *vyākaraṇa*, when applied to the whole,[720] cannot be justified as (applying to) a part (only).[721] Yet[722] (the name) *vaiyākaraṇa* ' grammarian ' is desired for one who studies even the *sūtras* ' rules ' (only)[723].

137. *(Bhāṣya : Objection removed)*

No difficulty here. Because words used with reference to wholes are used with reference to parts also. Taken an example, *pūrve pañcālāḥ* ' East Pañcāla ', *uttare pañcālāḥ* ' North Pañcāla ' *tailaṁ bhuktam* ' oil has been eaten ', *ghṛtaṁ bhuktam* ' ghee has been eaten ' *śuklaḥ* ' white ', *nīlaḥ* ' violet-blue ', *kṛṣṇaḥ* ' black '.[724]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) '*pūrve pañcālāḥ*'. When one wants to suppress reference to the other (part of the) *janapada* ' regional state ', one uses (the word *pañcālāḥ*) even with reference to a part (like *pūrve pañcālāḥ*), by superimposing the form of the whole (on it).[725]

(On) ' *tailam* ' (etc.). When we have a (certain) measure of ghee or oil, which has been medicated,[726] then this is the example. But when the words ghee or oil stand for (ghee or oil as) an *ākṛti* ' genus ', (then) their

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718. Prescribed by P.1.2.64.

719. That is, the *Bhāṣya* dealing with *ekaśeṣa*. If the *ekaśeṣa*-principle is stretched this far, it is difficult to see why it should not be applied to other words also. The outcome would be the use of few words with many meanings, with possible disastrous consequences for communication.

720. I.e., to the combination of *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa*.

721. Namely, to *lakṣaṇa* ' the rules ' only.

722. *Ca.*

723. *Vaiyākaraṇa* derived with the suffix *aṆ* in the sense of *tad adhīte tad veda* (P.4.2.59) Compare in this connection the dialogue between the charioteer and the grammarian translated in Note (43). Apparently, the ideal grammarian is one who is both *iṣṭijña* and *prāptijña*, like the three *munis* of grammer.

724. Nearly the complete *Bhāṣya* is repeated in *TA*, *Bh.* No. 31 on P.2.2.6.

725. Compare *TA*, p. 102, for Kaiyaṭa's comment, and ibid. fn. 304. The idea is that, when we use a word standing for a whole, like *pañcālāḥ*, with reference to a part, like *pūrve pañcālāḥ*, we do not use the word *pañcālāḥ* in its primary, literal sense. But a change of this sense cannot be assumed arbitrarily. That is why Kaiyaṭa thinks that here the idea of the whole is superimposed on the part, so that, still, the primary sense of the word *pañcālāḥ* is retained. The idea of superimposition comes from the *MBD*, see Note (62).

726. *Oṣadhisaṁskṛta.*

use in the primary sense (of the word) has nothing to do with composition or measure. [727]

(On) '*śuklaḥ*'. Even when part (of the object) is not white, then one may use (the word white) on account of superimposition, since whiteness of the whole is (assumed) because of the whiteness of another part.[728]

Note (62)

The *MBD* (p. 40, lines 4-8), commenting on 'And words used with reference to wholes', says 'As regards what will be stated later on, namely, that one (word *vyākaraṇa*) stands for *lakṣya* "the examples", and another (word *vyākaraṇa*) for *lakṣaṇa* "the rules", and still another (word *vyākaraṇa*) for the whole (of *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa*), (we wonder) why has the statement *samudāyeṣu ca śabdāḥ pravṛttāḥ* "And words used with reference to wholes" been made ?[729] Therefore, just as the words *saṁgha* "congregation", *maṇḍala* "group", *senā* "army", and *vana* "forest" convey the sense of a whole, (but) not that of a part, in the same way (we would assume that) the word *vyākaraṇa* also conveys, the sense of a whole, not that of a part. Thus the difficulty is this. Just like these (words) *vana* "forest", etc. are not used in the sense of a part, in the same way this (word *vyākaraṇa*) is not either'.

The *MBD* (p. 40, lines 8–12), commenting on *pūrve pañcālāḥ,* says: '(An item) which has been caused to attain the status of a whole is referred to by a word standing for (that) whole. Just as an inhabitant of Vāhīka, who has been caused to attain the status of ox,[730] (is referred to by the) word *ox* (standing for a whole). For (such) a word (standing for a whole) it is not possible to give up (its sense of) a whole and take on (that of) a part. Therefore, when a whole superimposes itself on a part in its entirety, (only) then the word standing for a whole can be used (in the sense of a part). In the same way, when the word *vyākaraṇa*, which has the sense of a whole, installs itself[731] in (the domain of the word) *sūtra*,

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727. Compare *TA*, fn. 396. In the example *tailaṁ bhuktam*, according to Kaiyaṭa, *taila* 'oil' stands for a particular measure of oil. Actually, what Patañjali means is that an oily piece of food has been consumed. Here the word *taila* really stands for a part,, namely, the oily part, of the piece of food.

728. Compare *TA*, fn. 397. Kaiyaṭa's idea is that the word *śukla* is used to refer to a whole consisting of a white and a non-white part. But here white is taken as the dominant colour of the whole. Therefore the non-white part is included in the reference of *śukla* also. Actually, what Patañjali means is that *śukla*, which normally refers to a *guṇopasarjanadravya* 'substance along with its quality', may be used with reference to a part, namely, the quality, also.

729. If three different words *vyākaraṇa* are assumed to convey the meanings mentioned, then the statement that words standing for wholes stand for parts also is defeated.

730. Compare fn. 652. *Āpādita* implies superimposition.

731. *Ātmānaṁ saṁniveśayati.* Another expression indicating superimposition.

which (stands for) a part, only then that word (*vyākaraṇa*) can be used (with reference to *sūtra* ' the rules ') '.[732]

The *MBD* (p. 40, lines 13–14), commenting on *tailaṁ bhuktaṁ ghṛtaṁ bhuktam*, says : ' Just as the word (*taila* or *ghṛta*) standing for a whole is used with reference to a part,[733] having assumed (the function of that) word (*taila* or *ghṛta*) in the sense of (an eatable prepared with) oil or ghee, which may be harmful or favourable (to health). In the same way, because some part only is dyed white, (we feel that) the whole called *paṭa* " cloth " itself is made to have a different colour.[734] That is why (here) a word which stands for a whole is used with reference to a part. (Or) just as one does not perceive a jar in its entirety, but the notion of jar (arises) on (the basis of) some parts only, in exactly the same way one uses the word *vyākaraṇa* with regard to that much only,[735] just understanding (the idea of) the whole from the mere *sūtra* " rules ". (Or) just as to one who has merely seen that (a pot) is put on the fire (and) says *pacaty ayam* " that (man) is busy with cooking ", because (the aciion of putting the pot on the fire) is meant for that (cooking), it is said, *nāyaṁ pacaty, adhiśrayati kiṁ tu udakaṁ saṁpādayati* " he is not busy with cooking, he just puts (the pot) on the fire, but he prepares (hot) water ".[736]

Bhartṛhari's examples are not all of them on the same level. For the sake of clarity they are numbered as follows :

(1) the *samudāya*-words *saṁgha*, *vana*, etc.,
(2) the Vāhīka and *gotva*,
(3) *tailaṁ bhuktam*, etc.,
(4) *śuklaḥ paṭaḥ* ' the white cloth ',
(5) the perception of a jar, and
(6) *pacati*.

In (1) and (2) the idea of a whole is superimposed on that of a part. That is why we may use the word *pañcālāḥ* for what is really *pūrve pañcālāḥ*. In (3) *taila*, etc. function as the *samudāya*-word. These words *taila*, etc. are used with reference to an item in whose preparation *taila*, etc. play an essential role. No question of superimposition here. In (4) only part of

732. The portion (*e*)*kena kartavyā* is not clear and has been dropped.

733. Namely, an eatable prepared with oil or ghee.

734. The expression used is *śuklaḥ paṭaḥ* ' a white cloth ', although only part of it is white.

735. Namely, *sūtra*.

736. Reference is to *Vt*. VIII on P.1.4.23, for which see *KARA*, p. 28. The word *pac*– refers to a conglomerate of actions, like putting the pot on the fire, pouring water into the pot, fetching the fuel, etc. The point of the present illustration is that first, in *pacaty ayam*, the word *pac*– is used with reference to a part-action, namely, *adhiśrayaṇa*, whereas afterwards, in *nāyaṁ pacati*, the word *pac*– is used with reference to the whole of the actions indicated as *pac*–. Compare also *VP* 3.7.58.

the cloth is white. But the whitemess of the part is superimposed on the whole. That is why we say *śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*. Thus here the superimposition takes a different direction from the one assumed in the examples (1) and (2). In (5) we develop the notion of a whole from the percption of parts. Here no question of superimposition. Similarly, from hearing the word *vyākaraṇa* which refers to a part, namely, *sūtra* ' the rules ', we have the idea of a whole, namely, *lakṣya* ' the examples ' and *lakṣaṇa* ' the rules '. In (6) one and the same word *pacati* is used with reference to a part (*adhiśrayaṇa*) and to a whole, namely, the conglomerate of action summed up by the word *pac-*. No question of superimposition here.

138. (*Bhāṣya : Acceptance of the other side of the alternative*)[737]

Or rather, let (the word *vyākaraṇa*) again (be taken to mean) *sūtra* ' the rules '.

Note (63)

Apparently, the proposal to regard *vyākaraṇa* as a word standing for the whole of *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa*, and to justify its use with regard to *lakṣaṇa* only by means of a general dictum is not approved of. The fact remains that *vyākaraṇa* is a means of analysis of words and usage. These words and the usage they constitute are provided by the speech-community. They do not form part of *vyākaraṇa* as such. Therefore *vyākaraṇa* is taken in the sense of *sūtra* again.

139. (*Bhāṣya : Reminder of an earlier objection*)

But hasn't it been stated *sūtre vyākaraṇe ṣaṣṭhyartho ' nupapannaḥ* ' if (the term) *vyākaraṇa* means *sūtra* ' the rules ', (then) the meaning of the genitive ending cannot be justified ' ?[738]

140. (*Bhāṣya : Objection removed*)

No difficulty here. (The meaning of the genitive ending) will be there by means of *vyapadeśivadbhāva* ' treating (an item which cannot have a designation in the primary sense of the term) like the item which has that designaiion (in the primary sense of the term ')[739].

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737. See fn. 640.

738. *Vt*. XIV.

739. Reference is to *PN*, *pb*. 30. The rule says *vyapadeśivad ekasmin* ' treatment like the item which has a designation (in the primary sense of the term) for an item which stands alone '. Kaiyaṭa on *Bh*. No. 4 on P.1.1.21 (*Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣye Navāhnikam*. *NSP* ed. Bombay 1951, p. 275) says *nimittasadbhāvān mukhyo vyapadeśo yasyāsti sa vyapadeśī. Yas tu vyapadeśahetvabhāvād avidyamānavyapadeśaḥ sa tena tulyaṁ vartate kāryaṁ pratīti vyapadeśivad bhavatīty ucyate* ' that (is called) *vyapadeśin* for which we have a designation in the primary sense (of the term) because of the presence of the causes (for its application). But that which cannot have (this) designation, because the grounds for (applying) the designation are lacking, is (considered) equal to that (*vyapadeśin*) with regard to a grammatical operation. Therefore it is said that it is treated like the *vyapadeśin* '. See further Note (64).

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' by means of *vyapadeśivadbhāva* '. Just as in (connection with the expression) *rāhoḥ śiraḥ* ' the head of Rāhu ' we speak of difference[740] with regard to one and the same thing, because a difference is (introduced) between the word-meanings.[741] In the same way, here also. The word *vyākaraṇa* tells us that the science (of grammar) serves as the instrument of the action of analysing.[742] But the word *sūtra* (merely) refers to (the body of rules) as a whole.[743] In this way, to speak of difference (between the items *vyākaraṇa* and *sūtra*) is justified.

Note (64)

In connection with the *vyapadeśivadbhāva* invoked in the *Bhāṣya* a few examples may be convenient to understand what is actually the case. The first example is the designation *ekāc* ' possessing one single vowel ' in P 6.1.1. *Ekāc* is a *bv.* cp. which, in its primary sense, is applicable to verbal bases like *pac-* ' to cook '. The primary, *bv.* sense requires that, apart from the single vowel, there must be some other element or elements, in order to justify the *anyapadārtha.* But this designation *ekāc* is also desired in connection with the verbal base *i-* ' to go '. This base consists of just one single vowel, which stands alone. Here the designation *ekāc* is desired in order to apply reduplication by P. 6.1.1. But the difficulty is, that since *i-* consists of just one single letter, the designation *ekāc* cannot become applicable in its primary sense. Therefore it is applied in a secondary sense which is described as *varṇarūpaḥ ekaḥ ac yasmin etādṛśaḥ arthavān ikāraḥ* ' such a letter *i* which possesses meaning (and) in which there is a single vowel as its specch-sound '. Thus, whereas in the primary sense the *anyapadārtha* is represented by a group of letters different from the single vowel, in its secondary sense the *anyapadārtha* is phrased in terms of meaning belonging to that single vowel.

Another example from outside the technicalities of grammar. We have the usage *(vyavahāra) devadattasya śiraḥ* ' the head of Devadatta '. Here *devadatta* represents the whole and *śiraḥ* the part. So we have no difficulty in justifying the use of the genitive ending which requires the presence of different items. But we also have the usage *rāhoḥ śiraḥ* ' the head of Rāhu '. Here the point is that Rāhu is nothing but a head. Therefore, since the required difference between the items concerned is lacking, we cannot justify the use of the genitive ending here. Still, the usage is available, and we must find a way to justify it. In order to do so, we assume that there is a differ-

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740. See fn. 642.

741. This will be clear from Note (64).

742. That is, the word *vyākaraṇa*, in addition to standing for the body of the rules, tells us that *vyākaraṇa* serves to analyse words and larger utterances. Here this latter information received from the word *vyākaraṇa* is the extra meaning assigned to this word, which is required to establish a difference between *vyākaraṇa* and *sūtra.*

743. *Samudāyarūpatā.*

ence. To establish this difference, we assign an extra meaning to the word *rāhu.* It is taken to stand for the item called Rāhu in its various stages, past and future. The word *śiraḥ,* on the other hand, is taken to stand for just one single, specific, present stage. In this way, a part-whole relation is established, which provides the difference required by the use of the genitive ending. In this way also, the word *rāhu* is treated like the *vyapadeśin devadatta.*

A third example. We have the usage *devadattasya śarīram* ' the body of Devadatta '. Here we have no difficulty in justifying the use of the genitive ending, because, in some way or other, Devadatta is different from his body. But we also have the usage *śilāputrakasya śarīram* 'the body of a stone used for grinding condiments ' (see *PN,* Part II, p. 155). Here the body is nothing but the stone. So the same difficulty arises which was stated in connection with *rāhoḥ śiraḥ.* It is removed by assigning an extra value to *śilāputraka,* in the sense that *śilāputraka* represents the various stages of the stone, whereas *śarīra* refers to just one single stage out of these. Thus, again a part-whole relation is established by which we justify the use of the genitive ending. In this way also, *śilāputraka* is treated like the *vyapadeśin devadatta.*

Finally, *vyākaraṇasya sūtram.* Normally speaking, there should be no difficulty here, that is, if *vyākaraṇa* is taken in the sense of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī,* and *sūtra* as a rule belonging to the *Aṣṭādhyāyī.* Here the part-whole relation is clear, and the use of the genitive ending is justified. But the proposal of the *Bhāṣya* is to take *vyākaraṇa* and *sūtra* in the same sense, namely, as the rules of grammar. The consequence is that the condition for the use of the genitive ending in *vyākaraṇasya sūtram* is lacking. This difficulty is solved by assuming *vyapadeśivadbhāva* for the word *vyākaraṇa.* Here the question is, which is the *vyapadeśin* ?

We will assume the usage *śabdānuśāsanasya sūtrāṇi* ' the *sūtras* of (the science) which teaches (the analysis and subsequent derivation of correct Sanskrit) utterances '. Here we take the science mentioned as the *vyapadeśin,* the item which possesses the designation *śabdānuśāsana* in its primary sense. We also] have the usage *vyākaraṇasya sūtram.* Here the difficulty is that *vyākaraṇa* is nothing but *sūtra,* as proposed by *Bh.* No. 138. Now, to justify the use of the genitive ending, we assign an extra value to the word *vyākaraṇa.* It is taken to mean the body of rules by which utterances are analysed (and subsequently derived). In this way, *vyākaraṇa* becomes *vyapadeśivat.* In this way also, a difference is introduced between the meanings of the word *vyākaraṇa* and *sūtra.* Consequently, the use of the genitive ending in *vyākaraṇasya sūtram* is justified.

The *MBD* (p. 40, line 19–p. 41, line 13), commenting on ' will be there by means of *vyapadeśivadbhāva* ' says : ' And the *vyapadeśivadbhāva* (is applied) in different cases in different ways.[744] Here, (when the question

744. *Kvacit kathaṁcit.*

is of applying the rule) *ekāco dve prathamasya*[745] (with regard to *i*- " to go"), (then,) on the one hand, (*i*- has)[746] the form of a verbal base, on account of the fact that it possesses meaning which is understood on the basis of *anvayavyatireka*[747] (and) on the other hand,[748] (it has) the form of a (single) speech-sound. This being so, *i* taken in its one aspect[749] receives the designation (*ekāc*) due to (the association with) its other aspect.[750]

Or there, when a part-whole relation is assumed,[751] (we will say that) the verbal base *i*-[752] is a part of that whole which consists in usages like *eti* " he goes ", *itaḥ* " gone to " (or) *ayana* " the going " (and which) leads to the differentiation of terms.[753] Like (when we saw) this is a *śilāputraka* " grinding-stone " which is seen to have undergone various actions. Of that (*śilāputraka*) this is the body.[754]

But here in *sthūlaśirā rāhuḥ* " Rāhu possessing a big head ", although there is no part-whole relation, (and) although there is no difference (between Rāhu and the head), the expression (*sthūlaśirāḥ* is used in connection

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745. P.6.1.1. The rule says that the first syllable containing one single vowel (of a verbal base) is reduplicated.

746. Supply *eteḥ* ' of (the verbal base) *i*-'. Or the text may be emended to read *ityeterastyeva* for *ityastyeva*.

747. *Anvayavyatireka* ' (the method of) contrast and agreement ' is the method to divide words into their meaningful elements. For instance, in *eti* ' he goes ', *yanti* ' they go ', *ayana* ' the going ' the elements e/y/ay are found to be connected with the idea of going. A further step is to regard these elements as allomorphs of *i* which is ultimately responsible for this meaning. See further *The Sphoṭanirṇaya of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa*. Edited....by S. D. JOSHI, *Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit*, Class C, No. 2, University of Poona, Poona, 1967. Introduction, p. 5-6.

748. Read *dhāturūpatāsty eva varṇarūpatā* for *dhāturūpatāsti varṇarūpatā (ca)*. For *asty eva....asty eva* ' on the one hand....on the other hand ' compare *MBD*, p. 41, line 6.

749. That is, *i* in its phonetic aspect of being a single speech-sound (*ekaḥ ac*).

750. That is, *i* in its aspect of being a meaningful verbal base, in addition to its phonetic aspect (*ekaḥ ac yasmin*).

751. Between the constituent's meaning *(ekaḥ ac)* and the *anyapadārtha (yasmin)* in *ekaḥ ac yasmin*, in order to justify the application of the designation *ekāc* in P.6.1.1 to *i*-.

752. Noted down as *eti*.

753. Namely, the single vowel *i (ekaḥ ac)* and the verbal base *i*- *(ekaḥ ac yasmin)* which forms part of different forms like *eti*, *itaḥ*, etc.

The difficulty lies in applying the designation *ekāc* to *i*-. To solve this difficulty, the *MBD* here says that the verbal base *i*-, which is to be reduplicated, is part of forms like *eti*, *itaḥ*, etc. Thus, in this solution, the *anyapadārtha* of *ekāc* in connection with *i*- is found in the whole of words derived from *i*-. But the solution is not satisfactory, because, according to Pāṇini's rule, that which is *ekāc*, that is, the *anyapadārtha* of *ekāc*, is to be reduplicated. Obviously, this cannot be the case with the whole consisting of *eti*, *itaḥ*, etc.

754. This is another example of *vyapadeśivadbhāva*. Here *śilāputraka*, which is associated with various actions represents the *vyapadeśivat* item. According to tradition, *śilāputrakasya śarīram* is an example of *vastvavasthābheda* ' difference in states belonging to one object '.

with Rāhu) merely on account of *śabdavyāpāra* " the people use words. "[755] The fact is that words are used without taking into account the absence or presence of our cognition of objects, (but just) by determining some part of the thing-meant. To explain, the word ' finger ' does not mention the fact that the finger has joints,[756] although this is really the case. In the same way, the word *rāhu* does not mention[757] the fact that Rāhu merely consists in a head, although this is really the case. Because only that much meaning is expressed by the word *rāhu* as is denoted. (But) the expression (*sthūlaśirāḥ* is used) on account of the head (plus something else).[958]

(Or) just like a comparative suffix[759] is (used) because of reference to (different) stages of an object, although there is just one object.[760] (For instance,) *parud bhavān paṭur āsīt. Paṭutaraś caiṣamaḥ* " last year you were clever. (But) you are more clever this year ".[761] In the same way, here also. On the one hand, *vyākaraṇa* has the form of a whole, namely, a book, (whereas,) on the other hand, it has the form of a part.[762] This being so, the designation (*ṣaṣṭhī*)[763] is fitting, because (we assume) a difference in states.[764] Or (we justify the designation *ṣaṣṭhī*) on the basis of *sāmānya-viśeṣabhāva* " the general-particular relation ".[765] (To explain, when some-body says) *iha sūtram* " here (you have) a *sūtra* ", we understand (the word *sūtra*) as a general name for something. But when (the question is raised regarding) the *viśeṣabhāva* " status of particular thing " by (the word) *kasya*

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755. As explained in the sequel, the way in which people use words to refer to things and the things they refer to, need not exactly correspond. Language may suppress facts which are there, or assume things which are not really there. Compare *KARA*, Bh. 6 No.13 on P.1.4.24, ' ....a speaker may not want to express even what does exist. (....) But a speaker may want to express (also) what does not really exist '.

756. Read *parvavattām aṅguler aṅguliśabdo na bravīti* for *parvatām aṅguler aṅguli-śabdena bravīti.*

757. Read *rāhuśabdo na* for *rāhuśabdena*. In fact, *rāhuśabdo na* is the original reading of the ms., see n. 5 of the critical apparatus. The editors must have changed the text here on the analogy of the preceding *aṅguliśabdena*, which happens to be a wrong reading.

758. The *anyapadārtha* of *sthūlaśiras* is Rāhu, who must represent something in addition to the *svapadārtha śiras*. Bhartṛhari does not say in which the something extra consists. He merely says that this is *śabdavyāpāra*.

759. *Prakarṣapratyaya*, literally, a suffix conveying the sense of a higher degree.

760. Usually a comparison is between two separate items. But here the question is of a comparison between two different states of one item, belonging to different periods.

761. The example is from Patañjali (*Mbh*. II, p. 417, lines 2–3).

762. *Vyākaraṇa* may be taken to stand for the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* as a complete text, or for the *sūtras* of which this text consists.

763. A *vyapadeśa* is a naming expression. It may be a technical one, like *bahu-vrīhi*, or *ekāc* or *ṣaṣṭhī*, but also a non-technical one, like *sthūlaśirāḥ*.

764. *Avasthābheda*.

765. In this way also, the required difference (*vyatireka*) can be established.

" (*sūtra*) of what ? "[766] (then the answer) *vyākaraṇam*[767] is accepted even (in the opinion)[768] of the person who holds that there is no difference (between *vyākaraṇa* and *sūtra*). (However,) when the word *vyākaraṇa* is used in the sense of a whole, and the word *sūtra* in some cases only in the sense of a (single) rule, then (we can maintain) difference as (in the case of) primary meanings.[769]

This being so, (as regards *vyākaraṇa* and *sūtra* in *vyākaraṇasya sūtram*, we have the choice between) *viśeṣa* " particular thing " only, or *sāmānya* " general thing " only.[770] Therefore there is no (question of) *vyapadeśivadbhāva*.[771] (Like in) *candanasya candanam* " the best of sandalwood " (or) *rūpādayo rūpādīnām* " the best of colours, etc. ".[772] But when a *sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva* (is assumed, then) the designation (*ṣaṣṭhī* for *vyākaraṇa* in *vyākaraṇasya sūtram*) becomes (justified) even to (the opinion of) a person who holds that there is no difference (between *vyākaraṇa* and *sūtra*). (Like in) *candanasya gandhaḥ* " the fragrance of sandalwood ".[773]

In his long comment on *vyapadeśivadbhāva* Bhartṛhari offers alternative explanations and examples for the justification of the expression *vyākaraṇasya sūtram*. The explanation and examples may be conveniently summed up as follows :

(A) *Vyapadeśivadbhāva* :

(1) *Vyapadeśivadbhāva* pure and simple, with the example *ekāc* in connection with *i-*. The designation *ekāc* is justified here by assuming *artha* 'meaning' as the *anyapadārtha*.

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766. Here *sūtra* stands for any text in *sūtra*-form. Then, by asking '*sūtra* of what ?' what we want to know is a particular type of such a text.

767. Actually, the answer should read *vyākaraṇasya* '(a *sūtra*) of *vyākaraṇa*'.

768. To account for the genitive form *ananyatvavādinaḥ* a word like *matena* 'in the opinion (of)' is supplied.

769. Read *mukhyavad bhedaḥ* for *mukhyavad abhedaḥ*.

770. Possibly Bhartṛhari means to say that once the status of *viśeṣa* is assigned to *vyākaraṇa*, *sūtra* must have a *sāmānya*-status, or once the status of *sāmānya is* assigned to *sūtra*, *vyākaraṇa* must have a *viśeṣa*-status. But since in connection with *vyākaraṇa* two views are mentioned, namely, that of *viśeṣa* and that of *samudāya*, we would rather have expected the text to read *tatra viśeṣa eva samudāya eva vā* 'with regard to this (word *vyākaraṇa* we have the choice between) *viśeṣa* only and *samudāya* only'.

771. Thus Bhartṛhari expresses his disagreement with Patañjali.

772. The examples are taken and explained as idiomatic usages conveying a superlative meaning, for which compare in English *the cream of the cream, in one's heart of hearts*. Such usages must have been known in Sanskrit, witness *satyasya satyam* 'the ultimate truth' No question of *vyapadeśivadbhāva* here. However, a part-whole relation may be assumed: the best *candana* is a part of *candana* as a whole, etc.

773. The point of the example is that a non-difference between the fragrance and the sandalwood is assumed (see *TA*, fn. 510). Still, to justify the genitive expression, a difference may be introduced by assuming a *sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva*. This relation can be made clear with the help of a question and answer, as in : *kasya gandhaḥ* ? *Candanasya* 'fragrance of what ? Of sandalwood'.

(2) *Vyapadeśivadbhāva* based on *samudāyāvayavabhāva*, with the example *ekāc* in connection with *i-*.

(3) *Vyapadeśivadbhāva* based on *anekakriyāviṣayatā* 'the fact of undergoing various actions', with the example *śilāputrakasya* in the case of non-different items.

(4) *Vyapadeśivadbhāva* based on *śabdavyāpāra*, with the example *sthūlaśirā rāhuḥ* in the case of non-different items. The example is parallel to *ekāc idhātuḥ* 'the verbal base *i-* possessing one single vowel'.

(5) *Vyapadeśivadbhāva* based on *vastvavasthābheda* 'a difference in status of an object', with the example *parud bhavān paṭur āsīt. Paṭutaraś caiṣamaḥ.*

(B) Other than *vyapadeśivadbhāva* :

(6) *Sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva*, with the example *vyākaraṇasya sūtram* in the case of non-different items. Here *vyākaraṇa* is taken to represent a particular type of *sūtra*-littrature. Three more examples are quoted, *candanasya candanam*, *rūpādayo rūpādīnām*, and *candanasya gandhaḥ*.

(7) *Samudāyāvayavabhāva*, with the example *vyākaraṇasya sūtram*. But here *vyākaraṇa* and *sūtra* are taken as different items.

In this way Bhartṛhari shows that *vyapadeśivadbhāva* allows of more than just one interpretation, and that, in order to justify the genitive usage *vyākaraṇasya sūtram*, we need not invoke *vyapadeśivadbhāva* at all.

141. *(Bhāṣya : Reminder of the removal of an earlier objection)*

As regards what was stated also, namely, '(There would be a chance for) not knowing the words',[774] (and) 'because words are not known from *sūtra* "the rules" only. Then how (do we know them)? From *vyākhyāna* "explanation" also',[775] that has been rejected (by saying :) 'this *sūtra* itself, when divided up (into its constituent words) becomes the explanation".[776]

142. *(Bhāṣya : Reminder of an earlier objection)*

But hasn't it been stated that 'the mere (separate) words resulting from *carcā* ("the process of) repeating (the words of a given text)", as *vṛddhiḥ, āt, aic*, do not constitute *vyākhyāna* "explanation". Then (in) what (does *vyākhyāna* consist)? (In) *udāharaṇa* "example", *pratyudāharaṇa* "counterexample" (and) *vākyādhyāhāra*

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774. *Vt.* XV.

775. *Bh.* No. 122.

776. Reference is to *Bh.* No. 123, which removes the objection raised by *Vt.* XV.

" completion of the utterance (by supplying words) ". All of that together becomes the *vyākhyāna* " explanation " ?[777]

143. (*Bhāṣya : Justification*)

This happens to be so for an ignorant. Becaus words are known from *sūtra* ' the rules ' only. (It must be) ' from the rules only ' for the additional reason that whatever one speaks as going beyond the rules,[768] that cannot be accepted.[779]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' from *sūtra*...only '. Because the meaning of the rules itself is made clear by means of the *padaccheda* ' dividing (a rule) up into its (constituent) words ', etc.

(On) *ātaḥ* ' for the additional reason '. (This is) a *nipāta* ' particle '.[780] It means : *ātaś ca hetoḥ* ' for this additional reason '.

(On) *nādaḥ* ' that (can) not '. That is to say, *na etad* ' that (can) not '.[781] Or rather, *nādaḥ* means (to say that) mere sound will be grasped only, because it is devoid of meaning.[782]

Note (65)

The earlier sequence of *Bhāṣyas* referred to in *Bh.* Nos 141 and 142 may be summed up as follows : *Bh.* No. 122 explains *Vt.* XV which formulates an objection against the view that *vyākaraṇa* means *sūtra*. The *Bhāṣya* says that we do not just know the words from *sūtra*, but from *vyākhyāna* ' explanation ' also. *Bh.* No. 123 removes the objection by saying that *vyākhyāna* means nothing but the *sūtra* divided up into its constituent words. *Bh.* No. 124 denies this. *Vyākhyāna* means example, counterexample and completion of the statement. So the original objection formulated by *Vt.* XV

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777. *Bh.* No. 124.

778. *Utsūtram.* The cp. is formed in the sense of *sūtrād udgatam* ' what has gone beyond the rules ' by *Saunāgavārttika* 9 on P.2.2.18 (see *TA*, p. 195).

779. That is, it cannot be accepted as authoritative. For the use of the optative see S. J. SPEYER, *Sanskrit Syntax*. Leiden, 1886, para 343 e.

780. Not listed by Pāṇini. The lengthening of the first vowel may be due to emphasis added by the speaker which has come to be accepted in orthography.

781. The *MBD* (p. 41, line 19) says *na tat* ' that (can) not '.

782. Since what the speaker says doesn't have the support of the rules, it is considered as a mere buzzing of the ears. According to Y. OJIHARA, " Sur une formule patanjalienne : " *Na cedānīm ācāryāḥ sūtrāṇi kṛtvā nivartayanti* " ", *Indologica Taurienensia.* Official Organ of the International Association of Sanskrit Studies, Vol. VII, Torino, 1978, p. 230, in *nādaḥ* Patañjali has used a pun (*śleṣa*). This appears to be correct, because of the use of the pronoun *adas* instead of the more usual *tad*. Thus here we find an early example of what is later on called *sabhaṅgaśleṣa*, '*śleṣa* based on a different break-up of the phonic sequence '.

stands. This is the objection removed by *Bh.* No. 143. The *Bhāṣya* says that only an ignorant can think that *vyākhyāna* is something different from *sūtra*. But *vyākhyāna* is not something that goes beyond the rules, for in that case it would not be accepted.

Thus, after a long detour in which three views on the meaning of the term *vyākaraṇa* have been put forward and in which objections against each view were raised and removed, the *Bhāṣyakāra* finally accepts that *vyākaraṇa* means *sūtra* '(the body of) rules'. *Vyākaraṇa* does not mean *śabda*. But the view that *vyākaraṇa* means the whole of *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa* is not completely rejected. *Bh.* No. 137 says that words which stand for a whole may be used with reference to a part also, and thus the use of the word *vyākaraṇa* with reference to *lakṣaṇa* can be justified. Still, the fact remains that we use the word *vyākaraṇa* nearly always with reference to *lakṣaṇa*, and that is far better explained by assuming that *vyākaraṇa* stands for *sūtra*.

The view according to which *vyākaraṇa* stands for *śabda* ' the words ' may seem strange to modern eyes. Presumably, it is a remnant of an older tradition which goes back to the *pratipadapāṭha* ' word by word recitation ' of Bṛhaspati mentioned in *Bh.* No. 51, and to the *padapāṭhas* of the Vedas, in which *ṛks* are analysed or divided up (*vyākṛ-*) into their constituent words.

X

(NOW STARTS THE SECTION DEALING WITH THE PURPOSE OF TEACHING THE SPEECH-SOUNDS IN THE ORDER ADOPTED BY THE *ŚIVASŪTRAS*)

144. (*Bhāṣya : Introducing a Vt.*)

Now what purpose is served by the *upadeśa* ' teaching ' of the speech-sounds ?[783]

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783. The word *upadeśa* is used in at least three senses :

(1) the action of teaching (*upadeśanam upadeśaḥ*),

(2) that which is taught or imparted by way of instruction (*yad upadiśyate tad upadeśaḥ*, the *karmaṇi* sense), and

(3) that by means of which something is taught (*upadiśyate ' nena sa upadeśaḥ*, the *karaṇa* sense).

Taken in its second sense, *upadeśa* includes the primitive terms of Pāṇini's system, that is, the ultimate linguistic elements like verbal and nominal bases and the suffixes. These elements are obtained by means of linguistic analysis. From these elements, by a process called *vṛtti* ' integration ' more complex elements are built up until a usable language form is derived. These elements may be stated in their bare analytic form, like *kṛ-* or *-ti*, or in a more technical form with *anubandhas* added, like *ḌukṛÑ* or *tiP*. When taken in its third sense, *upadeśa* also includes the rules (*paribhāṣās*) and devices which are helpful to make the system work.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'what purpose is served...?' The reason (for raising the question) is that by teaching the speech-sounds not any correct word is taught. This is what (the author) means to say.

Note (66)

The *MBD* (p. 42, lines 5–7), commenting on the question put in the *Bhāṣya*, points out that grammar deals with the derivation of meaningful words. But the sounds listed in the *Śivasūtras* are not meaningful elements of language. Nor is their teaching indended to state the complete inventory of Sanskrit speech-sounds. Since the verbal and nominal bases and the suffixes have been taught, the sounds of which they consist have become automatically taught also. Therefore what is the purpose of separately teaching the speech-sounds at the beginning of grammar ?

XIX. (Vārttika : The purpose of teaching the speech-sounds)

The *upadeśa* **'teaching' (of the speech-sounds) is meant for** *vṛtti-samavāya.*[784]

145. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

The teaching of the speech-sounds must be provided for the sake of *vṛttisamavāya.* (But) what is *vṛttisamavāya ?* (In the sense of) *vṛttaye samavāyāḥ* '*samavāya* in order to have the *vṛtti*' (we derive) *vṛttisamavāya.* Or (in the sense of) *vṛttyarthaḥ samavāyaḥ* '*samavāya* for the sake of the *vṛtti*' (we derive) *vṛtti-samavāyaḥ.* Or (in the sense of) *vṛttiprayojanaḥ samavāyaḥ* '*samavāya* aimed at the *vṛtti*' (we derive) *vṛttisamavāyaḥ.*[785]

But what (does) *vṛtti* (mean here) ? (It means) *śāstrapravṛtti* 'the application of the rules'.[786]

As is made clear by the *Bhāṣya*, the teaching is of *varṇas*. How to render this term here ? According to W. S. ALLEN, *Phonetics in Ancient India, London Oriental Series*, Volume 1, London, 1953, p. 15–16, the translations 'phoneme' and 'sound-unit' of *varṇa* are to be rejected for different reasons. Allen advocates rendering *varṇa* as 'letter' for which he invokes Roman grammatical theory. This idea is dismissed by P. THIEME in his review of Allen's book, in : *Kleine Schriften*, Teil 2, Wiesbaden, 1971, p. 720–21. But Thieme's idea that *varṇa* refers to an abstraction which has no linguistic reality, and should be taken in the sense of a species of sounds ('Lautgattung') is not a very happy one either. The reason is that later on in our text, in *Vt.* XXIII, the *Vārttikakāra* makes mention of the proposal to regard the *varṇas* listed in the *Śivasūtras* as *ākṛtis*, that is, as sounds in their generic form. Therefore the teaching of *varṇas* meant by the present *Vt.* can only be that of individual speech-sounds.

784. What is meant by *vṛttisamavāya* is explained in detail in the next *Bhāṣya*.

785. For the three types of cp.-analysis (dative ending, *-artha* and *-prayojana*). compare *Bh.* No. 83 in connection with the cp. *dharmaniyama*.

786. Here *vṛtti* is taken in the basic sense of mode of operation. *Śāstrapravṛtti* practically amounts to 'the technical procedure of grammar'. P. THIEME, review of L.

Now, what (does) *samavāya* (mean)? (It means) the arrangement of the speech-sounds in (a particular) order.

Now, what (does) *upadeśa* (mean)? (It means) *uccāraṇa* 'utterance'. Why is that (so)? (The verbal base) *diś*-[787] (stands for) the action of *uccāraṇa* 'uttering'. Because having uttered the speech-sounds (the Teacher) says that these speech-sounds have been taught.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'for the sake of *vṛttisamavāya*'. That is to say, for the sake of the application of the rules in an economic way.[788] Cp.-formation like (in) *dharmaniyama*.[789]

(On) *vṛttyarthaḥ (samavāyaḥ)*. (By this analysis Patañjali) shows that the *samavāya* '(particular) arrangement (of the speech-sounds)' is directly connected[790] with the application of the rules. Because the rule P. 1.3.10 asserts itself in P. 1.1.45 on the basis of the (particular) arrangement of the speech-sounds only.[791]

(On) *vṛttiprayojanaḥ (samavāyaḥ)*. (By this analysis Patañjali shows that the particular arrangement of the speech-sounds) becomes indirectly helpful for the application of the rules.[792] Because once (we have) the (particular) arrangement (of the speech-sounds) the designation *it* (becomes possible).[793] On the basis of that (we can form a *pratyāhāra*) by

RENOU, *Terminologie grammaticale du Sanskrit*, in : *Kleine Schriften*, Teil2, Wiesbaden. 1971, p. 732, thinks that *śāstrapravṛtti* means 'procedure of the instruction', and that *vṛtti* here is to be taken as a designation of a teaching procedure. This is wrong.

In *śāstrapravṛtti* the principles and conventions which have been laid down by for instance, the *saṁjñā*-rules and the *paribhāṣās*, and which are followed in the application of the rules, are implied.

787. Noted down as *diśi* by *Vt*. II on P.3.3.108.

788. Comment taken from the *MBD* (p. 42, line 9). It is, in fact, the alternative explanation given by Bhartṛhari.

789. See *Bh*. No. 83.

790. *Pratyāsannatvam.*

791. P.1.1.45 is the rule which assigns the designation *saṁprasāraṇa* to the vowels *i, u, ṛ, ḷ*, when they replace the corresponding semivowel. P.1.3.10 establishes a one-to-one correspondence between two sets containing an equal number of elements. This rule, when brought to bear upon P.1.1.45, tells us that the *i* replacing *y* is called *saṁprasāraṇa*; that the *i* replacing *y* is called *saṁprasāraṇa*, etc. But this respective order is possible only, because the speech-sounds themselves have been arranged in a particular order, as mentioned in the *Śivasūtras*. That is how the *samavāya* becomes directly connected with the *śāstrapravṛtti*.

792. Indirectly helpful' means that the grouping of the speech-sounds is not directly reflected in the application of a rule, like in the case of P.1.1.45. But the mechanism involved in the formation of *pratyāhāras* becomes indirectly associated with the application of a particular rule.

793. It is the designation given to the last consonant in a set of speech-sounds in the *Śivasūtras*, by P.1.3.3.

P. 1.1.71.[794] On the basis of that, the application of a rule like P. 6.3.111, etc. (takes place).[795]

Note (67)

In his *Bhāṣya* Patañjali gives three alternative ways of analysing the cp. *vṛttisamavāya*. According to Kaiyata, the first analysis is meant to indicate that the speech-sounds are taught in a particular order so that the operation, that is, especially the phrasing of the rules takes place in an economic way. The second analysis informs us that the particular order of the speech-sounds adopted in the *Śivasūtras* is directiy connected with the application of the rules. The third analysis finally tells us that the *Śivasūtras* are indirectly helpful in the application of the rules. To clarify the intention of the second and third analysis examples are quoted. However, the distinctions between the several ways of cp.-analysis introduced by Kaiyaṭa are not convincing, and may be taken as part and parcel of a commentator's style to establish significance where it is not intended.

As explained by the *MBD* (p. 42, lines 7–9), commenting on *Vt.* XIX, the point of the *Vārttikakāra* is that the speech-sounds of Sanskrit are not mentioned at the beginning of grammar to teach us the alphabet, just like children learn the alphabet at the beginning of their school career. But the sounds are stated so that we might know the way in which they have been ordered and grouped together for the application of the rules, which refer to them through *pratyāhāras*. Thus, in the *Śivasūtras* the essential thing is not the sounds themselves, but their ordering and grouping, which becomes helpful for the phrasing of rules dealing with phonology.

XX. (Vārttika : Another purpose)

Also for the sake of adding *anubandhas* ' tags '.[796]

146. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

Teaching of the speech-sounds must be provided for the sake of adding *anubandhas* ' tags ' also. (That is to say, Pāṇini teaches

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794. This rule prescribes the formation of *pratyāhāras* ' short, comprehensive names ' for sets of speech-sounds.

795. This rule prescribes the compensatory lengthening of the preceding *a*, *i* or *u*, when *ḍh* or *r* have been deleted. These vowels are summed up in the *pratyāhāra aṆ*, which is mentioned in the rule. The *pratyāhāra* is formed with the help of P.1.1.71. The application of the latter rule is, again, dependent on P.1.3.3. But this rule can become operative only, when we know the particular order of arrangement of the speech-sounds as stated by the *Śivasūtras*. In this way, a chain of dependence between rules can be established.

796. *Anubandha* is rendered as ' tag ', because this retains something of the literal meaning of *anubandha*. Pāṇini uses the term *it* (P. 1.3.2). O. BÖHTLINGK, *Pāṇini's Grammatik*, Leipzig, 1887. Nachdruck Hildesheim, 1964, Eintleitung, p. XIV, renders *it*, pl. *itaḥ*, as ' stumme Laute '. G. CARDONA, *Pāṇini : A Survey of Researeh.* The Hague–Paris, 1976, p. 119, uses the term ' marker '. For more renderings see ibid., p. 355, n. 312. To these may be added ' meta-sound / meta-letter ' and ' go-go letter '.

these sounds) thinking, I shall attach tags (to them). Because without having first taught the speech-sounds, it is not possible to add tags (to them). (Thus) that very teaching of the speech-sounds is both for the sake of a (particular) arrangement (of the sounds) for the application (of the rules) and for the sake of adding tags. Both the (particular) arrangement (of the sounds) for the application (of the rules) and the addition of tags serve the purpose of (forming) *pratyāhāras*.[797] (And) a *pratyahāra* is for the sake of *vṛtti* 'the application (of the rules)'.[798]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'serves the purpose of (forming) *pratyāhāras*'. By the word *pratyāhāra* the designations *aN*, etc. are referred to.

147. (*Bhāṣya : Introduction to Vt. XXI*)

Also for the sake of getting to know the desired (sounds).[799] The teaching of the speech-sounds is for the sake of getting to konw the desired (sounds) also.[800] (That is say, Pāṇini teaches these sounds) thinking, I shall (make people) know[801] the desired speech-sounds. (Because) without having first taught the speech-sounds, it is not possible to (make people) know[802] the desired speech-sounds.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'Also for the sake of getting to know the desired (sounds)'. The teaching of speech-sounds being given, those speech-sounds which are free from defects like *kala* 'wrong articulation', etc. are to be used in that way only.[803] This is what is stated (by the passage).[804]

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797. See fn. 794. The *MBD* (p. 43, line 4) defines *pratyāhāra* as *vistīrṇasya yaḥ saṁkṣepaḥ* 'the pressing together of what has been stretched out at full length'.

798. *Vṛtti* means *śāstrapravṛtti*, see fn. 786.

799. In the case of *iti cet vārttikas*, like *Vt*.XXI, which comes next, the *Bhāṣyakāra* often takes out the *iti cet* part for separate discussion. This is what happens here. See further *BDA*, fn. 633.

'Desired' means : free from defects. See further Note (67).

800. Here the part-*Vt*. is formally repeated. At the same time, the words *varṇānām upadeśaḥ* are supplied to complete the sense.

801. *Bhotsye*. Nāgeśa here reads *bhotsyāmahe*, for which he assumes an implicit causative sense (*antarbhāvitaṇyartha*). The point is that one can hardly think of Pāṇini teaching the *Śivasūtras* with the idea that he himself should know the desired speech-sounds.

802. *Vijñātum*. Again Nāgeśa assumes an implicit causative sense here.

803. For *kala* see *Bh*. No. 150 and Kaiyaṭa on that.

804. *Ity uktaṁ bhavati*.

XXI. (Vārttika : Objection)

If (it is argued) that (the teaching of the speech-sounds) is for the sake of getting to know the desired (sounds), (then) teaching (must be provided) of (what is) *udātta* **'(a vowel) with high pitch',** *anudātta* **'(a vowel) lacking high pitch',** *svarita* **'(a vowel) with rising-falling pitch',** *anunāsika* **'(a) nasal (vowel)',** *dīrgha* **'(a) long (vowel)' and** *pluta* **'(a) protracted (vowel)' also.**[805]

148. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

If (it is argued) that (the teaching of speech-sounds) is for the sake of getting to know the desired (sounds), (then) teaching must be provided of (what is) *udātta* '(a vowel) with high pitch', *anudātta* '(a vowel) lacking high pitch', *svarita* '(a vowel) with rising-falling pitch', *anunāsika* '(a) nasal (vowel)', *dīrgha* '(a) long (vowel)' and *pluta* '(a) protracted (vowel)' also, because the speech sounds of these qualities are also desired.

Kaiyaṭa

Since the *(Śiva) sūtras* are recited by way of *ekaśruti* 'monotone (recitation)',[806] teaching must be provided of all (varieties of vowels) like *udātta*, etc. That is why (the *Vārttikakāra*) says 'If (it is argued) that (the teaching of the speech-sounds) is for the sake of getting to know the desired (sounds)' (etc.).

Note (68)

The *Śivasūtras* list the speech-sounds, and, among them, the vowels, in order to communicate to us the desired sounds, that is, the speech-sounds as free from defects. But the difficulty is that these *sūtras* are recited without distinction of accents, etc. Therefore one might conclude that vowels possessing qualities of pitch, etc. are undesired. To prevent this, it is proposed that the *Śivasūtras* should mention the vowels with all their accentual and other variations.

Nāgesa observes that if the *Śivasūtras* were recited in *traisvarya* '(recitation with) all three accents', two varieties would have to be mentioned in any case for each vowel separately, because recitation can give

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805. For the vowel-varieties mentioned here see W. S. ALLEN, *Phonetics in Ancient India, London Oriental Series*, Volume 1, London, 1953, p.87–89 *(udātta, anudātta, svarita)*, p. 83–84 *(dīrgha, pluta)*, and p. 39–40 *(anunāsika)*.

806. Since the *Vārttikakāra* enumerates all three accents, the assumption that, according to him, the *Śivasūtras* were recited in *ekaśruti*, seems justified.

Ekaśruti is the recitation of Vedic texts without pitch distinctions. As such, it is opposed to *traisvarya*, the recitation with all three accents. The practice of *ekaśruti* during the performance of a sacrifice was already known in Pāṇini's days (P.1.2.34). See further V. S. AGRAWALA, *India as known to Pāṇini*, Second Edition, Varanasi, 1963, p. 379–80.

us one variety at a time only. But, as noted by other scholars, even this assumption of *traisvarya* would practically amount to the mention of all three varieties. Because, if *a* is recited as *udātta*, we would have to include the *anudātta* and *svarita* varieties. If *a* is recited as *anudātta*, we would have to include the *udātta* and *svarita* varieties. Finally, if *a* is recited as *svarita*, we would have to include the *udātta* and *anudātta* varieties. And so on, in connection with each vowel.

149. (*Bhāṣya : Introduction to Vt. XXII*)

We can manage by teaching (the speech-sounds) in their generic form.[807] We can manage this[808] by teaching (the speech-sounds) in their generic form.[809] Once the generic form of the sound *a* has been taught, it will include the whole class of *a*. The same for the generic form of the sound *i*. The same for the generic form of the sound *u*.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'by teaching (the speech-sounds) in their generic form'. When we want to give prominence to the generic form, (then) even if a particular (form) is mentioned, it is not (felt as) intended (as such), because (the former) cannot be without (the latter).[810] This is what (the passage) means.

Note (69)

The difficulty pointed out by *Vt.* XXI was that in the case of the vowels taught in the *Śivasūtras* distinctions of accent, etc. must be introduced, because otherwise one might conclude that the vowels taught in *ekaśruti* are the only desired ones. This difficulty is removed by the *iti cet* part of *Vt.* XXII. We will assume that the vowels as they are taught by the *Śivasūtras* represent their generic form.

But how to indicate a generic form without having recourse to a particular one? And once a particular form, like *a* in its *udātta*, *anunāsika* and *hrasva* variety, is mentioned, it cannot but exclude the other varieties. To remove this difficulty, Kaiyaṭa says that, since mention of the generic form cannot be made without having recourse to a particular form, the particular must be regarded as a sample of the generic form, not as its only representative to the exclusion of the others.

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807. Here the *iti cet* part of *Vt.* XXII is taken out for separate discussion, see fn. 799. The word rendered as 'generic form' is *ākṛti*.

808. That is, we can overcome the difficulty pointed out by *Vt.* XXI.

809. Here again the part-*Vt.* is formally repeated. At the same time the word *etad* is added to complete the sense. See further fn. 808.

810. *Nāntarīyakatva*. The word is used to denote an inseparable connection, as between a genus and an individual belonging to that genus.

XXII. (Vārttika : Objection)

If (it is argued) that we can manage by teaching (the speech-sounds) in their generic form, (then) a prohibtion (should be stated) of *saṁvṛta* ' closed ', etc.

150. *(Bhāṣya : Explanation)*

If (it is argued) that we can manage by teaching (the speech-sounds) in their generic form, (then) a prohibition should be stated of (the defects called) *saṁvṛta* ' closed ', etc. But which are those (defects called) *saṁvṛta*, etc. ? (They are) *saṁvṛta* ' closed ', *kala* ' inarticulate drone ', *dhmāta* ' held too long ', *eṇīkṛta*,[811] *ambūkṛta* ' muffled ' *ardhaka* ' half (pronounced) ', *grasta* ' constricted ', *nirasta* ' wrongly articulated ', *pragīta* ' chanted ', *upagīta* ' influenced by a chanting pronunciation ', *kṣviṇṇa* ' quivering ' (and) *romaśa* ' rough '.

Another (phonetician) says : *grasta* ' constricted ', *nirasta* ' wrongly articulated ', *avilambita* ' not slow ',[812] *nirhata* ' suppressed ' *ambūkṛta* ' muffled ', *dhmāta* ' held too long ' *vikampita* ' tremulous '[813], *saṁdaṣṭa* ' pressed together ', *eṇīkṛta*, *ardhaka* ' half (pronounced) ' *druta* ' rapid ',[814] (and) *vikīrṇa*.[815] These are the causes of defects (in the pronuntiation) of vowels.[816] (the defects) other than these are defects (in the pronuntiation) of consonants.

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811. *Eṇīkṛta* literally means ' turned into *eṇa* '. *Eṇa* is a species of deer or antelope. The rest is anybody's guess. One may think of *eṇīkṛta* as an onomatopoeic word, on the analogy of *ambūkṛta*, but in that case also its meaning is not clear. The *MBD* (p. 43, line 22) explains it as *avyakta* ' indistinct '.

812. Kaiyaṭa reads *avalambita*, which is also the reading adopted in the *NSP* ed. The *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya*, 13.19 (*The Ṛgveda-Prātiśākhya* with the commentary of Uvaṭa. Edited by M. D. SHASTRI. Vol. I (text), Varanasi, 1959, p.57), mentions three speeds of utterance, *druta* ' rapid ' (for purposes of repetition while studying), *madhyama* ' medium ' (for purposes of ordinary use) and *vilambita* ' slow ' (for purposes of teaching). Compare W. S. ALLEN, *Phonetics in Ancient India, London Oriental Series,* Vol. I, London, 1953, p. 93. In opposition to *druta* ' rapid ' the mention of *avilambita* ' not slow ' doesn't make sense. One would rather expect *vilambita.*

813. The *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya*, 3.18 b (text ed. M. D. SHASTRI, p. 17) mentions *avikampita* ' free from tremor ' as a requirement for the correct pronuntiation of accents.

814. See fn. 812.

815. Not clear.

816. The source of the statement ascribed to another phonetician has not been identified. The Kielhorn and the *NSP* editions print the statement as a metrical one. The first line contains 25 syllables, the second 24 syllables. F. KIELHORN, " Notes on the Mahābhāṣhya ", *The Indian Antiquary....*Edited by J. G. FLEET and R. C. TEMPLE, Vol. XV, Bombay, 1886, p.229, probably assumed an irregular *jagatī* metre for the first line. The second line is a combination of *indravaṁśa* and *vaṁśastha*. In the same article, p. 228–29, Kielhorn states a useful grouping of the grammatical verses found in the *Mahābhāṣya* –about 260 in all–, according to the way in which they are porvided with a commentary, according to their nature, and according to their metre.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' of *saṁvṛta* " closed ", etc. '. Being *saṁvṛta* is a defect (in the pronuntiation of the vowels), *ā*, etc.,[817] but not (in the case) of the sound *a*, because this possesses the quality of being closed.[818] This being so, in (the case of) diphthongs which are to be pronounced as *vivṛtatama* ' open in the highest degree ' (the pronuntiation) as closed is a defect.

(On) *kala*. (It means a vowel) produced at a different[819] place of articulation. It is wellknown as *kākalitva* ' the quality of a low humming sound '.[820]

(On) *dhmāta*. (It means) that (a vowel), although it is short, is perceived as long due to too much breath.

(On) *eṇīkṛta*. (It means a vowel which is) indistinct, (like) when (we are in) doubt, whether this is an *o* or an *au*.[821]

(On) *ambūkṛta*. (It means a vowel) which, although it is distinct, is heard as (remaining) inside the mouth.[822]

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817. I.e., *ā* and *ā*3.

818. *Saṁvṛta* ' (relatively) closed ' (presumably measured by the degree of openness of the mouth) is the phonetic condition assigned to the neutral, central vowel *a* (as in English *a*go). Compare P.8.4.68. As distinct from this, the other wowels, including *ā* and *ā*3, are termed *vivṛta* ' (relatively) open '. Compare W. S. ALLEN, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

The *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya*, 13.1 (text ed. M. D. SHASTRI, p. 55) uses the terms *saṁvṛta* and *vivṛta* with reference to the relative closure and openness of the throat (*kaṇṭha*, for clarity's sake interpreted as ' glottis '), resulting in voice and lack of voice. The different meanings should be carefully kept apart. In the first case, *saṁvṛta*/*vivṛta* refer to phenomena belonging to the *ābhyantaraprayatna* ' intra-buccal articulatory process ', whereas, in the second case, like the related terms *saṁvāra* and *vivāra*, they refer to phenomena belonging to the *bāhyaprayatna* ' extra-buccal articulatory process '.

The *MBD* (p. 43, lines 20–21), commenting on ' a prohibition should be stated of ....*saṁvṛta*....etc.', says : ' (that is) named *saṁvṛta*, which is *bāhyaprayatna* " the extra-buccal articulatory process ". Because the *ābhyantara prayatna* " the intra-buccal articulatory process " produces the sound *a*. (But this is) not so (in the case of) *kala* '. Thus, as regards the meaning of *saṁvṛta*, the *MBD* agrees with the *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya*. But if *saṁvṛta* belongs to the *bāhyaprayatna*, it can never be a defect in the pronunciation of vowels.

819. I.e. wrong.

820. Meaning uncertain. Reference may be to the sound produced by a drone. The word *kala* is used in two identical expressions in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, 6.1.8, and the *Chāndogya* Up., 5.1.8, namely, *yathā kalā avadantaḥ* ' like dumb persons, not speaking '. The context is that of a contest of the organs of the body. The word *kala* in the sense of a dull, indistinct sound may be a development of the sense of ' dumb (person) ', namely, the sound produced by him.

821. See fn. 811. Kaiyaṭa repeats what the *MBD* says, and adds an idea of his own.

822. The literal meaning of *ambūkṛta* ' turned into water ' makes hardly any sense here. But in the *Jānakīharana*, 10.17, *ambūkṛta* appears to have the sense of ' uttered with excess of saliva '. In the present context, the word is better taken as an onomatopoeic word built on the sequence -mb-. The *VP*, 1.179 (ed. W. RAU, p. 55) mentions *ambvambv iti* as characteristic of the inarticulate speech of babies. The Abhyankar-Limaye ed., 1.152, however, reads *ambāmbeti*, where *ambā* stands for ' mother ', and the onomatopoeic effect is lost. Compare fn. 318.

(On) *ardhaka.* (It means a vowel) which, although it is long, is heard as short.[823]

(On) *grasta.* (It means a vowel) which is held back at the root of the tongue.[824] Others (say, it means) not pronounced clearly.

(On) *nirasta.* (It means a vowel which is pronounced) harsh.[825]

(On) *pragīta.* (It means a vowel which) has been uttered like a *sāman* ' chant '.[826]

(On) *upagīta.* (It means a vowel whose prounciation) has been coloured by the chanting prounciation of another, neighbouring (vowel).[827]

(On) *kṣviṇṇa.* (It means a vowel whose pronunciation is) quivering as it were.[828]

(On) *romaśa.* (It means a vowel whose pronunciation is) low.[829]

(On) *avalambita.* (It means a vowel whose pronunciation) has been mixed up with (that of) other sounds.[830]

(On) *nirhata.* (It means a vowel whose pronunciation is) rough.[831]

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823. One may think of the loss of one *mātrā* in the case of a long vowel measured by two *mātrās*, as Kaiyaṭa does. So also Nāgeśa, who says : ' uttered with a shortening (*saṁkocana*) of duration like that (short vowel) '. But it seems also possible to think of a faulty pronunciation of diphthongs in particular, compare the *Pārāśaraśikṣā*, 6.

824. Kaiyaṭa borrows his explanation from the *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya*, 14.3 c (text ed. M. D. SHASTRI, p. 58). In stanza 14.4 c *(grāsa)* the defect is especially assumed in connection with the two *kaṇṭhya* ' guttural ' vowels *a* and *ā* (compare Allen, *op. cit*., p. 58–59). It is not clear in what exactly the defect consists.

825. Why *nirasta* should have this meaning is not clear. *Nirasta* is a faulty pronunciation of speech-sounds, defined as *sthānakaraṇāpakarṣa* ' the drawing away of the articulator from the (correct) place of articulation (and putting it in the wrong place) ', see the *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya,* 14.2 a (text ed. M. D. SHASTRI, p. 58). It is declared to be a faulty pronunciation of vowels specifically by *Rk-Prātiśākhya* 14.4 b (*nirāsa*).

826. Apparently, what takes place here is an undesired modulation of the voice.

827. The phonetic process is not clear.

828. The *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya,* 14.6 d (text M. D. SHASTRI, p. 59), mentions *kṣveḷana-kśveḍana*) as a faulty pronunciation of fricative *(ūṣman)*. In his translation (*The Ṛgveda-Prātiśākhya* with the commentary of Uvaṭa.... *The Punjab Oriental Series,* No. 24, Vol. III, Lahore, 1937, p. 102) Shastri uses ' hissing sound '. W. S. ALLEN, *op. cit*., p. 27, says ' whistling '. It is not clear on what Kaiyaṭa's explanation is based.

829. Kaiyaṭa's interpretation seems to be pure guesswork. The *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya,* 14.6 d (text ed. M. D. SHASTRI, p.59), mentions *lomaśya* as a faulty pronunciation of fricatives *(ūṣman)*. In his translation (Vol. III, p. 102) Shastri uses ' roughness '.

830. See fn. 812. Kaiyaṭa's explanation starts from the literal meaning of *avalambita.*

831. Kaiyaṭa's interpretation seems to be guesswork again. The *Mbh.* I, p. 11, line 6, uses *nirhan-* in the sense of ' to remove '. That is why the term *nirhata* in the present *Bhāṣya* is translated as ' suppressed '. Reference may be to cases like the ones mentioned n *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya* 14.13 b and 15 ab (text ed. M. D. SHASTRI, p. 60).

(On) *saṁdaṣṭa.* (It means a vowel whose pronunciation) has been increased, so to speak.[832]

(On) *vikīrṇa.* (It means a vowel the pronunciation of which) has passed over into another sound. Others (say that), although it is one sound, it appears like many.[833]

(On) 'the causes of defects....of vowels'. (That is to say,) the classes of defects (in the prounciation) of vowels. In fact, there are innumerable defects due to inability and sloppiness.[834]

Note (70)

This interpretation of *Vt.* XXII by the *Bhāṣyakāra* is questionable. To show this, a short summary of the argument in the *Vts* concerned may be useful.

The question is about the purpose of the *Śivasūtras*. *Vt.* XIX says that they are meant to teach us praticular groupings of speech-sounds which become functional in grammar. *Vt.* XX says that from the *Śivasūtras* we also come to know the *anubandhas*. Knowing the *anubandhas* is essential in forming the *pratyāhāras*. Then somebody suggests that the *Śivasūtras* are also meant to teach us the correct pronunciation of the Sanskrit speech-sounds. *Vt.* XXI formulates an objection: in that case, the *Śivasūtras* should also teach the differences of pitch, nasality and quantity for each vowel. Against this, somebody argues that this is not necessary, because we will assume that the *Śivasūtras* teach the vowels in their generic form. That will take care of all the differences mentioned. *Vt.* XXII formulates an objection: in that case, we still have to phrase a prohibition of *saṁvṛta*, etc.

Saṁvṛta is the characteristic quality of sound ascribed to short *a* in Sanskrit phonetics. In distinction from this, the characteristic quality of long *ā* (and, theoretically, of *pluta ā* also) is described as *vivṛta*. Now the difficulty is this: if the vowels listed in the *Śivasūtras* represent their generic

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832. Kaiyaṭa's interpretation is not clear. The *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya*, 14.3 a (text ed. M. D. SHASTRI, p. 58) defines *saṁdaṣṭa* as a faulty pronunciation of speech-sounds in general, as *vrīḷana (vrīḍana)* or as *vrīḷanaṁ hanvoḥ*. M. D. SHASTRI, (translation, Vol. III. p. 100) takes it in the latter way, and translates it as 'a lowering of the jaws', which is physically impossible. The *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya*, 14.4 b, declares *saṁdaṁśa* to be a faulty pronunciation of vowels specifically, whereas 14.4 d connects it *(saṁdaṣṭatā)* with nasal vowels. It is not certain what *vrīḷana* means. In the *Nirukta*, 5.16 (text ed. L. SARUP, Second Reprint, Delhi, 1967, p.102) Yāska explains the verbs *vīḷayati* and *vrīḍayati* in the sense of *saṁstambhakarman* 'the action of making hard or firm'. One way of making hard or firm is by pressing or squeezing together. Thus for *vrīḍana* the meaning 'pressing, squeezing together' may be assumed, which goes well with the literal meaning of *saṁdaṁśa*.

833. Not clear.

834. Kaiyaṭa takes his comment from the *MBD* (p. 43, lines 23–25). The mention of innumerable defects is reminiscent of the *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya*, 14.28 ab (text M. D. SHASTRI, p. 62), *na doṣāṇām....anto gamyaḥ saṁkhyayā* 'the end is not attainable, by enumeration of faults' (translation M. D. SHASTRI, Vol. III, p. 107).

form, then the short vowel *a*, which is spoken as *saṁvṛta*, will represent its long variety as *saṁvṛta* also. But this is not desired, because Sanskrit does not know a *saṁvṛta* long *ā*. It only knows a *vivṛta* long *ā*. That is why Kātyāyana says that we have to phrase a prohibition, namely, a prohibition of *saṁvṛta* long *ā*. On the other hand, we do not want a *vivṛta* quality for short *a*. That vowel should remain *saṁvṛta* only. Therefore here a prohibition of *vivṛtatva* 'the quality of being open' is to be phrased. Accordingly, we assume that by saying *saṁvṛtādi* in *Vt.* XXII Kātyāyana means *saṁvṛta* and *vivṛta*.

But then doesn't the Kātyāyana who phrased *Vt.* XXII know the *pratyāpatti* 'reinstatement' rule P. 8.4.68 ? This rule expressly says that for the *vivṛta* short *a*, assumed in grammar for the sake of *prakriyā*, a *saṁvṛta a* is to be reinstated in *prayoga*. Apparently, the Kātyāyana of *Vt.* XXII does not know this rule. Nor does the Kātyāyana who phrased *Vts.* I and II on on *Śivasūtra* 1. Here *Vt.* I (*Mbh.* I, p. 15, line 2) says *akārasya vivṛtopadeśa ākāragrahaṇārthaḥ* 'teaching as *vivṛta* (should take place) of the sound (short) *a* in order to include the sound (long) *ā*'. *Vt.* II (*Mbh.* I, p. 15, line 21) says *tasya vivṛtopadeśād anyatrāpi vivṛtopadeśaḥ savarṇagrahaṇārthaḥ* 'once this (short *a*) has been taught as *vivṛta* (in the *Śivasūtras*), it should be taught as *vivṛta* elsewhere (in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*) also, in order to include the *savarṇa* (-vowel long *a*)'. If P. 8.4.68 had been known to Kātyāyana, he has no reason to say that short *a* should be taught as *vivṛta*.

From this reasoning three conclusions may be drawn :

(1) Kātyāyana is unaware of Patañjali's lists of *doṣas*, which, in fact, completely twist his argument;

(2) Kātyāyana does not know P. 8.4.68, which therefore must be considered as a very late addition to the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, and

(3) the *Vts* mentioned by Patañjali on P.8.4.68 should be regarded as coming from a different source.

How many Kātyāyanas do we assume ? The answer to this question can only be given after a careful listing of the *Vārttikas* in the *Mbh.* according to their probable sources. Since this forms the topic of a separate investigation, we shall, for the time being, restrict ourselves to the interpretation of *Vt.* XXII as given by Patañjali.

Vt. XXII states a difficulty in the view that the *Śivasūtras* list speech-sounds, especially vowels, in their generic form. According to Patañjali, the difficulty is that the generic form will comprise undesired realizations as well as desired ones. How to exclude the former ? Patañjali's idea is, by listing possible mispronunciations.

The *Bhāṣya* presents two such lists. The second list is acknowledged as coming from a different source. It appears to have a metrical form. Both lists contain twelve defects. To point out the similarities and dissimilarities between them, we shall designate them as A and B, and enumerate the

defects in alphabetical order. The designation AB after the name of a defect means that it is common to both lists. The result is as follows :

(1) *ambūkṛta* 'muffled'	AB
(2) *ardhaka* 'half pronounced'	AB
(3) *avilambita* 'not slow' (but see fn. 812)	B
(4) *upagīta* 'influenced by chanting'	A
(5) *eṇīkṛta*	AB
(6) *kala* 'dull, drone-like sound'	A
(7) *kṣviṇṇa* 'quivering-like' (?)	A
(8) *grasta* 'constricted'	AB
(9) *druta* 'rapid'	B
(10) *dhmāta* 'held too long'	AB
(11) *nirasta* 'wrongly articulated'	AB
(12) *nirhata* 'suppressed' (?)	B
(13) *pragīta* 'chanted'	A
(14) *romaśa* 'rough' (?)	A
(15) *vikampita* 'tremulous'	B
(16) *vikīrṇa*	B
(17) *saṁvṛta* 'closed'	A
(18) *saṁdaṣṭa* 'squeezed together'	B

Thus, out of twelve defects, the lists share six. Assuming that the rendering of the names is correct, we can bring them under the following headings :

(A) Phonetic process	..	(8), (11), (12 ?), (17), (18)
(B) Accent	..	(7 ?), (15)
(C) Modulation	..	(4), (13)
(D) Duration	..	(2), (10)
(E) Acoustic impression	..	(1), (6), (14 ?)
(F) Speed of utterance	..	(3), (9).

Typical for list A is the mention of *kala*, and of the defects connected with the modulation of the voice. Typical for list B are the defects connected with the speed of utterance.

The *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya paṭala* XIV, also contains a list of *doṣas*, both of vowels and of consonants. Moreover, from a stanza at the end of *paṭala* III defects in the pronunciation of accents may be inferred, and from a stanza at the end of *paṭala* XIII we learn something about the speeds of utterance, and therefore also about defects in this respect. The *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya* is a metrical text (see ed. M. D. Shastri, Vol. I, Introduction, p. 59–62; *paṭala* XIV is mainly in *triṣṭubh*). It is also a text of multiple authorship (see ibid., p. 71–77; *paṭalas* XIII–XV are assumed to come from one single source, see ibid., p. 72).

The defects in the pronunciation of vowels and the inferred defects in accent and speed of utterance, in alphabetical order, with the stanza (text ed. M. D. Shastri, Vol. I) in which they are mentioned, are mainly the following :

(19) *ayathāmātra* 'not according to the *mātrās*', 14.4 a.

(20) *kampita* 'tremulous', 3.18 b (*akampita*).

(21) *grasta* 'when there is a restraint at the root of the tongue', 14.3 a (*grāsa*, 14.4 c, especially for *a* and *ā*).

(22) *druta* 'rapid', 13.19 a.

(23) *nirasta* 'when there is a drawing away of the articulator from the (correct) place of articulation', 14.2 a (*nirāsa*, 14.4 b).

(24) *pīḍana* 'when there is *saṁhāra* "a bringing together"', namely, of the articulator and the place of articulation, 14.2 b (in connection with vowels especially, 14.4 b). Compare *The Taittirīya-Prātiśākhya* with...the *Tribhāṣyaratna.* Text, Translation and Notes. By W. D. Whitney. New Haven 1868. Reprint Delhi 1973, stanza 2.12. The stanza deals with the correct pronunciation of the vowels of the *a*-series, and says that in forming these vowels the lips and the jaws must not be too nearly approximated, nor too widely separated. According to the *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya*, 14.26 ab, the pronunciation of the vowel *a* is basic for that of the other vowels. With regard to this, M. D. Shastri, Vol. I, Supplementary Notes, p. 93, quotes the *Aitareya Ār.* 2.3.6, *akāro vai sarvā vāk.*

(25) *rāga* 'nasalization', 14.24 a; compare *viṣamarāgatā* ''undue nasalization', 14.4 d.

(26) *lumpanti* 'they drop', namely, vowels or part of diphthongs, 14.13 b, 14.15 ab.

(27) *vikṛṣṭa* 'separated', 3.18 b (*avikṛṣṭa*).

(28) *vilambita* 'slow', 13.19 d.

(29) *vyāsa* 'when there is *vihāra* "separation", namely, between the articulator and the place of articulation, 14.2 b (in connection with vowels especially, 14.4 b). See the reference to the *Taittirīya Prātiśākhya* under (24) above. Thus, whereas *pīḍana* refers to an undesired degree of nearness, *vyāsa* refers to an undesired degree of separation. As distinct from both, *nirāsa* refers to an altogether wrong articulation.

(30) *saṁdaṣṭa*, rendered by *vrīḍana*, 14.3 a (see fn. 832) (*saṁdaṁśa*, 14.4 b, especially in connection with vowels; *saṁdaṣṭatā*, 14.4 d, of nasal vowels).

(31) *saṁdigdha* 'indistinct', 3.18 b (*asaṁdigdha*).

We note that *lomaśya* and *kṣveḷana* are mentioned together in the *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya*, 14.6 d, as defects in the pronunciation of *ūṣmans*, not of vowels, in contrast with the related terms *kṣviṇṇa* and *romaśa* in list A. The defects mentioned above can be brought under the following headings:

(A) Phonetic process	..	(21), (23), (24), (25), (26), (29), (30)
(B) Accent	..	(20), (27), (31)
(D) Duration	..	(19)
(F) Speed of utterance	..	(22), (28).

A comparison between the list of *doṣas* of vowels of the *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya*, as stated above, and the lists A and B provides the following points which may serve to establish a mutual relationship :

(1) Out of the six items shared by A and B, the *Ṛk-Pratiśākhya* mentions only two, namely, *grasta* and *nirasta*. Defect (2), *ardhaka*, can probably be connected with (19) *ayathāmātra*.

(2) The *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya* makes no mention of defects of modulation (see the edition of M. D. Shastri, Vol. III, Indices II and III, where *upagīta, gīti* and *pragīta* are lacking),

(3) The *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya* does not mention defect (6), *kala*, (see the Indices), unlike list A, and like list B.

(4) The *Ṛk-Pratiśākhya* lists *lomaśya* and *kṣveḷana* (in immediate sequence) as defects of consonants, as opposed to list A, which mentions *kṣviṇṇa* and *romaśa* (in immediate sequence) as defects of vowels. List B does not mention these terms at all.

(5) The *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya* mentions the speeds of utterance, unlike list A, and, at least partially like list B.

(6) The *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya* allows an inference with regard to accent (*kampita*) which is nearly identical with defect (15), *vikampita*, in list B. List A, with the exception of one doubtful reference, makes no mention of accent at all.

(7) The *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya* makes explicit mention of (undue) nasalization, unlike list A, and possibly like list B (*saṁdaṣṭa*, which is in some way or other connected with nasalization, whether undue, or defective).

Thus, the evidence, as far as it goes, points to a greater affinity of the *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya* list with list B, than with list A. Here the metrical form of the *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya* and list B may provide an additional argument in favour of the affinity assumed. It can also be seen that the core of the tradition of defects in the pronunciation of vowels is formed by the defects called *grasta* and *nirasta*.

151. *(Bhāṣya : Objection removed)*

No difficulty here. (The defects called) *saṁvṛta* 'closed', etc. will be removed by the recitation of the *garga*, etc. (list) and the *bida*, etc. (list).[835]

152. *(Bhāṣya : Objection sustained)*

(But) for the recitation of the *garga*, etc. (list) and the *bida*, etc. (list) there is a different purpose. Which ? So that the correctness of the wholes can be (established).[836]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'there is a different' (etc.). (That is to say,) so that the correctness of (the stems) *garga*, etc. can be (established) through the sequence[837] *g-a-r-g-a* only, but not (the correctness) of (the derived stems) *gārgya*, etc. And therefore the removal will take place of defects of the (sounds) *a*, etc. which belong to these (word-stems *garga*, etc.) only, but not (of the defects) of those (sounds *a*, etc.) which are located in other wholes.[838] Although the recitation of (the) *garga*, etc. (list) happens for the sake of the prescription of a (particular) suffix,[839] still, incidentally, it will be for the sake of (establishing) the correctness of the wholes[840] (also).

Nāgeśa

Pare tu (etc.). But others[841] (say that) the recitation (of the *garga*, etc. list) becomes purposeful for the sake of this : so that the correctness

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835. Reference is to the *gaṇas* mentioned in P.4.1.105 and 104 respectively. The idea is that the stems in these lists have been stated or recited free from defects, including those of pronunciation. Presumably the *gaṇas* referred to are wellknown, because they serve to form *gotra*-designations, that is, names of descendants starting from the grandson (P. 4.1.162).

According to the order of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, the correct sequence is *bidādigargādi* But, as stated by *Bh.* No. 130, once the *ācāryas* have phrased rules (or expressions), they do not take them back nowadays.

836. On what the *Bhāṣya* means by 'the wholes' the commentators differ. See Note (70).

837. *Saṁniveśa.* Literally, the word means 'arrangement'. In the present case, the arrangement meant is that of the speech-sounds in a given word.

838. Like *gārgya*, etc.

839. The suffix is *yaÑ*, prescribed in the sense of *tasya apatyam*, that is, *gotrāpatyam*, (P.4.1.92–93) by P.4.1.105.

840. Namely, of the words *garga*, etc. The *garga*, etc. list is clearly meant to specify the stems after which the suffix *yaÑ* is to be added. But since *garga*, etc. are assumed to be free from defects, because they have been included in a *gaṇa*, we come to know the correct pronunciation of the vowels in *garga*, etc. also.

841. In the usage of the commentators the word *anye* refers to views held by others. *Pare* is used to refer to views of later, modern scholars. Nāgeśa, throughout his works, uses *pare* to indicate views of his own.

can be (established) 'of the wholes',[842] (i.e.,) the wholes ending in (the suffix) *yaÑ* having this (*garga*, etc.) as their stem, (but) not so that it should remove the defects (called) *kala*, etc. This only is the meaning of the *bhāṣya* (-passage).

Note (71)

Bh. No. 151 says that from the recitation of the *garga*- and *bida*-lists the student can learn the correct pronunciation of vowels. Thus there is no need for setting up a list of defective vowel-pronunciations. *Bh.* No. 152 objects to this. The lists have a different purpose, namely, to teach us the correctness of the wholes. The question is, of course, which wholes? Here the commentators differ. To understand what Kaiyaṭa says, the *MBD* here is essential. Therefore first the translation of the *MBD*-passages concerned is given.

The *MBD* (p. 43, line 24, p. 44, line 2), commenting on '(The defects called) *saṁvṛta*...etc. will be removed by the recitation of (the) *garga*, etc. (list) and (the) *bida*, etc. (list)' says: 'They think like this. Speech-sounds (just by themselves) are not uttered anywhere at all. Then what (is uttered)? Only words as wholes are recited. And the whole consists of speech-sounds. And (it is) the whole in which (the defects called) *kala*, etc. are removed, (which) is recited. This being so, the removal of (the defects called) *saṁvṛta* "closed", etc. has been established'.

The *MBD* (p. 44, lines 2–5), commenting on 'for the recitation of (the) *garga*, etc. (list) and (the) *bida*, etc. (list) there is a different purpose' says: 'What (the passage) says is this. The recitation of (the) *garga*, etc. (list) and (the) *bida*, etc. (list) has a purpose like this. Like what? (so that) correctness should be (established) by means of this sequence (of sounds), but not by another. Namely, (by the sequence) *g-a-r-g-a*.[843] What (after all) can we do?[844] (Thus, it comes to this:) so that removal should take place of (the defects called) *kala*, etc. for (the stems) put in the list. But with regard to the wordforms which are not recited (in the *garga*- and *bida*-lists) (the defects called) *kala*, etc. have not been removed'.

To sum up, the *MBD* says that

(1) the wholes mentioned in the *Bhāṣya* are the word-stems *garga*, etc. and *bida*, etc. listed in the respective *gaṇas*, and which consist of particular sequences of speech-sounds,

842. The word *samudāyānām* quoted from the *Bhāṣya*.

843. And not, presumably, in the case of sequences like *a-ś-v-a* and *g-a-r-d-a-bh-a* in *aśva* and *gardabha*, which have not been included in the *gaṇas* mentioned. For *aśva* and *gardabha* see *Bh.* No. 132

844. *Kiṁ vā kartavyam.* An expression of helplessness.

(2) from these wholes we will know the correct sequenceo speech-sounds, like *g-a-r-g-a*, etc.,

(3) from these wholes we will also know the correct pronunciation of the vowels which form part of the sequences,

(4) but we will not know the correctness of sound-sequences in word-stems, presumably like in *aśva* and *gardabha*, which have not been listed in the *garga-* and *bida-gaṇas*, nor will we know the correct pronunciation of the vowels in those word-stems.

Kaiyaṭa agrees with the *MBD* on points 1–3. But with regard to point 4 he has a different idea. He thinks that we will not know the correct pronunciation of the vowels in the derived stem *gārgya*, etc.

Nāgeśa disagrees with the *MBD* and Kaiyata on two points, namely, 1 and 4. According to him, the wholes are those consisting of a *prakṛti* and the *pratyaya* prescribed, like *gārgya*, etc. Moreover, he thinks that, although we can be certain of the correctness of the derived forms *gārgya*, etc. in respect of the sequence of the sounds and in respect of pronunciation, we are not certain of the correctness of the pronunciation of the vowels in *garga*, etc.

The following scheme will clarify the differences between the commentators regarding the meaning of the word *samudāya* in the text of the *Bhāṣya* and regarding what they consider to be other wholes :

	samudāya	*samudāyāntara*
Bhartṛhari	*garga*, etc.	*aśva*, *gardabha*, etc.
Kaiyaṭa	*garga*, etc.	*gārgya*, etc.
Nāgeśa	*gārgya*, etc.	*garga*, etc.

The position taken by Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa is not free from difficulties. In the first place, as regards Kaiyaṭa, if *garga*, etc. and *yaÑ* and the *vṛddhi* vowel necessary to derive the forms *gārgya*, etc. are free from defects, how could the resulting forms, *gārgya*, etc. not be free from defects also? In the second place, as regards Nāgeśa, if the derived forms *gārgya*, etc. are free from defects, how could the original stems *garga*, etc., which are directly stated, not be free from defects? Therefore the interpretation offered by the *MBD* appears to be forced upon us, namely, that although we can be certain of the correctness of the listed stems *garga*, etc., we cannot be certain of the correctness of stems which have not been listed, like *aśva*, etc. Patañjali will return to this point in the final *Bhāṣyas* of the *Paspaśāhnika*.

In the meantime, the explanation of the point made by *Bh.* No. 152 has disappeared from sight. The point of *Bh.* No. 152 is that it rejects *Bh.* No. 151. This latter *Bhāṣya* says that we need not set up a list of faulty vowel-pronunciations because we know the correct pronunciation of the vowels in the *Śivasūtras* from the recitation of the *garga-* and *bida*, etc. list.

This is denied by *Bh.* No. 152. The question is, exactly how? In this connection the following interpretation is proposed. A *gaṇa* like the *gargādi*-list or the *bidādi*-list may be assumed to have different purposes. It may serve to teach us the precise word-stems after which a particular suffix is to be applied, and it may serve also to teach us the correct sequence of speech-sounds in the word-stems listed. But it can never teach us the correct pronunciation of the vowels in these word-stems. The reason is that it has no means to do so. It has no phonetic notation at its disposal, and for every recitation of such a list we have to take into account the idiosyncrasies of the teacher who recites. Therefore, for the time being, a list of faulty vowel-pronunciations remains required.

153. (*Bhāṣya : Another solution, in anticipation of a Vārttika-like statement*)[845]

(If this is) so, then[846] I[847] shall state the reinstatement[848] of the speech-sound *a*, which (reinstatement) shows eighteen varieties (and) which is free from (the defects called) *kala*, etc.[849]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'which is free from....*kala*, etc.'. (Patañjali) does not say *nivṛttasaṁvṛtatvādikām* 'free from (the defects called) *saṁvṛtatva* "being closed", etc.', because the sound *a* is (itself) *saṁvṛta* 'closed'.[850] Since the sound *a* serves as an example (only),[851] the reinstatement at the end of the science (of grammar)[852] (will be) of all speech-sounds. This is what (the author) means to say.

Note (72)

The position after the rejection of the *garga*-and *bida*-list as providing the models for the correct pronunciation of the vowels in the *Śivasūtras* by Bh. No. 152, is that the pronunciation of these vowels will be affected by the defects called *kala*, etc. Therefore we have to find another way of removing

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845. Other than the one proposed in *Bh.* No. 151, which was rejected by *Bh.* No. 152. In *Bh.* No. 153 Patañjali takes out the *tu*-part of the coming *vārttika*- like statement for separate discussion. Compare fn. 799 for the *iti cet Vārttikas.*

846. For *evaṁ tarhi* see fn. 671.

847. The author of the *Vārttika*-like statement quoted after *Bh.* No. 154.

848. *Pratyāpatti.* The idea is that the vowel *a* (and the other vowels) are restored to their desired pronunciation, free from defects.

849. See *Bh.* No. 150.

850. See fn. 818. Kaiyaṭa takes his comment from the *MBD* (p. 44, line 7). In this latter passage read *akārasya saṁvṛtatvāt* for *saṁvṛtatvāt*, and put a *daṇḍa* after *saṁvṛtatvāt*.

851. Kaiyaṭa takes his comment from the *MBD* (p.44, line 6), *nidarśanaprakāreṇa* 'by way of example (only)'.

852. In the context of P.8.4.68.

these defects. The proposal of *Bh.* No. 153 is to introduce a number of reinstatement rules for this purpose, on the analogy of P. 8.4.68, at the end of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, and for all varieties of vowels. Thus the defective varieties are each of them replaced by the desired varieties, first of the vowel *a*, then of the other vowels also. In this way, the defects called *kala*, etc. will be removed, and our doubts on the point of pronunciation will be set at rest.

Kaiyaṭa has two difficulties. The first is, why does Patañjali say *nivṛttakalādikā*, and not *nivṛttasaṁvṛtatvādikā*, which more closely agrees with the first list stated in *Bh.* No. 150 ? The answer is, that *saṁvṛtatva* 'being closed' is not just a defect. The short *a* is always *saṁvṛta*. Therefore Patañjali has dropped the reference to *saṁvṛta* and starts from *kala*. The second difficulty is that, according to the way in which Patañjali has phrased the proposal, we shall be able to know the correct pronunciation of the vowel *a* only, not that of the other vowels. To remove this difficulty, Kaiyaṭa says that Patañjali mentions the vowel *a* as a sample only.

154. (*Bhāṣya : Objection*)

Then should that[853] be stated ?

Nāgeśa

(On) 'Then should that be stated' in the *Bhāṣya.* (The author) means to say that, in this way, if we have recourse to *pratyāpatti* 'reinstatement', (the result will be) *gaurava* 'complication'.[854]

A. (*Vārttika*-like statement : Rejection of an implied objection)[855]. But *pratyāpatti* 'reinstatement' is for the sake of the *liṅgas* 'markers'.[856]

155. (*Bhāṣya : Explanation*)

Then that (reinstatement) will be for the sake of the *liṅgas* 'markers'.

Nāgeśa

(On) 'But....for the sake of the *liṅgas*'. That is to say, in order to remove (the defects called) *kala*, etc. located in various verbal bases (and)

853. The reinstatement rules.

854. According to Nāgeśa, *Bh.* No. 154 really states an objection, namely, of *gaurava.* The deep sense of this will only become clear later on.

855. According to F. KIELHORN, "Notes on the Mahābhāṣhya", *The Indian Antiquary*....Edited by J. F. FLEET and R. C. TEMPLE. Vol. XV, Bombay, 1886, p.228, the *vārttika*-like statement forms a quarter-verse.

856. The word *liṅga* in the sense of 'marker', to be interpreted as *anubandha*, occurs in *Vt.* IX on *Śivasūtra* 1 (*Mbh.* I, p. 17, line 8). But the *liṅgas* mentioned in the *vārttika*-like statement are clearly not the Pāṇinian *anubandhas*, but the defects called *kala*, etc. to which a technical grammatical function has been assigned in the meantime. See Note (73).

which have taken the place of the (Pāṇinian) *anubandhas*.[857] (The author) means to say, that the purpose of the reinstatement does not merely lie in the removal of defects occasioned by the teaching of the generic form (of the vowels in the *Śivasūtras*), but that it also results in the doing away with all *anubandhas* and with the rules dealing with the designation *it*.[858] In this way there is no (danger of) complication.

Note (73)

Bh. No. 154 questions the solution proposed by *Bh.* No. 153, seemingly in a very innocent way. The proposal was to add a number of reinstatement rules in the context of P. 8.4.68, in order to remove defects in the pronunciation of vowels. The prima facie objection to proposal is clear: the addition of the reinstatement rules will make the system more complicated. But there is a much deeper sense to the proposal, which has not been explicitly stated in the text of the *Bhāṣya* so far.

It is explained by the *MBD*. The relevant passage (*MBD*, p. 44, lines 8-11) says : ' (The defects called) *kala*, etc. are accepted for the sake of (carrying out) the grammatical operations. (For instance,) I shall read (the verbal bases mentioned as) *śīṄ* and *āsA*[859] as (marked with the defects called) *kala* and *dhmāta*. I shall not read the (*anubandha-*) sounds *Ṅ* and *A*.[860] And I shall (for instance,) phrase P. 1.3.12 as *kaladhmātād ātmanepadam* (sc.) *bhavati* " after (a verbal base marked with the defects called) *kala* and *dhmāta* (the endings called) *ātmanepada* are (added)".[361] But in this (new system) it becomes impossible to accept (for instance,) this (rule), namely, *iko yaṇ aci*.[862] (And) when there are no *anubandhas*, this rule, namely, *ādir antyena sahetā*, which contains the designation *it*, is not there either.[863] This being so, (the defects called *kala*, etc.) must all of them be mentioned in as many grammatical operations as are characterized by (the presence of) *pratyāhāras*'.

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857. The passage seems to indicate that Nāgeśa either knew the relevant *MBD*–passage (for which see Note (73), or a tradition going back to that passage.

858. P.1.3.2-8.

859. *Dhātupāṭha*, 2.22 and 2.11 (which reads *āsA*) respectively. Read *āsim* for *āsam* (which by itself could be a quotation form of *ās-*), as is borne out by the following statement *ṅakāram akāraṁ nādhyeṣye* (for the misprint *nodhyeṣye*).

860. In *śiṄ* and *āsA*.

861. The text reads *kalādhmātād* which is emended by Abhyankar and Limaye to *kalād dhmātād*. The correct formulation, by Pāṇinian standards, is *kaladhmātād*, a *dvandva* with a disjunctive value, see S. D. JOSHI and S. BHATE, *The Role of the Particle ca in the interpretation of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit*, Class B, No. 8, University of Poona, Pune, 1983, p. 10.

862. P.6.1.77.

863. P.1.1.71.

Here Bhartṛhari makes clear what are the consequences of the proposal made by *Bh.* No. 153. It amounts to nothing less than a complete reworking of a part of Pāṇini's system. The defects called *kala*, etc. are no longer regarded as mere undesired pronunciations, but they have received a technical grammatical function, namely, the one previously fulfilled by the *anubandhas*. This being the case, we have to rephrase as many rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* as are phrased with the help of *anubandhas*. Bhartṛhari gives three examples. P. 1.3.12 read *anudāttaṅita ātmanepadam*. It contains the word *anudātta* and the *it*-letter *Ṅ*. Both are to be replaced by a defect in the *kalādi*-list. The result is stated. The second example is *iko yaṇ aci*. This rule contains three *pratyāhāras* for the formation of which *it*-letters are required. All of these have to be replaced by defective vowel-pronunciations. The third example is P. 1.1.71, which contains the word *itā*. In his comment on *Bh.* No. 157, Kaiyaṭa shows how the rule is to be rephrased.

The acceptance of the faulty vowel-pronunciations which achieves the purpose of *anubandhas* is assumed by the *vārttika*-like statement. It says that the reinstatement is for the sake of these new *liṅgas*. That is to say, these pronunciations must be restored to the desired pronunciations after they have fulfilled their function.

156. *(Bhāṣya : Objection)*

Then should that[864] be stated ?

157. *(Bhāṣya : Answer)*

Even though this were stated, still, on the other hand,[865] one need not utter several hundreds of *anubandhas*, one need not state the designation *it*,[866] and one need not state *lopa* ' elision '.[867] What s done (now) by means of *anubandhas*, that will be done (then) by means of (the defects called) *kala*, etc.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' What. . . .by means of *anubandhas* ' (etc.). Just as the status of (being marked with) *svarita* is for the sake of (indicating) an *adhikāra* ' section-heading ',[868] in the same way, having accepted (the defects called) *kala*, etc. for the sake of (indicating) *ātmanepada* (endings), (a rule) like *kalād ātmanepadam* ' after (a verbal base marked with the defect called) *kala* (the endings called) *ātmanepada* (are added) ', etc. will be phrased, but not

864. All of the changes required by substituting faulty vowel--pronunciations for the *anubandhas*, and all of the reinstatement rules.

865. Nāgeśa explains the expression *athavaitarhi* as a whole as *tathāpi* ' still '.

866. Thus the sequence of rules P.1.3.2–8 becomes redudant.

867. Reference is to P.1.3.9.

868. Reference is to P.1.3.11.

(the rule) *anudāttaṅita* (*ātmanepadam*), etc.[869] (Objection) But if there are no *anubandhas*, how can designations like *aN*, etc. be justified ? (Answer) Having stated (the rule) *ādiḥ kalaiḥ saha* ' a beginning (sound) together with (what is marked by the defects called) *kala*, etc. (stands for itself and the intervening sounds in the *Śivasūtras*) ',[870] designations like *a-u* will be formed, and vowel-sandhi will not be applied in order to avoid ambiguity. In that way, (there will be) no difficulty.

Note (74)

The point of *Bh.* No. 157 is that far from resulting in *gaurava* (a greater) complication ', the replacement of the *anubandhas* by the defects *kala*, etc. and the addition of the reinstatement rules will result in *lāghava* ' (a greater) simplicity '. The reason is that we can do away with the whole technical subsystem of *anubandhas*.

Kaiyaṭa makes an interesting contribution. After the replacement of the *it*-letters, the question is, how do we form *pratyāhāras* ? To show this, Kaiyaṭa rephrases the basic rule P. 1.1.72, and adds the provision that in these new *pratyāhāras* (like *a-u*) sandhi is not allowed.

Nāgeśa adds examples of verbal bases provided with the new *liṅgas* and of the necessary rephrasing of the rules concerned. He concludes his comment by saying that these faulty vowel-pronunciations are accepted only in the *prakriyā*-stage. In usage the fully derived word is free from these defects thanks to the reinstatement rules at the end of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. The purpose of Nāgeśa's statement *ādiḥ kalaiḥ saha iti pāṭhaḥ* which apparently echoes Kaiyaṭa's earlier statement, is not clear.

158. (*Bhāṣya : Final answer*)

In this way, it works. But it becomes un-pāṇinian. (Therefore) let it remain according to (the original) formulation.

Nāgeśa

(On) ' un-pāṇinian ' in the *Bhāṣya*. If the whole of grammar is changed in a complicated way which requires (a lot of) explanation, in order to remove a single defect (discovered) by someone whose effort is directed at justifying the enumeration of the speech-sounds,[871] (then) the undesired consequence is (that) the maxim *vṛścikabhiyā* etc. (would become applicable).[872]

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869. P.1.3.12. Kaiyaṭa borrows his comment from the *MBD*, see Note (72).

870. Reference is to P.1.1.71

871. *Varṇasamāmnāya*. That is, the *Śivasūtras*.

872. The complete maxim reads *vṛścikabhiyā palāyamāna āśiviṣamukhe nipatitaḥ* ' fallen in the mouth of a poisonous snake when fleeing out of fear of a scorpion '. See Colonel G. A. JACOB, *Laukikanyāyāñjaliḥ. Dvitīyo bhāgaḥ*. A Second Handful of Popular Maxims current in Sanskrit Literature. *NSP*, Bombay, 1902, p. 42.

Note (75)

The *Bhāṣyakāra* admits that, as far as the pronunciation of the vowels in the *Śivasūtras* is concerned, the idea of accepting the *kalādi*-defects in the role of *anubandhas* and of the reinstatement rules may be an improvement of Pāṇini's grammar, or, at least, part of it. But it goes against Pāṇini's method, and it would result in the rephrasing of many of Pāṇini's rules. This the *Bhāṣyakāra* is not willing to accept. Therefore he finally concludes that we better drop the idea of the *kalādi*-defects as new *liṅgas*, and that of *pratyāpatti* on a big scale, and be satisfied with the way in which Pāṇini has phrased the rules concerned.

Nāgeśa points out that, apart from going against Pāṇini's method, the new proposals would result in a great deal of complication which, in view of the relatively small gain, is not really worth while.

159. (*Bhāṣya : Reminder of an earlier objection*)

But hasn't it been stated : ' If (it is argued) that we can manage by teaching (the speech-sounds) in their generic form, (then) a prohibition (should be stated) of (the defects called) *kala*, etc. ' ?[873]

160 (*Bhāṣya : Answer*)

That (difficulty) has been rejected (by saying :) ' (the defects called) *saṁvṛta*, etc. will be removed by the recitation of the *garga*, etc. (list) and the *bida*, etc. (list).[874]

161. (*Bhāṣya : Reminder of an earlier objection*)

But hasn't it been stated : ' (But) for the recitation of the *garga*, etc. (list) and the *bida*, etc. (list) there is a different purpose. Which ? So that the correctness of the wholes can be (establised) '?[875]

162 (*Bhāṣya : Answer*)

(If this is) so, then[876] by this (recitation) the two (aims) are served, (namely,) both the recitation itself is made specific,[877] and (the defects called) *kala*, etc. are removed.[878] But how can two things be obtained by one single stroke ? He[879] says, they can be

873. *Vt*. XXII.

874. *Bh*. No. 151.

875. *Bh*. No. 152.

876. For *evaṁ tarhi* see fn. 761.

877. In the sense that the sounds of the words recited come in a fixed order, like *g-a-r-g-a*.

878. Because the recitation sets the standard for pronunciation.

879. An unidentified grammarian.

obtained. How? (Because) there are also *hetus* 'causes' which work in two ways. Take an example, *āmrāś ca siktāḥ pitaraś ca prīṇitāḥ* 'the mango-trees are watered and the ancestors are gratified'.[880] In the same way, there are also expressions which convey two meanings.[881] (For instance,) *śveto dhāvati*

(1) 'the white one runs', and

(2) 'the dog runs from here',[882]

(and) *alambusānāṁ yātā*

(1) 'he will go (to the country) of the Alambusas', and

(2) 'he is able to obtain / reach the waters'.[883]

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'the two' (etc.). We understand that the sounds *a* etc. are to be pronounced everywhere as having exactly the same quality which they have in (the recitation of) the *garga*, etc. (list). This is the meaning (of the passage).

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880. The causes meant here are particular actions, like watering, which turn out to have two effects. For *āmrāś ca siktāḥ*, etc. see Colonel G. A. JACOB, *Laukikanyāyāñjaliḥ Tṛtīyo bhāgaḥ, NSP*, Bombay, 1904, Superaddenda, p. 129, s.v. *āmrasekapitṛtarpaṇanyāya.* The maxim occurs again in the *Mbh.* III, p. 388, line 9.

881. Nāgeśa explains the word *dviṣṭha* as *dvayor arthayoḥ tiṣṭhanti* 'they stand for two things'.

882. In order to have meaning (2) we have to break up the phonic sequence as *śvā + ito + dhāvati.* The *MBD* (p. 45, line 15) states the explanation, and so does Nāgeśa. Kaiyaṭa is silent. Compare fn. 782.

883. Another example of *sabhaṅgaśleṣa.* But this time the difficulty is to divide up the phonic sequence in order to have an acceptable second meaning. The *MBD* and Kaiyaṭa are silent. Nāgeśa proposes *alam + busānām + yātā.* Here *alam* stands for *samartha* 'able to', *busa* for *palālavarṇa* 'one having the colour of straw' and *yātā* for *prāptimān* 'possessing the action of obtaining/reaching'. It is not clear how Nāgeśa can explain *busa* in the sense of 'one having a *busa*-like colour'. From the rendering of *yātā* as *prāptimān* it is clear that Nāgeśa takes *yātā* as a *tṛjanta* word, not as a verbform *(luṬ)*. The genitive construction of *busānām* and *yātṛ* is allowed by P.2.3.65. *Alam* + a *tṛjanta* derivative in the sense of *samartha* + inf. is not attested, but it is the only way of interpretation which makes sense. Thus Nāgeśa's solution amounts to this : 'he is able to go to the ones who have the colour of straw'. Probably the solution is not to be taken very seriously.

The word *alambusa* is used in the *Mahābhārata* (BORI ed.), 7.84.29 cd, in the sense of the name of a demon and that of a fruit. Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 94, lists the word as *alambuṣa*, and mentions *alambuṣā* as the name of an aspsaras.

Yāska, in his *Nirukta*, 5.19 (ed. L. SARUP. Second Reprint, Delhi, 1967, text, p.104, line 6), explains the word *busa* in a Ṛgveda stanza as a synonym of *udaka* 'water'. This is the explanation adopted in the translation of the *Bhāṣya.* One may think of the well-digger mentioned in *Bh.* No. 118.

Nāgeśa, in his commentary, mentions a variant reading for *yātā*, namely, *pātā* 'protector / drinker'.

(On) ' which work in two ways '. (*Dvigatāḥ* is to be explained in the sense of) *dvau arthau* (that is,) *prayojanadvayam* ' two purposes ' (*tasya)* *sampādakāḥ* ' ones who bring (that) about '. This is the meaning (of the passage).

(On) In the same way. . . .also expressions ' (etc.). Just like a thing, a word (form) also may work in two ways.[884] This is the meaning (of the passage).

Note (76)

Bh. No. 151 says that the defects *kala*, etc. will be removed by the recitation of the *garga-* and *bida*-lists, which provides us with the correct pronunciation of vowels. *Bh.* No. 153 says no, because these lists have a different purpose, namely, to establish the correctness of the wholes. It is assumed that by ' the wholes ' the *Bhāṣya* means the sound-sequences of the words listed in the two *gaṇas*. *Bh.* No. 162 says, why not accept that the recitation of the *garga-* and the *bida*-lists has two purposes ? It removes the *kalādi*-defects and it fixes the sound-sequence for every word listed. In the phrase *pāthaś caiva viśeṣyate*. . . . " the recitation itself is made specific " in *Bh.* No. 162 we have an additional proof for the assumption that by ' the wholes ' in *Bh.* No. 153 the words in the *garga-* and *bida*-lists are meant in their particular sound-sequences, and not something outside these lists.

The *MBD* (p. 45, line 11–p. 46, line 4), commenting on ' in the same way, there are also expressions which convey two meanings ', says: (supply) *dṛśyante* " they are seen ". (The author) tells (us) this. This[885] is not just a feature of meaning only. Then (of) what (else) ? It is a feature of the wordform also. Here (in language) every single wordform brims with (denotative) powers.[886] (In communication) just a mere *avaccheda* ' delimitation ' of the (denotative) powers takes place.[887] Like one and the same word *purā* and (one and the same word) *ārāt* means *purā* " formerly " (and) expresses (the sense of) *saha* " together with ",[888] and expresses (the sense

884. Kaiyaṭa refers to homophonic sequences which may be regarded as two, according to the two meanings which are conveyed by them, as is the case in *śleṣa*.

885. The fact of serving two purposes.

886. *Śakti*, a central concept in Bhartṛhari's linguistic mysticism. In connection with words, *śakti* is the capability which words possess to enter into syntactic construction wtih other words. For instance, the word *ghaṭa* ' pot ' may have a *karmaśakti* ' capability to function as the (grammatical) object ' or a *karaṇaśakti* ' capability to function as the (grammatical) means ', depending on constructions like *ghaṭam ānaya* ' bring the pot ' or *ghaṭena jalam ānaya* 'bring water with the help of a pot', in which the *śaktis* concerned are revealed or manifested. See further K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER, *Bhartṛhari*, Poona (Deccan College), 1969, p. 108–110, 210–11, 283–85, 298–99, for the general philosophy of *śakti*, and p. 298–325 for the grammatical elaboration.

887. In sentences, which are the units of communication, the meanings conveyed by the words become mutually delimited or specified. Compare *VP* 3.14.11 (ed. W. RAU).

888. This is the meaning conveyed by the instrumental ending in *purā* taken as a noun, in the sense of ' with the city '. Compare *VP* 2.2.68 (ed. W. RAU).

of) "near" and "far" (respectively). In the same way, the wordform *śvetaḥ* brims with (denotative) powers. (In communication) just a mere *avaccheda* "delimitation" of the (denotative) powers of that (wordform) takes place. (For instance, we say) *śveto gauḥ* "the white bull".[889] (Or) a speaker uses (*śvetaḥ* in the sense of) *śvā itaḥ* "the dog (runs) from here".[890] The hearers understand the meaning on the basis of *avaccheda* "delimitation" according to their capabilities.[891] According to a different meaning,[892] these two words[893] are uttered. Like a lamp functioning through *tantra* "multi-purposiveness"[894] produces[895] an object according to what is intended by those who are in need (of something, in the dark). Or (like a lamp),

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889. Here the meaning 'the white one' conveyed by *svetaḥ* is delimited by the meaning 'bull' conveyed by *gauḥ*.

890. The text reads *śvā saṁ ita iti*. It is not clear what *saṁ* stands for. It may be an abbreviation indicating combination, more or less like 'plus'.

891. Not everybody may understand the *śleṣa* in the phonic sequence *śvetaḥ*.

892. That is, in order to convey a different meaning.

893. *Śvā* and *itaḥ*. The phonic sequence *śvetaḥ* is discussed by Bhartṛhari in the *VP* 2.96–97, 104, 106, 108 (resemblance with *ekaśeṣa*)–109.

894. *Tantra* is a concept originating from Mīmāṁsā. Śabara (on *Jaimini-mīmāṁsāsūtra* 11.1.1) explains it as *vat sakṛtkṛtam bahūnāṁ upkaroti tat tantram ity ucyate* , what, perofrmed (just) once, becomes helpful for many (things or purposes) is called *tantra*' (reference in *The Mīmāṁsā Nyāya Prakāśa*....Translated into English....by F. Edgerton. New Haven : Yale University Press, 1929. Glossarial Index of Sanskrit Words, s.v. *tantrasambandha*. MM. Bh. Jhalakikar, *Nyāyakośa*. Revised and re-edited by MM. V. S. Abhyankar, Poona (B.O.R.I.), 1928, s.v. *tantram*, sub 4, says : *sakṛduccāritasyaikasya śabdasya śaktyā anekārthapratipādakatvaṁ tantram iti śābdikā vadanti* 'the grammarians say that *tantra* means the bringing about of several meanings through the (denotative) power of a single word, uttered (just) once'. A traditional definition says : *nānāphala-kasamānakārakānekavyāpārāṇāṁ madhye anekaphaloddeśenaikavyāpārakaraṇaṁ tantram* 'the performance (*karaṇa*) of a single action with a view to (obtaining) many results, instead of several actions having many results (and) having the same form, (is called) *tantra*'.

Compare MM. G. Jha, *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā in its Sources*. Banares Hindu University, 1942, p. 349; P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. V, Part II. *Government Oriental Series*, Class B, No. 6, Poona (B.O.R.I.), 1962, p. 1331,'....cases where one act serves the purpose of several other acts or rites', and ibid,. p. 1331–32, 'If the fruit or result (*phala*) follows from all the component sacrifices collectively, then the subsidiary details have to be performed only once, and not separately in the case of each component; this is *tantra*'; and K. A. Subramania Iyer, *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari. Kāṇḍa* II, English Translation with Exegetical Notes, Delhi, 1977, p. 36 (commentary on stanza 77).

In the *VP* Bhartṛhari makes use of the concept of *tantra* on several occasions, for instance, *VP* 2.108–111 (ed. W. Rau = ed. K. V. Abyhyankar–V. P. Limaye) and *VP* 2.474–475 (ed. W. Rau = 2.471 – 472 ed. K. V. Abhyankar–V. P. Limaye).

895. That is, produces the perception of something, or reveals something. Compare *Mbh.* I, p. 411, lines 11–12, *samandhakāre dravyāṇāṁ samavasthitānāṁ pradīpani-mittaṁ darśanaṁ na ca teṣāṁ pradīpo nirvartako bhavati* 'in the dark we see things which (already) have a fixed form, due to a lamp, but the lamp does not produce these (things)'

through multi-purposiveness, produces knowledge, etc.[896] for each and every (student) who is desirous to see[897] (his textbooks in the dark), as if (it were) for one (student) only.[898] In the same way, in the case of wordforms, (one produces)[899] such a (phonational) act in which the energy[900] of the articulating organs is put to work, that[901] through multi-purposiveness two words, as it were,[902] are uttered. And in ordinary speech, as regards the use of words, there are two ways,[903] (namely,) either *krama* "(repetition in) succession", or *yaugapadya* "simultaneity (by an utterance just once)".[904] Sometimes one uses words which are repeated in succession. How is that (repetition in) succession? (For instance,) *akṣo bhajyatām* 'let the axle be broken", *akṣo bhakṣyatām* "let the seed be eaten", *akṣo dīvyatām* 'let the die be played".[905] (But) sometimes, having compressed the (repetition in) succession, one speaks by way of simultaneity. (For instance,) *akṣā bhajyantām bhakṣyantām dīvyantām* "let the *akṣas* be broken, eaten (and) played".[906] (As it has been stated:) *dvāv apy*[907] *upāyau śabdānām prayoge samavasthitau/ kramo vā yaugadadyaṁ vā yau loko nāttvartate* "as regards the use of words two ways have been established, (namely,) either *krama* "(repetition in)

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896. *Vidyādikāḥ*, pl. acc. fem. Another possibility is to read *vidyotikā* 'light', sg. nom. fem., for *vidyādikāḥ*, in order to have an expressly mentioned agent of *nirvartayati*. In that case, the emendation *ekasyaiva* (for *ekasyeva*) could be retained. But the word *vidyotikā* is not attested in the dictionaries.

897. *Didṛkṣor didṛkṣoś ca*. The sense of *vīpsā* by P.8 1.4.

898. Read *ekasyeva* (with the original text) for *ekasyaiva* (emendation by Abhyankar-Limaye). For the function of the lamp here compare the example given by Puṇyarāja, *śālāyām ekaṁ pradīpaṁ vyākaraṇādhyāyinaḥ prayojayanti* ' in the *(pāṭha-) śālā*. the students of grammar make use of a single lamp' (quoted by K. V. ABHYANKAR-V. P. LIMAYE, *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari*, Poona, 1965. Appendix V, p. 384, s.v. *tantra*.

899. The word *nirvartayati* is supplied.

900. *Parispandana*.

901. Construe : *tādṛśīm....yathā*.

902. Read *iva* for *eva*. The point is precisely that one single word is uttered, which, through *tantra*, becomes multiplied.

903. *Upāya*.

904. Here Bhartṛhari has referred to and partly quoted the *Vākyapadīya*-stanza which he is going to mention at the end of his comment. Thus it is clear that the *MBD* must have been written after the composition of the *Vākyapadīya*.

905. Here three homophonous words *akṣa* in the sg., each conveying a different meaning, are to be connected with the three verbs. Reference is to the discussion in the *VP* 2.464–480 (ed. W. RAU = 2.461–477, ed. K. V. ABHYANKAR-P. V. LIMAYE). More, especially reference is to *VP*. 2.473 (ed. W. RAU = 2.470, ed. K. V. ABHYANKAR-V. P. LIMAYE), which begins with the words *dviṣṭhāni yāni vākyāni*, quoting the *Mbh*. (vol. I, p. 14, line 14....*vākyāny api dviṣṭhāni*).

906. Here the single word *akṣāḥ*, used in the plural, taken as a whole which has three distinct denotative powers, is to be connected with the three verbs accordingly. Reference is to *VP* 2.472 (ed. W. RAU = 2.469, ed. K. V. ABHYANKAR-V. P. LIMAYE).

907. Read *apy* (with W. RAU) for *abhy* in the Abhyankar-Limaye ed. of the *Vākyapadīya*.

succession ", or *yaugapadya* " simultaneity (by an utterance just once) ", beyond which ordinary speech does not go ".[908] Therefore, here also, the recitation of the *garga*-list and the *bida*-list, through *tantra* " multi-purposiveness " establishes the wholes (of the stems listed) and their parts '.[909]

163. (*Bhāṣya : Alternative answer to the objection raised by Vt. XXII*)

Or rather, to begin with, this (opponent) should be questioned as follows. Where could these (defects called) *saṁvṛta* ' closed ', etc. be heard? (Perhaps) in the *āgamas* ' augments ' ?[910] (No, because) the augments are recited in their pure form. (Perhaps) in the *vikāras* ' modifications ' ?[911] (No, because) the modifications are recited in their pure form. (Perhaps) in the *pratyayas* ' suffixes ' ?[912] (No, because) the suffixes are recited in their pure form. (Perhaps) in the *dhātus* ' verbal bases ' ?[913] (No, because) the verbal bases also are recited in their pure form. (Perhaps) then in the *prātipadikas* ' nominal stems ' ?[914] (No, because) the nominal stems also are recited in their pure form. (Perhaps) then (in those nominal stems) which have not been mentioned as nominal stems ?[915] (No, because) these also should be taught for the sake

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908. *VP* 2.467 (ed. W. RAU = 2.464, ed. K. V. ABHYANKAR–V. P. LIMAYE).

909. Thus, by assuming multi-purposiveness for the recitation of the lists, we can establish both the correctness of the wholes, i.e., the sound-sequences of the stems listed, and the correctness of their parts, i.e., the correct pronunciation of the speech-sounds.

910. An *āgama* is a word-element which has no lexical or grammatical meaning of its own, but which is added to a stem or suffix in the course of the *prakriyā* in order to arrive at the desired wordform. The term *āgama* is not used by Pāṇini, but it is in the *Prātiśākhyas*, e.g. the *Taittirīya-Prātiśākhya* 1.23 (together with *vikāra*).

911. A *vikāra* is a modification of the stem caused by a grammatical operation like *guṇa, vṛddhi, lopa*, etc. The *KV* on P.4.3.134 defines *vikāra* in an ambiguous way, which may refer to *prakṛti* in the sense of ' original material ' or to *prakṛti* in the sense of ' (grammatical) stem '. The term *vikāra* is not used by Pāṇini as a technical term.

912. A *pratyaya* is a word-element which conveys a grammatical, categorical meaning, and which is, as such, opposed to the *prakṛti* ' stem ' which takes care of the lexical identity of a word. Pāṇini defines *pratyaya* by enumeration (P. 3.1.1–5.4.151).

913. What is understood by *dhātu* is defined by Pāṇini in P.1.3.1, *bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ*. What is meant by *bhūvādi* is made clear in the *Dhātupāṭha*.

914. What is understood by *prātipadika* is defined by Pāṇini in P.1.2.45–46.

915. That is, not mentioned as *prātipadika* in the *sūtras* and *gaṇas* of Pāṇini's system, as bases for grammatical operations. Here Patañjali refers to what he calls *avyutpannāni prātipadikāni* ' underived nominal stems ', that is, underived in the Pāṇinian system, whether analysable or not. Compare *Mbh.* I, p. 159, line 22, *uṇādayo* ' *vyutpannāni prātipādikāni* ' (the words derived with the help of) the *uṇādi* (-suffixes) are (regarded as) underived nominal stems '.

Yāska, in a wellknown passage (*Nirukta* 1.12), mentions a controversy between Śākaṭāyana and the *nairuktas* ' etymologists ' on the one hand, and Gārgya and the *vaiyākaraṇas* on the other. According to Śākaṭāyana, all nouns are derivable from verbal bases. This is denied by Gārgya. Both Śākaṭāyana and Gārgya are pre-pāṇinian grammarians

of accent, (the correct pronunciation of) the speech-sounds and the sequence (of the speech-sounds). (For instance, we recite), *śaśa* 'hare', so that we should not have *ṣaṣa*. (Or, we recite) *palāśa* 'the tree Butea Frondosa', so that we should not have *palāsa*.[916] (Or, we recite) *mañcaka* 'cot', so that we should not have *mañjaka*.[917] (As it has been stated:) *āgamāś ca vikārāś ca pratyayāḥ saha dhātubhiḥ / uccāryante tatas teṣu neme prāptāḥ kalādayaḥ* 'the augments and the modifications and the suffixes together with the verbal bases are enunciated. Therefore these (defects called) *kala*, etc. have no chance to occur in them'.[918]

(HERE ENDS THE FIRST *ĀHNIKA* IN THE *VYAKARANA MAHĀBHAṢYA* COMPOSED BY THE REVERED MASTER PATAÑJALI)

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'Or rather' (etc.). Since mere speech-sounds are not used in daily communication and since the verbal bases, etc. are recited in their pure form with the speech-sounds located in them, there can be no (question of) defects.

(On) 'then (in those nominal stems) which' (etc.). (Like) *ḍittha*, etc.[919]

(On) 'these also' (etc.). In this (grammar of Pāṇini) the collection of all (*prātipadikas*) has (already) been established, because (the *prātipadikas* derived with the help of) the *uṇādi* (-suffixes)[920] and (the *prātipadikas*

Compare *Mbh.* II, p. 138, line 14, *nāma ca dhātujam āha nirukte* 'and nouns are derived from verbal bases, (so the etymologist) says in the *Nirkta*'; and line 16, *vyākaraṇe śakaṭasya ca tokam* 'and (so says also) the descendant of Śakaṭa in grammar'.

In other wellknown passage (*Nirukta* 2.1), Yāska states the view of the *nairuktas* as follows: *avidyamāne sāmānye 'py akṣaravarṇasāmānyān nirbrūyāt. Na tv eva na nirbrūyāt* 'even when (words to be analysed) do not share ((a meaningful element which can form the basis for *vṛtti* "(grammatical) derivational procedure", still,)) one should state an etymology on the basis of a shared syllable or (even a single) speech-sound. But one should never give up etymologizing'.

916. Probably Patañjali here refers to instances of incidental mispronunciation of Sanskrit speech-sounds. In any case, there is nothing to suggest Prakrit influences, see R. PISCHEL, *A Grammar of the Prakrit Language*, translated from the German by S. JHA, Delhi, 1981, paras 262–265.

917. Another instance of incidental mispronunciation.

918. Here Patañjali probably quotes his source for the *kalādi*-discussion. The source is not identifiable. The *kārikā* is in the *śloka* metre. It mentions in a summary way the various possibilities put before the opponent in the present *Bhāṣya*.

919. The example is taken from the *MBD* (p. 46, line 7).

920. A collection of suffixes referred to in P.3.3.1 and P.3.4.75. These suffixes convey various grammatical meanings (*kārakas*, with the exception of *saṃpradāna* and

included in) the *pṛṣodara*, etc. (list)[921] are accepted as correct on account of (their forming part of) the usage of the *śiṣṭas* ' learned (brahmins) '.[922]

Note (77)

The *MBD* (p. 46, lines 6–17), commenting on ' then (in these nominal stems) which ' (etc.) says : For instance, (the forms) *ḍittha*, etc. These (*prātipadikas*) also must necessarily be taught, so that (we come to know) the accent, the speech-sounds and the sequence (of the speech-sounds).

Or, alternatively, the *garga*- and *bida*-lists must be taught, so that (we come to know the accent, the speech-sounds and the sequence (of the speech-sounds of these stems). A statement has been handed down which reads like this : *iha yad eṣām uccāraṇaṁ tat pratyayavidhyartham* " the recitation of these (*prātipadikas*) in this (grammar) is for the sake of the prescription of suffixes ".[923]

Or, alternatively, by him[924] who says so,[925] (what he means is this,) that all those (other stems, like *gārgya*, etc. and *baida*, etc.) are derived as dependent on these (stems *garga*, etc. and *bida*, etc.).[926]

(Objection) But then, what happens to those words which are not derived (in Pāṇini's system) ? The answer is (as follows). (Someone)[927] informs (us) of the following meaning : these (stems) *garga*, etc., which have been recited,[928] are not generated by Pāṇini.[929] Then what ? They are handed down (to us) in the form in which they are. (Now,) just as these (stems) are handed down in the form in which they are, in the same way other words also have been transmitted (to us) in a general way, namely, (as coming under) P. 3.3.1.[930] (That is,) in accordance with this (state-

apādāna), and serve to have an *ad hoc* analysis of a wordform which is otherwise underivable. The procedure of this type of analysis is described by Patañjali (*Mbh.* II, p. 138, line 20) as follows : *Prakṛtim dṛṣṭvā pratyaya ūhitavyaḥ pratyayaṁ ca dṛṣṭvā prakṛtir ūhitavyā* ' having seen (i.e., identified) a stem, one should make a guess at the suffix, and having seen a suffix, one should make a guess at the stem '. For the relation of the *uṇādi*-suffix to Pāṇini's system see G. CARDONA,, *Pāṇini : A Survey of Research*. The Hague–Paris, 1976, p. 170–73.

921. Read (with the *chāyā*) *pṛṣodarādīnāṁ ca* for *pṛṣodarāditvac ca*.

922. For the *śiṣṭas* see fn. 551.

923. Unidentified statement. It briefly states the purpose of collecting *prātipadikas* in *gaṇas*.

924. Patañjali.

925. Namely, *agrahaṇāni prātipadikāni, eteṣām api....upadeśaḥ kartavyaḥ*.

926. And so there is no need to list stems like *gārgya*, etc. and *baida*, etc., although they are non-mentioned *prātipadikas*.

927. Bhartṛhari himself.

928. In the respective *gaṇas*.

929. With the help of a stem-suffix analysis.

930. The rule says that the *uṇādi*-suffixes are applied in various grammatical meanings. See fns. 915 and 920.

ment) *pratyayataḥ prakṛteś ca tad ūhyam* " (when a specific word-meaning does not arise,)[931] that has to be guessed on the basis of an *(ad hoc)* suffix and an *(ad hoc)* stem ".[932] (That is to say,) having observed the usage of the *śiṣṭas* ' learned (brahmins) ', one should make a guess at a stem and a suffix. And one has to understand necessarily like this. To explain, even, when the *udātta,* etc. are taught, (and) even when (the defects called) *kala* etc. are removed,[933] (still, we will not be able to know that the) correct (form) is *ḍittha,* not *ḍuttha.* (In order to know that,) we have to depend on that very knowledge of the *śiṣṭas.* Therefore, without (having recourse to) the usage of the *śiṣṭas,* this is not (possible), namely, that we can establish the removal of (the defects called) *kala,* etc. in the case of all *(prātipadikas)* '.

What Patañjali has in mind, when he says that the *agrahaṇa* ' non-mentioned ' *prātipadikas* should form part of the *upadeśa (upadeśaḥ kartavyaḥ)* also, depends on what he meant by *upadeśa.* In the *Mbh.* this term is often used in contrast with *uddeśa.* For instance, *Mbh.* II, p. 233, line 1, says : *evaṁ tarhy upadeśa ity ucyate, uddeśaś ca prātipadikānāṁ nopadeśaḥ* ' (if this is) so, then (we take into account that) it is said *upadeśe* " (the rule applies to forms) in the *upadeśa* " and for *prātipadikas* (we assume) *uddeśa,* but not *upadeśa* '. The terms *uddeśa* and *upadeśa* refer to different ways in which words are mentioned or taught in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī. Uddeśa* is said of words taken as analysable and derivable units by means of the rules of grammar. Such words are not mentioned in their own, full form in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī. Upadeśa* is said of word-elements which are not further analysable in Pāṇini's system, and which serve as the starting-points of derivation. They may, therefore, be called Pāṇini's linguistic primitives. They are mentioned as such in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī.* In addition, *upadeśa* is said of elements of a technical nature which are required to bring the derivation to its desired end (see *BDA,* Introduction, p. i–ii). To put differently, *uddeśa* refers to the full, derived forms which together form the output of the derivational machine, whereas *upadeśa* refers to the elements, linguistic and otherwise, which together form the input of the machine. Thus *prātipadikas* like *garga,* etc. and *bida,* etc., which are primitives as far as word-derivation is concerned, belong to the *upadeśa.* On the other hand, *prātipadikas* like *gārgya,* etc. and *baida,* etc., which are the outcome of the application of rules, belong to the *uddeśa.* Now, when Patañjali in the passage just quoted says that for *prātipadikas* we assume *uddeśa,* not *upadeśa,* he only states half of the truth. Obviously, the *prātipadikas* he has in mind here are forms like *gārgya* and *baida,* etc., or *kṛdanta* stems. But in our present *Bhāṣya* No. 163 he states the other half,

931. Namely, on the basis of a stem-suffix analysis with the help of elements liste or mentioned in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī.*

932. The last part of a *Ślokavārttika* quoted by Patañjali in his *Bhāṣya* on P.3.3.1 *Mbh.* II, p. 138, line 19).

933. By way of *pratyāpatti* ' reinstatement (of the desired pronunciation) '.

but with a difference still. Because what he has in mind here is not *prāti-padikas* like *garga*, etc. and *bida*, etc., which are mentioned in the *gaṇas* of grammar, but *prātipadikas* like *ḍittha*, which are neither mentioned nor derived in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. What he proposes is that, in order to make grammar complete, these latter forms should be listed also as primitives of the system, like *garga*, etc.

The first question before Bhartṛhari was, to what does Patañjali precisely refer by saying *agrahaṇāni* ' non-mentioned ' ? Here Bhartṛhari offers an alternative. *Agrahaṇa* may refer to nominal stems like *ḍittha*, which, in fact are both non-mentioned and non-derived in Pāṇini's system. Or, alternatively, *agrahaṇa* refers to stems like *garga*, etc. and *bida*, etc. It is true that these stems already form part of the *upadeśa* in their respective *gaṇas*, but that was to enable us to derive stems like *gārgya*, etc. and *baida*, etc. But since lists can have one purpose only, a separate *upadeśa* is required for *garga*, etc. and *bida*, etc. as presenting models of the correct pronunciation of vowels, etc. (compare the argument in *Bh.* Nos. 160–161). Then Bhartṛhari introduces a sub-alternative to the previous alternative position : we will assume that lists may have more than one purpose also. Thus, the *garga*- and *bida*-lists may be taken to provide the starting-points for word-derivation, but, in addition, they may also be taken to provide the models of pronunciation, etc. The consequence of this is, that a separate *upadeśa* of the *garga*- and *bida*-lists for the sake of pronunciation is not required. That leaves us at the first position, the *upadeśa* of the *ḍittha* type stems for the sake of their correct pronunciation, etc.

This is where Bhartṛhari's second problem comes : what could be the place of the *upadeśa* of *ḍittha*, etc. in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* ?

Bhartṛhari solves the difficulty in the following way. Firstly, stems like *ḍittha* can be accommodated in grammar by bringing them under the control of P. 3.3.1, which will take care of them in a general way. In the second place, the question, which are these *ḍittha* type stems, and the question of their correct pronunciation, etc. can be answered by a reference to the *śiṣṭas*. We must accept that not just any stem which is not derivable in the Pāṇinian system will be brought under the control of P. 3.3.1, but only those which can be traced to the *śiṣṭaprayoga* ' usage of the *śiṣṭas* '. In this way, a restriction is imposed. Moreover, for the correct pronunciation of these stems we have to rely on the *śiṣṭas*. Thus, the phonetic burden has also been dshifted to the *śiṣṭaprayoga*. The result is that a separate *upadeśa* of the stems *ḍittha*, etc. as proposed by Patañjali, is not required.

Thus, clearly, Bhartṛhari disagrees with Patañjali. As regards the position taken by Bhartṛhari, three points may be noted. In the first place, he seems to adopt the view attributed to Śākaṭāyana in the *Nirukta*, namely, that all nominal stems are derivable in some way or other. Secondly, he

accepts a definite role for the *uṇādi*-suffixes within the framework of Pāṇini's rules. Thirdly, he does away with Patañjali's proposed inventory as falling outside the scope of grammar.

Kaiyaṭa agrees with Bhartṛhari. The only point he makes is that, apart from invoking the *uṇādi*-suffixes, we may appeal to P. 6.3.109 also, for listing underived stems. In any case, Patañjali's idea is rejected.

INDEX OF SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH TERMS

Index of Sanskrit Terms

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